PACIFIC
Theological Seminary

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2025

https://archive.org/details/expositor-1875_1914_8

THE EXPOSITOR

EDITED BY THE REV.

SIR W. ROBERTSON NICOLL, M.A., LL.D.

EIGHTH SERIES

Volume VIII

1914

HODDER AND STOUGHTON
WARWICK SQUARE, LONDON, E.C

MCMXIV

ser. 8
Y.8
1914:2

Butler & Tanner
The Selwood Printing Works
Frome and London

140

THE EXPOSITOR

VOL. VIII.

List of Contributors to Volume VIII

Rev. W. D. Allen, M.A.
Rev. Professor H. T. Andrews, D.D.
Rev. Professor B. W. Bacon, D.D.
Rev. Gerard Ball, B.A.
Rev. Arthur Carr, M.A.
Rev. A. A. Dauncey, M.A.
Rev. J. T. Dean, M.A.
Right Rev. J. W. Diggle, Bishop of Carlisle, D.D.
Rev. Professor B. D. Eerdmans, D.D.
Rev. Principal A. E. Garvie, M.A., D.D.
Rev. Professor C. Van Gelderen, Ph.D.
Professor Rendel Harris, Litt.D.
Rev. Professor A. Van Hoonacker, D.D.
Rev. John A. Hutton, M.A.
Rev. Maurice Jones, D.D.
Rev. Professor Ed. König, D.D.
Rev. Professor H. R. Mackintosh, D.Phil., D.D.
Rev. Professor Robert Mackintosh, D.D.
Rev. Alphonse Mingana, D.D.
Rev. Professor James Moffatt, D.D., Litt.D.
Rev. Professor D. Plooij, D.D.
Rev. E. B. Redlich, M.A.
Rev. C. F. Russell, M.A.
Rev. Douglas S. Sharp, M.A., B.D.
Professor Alex. Souter, Litt.D.
Rev. Professor James Stalker, D.D.
Rev. Professor Newport J. D. White, D.D.
Rev. J. A. S. Wilson, M.A.

DR SANDAY AND THE CREEDS.

I.

The religious world is startled at intervals, more or less frequent, by rumours of an impending crisis in the Church of England. In recent years the so-called crisis has been generally concerned with the excess of ritual or of teaching in a Romeward direction. These have, however, come and gone, but cannot be said to have seriously impaired the integrity of the English Church. An individual here and there may have entered the Roman Communion, but the Anglican ideal of comprehensiveness and the Anglican genius for compromise have on the whole prevailed, and nothing in the shape of forcible deprivations or voluntary secessions on a large scale has supervened as the result of these agitations. The present year promises, however, to prove a very marked epoch in the history of the Church of England in the twentieth century, and we are threatened with a development in the affairs of that Church which will call for the exercise of the most sympathetic patience, the most far-sighted prudence, and the widest tolerance on the part of the ruling authorities and of the clergymen concerned. The prevailing situation may be compared with that which was created by the publication of *Essays and Reviews* more than half a century ago. Now, as in 1860, it is the extreme left wing or, what, for want of a better term, we may call the modernist section of the Church of England clergy, upon which attention is focussed. The events of the present year are, however, only the climax

of a process which has slowly, but surely, been coming to a head for some considerable period. It is not easy to fix accurately the exact beginnings of a movement of this character. Whispers of the approaching storm were certainly heard seven or eight years ago when the appearance of Dr. Kirsopp Lake's book on *The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ* in 1907, and the utterances of the Oxford historian-philosopher, Dr. Hastings Rashdall, gave rise to a considerable degree of uneasiness, with the result that the limits of criticism which were compatible with the retention on the part of the critic of his official position within the ministry of the Church of England began to be freely canvassed. Four years later the disquietude assumed more serious proportions when Mr. J. M. Thompson, in his *Miracles of the New Testament*, explicitly rejected the traditional belief in our Lord's Birth of a Virgin Mother and in His bodily Resurrection, and proceeded to throw overboard a considerable section of the miracles recorded in the Gospels. The dissemination of Mr. Thompson's views on these points led to disciplinary action on the part of the Bishop of Winchester, as far as his powers as the visitor of Magdalen College, Oxford allowed him, and the former was inhibited from his duties as teacher of divinity in that institution. The volume of remonstrance was again increased by the publication in 1913 of *Foundations*, an attempt on the part of "Seven Oxford Men," among whom were to be found a Moberley, a Talbot, and a Temple, to restate the traditional faith in the language of the day. I must confess to have discovered in this most interesting volume of essays, in which all that was in any way new was put forward tentatively and not in the least dogmatically, little or nothing to justify the suspicion with which it was regarded in conservative circles, with the exception perhaps of one section of Mr. Streeter's essay on

"The Historic Christ," where he states his difficulty in accepting the traditional conception of the physical Resurrection of our Lord, in this matter disagreeing with the majority of his co-writers. It was probably this single point which led to Mr. Streeter being invited to resign his position of examining chaplain to the Bishop of St. Albans. The question of the orthodoxy of *Foundations* as a whole was vigorously reopened by the issue, towards the latter end of last year, of an "Open Letter" by Bishop Weston of Zanzibar to the Bishop of St. Albans. The present controversy might indeed well be called "The Battle of the Open Letters," as nearly every contributor to the discussion has adopted this particular form in making public his opinions. The primary motive of Bishop Weston's pronouncement was to protest against the proceedings of a Missionary Conference held at Kikuyu in British East Africa in June 1913, consisting of Anglican Bishops and representatives of all other missionary societies working in that area, except those of the Roman Catholic Church, in which a definite basis for federation between the different missionary bodies was laid down. It was this aspect of the letter which created the most excitement when it first appeared, but the action of the Archbishop of Canterbury in referring the issue to the Consultative Committee of the Anglican Communion has had considerable effect, and the agitation has for the present subsided to some degree. Side by side with the protest against the Kikuyu was, however, an emphatic condemnation of *Foundations*, and a call to action on the part of the authorities of the Church of England against the "modernist" views of its writers, which the Bishop regarded as the most deadly danger which confronted the Church at the present time. The Bishop's call to arms in defence of orthodoxy was not without considerable effect, and events began to move rapidly. Dr. Weston's protest

was practically re-echoed by the Bishop of Oxford in a letter to the *Times*, in which he suggested that the Church of England should be pruned by cutting off the extremists in every direction. This letter he followed up with an article in the *Constructive Quarterly* for March 1914 on "The Symbolical Language of the Creeds," and a few weeks later he put forth "An Open Letter to the Clergy of the Diocese of Oxford" entitled "The Basis of Anglican Fellowship in Faith and Organisation" in which his position with reference to the points at issue is set forth definitely and in detail. The Bishop's letter is directed against three movements. (*a*) The recent tendency of the critical movement which has resulted in an inordinate claim for licence of opinion among the Anglican clergy. (*b*) The Evangelical movement, especially strong in the Mission Field, towards fellowship among Protestants, which has had its outcome in proposals which seem to threaten the Catholic basis in organisation. (*c*) The tendency of the extreme members of the "Catholic" movement which ignores the appeal to antiquity and the Scriptures and makes it difficult to resist the claims of the Roman Church.

If space has any meaning, it would seem that the first of these movements looms the largest in the Bishop's mind, as he has devoted 20 pages to its discussion as against the 14 and 8 pages which he has assigned to the other two respectively. In justice to him it should be mentioned that he clearly disavows any desire to prosecute individual clergymen. His objective in this section of his letter is confined to the demand that the Bishops as the official guardians of the Church should by means of a definite declaration clear themselves of any complicity in the claim of those who, while declaring their inability to accept the miraculous events recited in the Creeds, yet assert their right to exercise their ministry in the Church. It is also

much to the Bishop's credit that he has the courage of his convictions, and is not apprehensive of the situation that may be created by the promulgation of the declaration that he demands. On the contrary he regards the prospect with equanimity, and would welcome such a crisis as "wholesome and necessary." Of the contents of the letter we shall have more to say when we come to Dr Sanday's reply.

Meanwhile the attention of the Church as a whole was much engrossed by the course of the discussion. Memorials and petitions to individual Bishops and to Convocation were widely circulated and signed by large bodies of Clergy and laymen, in most cases supporting the policy advocated by Bishop Gore, the only exception being the memorial promoted by the Churchmen's Union which strongly deprecated any interference with the freedom of inquiry and expression. Finally, early in May, the question was brought before the Upper House of Convocation of the Province of Canterbury by the Bishop of London, who in his introductory address severely censured the Hulsean Lectures of Dr. Latimer Jackson on *The Eschatology of Jesus*, and a declaration was passed, with only three dissentients, in the terms suggested by Bishop Gore. It was at this point in the controversy that Dr. Sanday intervened and published a reply to the Bishop of Oxford's "Open Letter" entitled "Bishop Gore's Challenge to Criticism," which is undoubtedly the most serious and the most significant outcome of the discussion. It was written, as he himself tells us, to deprecate the declaration asked for by the Bishop of Oxford, but before it actually appeared in print that declaration had been already registered in the proceedings of the Upper House of Convocation.

II.

Dr. Sanday's contribution to the discussion, indicating, as it does, on his part a serious advance in the direction of

modernism, is an event of the highest importance in the history of criticism, and cannot fail to have the most far-reaching results. His position in the theological world is almost unique. The greatest English Biblical scholar of the day, he occupies in this country a place analogous to that held by Harnack in Germany. A long and honourable career has been entirely devoted to the study of sacred literature and more especially of the New Testament, and no living teacher has a wider following among those who are interested in the development of Biblical and theological criticism. His work has been invariably characterised by the most transparent candour and sincerity; and whatever be the measure of our judgment upon the conclusions formulated in this his latest achievement, whatever element of surprise and pain they may bring to the individual reader, we are bound to acknowledge that his honesty and courage shine as conspicuously here as they do in the whole of that vast body of literature associated with his name. For once, however, that patience which has been such a conspicuous feature of his work, and that caution which to some seemed almost to amount to a positive weakness, would appear to have deserted him. But it is only fair to recognise that his hand has been forced to some extent. On his own confession, which is somewhat pathetic, the publication of his views has been made earlier than he intended or wished, although he has felt himself gravitating in that direction for some time. His action, nevertheless, does honour to his heart. It is in defence of workers with whom he felt he had much in common, and who were condemned by Bishop Gore, that he was impelled to make this premature disclosure of conclusions which he would have preferred to put forth to the world in another way and on another occasion.

In his reply he confines himself strictly to that section of Bishop Gore's letter which deals with the limits of criticism.

The main charge formulated by the Bishop is that an advanced school of Biblical criticism, on grounds which are philosophical rather than strictly critical, has reached the conclusion that the "nature miracles" of the Gospels, such as the feeding of the five thousand, the stilling of the tempest, and the miracles of the "Virgin Birth" and the Resurrection of our Lord's body from the grave, are now incredible, and that a considerable body of clergymen who share these views, or sympathise with those who hold them, passionately and insistently claim that they are not incompatible with the exercise of their ministry in the Church of England. With this main charge he combines an attack upon those who hold extreme eschatological views, mentioning expressly by name Dr. Latimer Jackson, whose work on *The Eschatology of Jesus*, although manifesting a tendency to accept too readily the extreme conclusions of modern German cricticism, is, in my opinion, a very valuable contribution to the discussion of a difficult subject. Throughout the Bishop's pamphlet the sincerity of the clerical members of the advanced school is seriously called in question, and particularly in connection with the public recitation of the Creeds. It will be well here to quote the Bishop's actual words. "When a man has come to the conclusion that he does not believe that we have adequate grounds for asserting that our Lord was born of a Virgin, or rose again the third day from the dead he cannot legitimately, or with due regard to public sincerity, retain his position as an officer in a Church which requires of its officers the constant recitation of the Creeds." He urges more especially that the Western form of the Creed which opens with the words "I believe" in contrast with the Eastern formula "We believe" implies the personal witness of the reciter to the truth of every several article of that Creed, and in this respect draws a definite distinction between the Apostles'

and Nicene Creeds on the one hand, and the *Quicunque Vult* on the other, the recitation of the latter amounting to little more than the joining in the general propositions of a canticle. In this way the Bishop would defend his own policy, which allows of a considerable degree of mental reservation with respect to the damnatory clauses of that Symbol. The Bishop then proceeds to emphasise further distinctions which he asserts are not observed by the advanced critical school, a distinction between the Old and the New Testaments, and a distinction between those clauses of the Creed the language of which may be accepted as symbolical and those whose language must be interpreted historically. Speaking of the distinction between the Old and the New Testaments, he lays stress on the broad difference between the Old Testament as prophecy and the New Testament as fulfilment in fact. "I seemed to see quite clearly that the preparatory revelation can be given as well in myth and legend and poetry and quasi-philosophical inquiry and moral tale, as in the simple record of historical fact." "Where the element of fact becomes of supreme significance, in the region of the Incarnation, there also the historical evidence is adequate, and, to my mind, convincing." In the Creeds he allows the use of symbolical language in those clauses which relate to Creation, Heaven, Hell, and Judgment, but not in those which affirm the Incarnation, Resurrection and Ascension of Christ, on the plea that with regard to what lies outside our present human experience we can only formulate our beliefs in symbolical language. But in the Incarnation God revealed Himself distinctly within human experience, in words and acts, some of these miraculous, while the Ascension is a symbolical but actual "historical demonstration" which our Lord gave to His disciples forty days after the Resurrection. The Bishop closes this section of his pamphlet with a vigorous defence

of himself against the charge of unorthodoxy which has been levelled against him by certain writers who would thus turn his own weapons against himself. On this point I would venture to remark that orthodoxy must always be a matter of standard, and, to some extent also, of public opinion. There are few who would deny to the Bishop the possession of orthodoxy according to the present day conception of the term, but it was not so in 1889 when the appearance of *Lux Mundi* caused no slight consternation in the more rigid circles of the Church of England. Language was used concerning the Mr. Gore of *Lux Mundi* by Prebendary Denison and others which rivalled in severity that employed by the Bishop of to-day in describing the advanced critical school. But when the Bishop passionately pleads that he is no " heretic " it is doubtful whether his plea is valid if measured by the standard of Chalcedon, which is, to all intents and purposes, the criterion by which he would judge the Modernist thinker of our age. That he has not denied a single article of the Creed may be true to the letter, but it is difficult to conceive that his published views as to the limitations of our Lord's humanity would have commended themselves to the Fathers of Chalcedon, and I have not the slightest doubt that he would have been as freely anathematised by that Council as any Arian, Apollinarian, Eutychian or Nestorian that ever lived.

It has been necessary to treat the Bishop's letter somewhat fully because Dr. Sanday's pamphlet, "*Bishop Gore's Challenge to Criticism*," which is the subject of this paper, is a reply in detail to all the points which have been enumerated in the foregoing epitome, and without a fairly complete conception of the charges against which that reply is directed it would be difficult to understand Dr. Sanday's standpoint.

I must confess that I have seldom found a subject so difficult to discuss clearly and with satisfaction to myself

as the matter in dispute between the Bishop and the Professor, and the ground of the difficulty is an exceedingly simple one. My sympathies sway from one side to the other, here to the side of the Bishop and there to Dr. Sanday's, so that anything like complete commendation or wholesale disapproval of either protagonist in the contest is impossible, and to steer a straight course is out of the question. For the purposes of this article we may conveniently divide Dr. Sanday's letter into two sections, the one almost entirely critical, in which he meets the charges brought against the advanced school by Bishop Gore; and the other constructive, in which he sets forth the line of thought that he has recently followed and the conclusions he has reached.

III.

With the critical section of Dr. Sanday's letter I may be said to be in general agreement, although there are points of detail here and there where I find myself unable to follow him. He takes the Bishop's charges *seriatim* and deals with each one of them separately.

1. *The charge of insincerity.* The accusation of insincerity, which is in truth somewhat surprising as coming from a man of Bishop Gore's high character, he has no difficulty in repelling, and one can sympathise wholeheartedly with his contention that the resolute pursuit of truth demands a high and austere sincerity as compared with the sincerity of the man who has been aptly described as "a smug conformer to the view of authority," who either conceals his real opinions or suppresses his individual conscience. I would identify myself entirely with the plea that room must be found within the ministry of the Church of England for men who believe in Christianity as sincerely as the Bishop himself, but who have been compelled by historical and critical research to come to certain conclusions upon

subsidiary questions. As against the Bishop's contention that the opening words of the Creed "I believe" require a personal expression of belief in every single clause, and that in the traditional sense, Dr. Sanday replies that the Creed as recited in the public offices of the Church is an act of corporate worship, and as such must be broad and comprehensive, and cannot be made at the same time a minute criterion of the faith of individuals. I am also at one with him in his claim that our outlook upon the Creeds must be deeply affected by the development of criticism. Not only has the sphere of knowledge been immeasurably extended during the last few generations, but our conception of the very character of knowledge has been revolutionised. A new scientific method has come into being which has influenced the whole course of human thought. As Dr. Sanday very justly points out there is no branch of study which has not been seriously affected by criticism. All views of secular history are critical views. It is vain, therefore, to expect that theology can be immune, or that the Creeds can be kept within a watertight compartment which the critical spirit of the age is not allowed to invade. As a matter of fact, criticism has influenced profoundly our conception of the Bible, and even the New Testament, which contains the fundamental documents of Christianity, has been subjected to the most exacting demands of the modern spirit, with results which have, in the opinion of the present writer, considerably increased its importance and enhanced its value. There seems no sound reason, therefore, why the same process should not apply to the Creeds, which are only secondary, explanatory, and interpretative. I do not recognise the validity of the claim that is advanced by some, that the Creeds are independent of the New Testament, and that an altered Bible cannot be used to justify an altered Creed. It is maintained that the Creeds were not built originally

upon the New Testament, but that they are the expression of the traditional faith of the Church in a separate and independent form, and that even if the unreliability, say, of the early chapters of St. Matthew and St. Luke and of the post-resurrection appearances of Christ were to be clearly proved by criticism it does not follow that the doctrines of the Virgin Birth and the physical Resurrection of our Lord must be given up. This contention does not seem to be relevant to the point at issue, because the Church of England explicitly declares in her official formularies that the Creeds are only binding because "they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture," and the question in dispute is the right of ministers of the Church of England to criticise the Creeds in the light of the new knowledge concerning the documents of the New Testament which has been brought within our reach in recent years. The Bishop of Oxford and his supporters would apparently allow the widest liberty in this direction for the individual and the scholar, and it is only in the case of the accredited teacher and officer of a definite Society that they desire to call a halt.

Dr. Sanday recognizes also that a limit must be set in the case of those who hold official positions in the Church of England, but it is a limit which is compatible with the widest tolerance and at the same time (to use his own words) "guarantees the central truth—the true Godhead of Father, Son, and the Holy Ghost—that our Lord Jesus Christ is truly God and truly Lord, very God and at the same time very Man." He has set the borders, it seems to me, exactly in the right place. "The total force of the central truth must not be impaired." The man who fervently believes in the Divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ and worships Him as his Saviour and His God must be freely acquitted of the charge of insincerity although he may regard certain clauses of the Creed as symbolical rather than a strictly literal

expression of facts. We may go even further and demand whether it is not the plain duty of men who are fearlessly honest in the search for truth, and who are, as Dr. Sanday assures us, genuinely religious men and good Christians, to remain where they are, and whether the Church of England would not sustain permanent injury if no room were to be found within the borders of her ministry for the honest and conscientious scholar and critic ?

2. *The distinction between the Old and New Testament.* Bishop Gore, as we have seen, draws a broad line of distinction between the Old Testament as prophecy and the New Testament as fulfilment in fact. He would allow the presence of a considerable element of myth and legend in the former, but contends for the supreme significance of fact in the region of the Incarnation. It is to be noted that he does not plead for the application of a different method of criticism to the New Testament as compared with that applied to the Old Testament. His point is that the standard of the evidence contained the New Testament is on a higher plane than that of the Old and deserves more considerate treatment. Here I must hold that the Bishop is on firmer ground than Dr. Sanday, who refuses to see any clear line of demarcation between the New Testament and the Old, and adds " that the New Testament must be even more liable to the same kind of influences as the Old because, whereas the Old Testament writers shaped their own methods of writing for themselves, the New Testament writers followed throughout the model of the Old Testament. Their minds were full of Old Testament narratives and there was a natural tendency to assimilate their own narratives to them."

The influence of Old Testament methods and ideals upon the writers of the New is manifest throughout the latter book; but even when this is granted the crucial difference between the standards of the evidence furnished by the two

books still remains. In the Old Testament, in a large number of cases, many centuries had elapsed between the alleged fact and its historical record, allowing ample time and scope for the growth of myth and legend and for the tendency to exaggeration to develop. In the New Testament, on the other hand, every document, with two possible exceptions, is the product of the century which witnessed the events recorded in it. While I am prepared to make every reasonable allowance for the rapid growth of legend in primitive Christian times I cannot help thinking that the difference between the two records is in this respect striking and significant. It is not easy to understand the relevancy of Dr. Sanday's reference to St. Luke in this connexion, where he writes, "Even St. Luke, whose preface breathes the spirit of a sober, secular historian, is entirely at one with his fellows in regard to miracle." I should have thought that this told against Dr. Sanday's position and not in his favour. I am aware that it is a commonplace of German criticism, much emphasised by Harnack, that St. Luke's record of the miraculous in his Gospel and the Acts is a mere mark of his credulity, seriously minimising the importance of his writings as historical documents of the first rank. Might it not be equally well argued that the fact that a writer, who possesses the undoubted genius and spirit of the true historian, does include miracles in his record proves that he is dealing with historical events ?

3. *The Distinction between different clauses of the Creed.*

On this point Dr. Sanday must be acknowledged to score heavily against the Bishop, who holds that in the Creeds we must make a clear distinction between those clauses which relate to what lies outside human experience, and those which refer to historical incidents. He contends that in the case of those which come under the former category the language must of necessity be symbolical, while clauses

which relate to the Incarnation, Resurrection, and Ascension are to be interpreted in a strictly historical sense. He carries his theory to the extent of making this differentiation between the two sections of one single clause of the Creed. Thus in the clause "He ascended into Heaven and sitteth at the right hand of God the Father" the language which speaks of the Session at the right hand of God is pure symbolism, while the first sentence "must be understood to refer to an historical incident, viz., that the body of Jesus Christ, forty days after His Resurrection, rose before His disciples' eyes upwards from the earth, and vanished."[1] This is also the view of Bishop Chase.[2] It is difficult to understand the strong reliance which is placed by both these Bishops upon St. Luke's account of the Ascension in the Acts, because the Evangelist has, presumably, given two contradictory descriptions of that event. St. Luke xxiv. 51, even if we allow the latter part of the verse to be a Western interpolation, is accepted by the great majority of scholars as a definite reference to the Ascension; and if this is so, it is a legitimate inference that St. Luke here describes the event as taking place on the very evening of the Resurrection day. Dr. Sanday, on the other hand, contends that the account of the Ascension is just as much pure symbolism as the language which speaks of the Session, and that the evidence is not sufficient to convince us that "the physical elevation of our Lord's body" really happened as an external, objective fact, and on this point I am inclined to agree with him. I would also sincerely endorse his denial of the presumption that because the Incarnation enhanced the dignity of the body and of all that goes with it, therefore in cases where a choice may be made between the two representations of an event, one of which is bodily and the other purely spiritual,

[1] Gore, *Constructive Quarterly*, March, 1914, p. 61.
[2] Chase, *The Gospels in the Light of Historical Criticism*, p. xxx.

the bodily version is necessarily to be preferred. The conception of the Ascension which I believe to be prevalent at the present moment provides a striking example of the unconscious influence of criticism upon the modern mind. The doctrine of the Ascension has not been the subject of any wide public discussion, and yet it is difficult to meet a clergyman in the present day who accepts it in the traditional sense or who would agree with Bishop Gore that we have no choice but to regard the Ascension as a physical, external and objective fact. The distinction, then, that the Bishop attempts to postulate as to the sense in which the language of the different clauses of the Creed is to be interpreted does not seem to be tenable. As Mr. Streeter very forcibly remarks, "the exact manner of the union of the Divine and Human in the Person of Christ and the exact nature of the life beyond the grave are both conceptions which carry us outside the world of present possible experience, and symbolical language is the only language that can be used to express them."[1] Symbolism is, therefore, not to be confined to those clauses of the Creed which relate to Creation and Judgment, Heaven and Hell, it is equally manifest in those wherein we assert our belief in the Incarnation, Resurrection, and Ascension. My attitude towards this section of Dr. Sanday's letter may be, then, summed up as follows. The charge of insincerity directed against the clerical members of the Modernist school in the Church of England clearly fails. True discipleship, and not mere accurate thinking, should be the test of the sincerity of a Christian minister. We are bound to insist that the religion of Christ and theological formularies are not necessarily one and the same thing. What is absolutely required of every clergyman of the Church of England is a conception

[1] Streeter, *Restatement and Reunion*, p. xvii.

of Jesus Christ which compels that worship which has from the first been offered to Him by His Church.

Now it is manifest that this is perfectly compatible with a critical attitude towards the Creed, and with a symbolical interpretation of many of its clauses. To confine the Church of to-day to a literal acceptance of the formularies put forth in the fourth century of the Christian era is to deny to that Church the possession of the gift of God's Holy Spirit, and to deprive the Church of Christ of the most precious of its prerogatives, viz., that it is a living, progressive Church. The advance of knowledge necessarily presupposes a modification of thought, and not even the statements of the Creeds can we exempt from this process. To quote Dr. Sanday's words again, "The total force of the central truth must not be impaired," but as long as the fundamentals of the faith are guarded and guaranteed the exact method of the Incarnation, Resurrection and Ascension must remain a subject upon which even a clergyman of the Church of England is well within his rights in expressing an honest and conscientious opinion.

IV

It now remains to notice the constructive section of Dr. Sanday's pamphlet, in which he sets forth the position that he has reached in relation to the miraculous element in the Gospels. It is upon this feature in his letter that public attention has been concentrated, and it is his pronouncement upon this particular issue that gives to his contribution to the discussion a grave significance. I desire to speak with all reverence and reserve of a teacher at whose feet I have sat for many a long year and from whom I have learnt more than I can ever adequately acknowledge. With his fearless advocacy of the freedom of criticism within the Church of England and with most of the grounds upon which that advocacy is based, I am in complete sympathy,

and it is with no little regret that I find myself compelled to part company with him on some of the most salient points that emerge in the latter portion of his letter. The advanced school, with which Dr. Sanday now definitely associates himself, is charged by the Bishop of Oxford on four counts—the denial of the "nature miracles" of the Gospels, of the Virgin Birth, and of the bodily Resurrection, and a reluctance to use the term "infallibility" in connexion with our Lord. In each one of these charges Dr. Sanday admits that there is a foundation of truth, but pleads that in every case there is also some important limitation or qualification which considerably modifies the force of the charge. Taking the counts in the order in which they are placed in Dr. Sanday's reply, we begin with the question of "*infallibility*." I do not find that the gulf which separates the Bishop from the Professor on this particular issue is in any wise a wide one. The difference between them is in the main a mere matter of terminology. The Bishop insists that the limitations of our Lord's incarnate state, as they are exhibited in the Gospels, should be frankly recognised, but strongly repudiates the attribution to Him of anything approaching fallibility as a teacher. Dr. Sanday deprecates the use of the term "infallibility" where knowledge is relative rather than absolute, and then proceeds to show that, except under special conditions connected with the particular purpose and circumstances of His mission, our Lord assumed the range of knowledge appropriate to the age in which He lived. But he allows to Him a perfect knowledge of the mind and will of the Father. which is to all intents and purposes an acknowledgement of infallibility in the realm of religion and morals . . . A "perfect knowledge of the mind and will of the Father" can scarcely mean less than this.

The "nature miracles" of the Gospels.

We reach here the very *crux* of the whole discussion, be-

cause this is infinitely the most important point in the whole controversy. The pages in which Dr. Sanday deals with this particular issue are, to my mind, much the weakest section in the whole of his letter. He formulates his position with regard to the "nature miracles" in the following words. "Of the two hypotheses—that they were performed exactly as they are described, and that they came to be attributed to Him in this form by the imagination of the Early Church—the latter is the more probable." By way of qualifying this statement he adds that he believes that in most cases *something* happened which gave rise to the story, but that the most difficult element in it was probably due to an extension of the original fact rather than itself original. He describes with some detail the line of thought by which his mind has been travelling and the reasons which have influenced him in arriving at this striking and, to many people, startling conclusion. A prolonged study of historical criticism had the effect of reducing the value of the evidence for breaches of the physical order recorded in the Old Testament and in profane history to a vanishing point, and he found himself left with the New Testament miracles as the only miraculous element in history which still needed to be explained. The difficulty connected with these he now claims to have successfully surmounted, with the result that the miraculous now practically disappears from history, whether sacred or secular. He postulates a distinction between events which are *supra naturam*—exceptional, extraordinary, testifying to the presence of higher spiritual powers—and events or alleged events that are *contra naturam*, involving some definite reversal of the natural physical order. In the first category he would place miracles of healing, which are abundantly accounted for by the presence in the world of a unique Personality, and for which the evidence is decisive. Under the second head are

included the "nature miracles" of the Gospels, such as the feeding of the five thousand, the stilling of the tempest, and the conceptions of the exact method of the Incarnation and Resurrection current in the Church, viz., the Virgin Birth and the bodily Resurrection of our Lord. I do not propose to discuss the validity of the distinction postulated here. That is a question which must be left to the philosopher and metaphysician to decide. I would only remark that Dr. Sanday's conception of the unnatural and the supernatural seems to run contrary to the view generally accepted by the best modern authorities on such subjects, and if this is so, his theory breaks down at the very outset. His treatment of the question of evidence and its value demands, however, more extended treatment. He is apparently perfectly satisfied that the evidence for the "*supra naturam*" miracles is quite adequate, but concludes that the attestation of the "*contra naturam*" class must be definitely and categorically rejected. The evidence in the latter case, according to him, is that "of men whose minds were steeped in the Old Testament, whose thoughts naturally ran into the moulds which the Old Testament supplied," and he is convinced that this one consideration is enough to explain all the so-called "nature miracles." But these are the very men who testify to the truth of the "*supra naturam*" miracles, and I absolutely fail to see any valid reason why their evidence should be accepted in the one case and refused in the other. To my mind there is not a particle of difference between the quality of the evidence adduced in support of the miracles of healing and of that which testifies to the true historicity of the "nature miracles." Let us take as a test of evidence the very instance utilised in the letter by Dr. Sanday himself, viz., the feeding of the five thousand. There is no incident in the whole Gospel record which is more strongly authenti-

cated than this. The fact that it finds a place in all the four Gospels does not necessarily enhance its value from a strictly evidential point of view, inasmuch as the accounts in the other three are probably all derived from St. Mark's Gospel, but the presence of the miracle in the first and third Gospels is a point of considerable significance. There is now a strong body of opinion in favour of the theory that St. Mark's Gospel was issued in at least three different editions, and many scholars agree in finding the earliest form of the Marcan document in St. Luke, a later form in St. Matthew, and the final edition in our canonical St. Mark. As this miracle is recorded by St. Luke it must have been included in the earliest edition of the Marcan Gospel. Now Harnack contends that the Marcan document used by St. Luke must have been in existence well before the year 60, and both Archdeacon Allen (see Allen and Grensted, *Introduction to the New Testament*) and Mr. Edmundson (in his *Bampton Lectures* on "The Church of Rome in the First Century") date the Gospel somewhere about the year 45. Here then we have an event recorded, according to some competent authorities, within less than 15 years and even according to Harnack within less than 25 years of its happening, an event in which, if true, there were many thousands of people concerned, a great proportion of whom were still alive. Is it probable, or is it indeed possible, that any Evangelist would have ventured to give currency to a story in which so many individuals were involved, and thus afford the widest opportunity for instant contradiction if the story was not founded on fact? Dr. Sanday acknowledges that the story is full of genuine historical matter, with the exception of the one detail which alone makes the story worth telling, the miraculous element in it. At the root of the story, he tells us, was a consecrated meal, which was no uncommon feature in our Lord's intercourse with His

disciples, but the multiplication of the food comes from the Old Testament narratives of Elijah and Elisha, and more especially from 2 Kings iv. 42. I am not prepared to deny that the story manifests something of the influence of Old Testament traditions upon the mind of the narrator, particularly in the matter of the "basketsful which remained over and above to them that had eaten"; but this is very different from treating the one salient feature in the narrative as pure myth. Dr. Sanday is undoubtedly inclined to exaggerate the effects of the Old Testament upon the New in this particular direction. This point is well brought out by Canon Scott Holland in the searching criticism of his brother Professor's position which appeared in the June number of the *Commonwealth*. He would have, however, considerably strengthened the telling argument which he bases on the fact that no miracles are attributed to the Baptist had he emphasised the close association of the Baptist with Elijah in the mind of the primitive Church. The Elijah of the Old Testament performed miracles in great profusion, the Elijah of the New "did no miracle." If we are to attach any value at all to the evidence of the Gospels, it is difficult to accept the suggestion that the very *motif* of the incident of the feeding of the five thousand is simply and solely the result of the influence of the study of the Old Testament upon the mind of the writer. If the evidence for this miracle, regarded from the point of view of strict evidence, is not adequate, I see no option but to abandon the idea of ascribing any historical value even to St. Mark's Gospel. To be quite candid it seems to me that the evidence for this particular miracle is rejected, not because of its inadequacy as evidence pure and simple, but as evidence sufficient to establish the truth of *a special type of miracle*. A careful perusal of Dr. Sanday's pamphlet and a certain amount of reading between the lines have

convinced me that at the root of his position with regard to this matter there lies, not so much the difficulty of the "nature miracles" on the evidential side, but rather the idea that a miraculous Christianity is repugnant to the modern mind and, therefore, a serious hindrance to the reception and progress of the Christian religion. A close acquaintance with his earlier work shows that this was not always the case. The question was approached by him and studied with perfect freedom from anything like prepossession, and therein lay its great value in the realm of criticism. This pamphlet reveals a different spirit and method. The strict and balanced study of evidence has been to some considerable extent, and perhaps unconsciously, replaced by a tendency to disparage evidence that does not quite fit in with a particular theory of miracle. His reference to the evidence of St. Paul is a striking example of this tendency. I will quote his statement on this point. "Wherever we have the direct evidence of St. Paul that evidence is immediate and cannot be questioned. But when we come to look into these miracles they are at once seen to come under the head *supra naturam*." Now this paragraph can only mean that St. Paul is a witness to the truth of certain New Testament miracles, and that these particular miracles, which on St. Paul's evidence must be accepted without question, when examined are found to come under the category of *supra naturam* miracles. The first difficulty that presents itself with regard to this statement is that the Pauline Epistles, as far as I am aware, provide no evidence for any miracle, *supra* or *contra naturam*, if we except the Incarnation and Resurrection of our Lord. St. Paul's evidence concerning miracle is confined to the mere general reference to the "signs of an Apostle" wrought in Corinth (2 Cor. xii. 12), and another of a similar character in Romans xv. 19. "Through mighty signs and wonders by

the power of the Spirit of God," surely a very slight foundation for the very definite and dogmatic statement of Dr. Sanday which we have just quoted. I imagine that the Professor is particularly sensitive to his immediate environment. During the last few years he has been closely associated with several men, considerably younger in years than himself, who are quite honestly convinced that the future of Christianity depends upon the possibility of unloading the greater proportion of the miraculous element which hitherto has been regarded as an essential component of the Gospel record. He acknowledges the influence upon him of this particular school of thought, and its effects are widely manifest in the pages of his letter. I do not think that it would be too much to say that it is his sympathy with his younger associates that accounts for much in this letter that appears strange and unfamiliar to the students of Dr. Sanday's work as a whole, the fanciful division of miracles into two classes, and the demand for a stricter standard of evidence in the one class as compared with what is accepted as perfectly adequate in the other.

These are features which will scarcely commend themselves to scholars in general. This also applies to the special respect paid to the alleged evidence of St. Paul. Even though St. Paul had witnessed in any substantial degree to the truth of certain miracles what grounds are there for giving his evidence such emphatic value, while that of St. Mark, who possibly wrote the first impression of his Gospel before any of the extant Pauline Epistles came into being, is rejected as unsatisfactory ?

The "Virgin Birth" and the "bodily Resurrection."

Dr. Sanday places the "Virgin Birth" and the "bodily Resurrection" of Christ in the same class as the "nature miracles" of the Gospels, but here he occupies a very much stronger position from the point of view of strict evidence.

He is careful, however, to assert most emphatically his belief in the Supernatural Birth and in the Supernatural Resurrection. He is of opinion that we ought to be satisfied with a heartfelt expression that, in the one case, the Holy Babe was Divine, and, in the other, that the Risen Lord as Spirit still governs and inspires His Church, and that the exact mode, whether of the Incarnation or the Resurrection, may well remain an open question. Without necessarily sharing Dr. Sanday's difficulty of conceiving the Supernatural Birth and the Supernatural Resurrection as literal facts my sympathies are entirely with him when he pleads that with regard to these difficult questions we should not attempt to draw precarious inferences ourselves, and still less force upon others inferences which they do not draw.

Regarded as evidence pure and simple the story of the "Virgin Birth" must be acknowledged to stand on a lower plane than the record of the public life of our Lord. It would seem to have formed no part of the original Apostolic preaching, and is found neither in St Mark's nor in St. John's Gospel. With the exception of the one possible hint in Galatians iv. 4, "made of a woman," St. Paul does not appear to connect the Incarnation with a miraculous Birth. Here, then, we seem to have an instance where a careful investigation of the evidence is legitimate and even necessary. The territory may be "holy ground," but it can nevertheless be approached and examined without undue presumption or irreverence. This is equally true of the exact mode of the Resurrection. The evidence of the Gospels on this point is confused and conflicting, and it is difficult to combine it with St. Paul's account so as to build up a consistent story. The contemporary conceptions of the nature of the "resurrection body" must also be considered when we come to estimate the historical value of the evidence and before we proceed to assert dogmatically any particular

theory as to the exact process and manner of our Lord's Resurrection.

In both these cases discretion and a strict regard for truth bid us proceed warily. As long as the essential Divinity of our Lord and His Risen glory are guaranteed, subsidiary problems of mode and manner may well be left for time to solve, if indeed a complete solution can ever be forthcoming.

This paper may fitly close with a reference to Dr. Sanday's appeal to the Liberal Protestant school in Germany in support of his position. I may say that I do not consider that he has at all strengthened his case by this appeal. I give way to no man in my intense admiration of the work done by the leading German scholars of the day in the sphere of Biblical criticism. English scholarship owes to Germany in this direction a debt that it can never liquidate, but with regard to the particular point at issue in this controversy the work of the German Liberal Protestants hardly seems to be relevant, and Dr. Sanday himself appears to have definitely put them out of court. His own deliberate criterion as to the legitimate limits of criticism for a clergyman of the Church of England is expressed in the following terms: "The total force of the central truth must not be impaired." "The central truth to guarantee is the true Godhead of Father, Son, and the Holy Ghost: that our Lord Jesus Christ is truly God and truly Lord, very God and at the same time very Man." I do not think that any one acquainted with the trend of Liberal German Christology would venture to assert that it even approaches the standard demanded by Dr. Sanday himself in his letter, and he has repeatedly acknowledged this in many of his earlier publications.[1] I may be allowed to quote here what I have said elsewhere on this point: "Their conception

[1] See especially *Christologies, Ancient and Modern*, p. 196.

of the Person of Christ is based on the slender evidence concerning the self-consciousness of Jesus furnished by a very much reduced version of the Synoptic Gospels, a version containing only those sections of the books the sources and origins of which they consider unquestionable. This sectional use of the New Testament is supported by the plea that the other documents treat of Christ as God. This additional evidence is, therefore, ruled out of court by the prepossessions of these scholars, and the Godhead of Christ is deliberately placed on one side as not being capable of proof or interpretation on scientific principles. A mere glance at Harnack's conception of the Person of Christ is sufficient to reveal the chasm that separates him from the full and complete faith of the Catholic Church. There is no Godhead of Christ in any real sense, and in Harnack's mind it means no more than the Divine element that is revealed in the uniqueness of His humanity. There is no atonement or redemption by His death, and no absolute claim on Christ's part on the love, worship, and homage of man as his supreme Lord and Master. The main weakness of Liberal German Christology is that it draws a portrait of Jesus which does not overstep the limits of the human, and yet claims for this conception of the Ideal Man the very extremes of spiritual value, and sets Him up as an object of religious worship. It has frankly broken with orthodoxy and its miraculous Christ, and yet retains for Him a central and unique position in relation to humanity. Schweitzer's description of modern historical Christology is that it is three-fourths scepticism, and has left in its hands only a torn and tattered Gospel of St. Mark, and the Jesus of its making is conceived in the German spirit of the twentieth century." [1]

[1] Condensed from *The New Testament in the Twentieth Century*, pp. 14, 17, 21.

The contribution of the Liberal German school to the study of Christology is, therefore, well outside the limit set by Dr. Sanday himself, and cannot legitimately be adduced in support of the claim made by the members of the advanced party *among the Clergy of the Church of England* to the liberty of prophesying, a claim, be it remembered however, that is perfectly reasonable on other and more adequate grounds.

MAURICE JONES.

THE SENSE OF SIN IN GREAT LITERATURE.

I. Introductory.

My object in these few addresses is to get down beneath the surface of our life. And the way I am going to take to do this is to follow in the track of some strenuous thinker who, it seems to us, as we consider everything, was fated, it may even have been from all eternity, to taste a certain moral loneliness, and to report.

Out of the heart of a people there is thrust forth from time to time one who by virtue of his sensitiveness and experience feels things which we who are of duller apprehension had not seen, or had forgotten. And yet we are so made that when a man of true insight, of an insight cleansed and certified by suffering, tells us what he saw and what he felt, there is something within us which acknowledges his story, and recognises that in some real way it is our story, and that we are no longer living honourably, if, having heard that story, it should be denied its proper influence with us.

I have entitled these studies : " The Sense of Sin in great literature."

Now, though I have no wish to dally over words, I should like to say what, from the standpoint of these studies, great literature shall be held to be. By great literature, I mean, now, literature which has dealt with the human soul at such a depth and with such purity and thoroughness of vision that what it has said is true, and will be recognised as true by serious souls in all times.

In my own view and belief, all great literature is confessional. Every really great work of art is the display of personality. This is not to say that in a great poem or drama, for example, the writer is giving us the facts of his own life ; but it is to say that in a great poem or drama the

writer is isolating some mood or feeling or moral discovery of his own, and is there brooding over it, pursuing the implications of it, tracking the roots and principles of it, until his own heart and flesh cry out with a cry which means that in the last agony of his thinking the man has found nothing; or that in the last agony of his thinking he has found God.

When the children of Israel were crossing the Jordan on their first entry into Canaan, Joshua summoned them one by one to take an oath of allegiance to the God who had so far prospered them. This they did. But before dismissing the assembled people, Joshua, we read, erected a stone in the presence of them all, and said, "This stone hath heard your vow. Therefore it shall stand there for ever as a witness against you, lest you deny your God."

The kind of literature I am thinking of is that kind of disclosure of the soul which, because it was given once upon a time, remains for ever as an afterthought, a plea, a standard to hold man to his destiny. For man will not consent for more than a time to be less than he has been; and that is not enlightenment, it is not properly speaking progress, which proposes for us a poorer moral career. Great literature, then, I shall take to mean that literature which deals with the soul of man as the home of great issues, as the meeting place of the seen and the Unseen, of the occupations of time and the recurring preoccupation of eternity.

I know that in speaking so pointedly about the sense of sin, I may be thought to be dealing with matters which are really not present to people's minds in our day. We had recently the *obiter dictum* of one of our most versatile men, himself no enemy of faith, that "men are not worrying about their sins." But that might very well be reason enough for some things being said which should have the effect of reviving that noble disquietude. And besides,

we must not be guided by what men, who have their own interests and preoccupations, perceive or do not perceive. We must be guided by what we believe to be there, whether men are thinking about it or not thinking about it.

It is a very silly thing to say that "men in our day are not worrying about their sins," if you mean by that, that therefore they are not to be worried, or that they have somehow got beyond the need for worrying. On the contrary, it should be held to be a very alarming moral and social symptom that men are not now worrying over matters which have undoubtedly worried men in all times, as often as men have looked themselves in the soul. St. Paul in his day was aware that great masses of people were not worrying about their sins. He spoke of them as being "past feeling." But that is a condition which no true man will regard as a desirable one for himself. It is also a condition which no far-seeing man will welcome as a sound one for society. To say that men in our day are not worrying about their sins, is to say that men are satisfied with themselves and satisfied with things as they are. And that is simply to say that such men are no longer men, no longer the instruments of God for better things, which, if history in the long run means anything, means that the Mysterious Force whose very being and passion it is to heighten and intensify the Spirit in man, will one day take from these decadent souls their high responsibility.

I say, we are to be guided not by what seems the spirit of the time. We are to be guided by what is there all the time. To take an illustration from a disaster the terror of which time may have so softened as to make the allusion not too poignant. As the *Titanic* tore through the dark waters on that April night two years ago, the passengers and the crew were not worrying about ice. A thousand things contributed to their gaiety and absence of care. The bright

lights, the general opulence, the hearty faces, the music, the long tradition of safety; or, if one bethought himself for a moment, there were the lifeboats and the life-belts. And besides the night was calm. Why then should any one worry? And no one did worry. Yet the terrible thing was there: and all the time the ship was rushing to meet its unequal, inexorable foe. But consider this also: earlier in the day which led up to that disastrous night, a message had been borne to the vessel not yet doomed; for ships and souls are not yet doomed so long as they have the faculty of hearing. That message, that report and rumour out of the vast sea, had reached the ship—had fallen indeed upon the ear of one whose very function it was to hear. We might without violence use words which St. Paul used of the souls of men and say that God did not leave that ship without witness.

Well, "we mortals cross this ocean of a world each in the average cabin of a life." As we voyage on,—and surely this which is the high interpretation of great literature is the true one,—from time to time, by the way of elected souls, voices are heard, the presence of threatening shapes is disclosed, and they, Captains of the soul, have it imposed upon them, so that it is a fire in their bones if they do not speak out, to declare what they have heard and to testify what they have seen.

But I do not believe that "men to-day are not worrying about their sins." I can well believe that an immense number of people are not thinking about their sins; though even there I am probably quite at fault. But even were it true that an immense number of people were not thinking about their sins, it is equally true that there is an immense number of people, it may even be the same people, who are not thinking about anything, because they are not thinking at all. But this is nothing new or singular. *Every man*

who thinks finds that he has to think for others besides himself. Every man who is living a spiritual life at all is carrying in his soul the care of some others. And if there are immense numbers who are not thinking seriously about life and about how things are going, the responsibility is simply the greater that those who are morally sensitive shall in a day of unusual carelessness be the more faithful to their scruples.

But, I repeat, I do not believe that in our day men are not worrying about their sins. If the literature of our time is in any faithful way the mirror of men's souls, the one preoccupation and concern to-day is just the ancient moral concern.

It is true that one may have to listen carefully, and to see the immediate aspect of things in the light of history, to perceive in the moral anarchy of our time anything with a high significance. Besides, there are times in which a mood of revolt descends upon a people and acquires such a head and volume that no good comes of mere argument. You might in literal truth as profitably argue with a bull which has begun to charge. We must wait and see, in the sense that we must simply wait until other people see what we for ourselves saw all the time.

The last generation has witnessed what seems to us an unusually strong and thorough-going criticism of the traditional morality. The nature of the soul has been put to the test. Experiments in living have been urged and followed which disputed the rulings and findings of the former time. We have been invited in the name of liberty and proper manhood to set out, to discover for ourselves the nature of this world and our own nature. To find out whether there is a limit in the nature of things, or, as we should say, in God, to the self-seeking and ruthlessness of the individual. But already, as I verily believe, signs are beginning to appear of the return upon the soul of those ancient misgivings which

may one day fling men, even in a kind of panic, upon the breast of the ancient faith.

For the fact is we men and women who are living in these days were in a sense not born in these days. The blood of our race is in us. The blood of humanity is in us. The reminiscence is there in our blood like a shadow, the reminiscence of great perils just escaped, of great disasters from which only with pain and the beating of the breast we have arisen. It was never for a moment to be believed that the race of man had learned nothing through all its long travail; or that its wisdom, embodied in its laws and in its pieties, had no objective and reasonable reality. Therefore it is not to be wondered at that, when any experiment in living which repudiates that hard-won wisdom of the race has gone a certain length, something should re-awaken in the human soul which protests that it shall go no further, for at the point at which it has arrived it seems to be reminded by dim intangible portents that once, before, it occupied that perilous ground and came within sight of some huge terror.

In his great literature, the soul of man has gone out all alone to face, without the distractions which we average men allow to obscure our vision, the limits and barriers of the moral world. Certain elect and predestined men have stood upon lonely promontories of the Spirit looking across sad waters. They have seen what they have seen and they have reported it to us. And so far as their soul has been truly human, and so far as they have kept their eyes upon the facts and have not spared themselves, they have with varying degrees of clearness and authority corroborated the testimony of Him who, in full self-consciousness, tasted death and touched the bottom and last limit of human experience and personality.

These elect and priestly souls, who have spoken in great literature, have assured us that the deepest and last thing

about man is, that there is a way by which he must go, that he bears to a Holy God a relation which cannot be dissolved.

"The Rime of the Ancient Mariner."

If my purpose were purely literary, I should occupy myself with quotations and recollections from the wonders of "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner." My object rather is to allow the poem to speak for itself, to make its own proper impression upon our moral nature. I believe it is by some such form of words as that, that we may maintain the balance in the controversy between art and morals. It is probably true on the whole that art must not have a conscious moral motive. On the other hand the human soul is so subtle and swift-glancing that you must not put a limit to its resources. It would be easy to accept the saying "art for art's sake," if it were not so manifest that every supreme work of art—in sculpture, in painting, in music, in literature, has an effect upon us in addition to its effect of beauty. We understand and can sympathise with the feelings of impatience and proper pride which led to the protest underlying the phrase "art for art's sake." It must have seemed to sincere and eager spirits a sordid thing to see art hiring herself out to the support of conventional views of life, thereby depressing her own vitality because thereby allowing the world of interests to divert and make oblique what should have been her steadfast gaze. And so at the rallying cry of this phrase there was a movement on the other side which, because it was a movement and self-conscious, was sure to do equal violence to the truth of things. Men of fine sensibility, jealous for the independence and freedom of art, made their protest against the relation which they found existing in their day between art and morals. But in most cases the way they took to make their protest was by

devoting their art to the other side of the moral issue. This, of course, was really to be guilty of the very offence from which in their view art needed to be purged. The only difference was that from being the servant of moral convention, art became the servant of want of convention. Now, as St. Paul once said, "circumcision availeth nothing"; but he added, "neither doth uncircumcision."

It is an old controversy: and yet the truth of the matter is perhaps simple enough. Art should be sincere. Or better still, artists should be sincere men. If we must not look to them to support conventional morality, we ought to look to them not to support what Carlyle used to call Bedlam, either for the fun of the thing, or still less for the money there may be in the business.

A great man who is expressing himself in a picture or in a poem, or, if I may say so, in a sermon, is not thinking of anything except how he shall not pervert or qualify the flood of truth which somehow has been let loose within him. The moment he becomes self-conscious, the moment he permits other considerations even to whisper to him, in that moment he has, obscurely it may be, but quite patently in the judgment of his peers, cut himself off from the source and home of all truth and beauty and power.

That is what I meant when I said some time ago that all truly great literature is confessional. It is that quality in great literature—that it is confessional—and not that it supports or impugns the moral code of our time, which gives great literature an influence in the region of the Will. It is not that the writer, the poet or the dramatist, or the teller of a tale, sets out with the object of influencing us in any way. What happens is, that the poet, or the dramatist, or the teller of the tale, has himself been so moved, so unified in the depths of his life, by the intensity and logic of his own imagination, that his words reach down in us to that precise

depth from which they proceeded in him. And so great literature—and the same is true of every medium of spiritual expression—great literature cannot but have a moral influence upon us; for it has borne witness to the depth and spirituality of our human nature. When we read or witness a great tragedy, it may very well be that no single moral scruple in our soul has been fortified, but our whole soul has been renewed, purified by pity or by terror. We close the book, or we come out into the night, with something of that double-assurance, whose presence indeed makes us truly human: we are sure of our own soul, and if we are not sure of God, we are sure at least that it is a very serious thing to live, that we live in a world of relationships.

Now, instead of working my way through these things, I might have been employed more wisely in expounding the wonderful poem which gives indeed such pointed illustration of what I have been saying.

You will read in any text-book that Coleridge and Wordsworth inaugurated the Romantic movement in English literature. You may learn there further that the "Rime of the Ancient Mariner" or something that was to be like it, was deliberately planned by those two great poets. As things turned out, the poem came to be written entirely by Coleridge, though Wordsworth supplied a fine couplet and suggested the Albatross. But when you have learned these odds and ends, you have learned nothing of real consequence. It is practically true, for example, of Coleridge and Wordsworth that, in the words of the Ancient Mariner himself, "they were the first that ever burst into that silent sea." But why did they set out? Why did they break away from the recognised materials and methods of the eighteenth century? Why, when they felt compelled to set out, did they take the line they took? Why, confining ourselves to Coleridge and to this poem, could he not escape, he who was

so apt to refuse a task which was likely to make a demand upon him,—why could he not escape such a subject as this? And how did it come to pass that once launched upon this poem, his soul seems to us to be under a doom to penetrate to all the subtleties and horrors of such a thing of the spirit? The simple fact is, and we only deceive ourselves if we try to get behind it, about every great work of art, that is to say, of self-expression, there is something mysterious, inexplicable, fated, "and he who can explain it least is he by whose hand it was done."

"A creative work stands apart and remains mute when we question its ancestry." "It is a very suggestive fact that Goethe could never explain many things in 'Faust.' The origin of the work itself was as mysterious to him as to every one else. It is easy enough to indicate the sources of the legend and of many of the incidents woven into it; but what affinity lodged this seed in the soil of his nature, what were the stages by which it sank deep into his soul and became so thoroughly part of himself that it came forth from his brain not only refashioned, amplified, harmonised with itself in artistic consistency, but pervaded by a soul which made it significant of profound and universal truth? . . . 'They come and ask,' writes Goethe, 'what idea I meant to embody in my "Faust," as if I knew myself.'

"For more than sixty years the drama was on his mind; and yet he tells us that the whole poem rose before him at once when it first touched his imagination. He often spoke of the progress of the work: there are indeed few works of art concerning the shaping and evolution of which we possess such full and trustworthy information; and yet of the first contract between the idea and his own soul, all he can tell us is that it was suddenly and completely disclosed to his imagination." (Mabie, *Essays on Literary Interpretation.*)

In all this, great literature approaches to the passivity

of nature. It offers to us levels and depths of interpretation equal to the level and depth of our own soul. You may take the poem as a temporary tract against cruelty to animals; and even from that point of view it will always deserve attention. But, if you are so minded, if life has laid your soul open to such a world of ideas, the poem may be to you and will be to you another of those utter and unflinching portrayals of what happens when a man has done something wrong, irreparable, and when the wrong he has done comes back upon him, so that he sees nothing else in all the world except that wrong thing. Of course, you may say, "But no man should take his sins so seriously as the Ancient Mariner took his shooting of the Albatross." And you and I may decide for ourselves that we shall not take ours so seriously. Still, as the Psalmist said, "we are fearfully and wonderfully made, and that my soul knoweth right well.' We never know in what mysterious ways some little thing which we have been able to make light of, and almost forget, is going to start up like an armed man, and stand before us blocking our way, until we trample it down and deliberately choose Hell, or allow its accusation to compel us to our knees, where we must remain until we find, each one for himself, some reason for rising, in God and in a new depth and softness of our soul.

Emerson has a noble passage where, illustrating the indomitable perseverance of man, he describes a race who build and rebuild their homes on the slopes of a volcano. In the great poems of the soul, we may all learn on the surface of what unquiet moral elements we take our liberties.

I have been reading recently a volume entitled, *The Eighteen Nineties*, a book which describes with sympathy and justice the wonderful outburst of youth in literature some twenty years ago. I am not speaking of the excellence of the work done by the men of that movement. And

I am not doubting but that in the long run the change of air may prove to have been good even for our spiritual life. But as an experiment in living it was a movement which failed and will fail.

It was all true enough for those who said the things which they said at the stage at which they were when they said them. But it was no way of life for people who were going to get old, or were to have little children, or having little children, were to lose them. They wrote and advocated views, those young men, as though they had it in their own power to control the subtle and inevitable reactions of the soul within them. They did not lay their account with that traditional life—the sum, within the breast of every man, of all that the soul has seen and been—that traditional life which, like the turbulent element beneath volcanoes, wa bearing them all the time that they were making their futiles and provincial proposals. And yet already in that book the ground has begun to rock, and here and there the old terror has burst from the ancient depth of things, and men are on their knees who in the headlong days of their youth had despised themselves for having knees.

> "I've taken my fun where I've found it,
> And now I must pay for my fun."

"And the end of it's settin' and thinkin'." There was one of t m—he has left behind him a mass of strange drawings like the work of Blake. He died at twenty-six. In his last days he became a Christian. Aye, there's the rub! It is all very well if a man is never to know better. But if one day he comes to know better, why then a moral upheaval is as certain as the thing which happens when a mine is fired. Indeed that is the very formula for the coming of truth to a man or to an age: it is the firing of a mine. In his last days, this young man became a Christian, and

was received into the Church. Whereupon a terror took hold on him. Oh, unreasonable if you will, exaggerated, something that took advantage of his bodily weakness. Yes, that may all be true. But it was everything to him who endured it. Out there in the last lucidity of his soul it was the one thing. "I implore you," he wrote, "I implore you to destroy all copies of (naming a work of his) and all like drawings that are harmful. Shew this to (naming a friend), and conjure him to do the same. By all that is holy, all obscene drawings." Then he signed his name, adding the words, "In my death agony."

We none of us know how we are going to behave, what terrible misgivings are one day going to be let loose by some event. We know within limits what we are, surrounded by the interests, the faces, the habits which go some way towards the making up of our life. But we all know likewise that there is something wild and unpredicable within us. Concerning this thing it is a great part of my own personal religion that in every set of circumstances into which I may plunge or drift in this world or in any world, Christ, whom I invoke daily, may take hold of that interior life of mine and maintain for me my personal identity and chosen spiritual order. For no man can say how he will behave, were life to drive him into that lonely sea through which the Ancient Mariner voyaged. No one knows what visions will yet assail him, and what moral terrors, based it may be upon tiny scruples like inverted pyramids (what terrors) may one day shake his soul.

Here is the story as Coleridge himself repeated it on the margin of the poem.

Part I.

An ancient Mariner meeteth three Gallants bidden to a wedding-feast, and detaineth one.

The Wedding-Guest is spell-bound by the eye of the old sea-faring man, and constrained to hear his tale.

The Mariner tells how the ship sailed southward with a good wind and fair weather, till it reached the Line.

The Wedding-Guest heareth the bridal music; but the Mariner continueth his tale.

The ship driven by a storm toward the south pole.

The land of ice and of fearful sounds where no living thing was to be seen. Till a great sea-bird, called the Albatross, came through the snow-fog, and was received with great joy and hospitality.

And lo! the Albatross proveth a bird of good omen, and followeth the ship as it returned northward through fog and floating ice.

The ancient Mariner inhospitably killeth the pious bird of good omen.

Part II.

His shipmates cry out against the ancient Mariner for killing the bird of good luck.

But when the fog cleared off, they justify the same, and thus make themselves accomplices in the crime.

The fair breeze continues; the ship enters the Pacific Ocean, and sails northward, even till it reaches the Line.

The ship hath been suddenly becalmed.

And the Albatross begins to be avenged.

A Spirit had followed them; one of the invisible inhabitants of this planet, neither departed souls nor angels; concerning whom the learned Jew Josephus, and the Platonic Constantinopolitan, Michael Psellus, may be consulted. They are very numerous, and there is no climate or element without one or more.

The shipmates, in their sore distress, would fain throw the whole guilt on the ancient Mariner:

In sign whereof they hang the dead sea-bird round his neck.

Part III.

The ancient Mariner beholdeth a sign in the element afar off.

At its nearer approach it seemeth him to be a ship ; and at a dear ransom he freeth his speech from the bonds of thirst.

A flash of joy.

And horror follows. For can it be a ship that comes onward without wind or tide ?

It seemeth him but the skeleton of a ship.

And its ribs are seen as bars on the face of the setting Sun.

The Spectre-Woman and her Death-mate, and no other on board the skeleton-ship.

Like vessel, like crew !

Death and Life-in-Death have diced for the ship's crew, and she (the latter) winneth the ancient Mariner.

No twilight within the courts of the Sun.

At the rising of the Moon,

One after another,

His shipmates drop down dead.

But Life-in-Death begins her work on the ancient Mariner.

Part IV.

The Wedding-Guest feareth that a Spirit is talking to him ;

But the ancient Mariner assureth him of his bodily life, and proceedeth to relate his horrible penance.

He despiseth the creatures of the calm.

And envieth that they should live, and so many lie dead.

But the curse liveth for him in the eye of the dead men.

In his loneliness and fixedness he yearneth towards the journeying Moon, and the stars that still sojourn, yet still move onward ; and everywhere the blue sky belongs to

them, and is their appointed rest, and their native country and their own natural homes, which they enter unannounced, as lords that are certainly expected and yet there is a silent joy at their arrival.

By the light of the Moon he beholdeth God's creatures of the great calm.

Their beauty and their happiness.

He blesseth them in his heart.

The spell begins to break.

Part V.

By grace of the holy Mother, the ancient Mariner is refreshed with rain.

He heareth sounds and seeth strange sights and commotions in the sky and the element.

The bodies of the ship's crew are inspired, and the ship moves on;

But not by the souls of the men, nor by demons of earth or middle air, but by a blessed troop of angelic spirits, sent down by the invocation of the guardian saint.

The lonesome Spirit from the south-pole carries on the ship as far as the Line, in obedience to the angelic troop, but still requireth vengeance.

The Polar Spirit's fellow-dæmons, the invisible inhabitants of the element, take part in his wrong; and two of them relate one to another that penance long and heavy for the ancient Mariner hath been accorded to the Polar Spirit, who returneth southward.

Part VI.

The Mariner hath been cast into a trance; for the angelic power causeth the vessel to drive northward faster than human life could endure.

The supernatural motion is retarded ; the Mariner awakes, and his penance begins anew.

The curse is finally expiated.

And the ancient Mariner beholdeth his native country

The angelic spirits leave the dead bodies,

And appear in their own forms of light.

Part VII.

The Hermit of the Wood

Approacheth the ship with wonder.

The ship suddenly sinketh.

The ancient Mariner is saved in the Pilot's boat.

The ancient Mariner earnestly entreateth the Hermit to shrieve him ; and the penance of life falls on him.

And ever and anon throughout his future life an agony constraineth him to travel from land to land.

And to teach, by his own example, love and reverence to things that God made and loveth.

That is the story. The moral authority of it lies just here, that we cannot read it or hear it read without the sense that in some region remote indeed from our accustomed interests but close to us and of the deepest consequence, it is all true, nay that it is all the truth. There is a sense in which it is what it is to us. If there is any one to whom it all means nothing, then in that one's case nothing more is to be said. That he feels nothing when other people feel something, is his own personal problem.

For there are those for whom the story does mean something on the moral plane, and indeed means nothing else, and must be permitted to mean nothing further until the moral demand of it is confessed. Well, there it is. The soul of a man once saw all that. And he has enabled us to

see it. Out upon that lonely, inalienable life of our own we have seen his signal and have signalled back to him.

We have heard a story. And this is the immense responsibility of seeing truth: it is left to us one by one, who have heard such a story, to act and take up our life henceforward as people must who by the illumination of such a story have now become aware of certain things; as people for whom it means what it means.

JOHN A. HUTTON.

STUDIES IN CHRISTIAN ESCHATOLOGY.

VI. Future Judgment.

The belief in Divine judgment on human life is present at every stage of Bible religion. It is present not by accident, or simply as a bare item of information, but in virtue of what God is, and because the revelation of such a God must always come with the twofold aspect of mercy and severity. Thus in Amos and Hosea, the earliest writing prophets, judgment stands in the forefront of the new message, as a result and outgrowth of new vision gained into the character of Jehovah. The true prophet will not utter merely smooth things; even Hosea, ambassador of an unwearied love, declares to Israel how penitence alone can decide whether the future is to be for them a future of blessing or cursing. Farther stages in the development of thought are the new individualism of Ezekiel, and the great forecast of the Book of Daniel according to which judgment as ushering in the final Kingdom begins definitely to be anticipated as a judgment upon all—a world-embracing fact. Thenceforward the advent of the Kingdom is uniformly preceded, in pictures of what is to be, by the judicial, sifting act of God. This is a note struck decisively by the Baptist. In later Judaism, the influence of Persia bore strongly on this general eschatological idea. But after all Parsism supplied no more than hues and figures for the apocalyptic representation; the moral grandeur and solemnity of the thought is an old prophetic legacy.

It is clear that such an expectation, once firmly lodged in the religious mind, could not ever again be lost. At bottom it is a moral certainty, and the religion which has ever been suffused by a passionate moral interest must retain it or perish. To men who have begun to look for a great final

inquisition, with some real appreciation of its certainty, its inevitableness, its sure and steady approach, life cannot again be quite the same. It is not merely that such a prospect deepens the gravity of living: for pre-Christian minds its effect was, at least in part, to dispel the shadows cast upon the Divine righteousness by the prosperity of wicked men and the afflictions of the good; also to presuade those who took it seriously that happiness upon earth is not the chief end of man. This service, by some reckoned elementary, it did then for devout hearts, and it is a service believing men will always need to have done for them anew.

Yet it is to Jesus that we owe the idea of judgment in its profoundest and most spiritual form. That is in itself significant. Not infrequently a vehement protest has been raised that on this point, as on so many others, the Church has misconceived her Lord. The unclouded prospect to which Jesus pointed, we are told, was later darkened cruelly by predictions of a wrath to come. But the real facts are otherwise. It was not apostles, but their Master, who spoke the words we know concerning outer darkness, the worm that dies not and the fire that is not quenched; who said that for the betrayer it were better if he had never been born. Whatever our prudent allowances for the figurative terms of description accepted by Jesus from His time and nation—still, figures have a meaning, and here it is a meaning that shakes the heart. We are compelled to realise, in His teaching, as it has been put, "how large a proportion the language of rebuke and warning bears to the language of consolation and promise; the one is as grave, as anxious, as alarming, as the other is gracious beyond all our hopes."[1] His purpose cannot have been only to scare the mind. He looked on rather to a great fact, none the less sure that it is

[1] Church, *Human Life and its Conditions*.

unspeakable, the appointed ordeal of "sin without excuse and without change."

It is unnecessary to labour the point that the same conviction is presented everywhere in the Epistles of the New Testament. The writers knew they were to stand before the Son of Man. Part of their common faith is that "it is appointed unto all men once to die, and after that the judgment." What is more, judgment is never alluded to as a discovery of their own, or as impending merely over the hostile world; it is something in which their own interest is vital and the reality of which has imposed itself on their minds in irresistible spiritual ways. They were as sure of it as of the forgiveness of sins. In both cases, belief was generated by contact with Jesus. He had left an impression of God which showed Him as Judge in virtue of His very Saviourhood.

I believe that all this finds an echo in the conscience of those who have any sense of God as a Power, not ourselves, making for righteousness.[1] No man can feel that God is, and is the moral law alive, and not feel that in due time He must express His whole mind regarding the ways and conduct of men. At all events, when future judgment is rejected by a moral theist as intrinsically unmeaning, the grounds of rejection must either lie in a special philosophy of experience or in a confusion of traditional thought about the thing with the very thing itself.

Thus it has been felt as a difficulty that the New Testament should represent final judgment as being committed to, or presided over by, Jesus Christ. How is it credible

[1] There are few points in the organism of Christian truth at which it becomes clearer that since Jesus, and for His followers, the distinction of religion and morality is obsolete. All true arguments for judgment are the arguments at once of faith and conscience. Both demand that the failure and vanity of sin shall be exhibited plainly at last for all to see; both insist that faith shall be vindicated as the one right attitude of the soul to God.

that before Him will one day be gathered not His followers merely, but all the nations of the world, or that it will then be His part to pronounce, with perfect insight, justice and power the lot of each human soul? Doubtless there are forms in which this may be made very unintelligible. Our fathers felt it to be sublime, yet nothing really is sublime which does not evoke a spontaneous assent to elemental truth. But surely here truth of just that kind is given. If Christ is central as Redeemer; if in history as proceeding now He has certified Himself to faith as One on whose person everything turns in the relation of God to man—and the Church has no other message—He will be central also at the end, and no human life can be conceived as closing out of relation to Him as the all-determining reality. He is the Revealer of the Father, and from the revelation present in Him something definite and universal, something laden with the last issues, must eventually come, for moral reasons, to each individual life. If any decisive close be in store for human life, then unless it were indissolubly bound up with the personality of Christ, we should feel the consummating climax of God's dealings with men to be strangely out of line and keeping with all the rest. There would be, as the only alternative, an abrupt and inconsequent change to a new disparate moral order, with caprice and incoherence fixing the quality of the whole. This principle—the principle of the moral continuity of life here and hereafter—is equivalent to the truth that the mediation of redemption is one with the mediation of judgment.

Some will deem this too speculative for a beginning; let us then make a new start, from a new point. It is not simply that death will place us before God, defining our attitude to Him unerringly; we are before Him now, and in the Gospel He is judging us as we live. Jesus tries a man by being what He is; the perfect Son, doing the Father's per-

fect will in life and thought and standing forth thereby as the great representative of our nature, its end and law. Here is a standard the quality of which is absolute. He was all this while He lived, but in addition there is to be considered His moral influence upon history. In point of fact, He has been judging men from the first century till now, in amazingly effective ways. The impact of His moral power on the world, for condemnation or approval, has been unceasing. Since Calvary, the world has had a new consciousness of evil. The fact that, as the Church soon perceived, He had died for slave, for woman, for barbarian, at once began to pour an uninterrupted flow of moral criticism on human life and conduct, and increasingly it meant at once protection for the weak and the inspiration of the good. And this has come from the personal knowledge of Christians that at each point in life they are being tried by their attitude to Jesus ; that His manhood is the criterion of ours, and that from its purity there is no appeal. Men have always felt that a present experience of this kind gives reason to believe in a future ordeal in which Christ will still be Judge.

Precisely here, however, is the crucial point which makes the thought of final judgment, even for some Christian minds, not so much difficult as rather superfluous and futile. To be frank, ought not this eschatological notion of a judgment to come, often mythically conceived as catastrophic, to be displaced once for all by the idea of the moral order of the world ? There is a judgment, but it is entirely immanent ; it fulfils itself to the last fraction in history. The best minds now think of moral life as an internally controlled self-regulating sphere within which certain relations operate unchangeably in accordance with laws of their own, so that any final scrutiny or verdict could only be an external and needless footnote to a complete text. At any given moment,

therefore too at the end, character fixes our place. Virtue is its own reward, and the vicious man is punished by being what he is.

No one, I imagine, will deny that behind this widely held theory we may discern great and arresting truths. The faith that the constitution of the world is against evil, that the mills of God are grinding all the time and with inescapable power, is a form of the fundamental moral conviction that there exists an objective norm of truth—the theist would say, a Divine mind of righteousness, whose view of the good or evil in human action is final and absolute, and in this sense abrogative of the diverse and fallible verdicts of men. But it is misleading to represent this true conviction as inconsistent with the idea of judgment to come. For one thing, that future judgment does not create facts; what it does is to recognise them as facts. As it has been put, they are not determined, but declared. Moreover, it is surely an important aspect of the case that the course of the world is after all a process, with all the partialness and inconclusiveness found in process everywhere. The good must reign, but to say that its triumph will ever be seen *in the present order*, in such wise as to convince all human minds, is to say something for which neither reason nor faith will care to be held responsible. The results of a temporal process, in their permanent and final form, can be fixed only beyond the process itself.[1]

[1] Troeltsch, in his brief note on "Gericht Gottes" in *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, suggests that when Dogmatic lays aside the mythic forms of thought characteristic of Christian thought in the past it will find Divine judgment solely in the course of evolution. It is difficult to tell what is his criterion of freedom from mythic elements. But at all events the purely immanent interpretation of judgment to which he leans is little in favour with many writers on Dogmatic who are usually classed as modern or critical—as for example, Nitzsch, Reischle, Kirn, Kaftan, Wendt. What is true in Troeltsch's remark is that no attempt to paint the last assize dramatically, or in detail, has any higher claim on assent than what we call "myths."

Not only so, but the theory that spiritual laws are self-acting, that in history as it stands the moral ordinances avenge themselves to the last jot and tittle, exacting here and now the precise penalty merited by human conduct—this theory is hard to reconcile with the facts of life. Too many of the Psalms are sad complaints of the prosperity of the wicked for it to be supposed that the writers held to any such purely immanent construction ; and the effect of revelation, as it grew and brightened, was not to teach them that the world's history is all the judgment it needs ; it was to cast them on God, who at last will vindicate all who trust Him. It is vain to brush aside difficulties due to the moral confusion of history by the plea that virtue and vice are their own recompense ; that goodness, even when crushed by violence, is spiritually the conqueror ; that evil, even when triumphant, is cursed by inward rottenness. Such a view has a noble sound, but it may represent a spiritualism of the most unwholesome type, in which the good man is bidden or encouraged to withdraw into the inward recesses of his own conscience and abandon the world to the rule of injustice and misery. What alone will satisfy the soul is not merely that goodness should win ideally, but that it should prevail in outward fact. Not only its authority but its power must be vindicated ; and the assertion of future judgment is a vital aspect of the faith that vindication will be complete at last. But the chief fault of the "self-acting" theory is that it is at bottom irreligious. Appeals to the Bible are in vain. To describe God as but "an otiose Spectator of the moral universe, having no other function in relation to moral government than to watch and to approve the perfect manner in which rewards and punishments are distributed by self-acting spiritual laws," is a travesty of faith in the Bible sense from the prophets on-

wards.[1] To be even plausible,[2] as we have seen, this hypothesis must confine its view of vindication to the inner life of man; but in no Bible writer is man's inner life ever considered by itself. There soul and body are a living whole, and in this whole of experience the mind of God regarding man is conceived as being registered finally. It is not registered with perfect fulness in this world. "We see not yet all things put under Him." Hence to say that "God has no unsettled accounts, no outstanding claims" is really, and from the point of view of religion, no more respectable as a dictum than the better known "Whatever is, is right."

How firmly the religious consciousness clings to the expectation of a last judgment may be gathered from one of Ritschl's more peculiar views. His interpretation of the wrath of God is to deny its reality as a present fact, with the reservation that one day it will operate actively and finally. He had no love for conceptions of cataclysm, yet he held that there will in the end be a decisive and annihilating reaction of God against those who obstinately spurn His love. We need not ask now whether Ritschl's denial of the present wrath is in harmony with Jesus' mind or with the spiritual experience of the Church; what concerns us is his affirmation as to the future, and it offers a new proof that when the moral character of Christianity is faced, the thought of judgment, as a moral certainty, is unavoidable. View our religion in a purely intellectual or aesthetic light, and it is easy to get rid of final decision; take it as morally qualified from end to end, and inexorably the prospect of trial comes in.

[1] Cf. R. W. Dale, *Atonement*, 326.

[2] It is not even that; for as Charles well points out, the theory that a man is requited here by his present experiences is overthrown by the obvious facts that the better a man is, the less he enjoys the satisfactions of conscience, the worse he is, the more he becomes immune from its reproaches. (*Drew Lecture*, 28–30.)

Much of the resistance to a doctrine of future judgment is due probably to the belief that such a notion is incurably magical or external. It supervenes upon normal experience, apparently, by way of bare addition to what is already a quite intelligible whole. I have already spoken of this argument in its wider, and what may be described as its cosmic, relations ; but it is now worth pointing out that any force it may have is at once destroyed when the question is taken, as all questions of religious truth must be, to the forum of personal Christian feeling. Let us take it there. Each one of us may say : I feel that judgment is a present fact ; I judge myself constantly, and the ideal I see in better men judges me too. Further, I am always in God's presence, and when I sin the powers of His retributive yet loving will visit and chasten me, in outer or inner ways. Is all this, then, inconsistent with a final and conclusive judgment ? Surely not, and that for at least two reasons. First, the mind of God upon our life has not yet been expressed fully, and there is no reason to suppose it will have been expressed fully by the time we die. Even at the hour of death it will be partial, as it is partial now. But if God is omniscient, and if my life here is over, why should it be impossible for Him to pronounce upon its value as a completed whole ? Why should He not then reveal to me what I have made of myself ? If He does so, what is this but final judgment ?

Secondly, it may be argued, as before, but now in the case of the individual, that judgment follows at each moment, automatically as it were, by the very structure of the spiritual world, apart from any " dramatic " pronouncement by a Divine Judge. Personally I regard all these suggestions of an automatic working of spiritual reality as thoroughly unsound, for which Bible minds, who knew what religion is, would have had no use at all ; but, waiving this, surely the argument has no force except as it assumes that we shall

never be consciously nearer God than we are now. Does the Christian consciousness—as it is, say, in high moments of prayer—confirm this ? I think not : we feel that we may yet enter His very presence, and bear on our naked spirit " that uncreated Beam." Death, if it has any spiritual significance, may place us there. But if so, then the piercing realisation of God appointed for us is an impending fact—one day to be as real as what is happening now—and to realise Him in this fashion, His holiness and His love, will be to gain a sight of our own self which we shall feel to be His Divine estimate of all we are. And because it is the judgment of God, in whom knowledge is one with power, it will entail for each life an adjustment, wholly just and gracious, of destiny and environment.

The moral reading of Christian life, then, is bound up with the expectation of a Divine judgment. We can escape from it only by holding that nothing decisive can ever happen anywhere. That is a view with many intellectual attractions, but it has no point of contact with the moral sense, and whether it clothes itself in the doctrine of the eternal recurrence, according to which the wheel of change repeats its meaningless revolution for ever, or takes the less distinctive form of belief in an eternal homogeneous advance no part of which is different from any other part, in both cases its purely unethical character is too plain for comment. If goodness and right are more than words, our attitude to them, our acts regarding them, though now lost and forgotten here will revive and be found in a coming experience of trial. In the last manifestation of His grace—for judgment too serves grace—God will treat each of us as bearer of a personal life, who by his exercise of will has formed a basis for his eternal relationship to God. The future cannot be the same for all ; and whatever be the differences, they will flow from no external or accidental cause, but the

righteous will of God. Each moment in which we set ourselves by conscious act before Him, seeing our sin, at least in effort, as He sees it, and speaking over it words of penitence and condemnation, is a foretaste and premonition of that last unveiling. As the pages of the New Testament show, this thought, that all is moving up to one great decision, imparts to what we are doing here the force and greatness of an eternal meaning. It is in this solemn light that all St. Paul's work is done. The certainty of judgment not only intensified his self-discipline ; by its ennobling power it quickened his zeal, gave inspiration to his energies, and set the figure of the coming Lord at the centre of all thought and feeling.

It is striking to observe how clear was the apostle's anticipation that *he* would stand before the bar of God. When we talk of future judgment, it is too often as something ordained for other people ;[1] but in reading St. Paul's words we are admonished to conceive it rather as what we personally must undergo. We cannot be certain about the responsibilities of others, about ourselves we do know something ; and in our best moments we are unable to find fault with the prospect of being tried by God at last. At the same time, this brings up a problem of some gravity. The New Testament has a great deal to say regarding the judgment of believers, but what can this mean ? It seems to bear that a man's destiny, of life or death, is unfixed till then ; yet

[1] In certain minds, doubtless, reluctance to assert the fact of judgment is traceable to a natural and indeed right feeling that we dare not anticipate the Divine judgment on a fellow-creature, even in thought. When we attempt to take to ourselves the functions of the Eternal, to assign merit and demerit, good and evil, we are beset with difficulties which are, fortunately, quite insuperable ; and as we grow older, this impression deepens. More and more we perceive the wisdom of our Lord's prohibition of the practice of referring individual suffering to individual sin. But we are bidden not to judge, regarding earthly trial or future destiny, not because judgment is unreal, but because in its august reality it pertains to God alone.

on the other hand this cannot be if there is any substance in the promise of the Gospel. "He that believeth on the Son hath eternal life," and it would not be glorifying to the omnipotence of God but derogatory to His faithfulness if any faintest doubt were cast upon the trustworthiness of that great word by postponing to the final scene the real decision on the lot of the saints. It would actually introduce a strain of unmoral caprice; for the whole question being whether men are or are not in fellowship with God, and in that fellowship have already the earnest of the future, it is inept to suppose that the reality of such communion could hang upon anything which transpired after death. Whatever judgment means for the Christian, it is not anything which can separate him from the love of God. But this does not alter the fact that in the New Testament believers are depicted as having in front of them a judgment in which they will be tried by works, not faith.[1] It will be a scrutiny of the entire outcome of life. And it is precisely this which makes the idea difficult. It has a look of incongruity with the truth of justification by faith—a truth which, in spite of some modern writers to whom the conception of free grace means moral anarchy, is the cardinal point in apostolic religion. How can it then be true that those who now have peace with God shall yet give an account of deeds done in the body? Is not this to lapse from grace to law? Is not the offer of grace a Divine proclamation, as it were, that judgment is out of the question as meaning, in a world of sin, universal condemnation? Moreover, we cannot receive the grace thus offered except as we own our unworthiness, as we declare that in the judgment of a holy God we have no hope to stand. It is a problem to give us something to think of.

We may find the answer, or a great part of it, in the fact

[1] Cf. Stange, *Moderne Probleme des christlichen Glaubens*, 188 ff.

that even in present experience God's love and wrath are consistent with each other. We know this in every hour of penitence; we know it, if possible more clearly, when we look to the Cross of Jesus. There the Father's condemnation of our sin is as real as His pardon; it is indeed something without which His pardon would have no sense. In the very article of forgiveness He reacts against evil, and by self-identification with Him through whom the mind of God is mediated we are enabled to react against it ourselves. But there is no reason why we should suppose this condemnation of sin to be excluded from His attitude to believers at the last. No more then than now will love make Him blind. No more then than now can He speak to us of what we are, and have done, except as good and evil in our life stand out for His reprobation or approval, in perfect openness.

But the point is that this judgment, real as it is, is the means of love, and serves love's purpose. It is by passing through it that believing men are finally delivered from the effects of their sinful history. Once for all, and for the first time, all things will have been laid open between the Father and His children. The peril of guilty secrets kept from Him will be gone for ever; the misgiving, too, lest He should have against us what we may suspect but do not clearly see. To stand thus before God, His searching eye upon us—knowing the heart and thoughts, and telling us all things that ever we did—this is a precondition of perfect and unclouded fellowship. It leads into this fellowship, and it secures it. To be tried at last, in Christ's presence, may be truly designated as the last means of grace for the redeemed. There will be pain in it, doubtless, beyond our imagining—the purifying shame of those who bend under the condemnation of perfect love, well assured that for all their guilt they will not be cast out. But our sin will then be shown us, not to

torture us, but in order that more and more we may understand the length and breadth and greatness of His mercy who knows what is in man.

H. R. Mackintosh.

NOTES ON THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

XIV. The Raising of Lazarus and its Result (John xi.).

(1) The raising of Lazarus from the dead raises the problem of miracle in a very acute form. For the naturalistic explanation of the acts of healing as *moral therapeutics* it must appear as an absolute impossibility, and so the record must be rejected as entirely unhistorical. Whether a rationalistic explanation as restoration from a prolonged trance has any probability from the standpoint of modern medical science is a question the writer claims no competence to decide.

(i) This is not the only instance of the raising of the dead by Jesus. The case of the daughter of Jairus is recorded by the three Synoptists (Matt. ix. 18–26; Mark v. 35–43; Luke viii. 49–56). The words of Jesus, "She is not dead, but sleepeth," are interpreted in two ways. "Either Jesus, confident of His power to recall from death, speaks of death as a sleep from which He will awaken (cf. John xi. 11), or He declares that the girl is not dead, but in a trance. Wonderful insight, if the latter is the case, takes the place of wonderful power, if the former. The words are ambiguous, but the evangelists convey the impression that they are recording a restoration to life, not a recovery from a trance" (*St. Luke*, in *Westminster New Testament*, p. 169). The case of the widow's son of Nain is recorded by Luke alone (vii. 11–17); and in this record there is no ambiguity of language. Although the circumstances do not exclude the possibility

of a trance, yet it would be a marvellous coincidence that the revival should take place at the moment when Jesus spoke the words of recall. The record in no way suggests such an explanation.

(ii) The case of Lazarus as recorded in the Fourth Gospel is held by many scholars to be an attempt to outbid the marvellousness of the case of the widow's son of Nain, inasmuch as Lazarus had lain in the grave four days (John xi. 17, 39), and the widow's son was being borne to it (Luke vii. 12). Luke too is charged with outbidding in the miracle he records, the common Synoptic record, as the daughter of Jairus had just died (Mark v. 35). One may ask whether the difference in point of time in the first two cases would be as significant for the evangelists as it may appear for the modern scholar who is casting about for a naturalistic explanation. If the reality of the death is conceded is restoration any more marvellous after a lapse of a number of hours than after the lapse of an hour? Do we know enough about the relation of soul and body to be able to declare confidently at what moment an irrevocable separation takes place? We need not speculate, as do Weiss and Beyschlag, regarding this insoluble problem. (See Bruce's *The Miraculous Element in the Gospels*, p. 200.)

(iii) The case of Lazarus is more difficult, and it is impossible to escape the impression that the evangelist in verse 39 desires to magnify the marvellousness of the miracle. If normally the process of putrefaction would have set in in the interval, we must suppose either an arrest or a reversal of the process by the miraculous power of Jesus. "Beyschlag," according to Bruce, "remarks that the ἤδη ὄζει of Martha cannot have been intended by the writer to exaggerate the miracle by making it consist in restoring life to an already putrefying corpse. One bent on magnifying the miracle would have represented the interval that had elapsed

from death, not as few days, but rather as four years or centuries and would not have put the ἤδη ὄζει in the form of a mere inference, a mistaken one, as the author thinks. *Leben Jesu*, I., 300." "That may be so," continues Bruce, "but it is difficult to think of a body out of which life has fled four days as still having within it 'echoes of life' as if the soul had not yet quite left it" (ibid.). But does not the evangelist quote Martha's words expressly to indicate the probability in the known conditions that the process of dissolution had begun? The evangelist has increased our difficulty by his manner of telling the miracle, unless, as Mr. Strachan suggests in the March EXPOSITOR, we may here suspect the editor's hand. The writer desires to guard his own mind against all credulity, and with hesitation he accepts the reality of the miracle on the grounds that on the one hand he cannot bring his mind to believe that the evangelist was capable of sheer invention when he seems most desirous of conveying the assurance of truth and that, on the other, he cannot fix the limits of the possibility of the miraculous action of the supernatural person of the Word become flesh, the Conqueror of death as Risen Lord.

(2) It must be frankly conceded that apart from the wider problem of miracle, the narrative in John xi. raises many difficulties. It has been urged as an objection to the historicity of this event, that *the silence of the other Gospels is inexplicable.* "It is just conceivable," says Dr. Moffatt, "that the incident failed for some reason to be included by the synoptic gospels; their silence would not by itself be absolutely conclusive against the historicity. The difficulty is to give any adequate psychological reason why so stupendous and critical an episode (witnessed *ex hypothesi* by all the disciples) should have failed to win a place in the synoptic tradition, even when that tradition is admitted to be incomplete at certain points, and this difficulty is height-

ened by the obvious motives of the writer, who makes this miracle the pivot of the final Jewish attack on Jesus, instead of the purging of the temple, which he transfers to the beginning of the ministry." (*Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament*, p. 539.) In spite of the concession at the beginning, this passage sets forth clearly the difficulty the silence of the Synoptists involves, and so deserves close scrutiny.

(i) The incompleteness of the Synoptic tradition needs to be asserted more unreservedly. If the record in the Fourth Gospel of a Judæan ministry prior to the Galilæan, and renewed from time to time in visits at the great feasts, is at all trustworthy, and in a previous article reasons are given for its historical probability, then the incompleteness of the Synoptics is at far more than "certain points," and one whole side of Jesus' ministry, and in some respects the most important, is ignored in the Synoptic tradition. If the Logia or "Q" source contained mainly sayings, and Mark (ultimately Peter) was the source of the Synoptic record in its main outlines, we can explain its incompleteness by the limitation of Peter's interest or knowledge. As a Galilæan disciple he was concerned solely about the Galilæan ministry apart from the final tragedy, and an event, however significant, and crucial for the Judæan ministry, about which the Fourth Gospel is concerned, might quite probably be passed over by him. If such limitation of interest be held incredible, there remains the possibility of the limitation of his knowledge.

(ii) The parenthesis in Dr. Moffatt's statement "witnessed *ex hypothesi* by all the disciples," appears a conclusion going beyond the data. As has already been indicated, the record in the Fourth Gospel affords ground for believing that the twelve, who were the constant companions of Jesus in Galilee, did not accompany Him on all His visits to Jeru-

salem ; and that there was a circle of disciples in Judæa, regarding whom because of the extreme hostility of the Jewish rulers secrecy had to be maintained. When disciples are mentioned in the Fourth Gospel we are not entitled straightway to assume that the twelve are meant. If the mission of the seventy in Luke x. 1–20 is a historical reality, a wider circle of disciples accompanied Jesus in the wanderings of the last stage of His ministry. Even if the disciples mentioned in verses 7, 8, 12 and 16 included some of the twelve, it is not at all improbable that Peter was not one of the number. Would the disciple, who was always ready to speak for, and take the lead of the others, have left it to Thomas, had he been present, to propose that they should go, if necessary, even to death ? These conjectures are offered as no more than conjectures ; but as at least forbidding the confident assertion that the twelve must all have been present on this occasion.

(iii) Even if the episode appeared so critical to the evangelist with his dominant interest in the Judæan ministry, and the influence of that ministry on the Jewish authorities, as bringing to a head the purpose of the rulers to rid themselves of Jesus once for all, the event need not have had the same significance for Peter, even if he knew of it, or any other witnesses to the Galilæan ministry, as probably they were entirely ignorant of the course of hostile action against Jesus by the scribes and Pharisees in Jerusalem. Verses 47–53 appear to come from one who was somehow in touch with the inner circles of Jewish politics, as none of the Galilæan disciples could be.

(3) It has been suggested that as the Synoptic tradition comes from a much earlier date than the Fourth Gospel, regard for the safety of the family in Bethany at a time of violent Jewish hostility to the followers of Jesus may have been the motive of silence. But this seems an improbable

reason. If the Jewish rulers were influenced in their action by this event, as the Fourth Gospel asserts, the family in Bethany would already be known to them, and a record of the event would not at a later date in any way increase their peril. This suggestion does get some support, however, from the fact that in Luke's reference to Martha and Mary, Bethany is not mentioned, but only "a certain village" (x. 38), and that in Mark's (xiv. 3) and Matthew's (xxvi. 6) account of the anointing at the supper, while Bethany is mentioned, the house is described as "of Simon the leper," and the name of the woman is not given. Is it likely that the company of disciples would know nothing about the family in Bethany? Some reason which we cannot now even conjecture there may have been for silence. In the preceding paragraphs, however, an adequate reason for the absence of any record of this event from the Synoptic Gospels has been given apart from this possible reason.

(4) The writer must confess that for him the greatest difficulties arise from the way in which the evangelist has presented the event in his narrative, affording not a little justification for such an explanation as that quoted from Forbes by Dr. Moffatt. "The whole evidence points strongly to the conclusion that the evangelist, using some tradition to us unknown and the synoptic material mentioned, elaborated them freely into a narrative designed to be at once: (*a*) an astonishing manifestation of the Logos—Christ, (*b*) a pictorial setting forth of the spiritual truth of Christ as Life, (*c*) a prophetic prefiguration of the death and resurrection of Jesus, as shown by the facts that the name Jesus and Lazarus have the same meaning, and that the narrative forms a transition to the final struggle and to death" (p. 273). While it seems incredible that the evangelist was capable of so freely and boldly inventing history in the interests of theology as the above quotation suggests, yet it

must be admitted that at several points doctrinal pragmatism appears to do violence to historical accuracy.

(i) Few statements have touched the human heart as the simple words "Jesus wept" (v. 35; cf. 33 and 38), revealing the depth of His compassion and the breadth of His sympathy for man in the presence of death. But it is not easy to reconcile with "this touch of nature that makes the whole world kin" His declaration in v. 4, in which His interest in the glory which is to be won by the performance of the miracle obscures His regard for His friends in their anxiety and need; or His further explanation in v. 15 that He is glad of His friend's death because of the opportunity it gives of strengthening the disciples' faith. Wendt (*St. John's Gospel*, pp. 153–158), in accordance with his partition hypothesis, derives from the source *vv.* 23–26, and also probably *v.* 27, and then as introductory to this utterance in *vv.* 1–22 he assigns the greater part to the same except *vv.* 1*b*, 2, 4, 11–15, taking similar exception to the representation there given of Jesus' attitude. Dr. Bruce seeks to weaken the strength of the objection by the following considerations: "The glory which is represented as the aim of the miracles is not of the vulgar, worldly kind. Glorification and humiliation are close of kin, or virtually identical, in John's Gospel." After quoting verse 4 he asks, "How does the sickness contribute to Christ's glorification? As the exit of the traitor did (xiii. 31)—by causing His crucifixion" (*The Miraculous Element in the Gospels*, pp. 151–2). This does not altogether relieve the difficulty. We must seek further explanation. Probably the evangelist understood the utterance in verse 4 as showing the supernatural foresight of Jesus into what He was about to do in raising Lazarus from the dead; but we can interpret the saying otherwise. Jesus may simply be expressing the absolute confidence in His Father that the issue would further God's purpose in Him,

while at the time not knowing exactly how. His delay in going to Bethany may be another instance of His constant habit of waiting upon God for direction. He did not and could not act till assured of God's will. We may accept verse 4 as an authentic utterance, although we may doubt whether Jesus did call Himself the Son of God. Verse 15 presents more difficulty. After learning that Lazarus was dead, and realizing as He must have done by His intense sympathy the desolation which the sisters were experiencing, could He, however confident of a happy issue out of this affliction by the Father's answer to His prayer, have said that He was glad He was not there? Did the disciples' faith need such confirmation? Was not the price of suffering paid by the sisters too high for even such an end? Would not restoration from sickness have served the purpose? This utterance breathes the theological pragmatism of the evangelist rather than the divine humanity of Jesus. If, as has been already suggested, the evangelist remained in Jerusalem, and did not accompany Jesus in His wanderings, the account from *vv.* 4 to 16 may be at second-hand; and so verse 15 may be the evangelist's modification of an utterance of different import imperfectly communicated to him.

(ii) A similar difficulty presents itself in verse 42. While it is altogether probable that Jesus uttered the words, "Father, I thank Thee that Thou heardest Me" (*v.* 41), and they afford a most significant indication that He exercised His supernatural power in dependence on God through constant prayer, is it credible that addressing His Father He would add the explanation that He thanked God for answered prayer, not because He Himself had any doubt of an answer, but that His mission might be divinely confirmed for the multitude? The writer cannot bring himself to believe that the saying in its present form is authentic. Possibly the evangelist had added to the prayer his own

explanation of its purpose, and gradually the third person was changed to the first, and a reflexion assumed the form of a reminiscence. At least this seems much more probable than that Jesus could have used the words just as reported.

(5) The account in *vv.* 47–53 has the marks of historical probability. The connexion of the evangelist with the high priest will be afterwards discussed in the more appropriate context (xviii. 15). Whatever it was it placed him in a position to know the plans of the enemies of Jesus. The phrase "high priest that year" cannot be regarded as a proof of his ignorance of Jewish affairs in view of all the other evidence the Gospel contains of intimate acquaintance with the national conditions. It is adequately explained by many scholars as referring, not to the length of Caiaphas' tenure of office, but to the significance of the year of the crucifixion of Jesus in human history. Probably the counsel of expediency given by Caiaphas has without any deliberate intention been so modified as to make it appear more obviously a prophecy. Verse 51 belongs to the evangelist's theology rather than to history. So uncertain is the Synoptic account of the last stage of the ministry, that it affords no good reason for challenging the substantial accuracy at the evangelist's representation of the historical situation at the moment when the Synoptic and Johannine streams of narrative begin to flow in one channel.

XV. The Week before the Passion (John xii.).

(1) Mark (xiv. 3–9) places the anointing in Bethany in immediate connexion with the treachery of Judas (10–11), and, if the note of time in verse 1, "after two days," applies to this incident also, on Wednesday evening. Matthew (xxvi. 6–16) gives the incident a similar position. Both may have intended to throw into bold relief the contrast

between Mary's devotion and Judas' treachery. And it is not at all improbable that the chronology of the fourth evangelist is to be preferred, and that it was on the Sabbath evening that the feast was given. There is no serious difficulty about harmonising the Johannine and the Synoptic accounts. The murmuring that is ascribed by Matthew (*v.* 8) to the disciples is by the fourth evangelist limited to Judas (*vv.* 4–5). The charge against Judas in verse 6 may be justified; but it may also be due to the evangelist's detestation, elsewhere shown in the Gospel, for the traitor, of whom he would on very slight evidence be ready to believe the very worst. The explanation of Mary's action by Jesus, according to the Synoptists, is much more intelligible than the saying reported in the Fourth Gospel (*v.* 7), although the import is similar. While the Synoptists pass at once to record the treachery of Judas, the fourth evangelist, with his interest in every detail of the growing hatred of the Jewish rulers which at last resulted in the condemnation of Jesus, turns aside to deal again with their machinations (*vv.* 9–11).

(2) The account of the triumphal entry (*vv.* 12–19) is told with less detail than by the Synoptists. How the young ass was found (*v.* 14) the evangelist does not tell us. Either he did not know, not being one of the twelve, or he himself was the citizen of Jerusalem who rendered the Master this service. Characteristic of the evangelist is the reference to the lack of understanding of the disciples till after the resurrection (*v.* 16). But did not the twelve and the multitude alike intend a Messianic demonstration, even although the prophecy was not in their mind? Characteristic too is the connexion indicated between the demonstration and the raising of Lazarus from the dead (*vv.* 17, 18). If some of the crowd from Jerusalem were so influenced, the multitude from Galilee were moved to their enthusiasm by

their knowledge of the Galilæan ministry. Here again is the evangelist's one-sided Judæan interest. A familiar trait in the Gospel meets us in the account of the effect of the demonstration on the Pharisees (*v.* 19). The cleansing of the Temple, recorded by the Synoptists, is not mentioned here, as the evangelist had already recorded a similar action at the beginning of the ministry. We need not assume that he has violently transferred an event at the close to the beginning of the ministry, and reason has been shown in a previous article why the act may have been repeated. Knowing as he did the grounds of the hostility to Jesus, he probably did not assign to this single event the importance given to it by the Synoptists.

(3) The next section (*vv.* 20–36) presents considerable difficulty; the request of the Greeks is reported, and the response of Jesus; but there is no record of the interview if it did take place. Instead we have a discourse in which distinctively Johannine ideas and phrases are blended with what seem to be indistinct reproductions of Synoptic material. Probably the evangelist was not here an eye-witness, but heard from Philip or Andrew about the incident; and having a less distinct memory of what he had heard from others than of what he himself witnessed there gathered around it in his memory other sayings of Jesus which also had come to him second-hand. Is it not probable that he would in old age better remember what he had himself seen and heard than what had been reported to him by others? Verse 23 is characteristically Johannine in form, but may be a genuine saying; while verse 24 sounds an authentic utterance of Jesus, suitable to the occasion. The possibility of the wider ministry among the Gentiles suggested by the request of the Greeks is set aside in view of the necessity of His death. He must die as Jewish Messiah before He can become the world's Saviour. Do not *vv.* 25 and 26 recall

Mark viii. 34–38 with such modifications as the words might undergo in the evangelist's mind ? We cannot but think of Gethsemane, of the agony in which the Fourth Gospel has no record, as we read *vv.* 27 and 28a. The voice from heaven 28b recalls the experiences of the Baptism and the Transfiguration, although the possibility of some unusual manifestation during Passion week cannot be excluded. But verse 30 must make us hesitate. It was not the method of Jesus to give signs from heaven; and does not the verse, as recorded in verse 28, give the response to the prayer ? In his pragmatism the evangelist contradicts himself. If we compare these verses with the Synoptic record of Gethsemane, when Jesus left all but three chosen disciples behind, and even withdrew a little from them (Mark xiv. 32–35) when He prayed, it will seem incredible that He should have laid bare His soul before the multitude. Surely the sacred intimacies of Father and Son were not for profane ears to hear. The theologian's ardour in the evangelist overcomes love's insight here. Verse 32 links itself to verse 24 as part of the reply to the Greeks' request, and is suited to the occasion. Probably Jesus Himself intended a wider reference here as in iii. 14 than the evangelist discovers (*v.* 33), and is it not probable that iii. 14, which, as has been indicated already, is out of its proper context, belongs here ? The verses that follow (34–37) are a probable sequel to these utterances. The evangelist's confirmation from prophecy of the necessity of the people's unbelief (*vv.* 37–40) is entirely in accord with the common interpretation of the Old Testament in the early church. The following statement (*vv.* 41–42) again indicates one who was in close contact with the ruling classes in Jerusalem and not a Galilæan fisherman. The next paragraph (*vv.* 44–50) is manifestly displaced, as this final appeal of Jesus to the Jewish multitude must have preceded the evangelist's summing up of the results of the ministry as regards

the Jewish people ; and Dr. Moffatt, in his *New Translation*, seems entirely justified in placing these verses between the two sentences in verse 36. It is perplexing to find at how few points the Synoptic and the Johannine tradition of Passion week coincide. Different interests in the witnesses afford only partial relief to the mind. We must add that probably the fourth evangelist, whose home was in Jerusalem, went to and fro as the service of the Master required, and that his influential position, of which more must be said afterwards, gave him access where the twelve were excluded.

Alfred E. Garvie.

A PLEA FOR THE FOUR TRUMPETS.

In a recent work, *Studies in the Apocalypse*, Dr. Charles has given an earnest of the long-promised volume on the Book of Revelation to be published in the International Critical Commentary. The present book is only a fragment, but in it the writer sets forth some conclusions which, though novel, he contends are in the main valid, and will only be confirmed by further investigation. Perhaps in the case of no book of the New Testament is the hope of finality in interpretation less warranted than with regard to the Apocalypse. The first two chapters of Dr. Charles's work show how successive interpreters have come to the Book, confident that at last they held the key that was to open its seals, and how their interpretations have been superseded by others, not less confident and not less transitory ; and it may be wise not to hail any conclusions, even though they come from an acknowledged master of interpretation, as final. Time will try them and sift them ; and it will be something if out of a good deal of chaff some good grain survives.

After the two chapters to which we have already referred, there follows a chapter of special interest and value on the Hebraic style of the Apocalypse, in which the writer maintains a thesis which will doubtless be treated with greater fulness in the forthcoming volume, a thesis which, if proved, promises to clear up many a difficulty with regard to the vexed question of the language and style. Limits of space —the book consists of four lectures delivered in connection with London University—hinder the author from dealing with more than a selected portion of the Apocalypse itself; and he has chosen chapters vii.–ix., not only because these chapters have been most misunderstood, but also because a right interpretation of them is of vital importance to the understanding of the significance of the remaining chapters of the Book. In his study of these chapters perhaps the point that will receive most attention and evoke most dissent is his theory with regard to the passage that describes the first four trumpets, which he looks upon as no part of the original writing, but as an interpolation by a later hand.

To one who has studied with any care the edition of the Book of Enoch or of the Apocalypse of Baruch which Dr. Charles has given to the world, and seen with what masterly skill, amounting almost to infallible instinct, he analyses these books, and assigns each section to its appropriate historical setting, it may well seem as if to him must fall the honour of saying the last word on any point of apocalyptic analysis. Yet, in the case of a book that makes so varied an appeal as the Apocalypse, any conclusion that will in the long run win the adherence of scholars will be such as will have commended itself after the Book has been looked at from every point of view. It may not be without value, then, to test the conclusion to which Dr. Charles has come, and to put in a plea for the passage on the

first four trumpets being retained as part of the original treatise.

Dr. Charles finds the passage suspicious because it "not only arrests the development of the Book, but also introduces an alien element at this stage" (p.146). It does not carry forward in a direct line what he conceives to have been the meaning of the Sealing of the tribes as narrated in chapter vii. "The reign of Antichrist with all its superhuman horrors was about to begin, and so the Sealing was carried out just then (i.e. after the opening of the 6th seal), and not earlier, and not later. This Sealing did not secure against physical or social or cosmic evils, such as had already occurred, or would again occur; least of all did it secure against martyrdom; but it secured the faithful against the coming outward manifestation of demonic power, the epiphany of Satan and his kingdom" (p. 143). But as the demonic plagues do not issue forth till the fifth trumpet has been sounded, whereas the first four give the signal for "colourless cosmic visitations" to fall upon the world, these latter constitute a seam of alien matter thrust in between two sections that otherwise would fit closely together.

While this may be taken as the chief objection to the admission of the passage, supporting arguments are not lacking. Of these the principal are two, viz., the contrast between the plain objective character of the first four trumpets and the visionary nature of the fifth and sixth, and the fact that the first four trumpet-judgments are weak and colourless repetitions of the Seals and the Bowls. In the wholesale destruction brought about by the last series of judgments there is an exhibition of strength itself in comparison with the weakness displayed in the partial and hesitating judgments inaugurated by the Trumpets. Therefore Dr. Charles comes to the conclusion that the

passage has been inserted by a later editor of the Book, who failed to apprehend the meaning of the Sealing and the movement of the author's thought; and that the simplest solution is to cut out the passage bodily.

But this entails other changes; for the interpolator had to alter the context in order to dovetail the interpolation into the original writing. Therefore various emendations have to be made to restore the text to what Dr. Charles conceives to have been its original form. *Seven* must be replaced by *three* wherever it occurs. The phrase *that stand before God* in v. 2 must be omitted, for in conventional religious thought the angels that stand before God were seven in number; and the verse must read, "And I saw three angels, and unto them were given three trumpets." Further, as this verse in its present position interrupts the natural connection between the silence in heaven and the acceptance of the prayers of the saints, it must be removed to another place, probably after v. 5. And lastly, the word *other* in v. 13, as implying the existence of trumpets that have already been sounded, must be taken out, and the word *yet* that has been incorrectly introduced into both English versions must be dropped, and the Greek word translated as it should be, *which are about to sound.*

Such is the theory which Dr. Charles advocates, and such the emendations of the text with which he supports it. At first sight it must be admitted to be extremely plausible, and one that requires an emendation of the text so simple that, if it is true, the wonder is that it never suggested itself before to any commentator. But its very simplicity makes us hesitate to receive it with open arms. May there not be something to be said for the retention of the passage which this simple though drastic scheme of excision and emendation does not take account of?

And first, let us examine the fundamental contention of

Dr. Charles, that the passage introduces an alien element into the movement of the writer's thought. What is the movement of his thought? According to Dr. Charles the servants of God were sealed to secure them against demonic powers. "The powers of Satan were about to make their last struggle for the mastery of the world. In the past their efforts had been hidden, invisible, mysterious, but now, at the end of time, they are to issue forth from their mysterious background, and make open battle with God and His hosts for the possession of earth and heaven. The hidden mystery of wickedness was about to reveal itself; the Antichrist was in some sense to become incarnate, and appear armed with all but almighty power. Against such spiritual foes coming into manifestation, the faithful needed special help, and this was accorded to them, and that just on the eve of the epiphany of the Antichrist and Satan." For the proof of this the writer relies on chap. ix. 4, where the scorpion-locusts are commanded not to hurt vegetation, but only such men as have not the seal of God on their foreheads. But chap. ix. 4, marks only an early stage in the developing thought of the Book. Can we arrive at no more definite knowledge of the writer's conception of these demonic forces? In some sense they were to become incarnate. In what sense? The 144,000 that were sealed are not lost sight of, but appear again in chapter xiv. as those that are with the Lamb on the mount Zion, with the seal, "His name, and the name of His Father," still visible upon their foreheads. They have come through the danger against which they were sealed. And if we may identify the 144,000 of chapter xiv. with those that are said in chapter xv. to stand on the glassy sea, the danger from which they have obtained security is clear; for they have "come victorious from the beast and from his image and from the number of his name." The vague demonic forces

that issued from the abyss have become concrete in the Roman Empire, that, by the institution of Cæsar-worship, has sold itself to the beast, and has become the embodiment of Antichrist in the world. They presented themselves in the form of the persecuting powers that laid their hand so heavy on the Church's life. The servants of God were indeed wrestling against principalities and powers, but principalities and powers that had become incarnated in flesh and blood. They found themselves in collision with the imperial system which they could not escape and which they could do nothing to appease. They were face to face with tremendous inducements to forsake Christ. And it was against all that was involved in standing face to face with so powerful and ruthless an adversary that they were sealed. They would not be exempted from outward calamities, even from martyrdom itself. On the contrary, the central idea of the Book is that the acceptance of what the world chooses to offer is the Royal road to the side of the Lamb on the mount Zion. But throughout the conflict between Satan and God which had its outcrop in history in the conflict between the Empire and the Christian Church, they would be kept safe and would achieve victory. Nor would the writer think that any element in the life of the Empire would be exempted from being involved in that conflict. The forces of nature would be pressed into the service of God or of Satan. The diminution of the productiveness of land and sea, the failing and poisoning of the sources of life, earthquake and eclipse of sun and moon, would all be on the field of battle. Cosmic forces cease to be purely cosmic when they are employed by Satan as his instruments, or by God as the vehicles of His judgments. Now it is the sense of a concrete and definite historical situation, which is writ on every page of the Apocalypse, that we miss in the treatment of Dr. Charles. From any-

thing that is said in the *Studies*, the Book might have almost as little of historical colouring as some apocalypses with which Dr. Charles has dealt in his time, to which it is extremely difficult, and in some cases impossible, to assign a date at all. Only once in his book are we brought into warm touch with history, where, on page 100, the second beast of chapter xiii. is interpreted as "the heathen priesthood of Asia Minor, which had for its office the worship of the Roman Emperor." Apart from this single reference the historical situation is spoken of in terms so vague that the Book might have been written as well at one time as at another, or might even be a detached speculation on the movements of the unseen world as they sometimes affect earth. There are two points of view from which the Apocalypse may be looked at. It may be looked upon as a true apocalypse, in which speculation on the unseen world and on eschatology is carried on largely for its own sake, and bearing a more or less faint tincture of the time in which it was written. Or it may be looked upon as a prophetic discourse, meant to persuade or exhort to a line of conduct in the presence or imminence of a great crisis, with the apocalyptic element in it subordinate and secondary, as being the conventional religious thinking and language and imagery of the time which a teacher of religion had to adopt if he was to make himself intelligible at all. Dr. Charles would seem in his book to take the former point of view; and this, it may be, has led him to forget that every element in the complex life of the Empire would be regarded by the writer as a possible vehicle of Divine working, and so to look upon the phenomena represented by the first four trumpets as introducing an element alien to the thought of the Book.

Consideration of the supporting arguments only deepens the belief that these verses are from the hand of the original writer and are no interpolation. Not much stress need be

laid on the fact that the heptadic structure is graven deep on the Apocalypse (seven seals, seven thunders, seven bowls), though in the case of a number with a recognised symbolic meaning the argument for uniformity of structure is stronger than it would otherwise be. And we can easily imagine that had the chapter come down in the amended form that Dr. Charles gives it, some scholar might have been contending on this very ground that a passage must have been dropped from the original. Nor does the argument from the contrast between the plain objective character of the four, and the visionary character of the fifth and sixth trumpets seem of much weight, for the same contrast is in the bowl-series also. Indeed so close is the parallelism between the one series and the other that the inference is suggested that in both cases the writer is regarding precisely the same phenomena from different points of view.

But Dr. Charles seems to lay great stress upon the weakness of the trumpet-judgments in comparison with the strength of the bowl-judgments. "Colourless and weak repetitions" he calls them, contrasting the destruction of one-third with the wholesale destruction under the bowls. But it is to be noted that we do not by any means get rid of this weakness by the excision of the first four trumpets. The sixth trumpet also brings judgment only on the third part of men (ix. 15); and the same partial scope of judgment is expressed in the fifth trumpet in a somewhat different way. There the scorpion-locusts are commanded not to kill men but only to torment them, and that, too, only for a limited time, five months. Thus this element of "weakness" inheres in all the trumpet series, and thus the question is suggested whether indeed it is not essential to their message.

There seems to be no possible doubt that in the symbol

bowls the writer has expressed the characteristic feature of these last judgments. The shape of the vessel, shallow and broad-brimmed, so that the contents could be dashed out to overwhelm those upon whom they fell, as well as the action of the angels that had charge of them, vividly suggests the deluge of Divine wrath that overtakes the impenitent world. So it may be legitimately inferred that a significance is intended to be conveyed in the other symbols, seals, thunders, trumpets.

Now, there is little difficulty in arriving at the idea that lies in the symbol Trumpets. The sound of the trumpet was an arresting one, and, frequently in the prophets, a warning one. The watchman on the city wall blew his trumpet to warn the citizens of approaching danger, and to summon them to defence. So in the name *trumpets* we may see the idea of arresting and warning. This idea is supported by chapter ix. 20 f., a passage which seems to belong to the trumpet-series as a whole. "And the rest of mankind, which were not killed with these plagues, repented not of the work of their hands . . . and they repented not of their murders, nor of their sorceries, nor of their fornication, nor of their thefts." When the writer states so emphatically that the rest of mankind did not repent, surely he means to suggest that repentance was the purpose of these judgments, that God was sending warnings and threatenings because He had mercy upon them.

And the contracted sphere of the trumpet-judgments seems intended to set forth the same truth. That punishment follows some sinners with leaden foot while others it overtakes with swift wing, is a fact of observation. Thus, by the punishment that falls upon some sins, their inevitable results are underlined and emphasised, so that those who may be conscious of being guilty of the same sins but have received a respite, may be led to repent and turn to God.

Thus in the trumpet-series there lies an idea that is not common in the Apocalypse, the mercy of God leading to repentance. As the product of a time of persecution and suffering the Apocalypse is not "rich in mercy." All the more welcome should be such traces of it as exist. And such seems to be the meaning of the partial character of the judgments, what Dr. Charles calls their "weakness." Long-suffering may appear weak in comparison with the summary exacting of vengeance; but it is the "weakness of God" which is stronger than men, and which is sometimes able to soften the heart that punishment would make only more obdurate. The Trumpets contain an idea that must be in the Book before it can be called a Christian book—that God, while making clear by many examples the inevitable issue of continuing in sin, yet holds Himself in, that men may have opportunity to repent before the outpouring of His wrath from which there is no refuge. The ground on which Dr. Charles would reject the first four trumpets seems, then, to be a feature that is not only common to them all, but which is the very idea that they are meant to convey.

With the objections to the first four trumpets all necessity for the proposed emendations of the context disappears. But two points of minor importance may be touched upon.

1. Dr. Charles removes viii. 2 from its position in the text and places it after v. 5, on the ground that it is an intrusion between the silence in heaven and the rising of the prayers of the saints into the ear of God. But the silence and the prayers do not constitute an independent episode. They are but elements in a great scene of judgment. They are the prelude to and, in a sense, the efficient cause of the outpouring of those judgments. But that God's judgments are ready to be poured out at the appointed time and on a given signal is an idea that is surely not unworthy of symbolic expression. And the symbol of their readiness

seems naturally to precede the symbol of the removal of the restraint upon their action. So in vii, 1 f. the angels of the winds are first announced, and then the angel that forbade them to hurl their judgments on the earth till the servants of God should have been sealed.

2. Dr. Charles also notes, as other commentators have done, the inconsequence of the effect upon the cause in the fourth trumpet. "There is no conceivable connection between the destruction of one-third of the light of the sun and the shortening of the duration of the day by a third." He attributes the inconsequence to a hopeless confusion of the text, and by a series of ingenious conjectures and with the help of a Hebrew original he is able to get the reading, "And the third of them shone not by day, nor by night likewise." But it may be doubted whether it is necessary to seek a reading different from that which we have. It is characteristic of the writer to lay stress on the ideas that he wishes to be conveyed rather than upon the imagery that he employs to convey them. And the idea that he has in his mind is the diminution of light, which may occur in one of two ways, either by decrease of its intensity or of its duration. Here, then, we have probably only one of many instances in this Book in which the consistency of the imagery is sacrificed to the ideas that it bears. Who could present to the eye, e.g., the picture of a Lamb standing, as though it had been slain, having seven horns and seven eyes, and taking a book out of the hand of Him that sat upon the throne? How are we to visualise the Holy City of which the length and the breadth and the height are equal? In the beginning of the 8th chapter, we have an instance of how lightly the author's imagery lies upon him. In the first verse we are told that on the opening of the seventh seal there was silence in heaven for the space of half an hour, in order that, as Dr. Charles suggestively interprets, "the

prayers of the suffering saints on earth may be heard before the throne of God." We should naturally expect, then, that the prayers should be represented as rising to God in terms of sound. As a matter of fact they are represented as rising in terms of sacrifice, so that the silence in heaven does not seem so necessary. The angel adds incense to them, and they ascend with the incense and are found acceptable. In the beautiful Old Testament phrase the Lord "smells a sweet savour in them." Incidentally, the present position of v. 2 finds support in this inconsistency.

There are many suggestive things in Dr. Charles's book with which we cannot deal. This foretaste whets the appetite for the full feast. If many of his conclusions have the revolutionary look of this one, his commentary will not prove the final word upon the interpretation of the Book of Revelation; but, coming from the hand of so great a master of apocalypse, it cannot fail to throw a flood of light upon a Book of which Dr. Charles justly says that "in its own literature it stands absolutely without a rival, while in the literature of all time it has deservedly won for itself a place in the van."

J. T. Dean.

PAPIAS AND THE GOSPELS.

The quotations in Eusebius iii. 29 from Papias have been sifted *ad nauseam*, and by every man according to his ability or prejudice. Yet they are of sufficient importance to be sifted ever afresh. They are being used every day. Thus in the Expositor for March 1914 Dr. Bacon breaks a lance over them with the "sixteen reconstructors of Q." The theory that Matthew made a collection of Logia in Aramaic which Matthew and Luke used and translated each according to his ability harks back to poor Papias. Papias actually

said "Matthew *composed* the Logia in Hebrew dialect, and each translated "*them* according to his ability." Zahn thinks, as did Salmon, that this "composition of the Logia" was our present Gospel of St. Matthew, and that the *each* who translated them were the Preachers and Teachers of Asia Minor who used it, the translation being piecemeal and extempore. Dr. Brown doubts the truth of the statement and affirms that Papias made it on unknown authority if on any. Zahn, too, makes Papias speak here "of himself"; and even of the quotation that deals with Mark, assigns the greater part to Papias and the first sentence only to the Presbyter. Dr. Swete infers from it that St. Mark was St. Peter's dragoman, St. Peter not knowing Greek enough to address cultured audiences; while Zahn, with good reason internal and external, repudiates this suggestion and finds no thought of translation at all in this sentence.

The account that Papias himself gives of his methods shows that he had some perception of the rules of evidence.

He writes it at the time when he is collecting material for his work on the Interpretation of the Logia of the Lord. He leaves us in no doubt as to what he means by the Logia. They are the "commandments of the Lord committed to Faith," the Holy Tradition or Deposit of Faith. His work is a commentary on them containing illustrated notes as to their meaning, together with other words of the Lord, parables, and narratives of miracles that he has collected. His Logia were arranged in five Compositions (Syngrammata), and the commentary was a systematic one, following the order of the text.

Logia (oracles) differ from Logoi (words) of the Lord Jesus only in so far as the former implied canonical authority, authority, i.e., as Scripture; and Logoi (words) of the Lord included as in the Epistles to Timothy, all such matter as

we find, e.g., in St. Mark's Gospel, i.e. "things said *and things done* by Christ." The steps by which this extension of meaning is reached are (*a*) that the Logia are embedded in narrative, (*b*) that they require narrative for their interpretation, (*c*) that the Lord teaches by Deed as by Word, by Example as well as Precept. Nevertheless, Logia are for Papias primarily things said. We gather that there were in circulation when Papias was planning his work many Bibloi or pamphlets of matter such as he was in search of. But he put them aside in favour of what he calls the Living Voice, i.e. the actual testimony of "disciples of the Lord." Irenæus says, and there is no reason to doubt him, that Papias was a hearer of John. Papias himself says that he collected his material from hearers of "the Presbyters" (of whom he names seven). Testimony of this kind went far back, for hearers whom Papias interviewed told of things heard long ago. Two disciples of the Lord are mentioned as still living, and the hearers come straight from them: one is Aristion, the other is "The Presbyter John" already mentioned in the first list of seven of whom the other six are apostles. Papias avows that he cross-examined all these hearers strictly, and he vouches for the truth of that which he tells upon their evidence.

In the judgment of Eusebius Papias was a "thin-witted man"; "he inserted in his Compositions some "paradoxical miracles and parables," and he was a Chiliast believing in "the speedy coming of the Lord to reign with the Saints for 1,000 years upon the earth." "He mistook things spoken symbolically for literal truth." We gather that Papias would have therefore a particular interest in the Eschatological or Apocalyptic Logia. Nevertheless such "thin wittedness" does not imply that he would be incapable of sifting evidence after the manner that he describes. If he were ever so incompetent, the quotations given from him suffice

to prove that the Gospels of St. Mark and of St. Matthew in the lifetime of disciples of the Lord (*a*) were beginning to be treated as having almost canonical authority, and (*b*) were causing from this point of view difficulties from inconsistences with one another or from failure in prediction. The authority of these Gospels rested upon their apostolic origin. *The quotations limit the responsibility of apostles for them by indicating the mode of origin, and that upon the authority of apostles.*

Mark is a " Gospel according to Peter " only so far as its characteristic feature is found in recollections of " Words of the Lord " as St. Peter habitually told them : and the Greek Matthew is a translation only of an original Aramaic.

The differences between these two Greek Gospels arise from this difference of origin.

" There were many omissions in Mark." Yes. St. Peter had not told everything, or Mark had not been always present, or Mark's memory had failed.

There were many differences in order. St. Peter never had any order ; he told " the words of the Lord " after the manner of a preacher as the needs of the moment suggested : St. Mark made his own order from indications given in the subject matter, or from knowledge gained in the mother-church during the fifteen years between the Passion and his leaving Jerusalem, or even possibly from St. Matthew's Aramaic Gospel. He would not follow the order of that Gospel precisely, for St. Matthew's Gospel is a Composition, and even a Syntaxis, of the Logia with a definite purpose.

There were differences in representation. St. Mark rightly preferred St. Peter's version to St. Matthew's in " some " cases : both might be true, and in others St. Peter was the better witness : all through it was not because the words were new that St. Mark was first called upon to write the recollections, but because of the vividness in detail that impressed

them upon the hearers. There were differences in the wording even of the Logia in the stricter sense. Well, St. Matthew's Gospel is after all a translation ; St. Mark's is perhaps at points a translation of St. Peter's Aramaic, in parts a translation of St. Matthew's, while in fact even the apostles, when they talked or wrote Greek, were translators. This point indeed Papias could not raise ; the apostles were already in a sense " as the Lord " for him. The ultimate questions of the Modernist, " What manner of men were the apostles ? What manner of man was the Lord ? " were questions already settled for the circle of Papias. They were not so settled for Eusebius.

Eusebius was a critic, and a man of culture, well placed in the world, and content with it, a courtier and servant of the empire, averse to Dogmatic Theology. The bad grammar, the solecisms, the fanaticism of apocalypses repelled him. Above all, the revolutionary spirit of the apocalyptic literature was alien to his temper. That spirit, that attitude to the world, characterises indeed all the Johannine scriptures ; it breathes even through the Gospel. Actually and temperamentally Eusebius and the Johannines are ever in antagonism. But the Gospel of St. Matthew is also eschatological. In it, however, the eschatology is balanced by another outlook. For St. Peter and St. Paul, the world, and the empire, are still of God ; loyalty to them is of the Gospel : they can be " saved." An eschatology with violent cataclysms of destruction is not of their essence. All things can be made new, reformed and transformed by the beneficent activities of the Church. The " cue " of symbolism was helpful in removing the alien strata ; and Eusebius was indebted to Papias for providing him with still another formula in the " each man translated according to his ability." Papias indeed was using it to account for a certain definiteness of prediction, and of prediction unful-

filled, to be found in St. Matthew. As in John xxi. "inaccuracy of reporters" is the escape from a dilemma.

Eusebius had a special interest also in Mark xvi. 9–20. Apart from critical reasons these verses report "paradoxical" miracles that offend the taste; and the "he that believeth not shall be damned" recalled the spectres of the hordes of hermits and monks who fought for Athanasius. All the authority for Mark xvi. 9–20 comes from the Johannine School, and Eusebius must have been well pleased to find in Papias a testimony of an estimate of St. Mark's Gospel, and a discontent with it, that would account for its "mutilation," and account for the "new ending" issuing from Ephesus.

But again, it is with St. Matthew's ending that the ending of St. Mark must be compared. Both indeed have been "tampered with." The translator in the one, the Ephesian emendator in the other have effectually destroyed the original record.

From the point of view either of Eusebius or Papias, the two Gospels referred to in the quotations are the Gospels of St. Mark and St. Matthew; the two are coupled, and the two notices explain one another. The "each man" who translated refers (*a*) to the Greek translator of St. Matthew, and (*b*) to St. Mark himself. "Translation," we need scarcely say, was not limited by modern restraints or by the restraint of dealing with Scripture. Summaries, expansions, and even the incorporation of new matter would all be covered by it. For modern ears "Greek editor" is not perhaps so misleading as "Greek translator."

With regard to Mark it is to be remembered (*a*) that the addresses given by St. Peter in Rome, according to tradition, were only some of those that St. Mark wrote down from memory, (*b*) that the form only and not the matter of them was striking, new, and of use, (*c*) that the arranging of them into a

connected narrative was a distinct step that may have been taken at a later time, and that (*d*) St. Matthew's Aramaic Gospel in its written form must have corresponded to a scheme of teaching with which St. Mark, from the circumstances of his life must have been familiar.

With regard to Matthew and Mark it is to be remembered that great part of the material must have existed in a Greek "translation" at a very early date.

Whether it existed in a written form or as an "Oral Tradition" after the model of the Oral Tradition of the scribes, or in a written form is uncertain and irrelevant. There are certain recurrent formulæ, as e.g. Judas, "one of the twelve," "who also betrayed Him," that point irresistibly to the idea of a tale systematically told: the "tradition" is at once stereotyped and mobile: there are "forms of words" and "fixed images," and yet there is a moving rush of life that plays about them.

In the Pastoral Epistles the "words of the Lord" are a Systematic Body of Doctrine, and are the sacramental means by which believers are "modelled unto eternal life." Some "Discourses" are evidently used liturgically, as for Ordination services, or Baptism and Confirmation services, or for the keeping of the Paschal Feast.

The "translator" naturally availed himself of these, and there was no reason, if Mark's version of St. Peter's narratives, e.g., were at hand, why he should not take from them what he wished.

In Mark the lines of the framework (Syntaxis) of Matthew are still plainly visible, but in the story of the early stages of the ministry in Galilee they have been dislocated. The reasons are (*a*) that Mark follows St. Peter as the eye-witness, (*b*) that he records as happening together things that St. Peter told together. Possibly since the Syntaxis of St. Matthew did not aim at strict chronological se-

quence, the order of events in Mark is nearer to fact in some cases than the order in Matthew. After Cæsarea Philippi, it is no longer a question of the order of these two as contrasted with one another, but of the synoptic order generally as contrasted with that of St. John. Here, too, Papias and the Johannine school found a help in recollecting the possibilities of error in translation.

As for our Greek Matthew, it contains within itself the indications of its Aramaic origin : (*a*) the famous formula, "And it came to pass when Jesus had finished," is Aramaic in origin. It follows and closes each of the five great "blocks of sayings" and is a formula of transition to a connecting narrative of "things said and done." The first is preceded by a general summary of circuit work in Galilee with its results : the last is followed by the story of the Passion culminating in the great commission given to the regathered Church "at the Mount" in Galilee. The whole "from the Mount" "to the Mount" is an artistic and dramatic presentation of the story of the Church from the laying down of its first lines to its launching fully equipped upon the deep. The "Galilee ending" is dramatically necessary in Matthew and original there. Again (*b*) the whole ministry in Galilee is divided into two portions by another Aramaic formula, "From then," each culminating in a dramatically necessary climax, the first portion at Cæsarea Philippi, and the second at "the Mount" in Galilee. One portion has for its theme the preaching of the kingdom, the other portion the preaching of the Passion ; but in fact the drama thus articulated by Aramaic formulæ has too many principles of unity to be summed up in one. They all coincide as unities of life. The great drama is still again linked on to forewords and prefaces by other formulæ of Aramaic idiom ; while in these prefaces, which determine the place in history

of the drama that they introduce, the recorder shows himself dealing freely with and translating independently Hebrew scriptures essential to the motive.

It would seem, then, that a study of the " quotations " in Papias from the point of view of Papias indicates that the two " quotations " are put together as supplementing one another, and explaining one another. It is these two Gospels that trouble the " arranger of the Interpretations of the Logia in Five Syngrammata or Compositions." Matthew also has Five Syngrammata ; to account for his discrepancies compared with Mark, and to find an explanation of their discrepancies compared with John or fact, these are the motives of Papias in recording the dicta ; and so read the plain statement of the " thin-witted man " is confirmed by the critical analysis. If, however, " the Logia " are the " Double Tradition of Matthew and Luke " or the Q of critics, we look in vain for any signs that it ever existed ; if it ever existed, it existed in Greek, not Hebrew ; it was not a " Syngramma " or Composition ; and the dictum that Matthew wrote it in Hebrew must be left as a statement " made on unknown authority if on any," entirely uncomfirmed by any facts ; while the sense of " each man interpreted it as he could " will remain for ever an unanswered riddle.

The date of the Aramaic Matthew has a bearing upon the critical view that the unity of the Greek Matthew is due to the Greek editor.

From internal evidence it might be inferred that the Aramaic Gospel was written (*a*) by a Galilæan for Galilæans, (*b*) for the support of the Galilæan Jewish Christians against the propaganda of Scribism and the Holy War, before war in Galilee had actually commenced, (*c*) at a time when the cleavage of the Church from the " old people of God " was complete, (*d*) at a time when there was a decision or a necessity to go " into all the world," (*e*) at a time when the primacy

of St. Peter needed vigorous assertion against some rival authority. This authority is not that of St. Paul. SS. Peter and Paul were at one in their view of the attitude of the Church to the world and the empire. It is St. John whose name stands for the converse outlook.

All these indications point to an early year in the sixth decade. But at any such time, and even as early as 44, we may say with certainty that even in Jerusalem a Greek Catechism, Instruction, or Tradition of which the Logia formed the substance was familiar. No Greek "translator" would approach the task of "translating" an Aramaic St. Matthew without such an acquaintance with the Greek Logia as would enable him to write *currente calamo*, and to transfer continually sentences and paragraphs by memory from the existing Greek equivalents. Such a translation was made perhaps in Asia during the mission work of St. Peter in Asia Minor, in which St. Mark had a part, and while yet Asia had not yet become frankly and entirely Johannine. I should conjecture also that St. Mark's Gospel, as distinct from St. Mark's recollections of St. Peter's narratives, had its origin then and there.

If this account be true, the "two quotations" contain the brief statement of unforgettable incidents in the story of the Asian Church.

If Mark finished his Gospel before he was summoned to Rome (Ep. 2 Tim.) and left in Colossæ one copy finished before starting to join St. Paul, it is perfectly possible that he perished with St. Paul, never escaped from Italy, and that any other copy that he had perished with him.

It is clear, if this account be true, that Papias had no knowledge of any St. Matthew but the Greek; nevertheless he makes no suggestion of any *interpolation* by the translator. Just as Mark is on the whole an accurate painstaking

and trustworthy narrative, so the Greek St. Matthew is a trustworthy version of the original. It must be remembered that "Matthew" is one of the seven Presbyters from whom Papias, by his own account, derived his "testimony of the living voice."

I subjoin a literal translation, without commas, of the quotations, and suggest that so interpreted they are the plain record of most important facts that consist with the facts of history and criticism. Papias, of course, himself is not as a fact quoting. He is giving in his own words the substance of a repeated teaching.

This the Presbyter used to say. Mark indeed having become interpreter of Peter as many things as he remembered accurately wrote not however in order either the things said or the things done by Christ. For he neither heard the Lord, nor followed in His steps but later as I said followed the steps of Peter who used to adapt his teachings to the needs of the moment, not as one framing consciously for himself a Syntaxis of the Words of the Lord, so that Mark made no mistake in writing some things as Peter told them and he recollected for one thing only he was careful to omit nothing that he heard and to falsify nothing.

These things then are recorded by Papias as the result of his investigations about Mark.

But about Matthew these things are said—

"Well then Matthew in Hebrew Dialect composed the Logia, and *each* translated them according to his ability."

W. D. Allen.

INTREPRETATIONS OF CERTAIN NEW TESTAMENT PASSAGES.

Luke x. 31–33: *κατὰ συγκυρίαν ἱερεύς τις κατέβαινεν . . . καὶ . . . ἀντιπαρῆλθεν . ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Λευείτης κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἐλθὼν . . . ἀντιπαρῆλθεν. Σαμαρείτης δέ τις ὁδεύων ἦλθεν κ.τ.λ.*

The point I wish to draw attention to has so far as I know not yet been adequately regarded. It is concerned with the words for "going" underlined above. It seems to me that while the priest and the Levite were merely passing aimlessly, strolling if you like, with plenty of time on their hands and well able to look after the wounded man, the Samaritan was actually on a serious journey (*ὁδεύων*), in which his business interests were involved, and nevertheless turned aside to do the kindness. This adds a new touch to his beneficent deed. *Ὁδεύω* is a comparatively rare word, occurring here only in the New Testament (but cf. Acts ix. 7), and seems to be selected with the distinct intention of showing the different character of the Samaritan's situation.

Luke xix. 33: *λυόντων δὲ αὐτῶν τὸν πῶλον εἶπαν οἱ κύριοι αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτούς, Τί λύετε τὸν πῶλον;*

Acts xvi. 19: *ἰδόντες δὲ οἱ κύριοι αὐτῆς ὅτι ἐξῆλθεν ἡ ἐλπὶς τῆς ἐργασίας αὐτῶν, . . . εἵλκυσαν . . .*

The three Synoptic accounts of the appropriation of the colt for the Lord's use differ considerably from one another, and one of the respects in which Luke's differs from the others is that he alone mentions *οἱ κύριοι*. In Mark it is "certain of the bystanders" (xi. 5) that object: Matthew makes no mention of any objectors. It makes no difference to the point which I wish to make where Luke obtained his *οἱ κύριοι*, whether it is a touch of his own or not. In the

passage of Acts above cited the reference is, of course, to the κύριοι of the Philippian ventriloquist slave girl. It is somewhat curious that Luke should be the only writer in the New Testament to refer to joint ownership of property and that he uses the same word in both cases. Readers conjure up an ownership by two or more men of the colt on the one hand and of the slave girl on the other. No one would deny such a possibility. What is really meant, however, by κύριοι in both passages is "master and mistress." One of the peculiarities of English is that it has no one word like this to describe a joint relationship of man and woman, but it is otherwise with some other languages, for example, Latin and German. The usage is one that ought to be better known than it is. In Latin, for instance, *fratres* may mean "brother and sister," *patres* "father and mother," *reges* "king and queen," and *domini* "master and mistress" (so also in Juvenal, *Satire* vi. 4, paruas domos, ignemque Laremque et pecus et *dominos*, though the commentators seem to have missed the point). In German we find *Geschwister*, "brother and sister." I contend that this interpretation makes much better sense of Luke xix. 33 and Acts xvi. 19. Some will see in this use of the expression οἱ κύριοι another sign of Luke's "feministic" attitude.

Romans xvi. 23: ἀσπάζεται ὑμᾶς Ἔραστος ὁ οἰκονόμος τῆς πόλεως καὶ Κούαρτος ὁ ἀδελφός. (Cf. 2 Cor. viii. 18, xii. 18.)

In the *Expository Times* for March and April 1907 (vol. xviii. pp. 285, 335 f.) I argued that τὸν ἀδελφόν in Second Corinthians viii. 18 and xii. 18 can only be translated "*his* brother." Professor J. H. Moulton, I believe, agrees, though, as some kind correspondents pointed out to me at the time, the interpretation had been ventilated and rejected by Alford and Meyer. Professor A. T. Robertson, of the Southern Baptist Seminary, Louisville, Kentucky, in his delight-

ful book on St. Paul, mentions with something like approval the interference I thence drew that Luke and Titus were brothers. This depends on the truth of the tradition that the person referred to as ὁ ἀδελφός was really St. Luke. Those who reject that tradition are still bound, I feel, to translate τὸν ἀδελφόν as I do. That this is the natural and proper sense to give to ὁ ἀδελφός in such a context is absolutely confirmed by Romans xvi. 23 above cited. Nothing but blindness caused by the ecclesiastical use of the word and carelessness in dealing with "a mere list of names" would have allowed the habitual translation of that verse to pass muster for so long. We are bound to translate "and Quartus *his* brother." Every one of the men mentioned in that chapter was as much "a brother" in the ecclesiastical sense as Quartus was, and it is a sheer absurdity to translate it in any other way than I have done. It is at the same time interesting to learn a little extra fact about two friends of St. Paul, that they were brothers by blood as well as brothers in the common Faith.

ALEX. SOUTER.

OLD TESTAMENT AND BABYLONIAN LANGUAGE.

THE discoveries of the Oriental excavations have not only thrown much light on the history of the ancient peoples, but have cast many new shadows as well. Each fact is true, especially in regard to the Old Testament. It is certain, on the one hand, that many difficulties, which the text of the Old Testament formerly presented to the expositor, have been removed by recent discoveries. We need only think, for example, of the names Ur, Pethor, Karkemish and Phul! But how many new questions have been raised by these finds also! One of the most important of the problems concerns the relationship of the Babylonian language and writing to the origin of the Old Testament.

This question, indeed, is still young, but on that account all the more troublesome. Scarcely a decade has passed since we first heard of it. It was only in the year 1902 that H. Winckler put forward the suggestion that the cuneiform character was even for Israel the script of religion and state administration.[1] Following him, A. Jeremias next assumed that the Decalogue was written in Babylonian cuneiform, and that even in the time of Isaiah this script was regarded as the sacred one.[2] Im. Benzinger, advancing on the same line, has actually maintained that the reformation of Josiah marks the close of the Israelitish use of cuneiform script.[3] But the most vigorous defender of this theory is Ed. Naville.

[1] Hugo Winckler, *Altorientalische Forschungen*, vol. iii., p. 165 ff.
[2] A. Jeremias, *Das A.T. im Lichte des alten Orients* (1906), p. 263.
[3] Benzinger, *Hebräische Archäologie* (1907), p. 178.

He contends that those portions of the Old Testament which existed up to the time of Solomon were written in the Babylonian language and script.[1] This most surprising assertion calls imperatively for a criticism of the grounds on which it is based. The most natural course for the inquiry to take, it seems to me, will be that of setting out and examining, first of all, the various reasons which have led to the propounding of this new thesis. After that we shall consider whether there are not also facts which directly contradict the new assumption.

I.

1. The great event, which gave the decisive impulse towards this questionable theory, was admittedly the discovery of the Amarna-texts. Although it happened as early as 1887–8, and an English and German translation appeared in the following decade, the full significance of this event was but gradually recognised and examined in detail. It is not surprising, therefore, that Naville (*Arch.*, p. 10) starts afresh from this event as the foundation of his argument. On this fact he builds the statement that "Babylonian cuneiform was the usual written language in Palestine at the time of the Eighteenth Dynasty." He repeats this assertion in ever varying forms (e.g. on pp. 15, 26, 203). But is he not exaggerating the significance of that incident? Others have done so before him. Because of the discovery of these very Amarna-texts, the assertion has frequently been made that Canaan, before the immigration of Israel, was "an entire domain of Babylonian culture."[2] We see that this is an exaggeration directly we begin to examine the differences which existed, partly in secular and partly

[1] Ed. Naville, *La découverte de la Loi sous le roi Josias* (Paris, 1910), p. 29; *Archaeology of the Old Testament* (London, 1913), p. 3 ff.

[2] Friedrich Delitzsch, *Babel und Bibel*, i., p. 28; H. Winckler, *Religionsgeschichtlicher und geschichtlicher Orient* (1906), pp. 15 f., 33, and others.

in religious matters, between the culture of Canaan-Phœnicia and that of Babylonia.

Some of these differences are found in the names of the months, the opening of the year, and the chief gods of the lands above mentioned.[1] Is there a similar exaggeration of the purport of the Amarna-texts in Naville's thesis which we are now considering ? Let us see how the matter stands.

The Babylonian cuneiform was undoubtedly used to a very large extent. It meets us eastwards from the middle Tigris in discoveries which have been made at Susa ; in Armenia in inscriptions, among the Hethites in Cappadocia, and also in Palestine, as is proved not only by the Amarna-texts, but also by the cuneiform tablets of Ta'annek and two contracts from Gezer. It meets us finally in Egypt, as is proved, once more, by the Amarna-texts. All the same, it is too much to say that " the whole world " in the age of the Amarna-texts wrote the Babylonish character,[2] and it is also quite uncertain as regards Palestine whether in the Amarna period the Babylonian language and script were the only means of writing. The Egyptian rulers of Tyre and Sidon did indeed write in Babylonish (Naville, *Arch.*, p. 13). But we know only this, that they wrote to Egypt in this form. They may, no doubt, have chosen a means of communication which was familiar to both sides. Nothing is positively proved except that during this time, and by the parties concerned, Babylonian cuneiform was *one* means of written communication. No fact beyond this can be securely ascertained.

A glance at Egypt suffices to warn us that caution is necessary in examining the subject. For there undoubtedly

[1] A more detailed explanation will be found in my *Geschichte der alttestamentlichen Religion* (1912), p. 275 ff.

[2] A. Jeremias, *Der Einfluss Babyloniens auf das Verständnis des Alten Testaments* (1908), p. 8.

in the time of Amenophis III. and IV the Babylonian language and script were used. But this was done only in the answering of letters which had arrived in this language and writing. Naville indeed observes (*Arch.*, p. 10) that letters such as those sent at that time from Palestine to Egypt "must be in the language either of the ruler or the subject." But he has overlooked a third possibility, namely that the language (and writing) in question is that which was relatively best known to both parties. In any case such was the custom in Egypt. Cuneiform writing and the Babylonian language were indeed used in order to maintain diplomatic intercourse with Babylonia and the governors in Palestine, etc.; but during that very time the Egyptians actually possessed and used their native writing and language. For these reasons it is an unnatural assumption of Naville (*Arch.*, pp. 17 and 204) that *Moses* was taught the Babylonian cuneiform writing at the court of Egypt. There is the less reason to presume such a fact because the Egyptians could have had no interest in facilitating or suggesting to him any kind of intercourse with other Semites. And we cannot deduce from the mere fact of the Amarna-texts or the Ta'annek letters that Moses used the Babylonian cuneiform writing. For these letters belong to the period before Moses; [1] and, moreover, the writings of Moses were composed outside Canaan.

2. But another very important consideration—much used of late in support of the view we are discussing—is associated with the age of Moses. It has been said that the

[1] That the Amarna-letters, these witnesses to the Egyptian rule over Canaan, were written after the time of Joshua, was incorrectly assumed by Böhl (*Kanaanäer und Hebräer*, 1911, p. 95), as this view cannot be reconciled with the complete silence of the Israelitish testimony as to such a political situation. The correct view is that accepted by Naville (*Arch.*, p. 16), "The Egyptian captivity (of Israel) is the time of the Tel-el-Amarna correspondence."

script of legal codification was the "holy" form of writing, for law was a part of religion in Israel as it was among other peoples of antiquity.[1] This kind of writing was that used by the learned, and was sent on Babylonian cuneiform tablets from the Euphrates to Canaan. This is alleged to have been the "writing of God" of Exodus xxxii. 16 (Naville, *Arch.*, p. 17). But we note, *first*, there is no proof that the kind of writing which was used in drawing up the legal code was regarded as the "holy" one. As far as Israel is concerned, this supposition is entirely erroneous, for the expression, "the writing of God," has no reference whatever to written copies of legal enactments, but is employed solely with reference to the Decalogue. Therefore the Hebrew sources do not permit us to force upon them the idea that a "sacred" (i.e. the Babylonian) writing was employed for the enumeration of laws or religious texts.

Secondly, the expression of Exodus xxxii. 16, *mikhtab elohîm*, means "writing, or *something written* by God." For this expression refers back to the words of xxxi. 18, that the tables of testimony were "written with the finger of God." The expression *mikhtab elohîm* is distinctly explained in Deuteronomy x. 4: "And He (God) wrote on the tables, according to the first writing, the ten commandments." [2]

Both points were overlooked by Winckler, Benzinger and Naville. The expression used in Exodus xxxii. 16 does not therefore mean a special *kind* of writing or alphabet, and consequently has no reference to the Babylonian cuneiform. Is the matter, we may add, affected in any way by the allusion to Egyptian expressions made by Naville (*Arch.*, p. 17 f.)? According to the well-known Rosetta stone the

[1] Benzinger, *Hebräische Archäologie* (1907), p. 177.

[2] *Mikhtab elohîm* is correctly interpreted, for example, in *Gesenii Thesaurus*, p. 723a, where it is translated "Scriptura scripta a deo." B.D.B. Oxford Lex., 508a: handwriting.

hieroglyphs were named the writing of divine words; and when an inscription, which was supposed to have been engraved by the god (Thoth) himself, is described as "writing of the divine words which are the Book of Thoth," the meaning is that the inscription concerned was written in hieroglyphics. But this fact alters nothing in our understanding of the Hebrew expression *mikhtab elohîm* (Exodus xxxii. 16), as this idea is deduced from the words, "written with the finger of God" (xxxi. 18). "Written by God" is not the same as "written over with a divine writing." The Hebrew does not imagine that a script, or at least a kind of lettering, was invented by a god. Therefore for him the expression "writing of God" cannot mean a *kind* of writing invented or employed by God. This one example shows that the "Egyptian" interpretation of the Old Testament, which is expressly recommended by Naville,[1] may lead us to place Hebrew and Egyptian modes of expression on the same level, and thus to lose sight of the distinctive characteristics of Hebrew thought.

3. The age of Solomon is supposed to supply a third main argument for the new thesis. For in that age, according to the view of Naville, Deuteronomy was written in the Babylonian language and script, and placed in the foundation walls of the Temple, to be brought forth once more in the reign of King Josiah in the year 621 (2 Kings xxii. 8). On what grounds did Naville reach this conclusion?

His starting-point is a custom which was observed in Egypt. In that country written documents and architectural plans have actually been discovered in the foundations of temples and under statues.[2] The recognition of

[1] *La Découverte*, etc., p. 12: "donner au texte l'interprétation égyptienne."

[2] Naville in the *Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archæology*, 1907, and *La Découverte*, etc., pp. 3–8; Joh. Herrmann in *Z.A.T.W.*, 1908, p. 291 ff.

this fact led him to the conclusion that in Egypt it was the custom to place religious texts in the foundation-walls of sanctuaries, and this circumstance seems to him to throw a clear light on the events which are narrated in 2 Kings xxii. 8. We remember that in the account of the restoration of the temple given in that passage it is stated that the high priest Hilkiah said to Shaphan the scribe, "I have found the book of the law in the house of the Lord."[1] But there are several circumstances which prevent us from seeing in this narrative a parallel to these Egyptian discoveries.

(*a*) In the first place, there is no reason and no possible excuse for assigning to the age of Solomon the date of the composition of Deuteronomy. The "kingly law," for example (xvii. 14–20), is directed against those very errors of the kings of Israel which were actually begun by Solomon (1 Kings x. 28; xi. 1 ff.; Cant. vi. 8). And further, the rule forbidding a multiplicity of places for Jahve's worship, which is so thoroughly characteristic of Deuteronomy, (xii. 4 ff.), could have no reference to the age of Solomon, or to any period earlier than the reign of Hezekiah (2 Kings xviii. 4).

(*b*) In the second place, there is no reference in the account of the building and consecration of the temple (1 Kings vi.–viii.) to the laying within the foundation walls or beneath the foundation stone of a copy of the book of the law. Naville (*La Déc.*, p. 21) thinks, indeed, that he can "easily" get rid of this objection. For as there is no mention of the laying of the foundation stone in the account of the temple building, there was no occasion, he thinks, to refer to the deposition of the book, which, as in Egypt, must have formed part of the ceremony of stone-laying. But,

[1] The translation "a book of the law" (Klostermann, *in loc.*) is incorrect. For the indeterminate nature of the matter is not indicated here, as in Deut. xvii. 18, by the meaning of *mischnê*, "duplicate or copy."

reversing the argument, we may say that this act would have been mentioned in the narrative of 1 Kings vi. if it had been carried out with any such fulness of ceremony as the deposition of original documents and the walling-in of a copy of the law-book would of itself have demanded. Note further, that the "foundation stone" is never mentioned in the old Hebrew writings. Twice we read of the "corner stone" (Isa. xxviii. 16; Job xxxviii. 6; cf. "head of the corner" Ps. cxviii. 22), and even this is not named in passages where, besides 1 Kings vi. 1, we might naturally expect to find it mentioned.[1] Therefore for this very reason it is improbable that a copy of the book of the law was deposited in the foundation walls, or rather in the foundation stone of the Solomonic temple. On the other hand, we are distinctly informed that a copy of Deuteronomy was deposited in the side of the ark of the covenant (Deut. xxxi. 26). Naville tries to explain this verse, which contradicts his argument, in the following way. He suggests that the words of Deuteronomy xxxi. 26 imply that a Deuteronomy —a copy of it—was deposited in the side of the ark. But the literal words convey no such meaning, and Naville's explanation is inadmissible. The text simply states that the book of the law should be preserved by the side of the ark. Tradition knows *nothing* of any other place where Deuteronomy or a copy of it had been deposited.

(*c*) In the narrative of the temple-renovation under King Josiah the purpose of the work is simply said to be that of "repairing the breaches of the house of the Lord" (2 Kings xxii. 5), i.e., the broken down or ruinous places. The concern of the workmen at that time was to restore such breaches in the masonry as were then apparent in the temple structure. The narrative does indeed mention the purchase of timber or hewn stone (v. 6), but there is not a

[1] Hag. ii. 16; Zech. iv. 9; Ezra iii. 6; 2 Chron. viii. 16.

hint as to the breaking up of the foundation, or of any interference with the foundation walls. Naville tries to deduce some such action from the use of "hewn stones" (*La Déc.*, p. 11). But the *'abenê machsēb* mentioned in the narrative might have been inserted in the walls here and there, without any disturbance of the foundations of the building. The digging up of the foundation stone of the structure would have involved its entire rebuilding, not the repairing of the breaches of the house.[1] We have lately, indeed, been reminded that "in ancient times the foundation stone was let into the wall not beneath but above ground."[2] This, however, proves nothing as to the possibility that the book of the law was discovered in the foundation stone of the temple. For in order to make such a thing possible, an opening up of the foundation wall would have been necessary. Now an operation of this sort is incompatible with the statement as to the object of the work undertaken, that of "repairing of the breaches of the house of the Lord." And besides, the defenders of the new theory ignore the words of the high priest, "I have found the book of the law in the house of the Lord." For if the book of the law had been found during the excavation of the foundation stone, it would not have been found by the high priest himself, but by the workmen engaged upon the building, and in that case, also, it could not be said that the former had found it in the "house of the Lord."[3] We see, then,

[1] Hub. Grimme thinks he can come to Naville's aid by translating Deut. xxix. 29, "This is that which remained hidden for Jahve, our God, and has been revealed again for us and our children, that we may do all the words of this law"; Naville accepted this assistance (*La Déc.*, p. 18), but this translation is made impossible by the position of the expression "*ad 'olam*," "for ever." Moreover, the subject of the sentence, "This is," should have been expressed by a demonstrative pronoun.

[2] Riessler, *Das alte Testament und die babylonische Keilschrift* (in the *Tübinger Theologische Quartalschrift*, 1911, p. 494).

[3] There is no justification for explaining this passage as Naville does, in the following way, "Hilkiah found it in the rubbish, or he picked it up when it fell out of its hiding-place" (*Arch.*, p. 129).

that in Hebrew antiquity there is no parallel to the custom which we observe in Egypt, of depositing written documents, as for instance portions of the so-called Book of the Dead, under the statues of gods.[1] The most probable theory as to the mode in which the book of the law was found in the year 621, is that the discovery was made *on the occasion* of this temple renovation. In all probability the book of the law was removed from the holy of holies under Manasseh and deposited in a side-room. But now, during the examination of the whole temple building, which naturally took place, it came once more under the high priest's notice. For the rest, we may add, the suggestion which has recently been often made, that the discovery of the book of the law was a fiction, finds no support, either direct or indirect, in the text of 2 Kings xxii.

(*d*) The most important point is the following. The words of 2 Kings xxii. 8, which inform us of the discovery of the book of the law, run thus: "And Hilkiah the high priest said unto Shaphan the scribe, 'I have found the book of the law in the house of the Lord.' And Hilkiah gave the book to Shaphan, and he read it." From these words, Naville (*La Déc.*, pp. 12, 23, 28) draws the twofold conclusion: (*a*) the high priest had not read the book himself because he could not read it, and (*b*) the scribe was the first who read the book aloud to the high priest, and the scribe was able to read the book because he, as secretary of state, knew Assyrian, which was the diplomatic language of Hither Asia.

[1] If, however, I am not in a position to establish such parallels from the matter supplied by these sources, my attitude is not correctly defined in the words, "König rejects the use of the Egyptian discoveries as a help in explaining the finding of Deuteronomy" (Riessler, *op. cit.* p. 494). The expression "rejects" seems to imply some arbitrary caprice on my part. I have set forth in careful detail the reasons which prevent me from accepting the view recommended by Naville (*La Déc.*, pp. 2, 22) on the "Egyptian interpretation of the Old Testament."

But let us ask, *first*, whether the high priest really could not read the book which he had found.[1] Such a fact, if it were true, would certainly have been noted in the narrative. Without an actual mention in the text, we have no business to assume such an unlikely circumstance. And further, not only is such an allusion quite lacking in the account, but words are introduced which are contrary to Naville's theory. Did not the high priest describe the book he had found as "the book of the law"? This would seem rather to point to the opposite of Naville's supposition. For these words of the text do not naturally lend themselves to Naville's idea,[2] that the high priest named the book "the book of the law" because he had found it in the house of the Lord. "Text of the law and building of the temple go together," says Naville, for Joshua, (according to viii. 32) wrote a copy of the law on the stones of the altar. This combination forms very threadbare stuff, and affords no natural basis for the clear and definite statement of the high priest, in which he simply designates the book he had found as "the book of the law." A book found in the temple might, for instance, have been "a book of the upright."[3] Naville remarks (*Arch.*, p. 130), "When Hilkiah says he has found the book, why does he give it to Shaphan? why does he not read it himself? Because most likely he could not read cuneiform." But if up to that time the law had been written in cuneiform, the priests would in all reasonable probability have known this form of the law. For they were the very persons on whom was laid the duty of transmitting the law to the people (Deut. xvii. 11; xxxi. 25 ff.; xxxiii. 10, etc.). How unnatural it is, then, to assume that the high priest could not read the book of the law!

[1] This is suggested also in *Arch.*, p. 193.

[2] *La Découverte*, p. 13; *Archæology*, p. 130.

[3] Cf. 2 Sam. i. 18, and the βιβλίον τῆς ᾠδῆς in LXX on 1 Kings viii. 53.

Secondly, Naville thinks (*La Déc.*, p. 13) that he is at liberty to alter the closing words of 2 Kings xxii. 8 as follows, "And the scribe read the book aloud to him."[1] He supposes that because the narrative is so very brief, it must be all the more remarkable that we are told that Shaphan read the book. According to his view, we must therefore translate, "And Shaphan gave him a reading of it, or read it aloud to him." But no, the words, as they stand, have a perfectly natural meaning. The text takes for granted, and makes no mention of the obvious fact that the high priest *had* already read the book. In order to indicate this, the narrator rightly thought it sufficient that he should put into the high priest's mouth the designation of the book as the book of the law. Further, the corresponding Hebrew verb (*kara'*) means simply "to read," and does not of itself convey the meaning "to read aloud." If the meaning had been "and he read it aloud *to him*," then *kara' lephanaw* would have been written, the expression we find immediately afterwards in v. 10 b; or use would have been made of the frequent word-conjunction *kara-be'oznaw*, "to read in his ears," an expression found in 2 Kings xxiii. 2, etc.

Thirdly, the idea that the high priest could not read the book he had discovered cannot be brought into the literal meaning of 2 Kings xxii. 8 even by a reference to the text of 2 Chronicles xxxiv. 14 b. For in that passage we read, "Hilkiah the priest found a book of the law of the Lord given by Moses." Naville (*La Déc.*, p. 23) applies the added words, "given by or through Moses," not to the law, but to the book, and considers that the meaning is that the book was written "as it was written in the time of Moses."[2] But if the syntax of the expression "through Moses" per-

[1] "Shaphan reads it aloud" (*Archæology*, etc., p. 130).
[2] "Comme on l'écrivait de son temps."

mitted such a meaning, this would have been made expressly clear by the introduction of the participle, "written," or some similar word. For the words, "by means of or through Moses," are often found in conjunction with the *law*, and this was perfectly natural because the law was revealed through the mediation of Moses. The transmission of the law itself was more important than the production of a copy of it.[1]

Fourthly and lastly, the suggestion that the high priest could not read the book of the law which he himself had discovered cannot be attributed to the Hebrew sources on the ground that in the *Egyptian* texts we read that "the great Rule of the plan of Dendera was found in an old text written on a goat-skin, belonging to the time of the servants of the god Horus" and so forth.[2] Statements of that sort prove nothing as to the meaning of the Hebrew narratives. *The position then is this.* In the Egyptian texts it is expressly said that the documents discovered belong to dim antiquity, but in the Hebrew narratives there is no similar statement. In these we find not the slightest indication that the newly found book had been written in an ancient script, which at the time of the discovery was legible to few. Nor is there the faintest hint in the Hebrew sources that the book had been composed in a foreign language. And since this is neither directly nor indirectly mentioned in the Hebrew texts, we have no right to read such a meaning into them. Therefore the assertion that the book of the

[1] For the association of the name of Moses with the book, Naville finds support in the translation διὰ χειρὸς Μωυσῆ, which was chosen by the LXX for 2 Chron. xxxiv. 14, while this version often elsewhere translates the Hebrew *bᵉjad* ἐν χειρί. But I have examined all the instances from Genesis to Joshua and have found that *bᵉjad* is translated διὰ χειρός in more cases also where a spiritual confirmation by God is meant (Lev. x. 11; Joshua xx. 2, etc. So the διὰ χειρός in 2 Chron. xxxiv. 14 in no way hinders us from thinking of the transmission of the *law* through Moses.

[2] Cf. Naville, *La Déc.*, pp. 5–7; or Herrmann in *Z.A.T.W.*, 1908, 292 f.

law which was found in the temple had been written in the Babylonian language or script has no more foundation in the sources than the assumption (Naville, *La Déc.*, p. 29) that the newly discovered law was forthwith translated into the language of the later time.

4. The new theory finds its main support in Isaiah viii. 1. In this verse the prophet is bidden to write "with the pen of a man" this sentence, uttered as a solemn warning, "The spoil speedeth, the prey hasteth." It is not certain whether the *gillajôn gadol* on which the prophet was to write was a large smooth tablet or a piece of papyrus or skin (Naville, *Arch.*, p. 18). But the former is more probable because the same word *gillajôn* in iii. 23 (a point overlooked by Naville) means a smoothed surface κ. ἐ., i.e. the hand-mirror. But the construction of the tablet *material* is less important than the nature of the writing which the prophet was instructed to employ. This is indicated in the words *cheret enôsch*. *Cheret* means practically the same as "pen," and the word is used figuratively to denote the art of writing. The more exact meaning of *enôsch*, "Man," is understood from the context. Because the warning inscription which was probably meant to be placed in the outer court of the temple would naturally be read by every passer-by, including people of all ranks in the nation, the expression *enôsch* must signify the simple, or lowly man, and as a genitive attribute it is equivalent to the adjective "well-known" or "familiar," expressed also by *îsch*, "Man," and the plural "men" in Deuteronomy iii. 11, and Ezekiel xxiv. 17, 24. It is probable, however, that by this universally legible script we are meant to understand large and disconnected alphabetic forms of a kind which the simple man, little accustomed to write, would be likely to use.[1]

[1] This interpretation is rightly given to the expression by Marti, *in loc.*; Condamin, *Le libre d'Isaïe* (1905), p. 52: "in large characters";

We find, too, on inscriptions elsewhere a large alphabetic form without connexion, and such letters may be seen in the stone-writing of the Samaritans.[1] We remember also the words of the Apostle Paul, who was usually wont to have his letters written by a " quick, i.e. practised writer " (Ps. xlv. 2, etc., " My tongue is the pen of a ready writer ") : " See with how large letters I have written unto you with my own hand ! " (Gal. vi. 11). The Egyptians also developed a kind of alphabet used by the people (Herod. ii. 36).

But is there an allusion in Isaiah viii. 1 to the difference between the Babylonian script as the " holy " one, and the ordinary " profane " made of writing ? Naville, following H. Winckler and A. Jeremias, gives an affirmative answer to this question.[2]

We reply first that no mention is made among the Hebrews of any sacred or divine mode of writing, which might be contrasted with *cheret enôsch*. It is useless for Naville to quote the words, " written with the finger of God " (Exodus xxxi. 18), for these words, like *mikhtab elohîm* (xxxii. 16) speak of a work *produced* by God, but not of a divine *mode* of forming written characters (see above under 2). As, then, the Hebrews knew nothing of a divine *mode* of writing, the expression *enôsch*, we remark secondly, can have no indirect allusion, as Naville fancies, to such a matter. Such a meaning is all the less derivable from *enôsch*, because the expression in no way refers merely to man in comparison with God. That contrast is also indicated when the word *adam*, " human being," is used. *Enôsch* is not used only " of

v. Orelli, 1908 ; Gray in the *International Critical Commentary* (1912) *in loc.* ; " in the ordinary alphabet with which everyone was familiar " ; Duhm, 1914, *in loc.*, " *Enôsch* is the ordinary, perhaps the old-fashioned man, who did not yet understand the current script of books—possibly writing like that on the Siloah-inscription."

[1] Bickell, *Outlines of Hebrew Grammar* : Riesen, *Schrifttafel, gezeichnet von J. Euting*, col. 35 and 39.

[2] Naville, *La Déc.*, p. 29 ; *Archæology*, p. 19.

man in comparison with God" (Naville, *Arch.*, p. 19), and *enôsch* is not an expression found only in the poets. It is used also by the orators (eight times in Isaiah),[1] and further in 2 Chronicles xiv. 10. Thirdly, if *cheret enôsch* was meant to imply a "profane" method of writing, the unnatural position would be suggested that this "profane" mode of writing had been chosen by divine direction for the recording of a divine message.

We see, therefore, that the only fact which may be deduced from Isaiah viii. 1 is that in the time of the writer the Israelites distinguished between "two kinds of writing." The expression "two writings" (Naville, *Arch.*, p. 20) is accurate, but, as we have set forth and proved already, all that he adds about the "two writings" is fanciful: "one which was considered as having been originally the work of God engraved by His finger, the cuneiform, and one which was called human because it was used in every-day life and not for law or any literary purpose." The closing words of this sentence are expressly contradicted by Isaiah viii. 16. For in that verse the prophet states that it is his task to "bind up the testimony." That expression points to the use of a roll of manuscript, and cuneiform was not written on such rolls. The verse makes it clear that Isaiah wrote the divine words which were given him to proclaim to the people in quite a different kind of writing, and Naville's suggestion that the case mentioned in viii. 16 forms an "exception" in his writing, is put forward (*Arch.*, p. 20) without any authority whatever. There is no foundation, then, for the remark he makes, in agreement with A. Jeremias (see above, p. 1) on p. 193 that "the prophets may have used cuneiform as a sacred writing."[2] He might

[1] Isaiah viii. 1; xiii. 7, 12; xxiv. 6; xxxiii. 8; li. 7, 12; lvi. 2.

[2] H. Winckler, ignoring all the facts which contradict his theory, says in his posthumous work, *Vorderasien im Zweiten Jahrtausend* (1913), p. 16.

have spared himself the trouble of making the further deduction from his theory, that it is doubtful whether Amos could write his own prophecies.

5. The discovery of the two mercantile contracts which were excavated at Gezer as documents of the years 650 and 647 B.C., has served as a point of departure for far-reaching conclusions. Benzinger [1] maintains that "the reformation of Josiah, which involved a sundering of the nation from Assyria, marks the earliest period at which cuneiform was abandoned, and the national alphabetic script was recognised as the state-writing." Naville (*Arch.*, pp. 11, 15) is sure of this at least: "The two contracts are legal documents which have a local origin, and were composed in a language which must have been the official language of that town."

But we must take into account, before going further, the possibility that these two contracts, although in one of them one of the parties is an Israelite, may have some connexion with the Assyrian garrison or colony which established itself perhaps at Gezer after the Assyrian conquest of the northern kingdom (722).[2]

The reformation of Josiah, be it observed, had no direct contact with the political relation of Judah to Assyria and Josiah fought with that Pharaoh who marched against the Eastern world-power in the year 608. While the narratives dealing with that period say nothing about the separation of Judah and Assyria, they provide the earliest evidence (Jer. xxxvi. 9, 22) of the transition from the ancient Hebrew New Year, which was in autumn [3] to

that "Isaiah and Jeremiah had studied their cuneiform, as a mediæval priest learned his Latin."

[1] Benzinger, *Hebräische Archäologie* (1907), p. 178.

[2] The cuneiform texts of Gezer, in the view of Meinhold (*Mose* xiv. (1911) p. 14) may possibly have originated with Assyrian officials in Gezer.

[3] According to Exodus xxiii. 16, etc.; in *Z.D.M.G.*, 1906, p. 624 ff.

the Babylonian New Year, which was observed in spring.

The same origin may be attributed, perhaps, to the fragment of a cuneiform inscription, and an Assyrian letter-wrapping which, as Professor Lyon wrote in the *Sunday School Times* of 1911, were found by the American expedition of 1909 in the town of Samaria. This is all the more probable because this fragment of cuneiform inscription was found at the foot of a wall erected in the Babylonian style. The following fact is, moreover, noteworthy. The Hebrew accounts of the reform under Josiah mention various things which were changed at that time (2 Kings xxiii. 4 ff.), but not one word is said as to a change in the language or writing.

These cuneiform documents of Gezer and Samaria could afford in any case no positive proof that cuneiform was the only kind of script which was used at that time by the Israelites (cf. for instance the Siloah-inscription), and that it was used for the purpose of writing the distinctive literature of Israel. The instances enumerated on behalf of the new theory fail entirely to establish any such conclusion. On this point they yield *no absolute certainty*. Naville (*Arch.*, p. 12) relies on the following sentence of Sellin: "In the already extensive excavations carried on in Palestine, no document was ever found except in Babylonian writing." But even if that statement were strictly accurate (see below), it would not prove that the Hebrews down to the time of Solomon wrote their literature in the Babylonian language and script. For in this case also the *argumentum e silentio* is incurably weak.

All the arguments which have been, and which can be, adduced in favour of the new theory, are seen, when closely examined, to have no such far-reaching significance as the supporters of that thesis have ascribed to them. And is it not possible that these writers have overlooked many points which ought to be carefully considered by those

who wish to understand the problem under discussion? We shall answer that question in the second part of our inquiry.

Ed. König.

THE SENSE OF SIN IN GREAT LITERATURE.

II.

"Peer Gynt."

It is the customary thing to say that Ibsen in *Peer Gynt* set himself to hold up the mirror to the moral countenance of his native Norway. Here, however, as elsewhere, the insight of genius, like the word of God, is never of merely private interpretation. "Peer Gynt" is not simply a Norwegian of our time; he is a man of all time. The poet has grasped the principle of his life so deeply, has with such fairness and inevitableness pursued what may have seemed to Peer Gynt himself to be casual and irrelevant words, imaginations, actions, to their one source in his ultimate nature; that in writing the play, *Peer Gynt*, Ibsen has declared from the housetops the secret of many hearts. For, once again, we men and women have come a long way, and have in the course of our voyage seen many things by land and sea. We have trafficked in strange merchandise. The reminiscences of infinitely various experiences lurk within us, written, as it were, on the tablets of our heart, in invisible ink. And at the challenge of a deep-seeing report concerning any one human soul, the hidden characters in every human heart stand out.

I am quite sure that if *Peer Gynt* had a fair chance, it would do an enormous moral service. In spite of its apparent richness and complexity, it is a simple drama. The very opening words, "Peer, you're lying!" put the clue

into your hands at the outset. All that follows is the movement towards that particular moral crisis (and to the solution of it, if there is in the drama such a solution), in which an essentially shifty and plausible human soul is at last confronted with the truth about itself.

It is a work also which should appeal to men of what is called a practical turn of mind, who may not take seriously the moral challenge of such poetry as deals with the troubles and embarrassments of rarer souls. I can overhear a man saying, "Hamlet! 'to be or not to be!' What moonshine! The man has far too little to do! These dreamers and poets only put ideas into people's heads." Now "Peer Gynt" is a practical man in the sense that he is one of those men who, having set his heart upon something, tries to get it. If scruples arise in his mind as to whether or not what he is doing or has done is right, he has an inexhaustible faculty for dodging the moral point and slurring it over with that rhetoric of self-support and self-justification for which we all have a perilous facility. Of course, he has his deeper moments as we all have, even the most prosaic, when we suspect that the kind of thing which we try to make light of as poetry, as imagination, as dreaming, may after all be the truth and the thing with which we have to do.

I once walked over the island of Rousay in the Orkney group. It stands sheer out of the sea like a table, a green and pleasant island. The sun was shining in a cloudless sky that day; and yet it would have been disastrous to keep one's eyes too much above the earth. For again and again, one came to a narrow slit or crack where, looking down, one saw the sea wriggling like a snake some hundreds of feet beneath. In his successful and outrageous career Peer Gynt comes to such slits and cracks in his own chosen scheme of things. Of course he does things which we who

dwell in cities cannot do. But these are not of the essence of his moral history. The essence of his moral history is something which we have in common with him, something certainly which offers itself to us all. No one knows better than Peer Gynt himself what precisely is that fundamental fault. He did not regard it as a fault : he simply regarded it as a fact. Sometimes he boasted of it. Sometimes he simply accepted it as part of himself, as he accepted the mountains as part of the world. There were moments when he was ashamed of it. And at the last he cried out in terror to be delivered from it.

And now what was this last fact or bias in Peer Gynt's soul which, and not circumstance, ordered his life and, to say no more, put his eternal destiny in hazard ? Well, after all, no one knows us so well as we know ourselves. " The spirit of a man is the candle of the Lord " : and more than once did Peer Gynt himself put his finger with absolute precision upon his own weak spot. For example, once upon a time, when he was in hiding in the forest, after one of his early misdemeanours, he sees a boy carrying a scythe. The boy looks about him stealthily to make sure that he is not observed ; and then with the scythe *cuts off his own finger*. He wraps up his bleeding hand and disappears. Peer Gynt understands everything. It is a boy who in fear or hatred of the national conscription has maimed himself so that he may escape as disqualified. Pondering the incident, Peer sees with perfect clearness that it is just a thing like that that he could never bring himself to do. Like that boy, he also might hate conscription and take means to escape it ; but it never, never would be such means. He might think of such means. Yes, he probably would : for it was a well-known, much-used way of avoiding the military service. He would certainly think of it.

"Ay, wish it done,—will it to boot,—
But do it!—No, that's past my understanding."

There you have the moral formula for this man: *he will never go through a thing, but round about it.* He will never stand up to the consequences of his own acts. He will not act unless he has already conceived the consequences and discounted them, not by the energy and fidelity of his own soul, but by making sure of a back door, a line of retreat, a bridge. Rather than look into the face of those moral realities which visit him, he will fell trees, as another man might play hard at golf, or he will drink, or he will whip up his own jaded passions, or he will intoxicate himself with lies of his own imagining, or he will assume the very consolations of religion as though they had been specially intended for him. Peer Gynt will not go straight. He will not think straight: and straight thinking is a formula for righteousness. Whenever a situation is becoming too hot for him, he will leave it. Whenever his own thoughts are becoming too sombre and close-fitting, he will think of something else. He will never cut off his finger—for anything, either good or bad. He will not endure the knife of reality even for the sake of the integrity and thoroughness of his soul. And yet, all the time, except in those moments when he sees through himself and knows that with all his tricks, he is merely postponing a painful interview,—all the time he takes pride in this mastery of himself as he calls it,—that he is above those scruples and interior judgments which stultify weaker men. He calls this 'being himself,' and 'being emperor of himself'; when the fact is, he is all the time afraid of himself. He even allows himself to believe that he is fighting his own battle, and bearing the consequences of his own acts: whereas the fact is, his whole path is strewn with sorrow which falls, not upon himself, but upon those like Åse his old mother and Solvejg his

sweetheart, who, because they love him, must wait and suffer. It is such an easy thing for a man to say that he can surely do what he likes so long as he is ready to bear the penalty. But the fact is, no man can bear more than a very small part of the influence which follows inevitably upon his acts.

One night, later on in the story, Peer Gynt, in the height of his prosperity, is discoursing over the wine. He is, as usual, complimenting himself upon his success. He attributes it all to his consistent adherence to the policy of "going round," of hedging, of not-committing oneself "once for all" to anything. He has a fine outburst elsewhere against the phrase "once for all," and against the entire idea of it. Hold on, he would say, so long as it suits you; but at that point let go. But hearken to Peer Gynt: like some of the world's most sinister figures, he has style.

> "The key to the art
> Of life's affairs is simply this:
> To keep one's ear close shut against
> The ingress of one dangerous viper."

"What sort of viper, pray dear friend?" asks Mr. Cotton, one of the sycophants who is listening to him. And Peer continues:

> "A little one that slyly wiles you
> To tempt the irretrievable.
> The essence of the art of daring,
> The art of bravery in fact,
> Is this: To stand with choice-free foot
> Amid the treacherous snares of life,—
> To know for sure that other days
> Remain beyond the day of battle,—
> To know that ever in the rear
> A bridge for your retreat stands open.
> This theory has borne me on,
> Has given my whole career its colour."

Peer Gynt, in fact, is one of those who *will* be morally com-

fortable. They do not propose to conform to the rules for living which make for peace of conscience. But if conscience should stir, and such men are not unaware that it may, he has his resource. He will dodge its thrust. He will think of something else. He will make a large contribution to some undoubtedly good cause, as Peer Gynt, when he became a little uneasy about his slave-carrying business, became a large exporter of Bibles by the same ships,—with the idea that God will be sensible and is sure to put one thing against another. It was like him, for instance, when, after a long absence, during which his old mother was left to see her home dismantled to pay his fines, herself sinking to death, it was like him on entering the old home, to forestall any word of reproach by sitting on the edge of her bed, putting his big arms round her frail body, knowing (for these subtle rascals know everything) that the divinity of a mother is just this, that she is ready to take any excuse for not keeping up even a true judgment of her child if that judgment is hard. There he sat, and before she could speak he had begun his old romantic stories recalling old incidents, mixing them with new lies, bearing down all her sense of injury:

> "No, now we will chat together,
> But only of this and that,—
> Forget what's awry and crooked,
> And all that is sharp and sore."

"Forget all that is sharp and sore": that is the formula for Peer Gynt. And now for this piece of sincere imagination, in which one who even here betrays that profound and ruthless power of analysis to which he gave free rein in his later social plays depicts the career of a man who has adopted such a formula for life.

Peer Gynt's first handicap was his father. From that father he inherited a swaggering and disorderly disposition.

The father had been a hard drinker, proud, flamboyant, unusual. He came of a family of some standing, and that fact alone had seemed to justify his indolence, and to establish his right to be a law to himself. He was what Mr. Chesterton has called "a rich and reeking human personality." As was natural, his wife Åse had a hard time. Poverty crept upon the home like a frost. Poverty, says Emerson, is demoralising. It is no answer to Emerson to say that it need not be.

Åse took refuge from the brutality of her position in fairy-tales, in stories of heroes, in folklore and mystery. Peer Gynt was the child of these two, according to the spirit also.

For myself, I think that in this drama Ibsen is fairer to all the facts of heredity than he came to be in his later writings. In those later writings he lays a terrible emphasis upon the inheritance which descends from generation to generation. But he came almost to lose sight of the spirit of protest and moral freedom which likewise is an endowment or prejudice of every human life.

In Peer Gynt we can see the working of the drunken, riotous father, and of the dreamy, imaginative mother: but in Peer Gynt we can see also the working of another personality which knows itself and which might have taken measures.

When we first meet Peer Gynt, he is in the middle of one of his stories which were apt to grow more and more wonderful as he proceeded with them; stories which he told with such circumstance and eloquence that he ended either believing them, or feeling and behaving as though they were true.

He is sore at the moment because in a quarrel he has had the worse of it, and with that thin-skinnedness of his he suspects that people are laughing at him. He would like to

do something to soothe his vanity and to re-establish himself as what Mr. Arnold Bennett has called "a card."

Ingrid, who would appear to have been in love with him, though her parents were opposed, is to be married to a kind of simpleton. Peer Gynt hangs about, hating everybody. The young girls will not dance with him. Even Solvejg, whom Peer has the insight to see as differing from all the others in sweetness and modesty, "with her eyes on the ground and her hand on her mother's skirt," even Solvejg shrinks from this wild man. He breaks through a door, finds Ingrid, the bride, and carries her off to the mountains by a path too perilous for pursuers. This is done not in love, but in sheer vanity and rebelliousness and self-assertion. An action like that, of course, brings things to a crisis: a man must repent and get better, or go on and get worse. He sends Ingrid home, and himself wanders among the mountains. Here he encounters mythical beings, trolls and the Dövre King,—representing without doubt the collapse for the time being of all the protesting voices in the man's soul. For the trolls are those beings in this world who are affected by our *thoughts* and whose thoughts affect us just as though thoughts were completed actions.

Nevertheless the higher voice is not quite silent in Peer; though when it appeals to him, instead of acting upon it, he simply becomes sentimental over it, thus allowing it to evaporate without having touched his will.

"There go two brown eagles sailing, and southward the wild geese fly; and here in the mire knee-deep must I tramp and moil. (Leaps up). Yea! I will with them! Yea, I will wash myself pure in the bath of the keenest wind! I will up; I will plunge myself clean in the shining baptismal font, I will out . . . o'er the mountains, I will ride all sweet in soul."

But as a matter of fact he does nothing. He was one of

those who exhaust the impulses of their soul in mere feeling or in speech, who, instead of acting, simply approve of themselves for having had such feelings, and move a vote of confidence in themselves. If there is any motion to the contrary, they declare it to be out of order.

Solvejg, the sweet maiden, who, as such things in the wonderful Providence of God do happen, sees something in this wild man which has let loose her power to love, Solvejg seeks him in the mountains, and is ready to share her life with him. He is man enough to know the value of her,—"it makes any day a holy day to look at you";—and sensitive enough to perceive that in loyalty to such a pure woman his disintegrated life would become sound and true. But he is man enough also to know that Solvejg is not one to love lightly, but to love once for all. And there, of course, he fails. She has entered his cottage, he remaining outside. But he does not enter. Solvejg speaks: "Are you coming?" "Round about!" he answers to himself. "What?" "You must wait. It is dark, and I've got something heavy to fetch." "Wait: I will help you: the burden we'll share." "No, stay where you are! I must bear it alone." "But don't go too far, dear!" "Be patient, my girl: be my way short or long, you must wait." And Solvejg answers, nodding to him as he goes, "Yes, I'll wait."

But he does not come back: at least, not yet.

He visits his mother, who is just dying. She is too weak to scold, and, as we saw, he soon with his stories and his fancies puts her off. He makes her imagine that he and she are off on a sleigh. He snaps his fingers, cracks a whip until the old woman feels the wind on her cheeks, and sees the lights of the city towards which she is being borne. But it is the city of God: for as Peer Gynt looks hard at her he sees that she is dead. A great gulp of tenderness

rises in his throat; but once again he destroys the very power of moral grief to do him good. He takes credit to himself for such fineness of feeling. He kisses his mother, saying, "That is the driver's fee," and then goes out leaving a poor peasant girl to bury her!

Peer Gynt emigrates, and we are led to understand that by the faithful application of his own unscrupulous principles he makes a fortune. This, in course of time, he loses. After wanderings in Morocco and in the Sahara he at length turns his face homewards. It is here that the drama rises to the level of great writing, to that level of moral insight and tenderness which will ensure it a place for ever. Peer Gynt comes back, and Ibsen makes us feel that this is what we have all to do: we have to come back. It is not easy. "Like an infinite wail is this coming in, coming home, coming back." For those who have eyes to see it is the first streak of any possible dawn for this man that he has so far overcome his love of moral comfort as to come back to scenes which must have the power to strike at his soul.

On the ship which is bearing him to Norway he encounters, when they are about a day's sailing from port, a stranger whom he had not seen previously. Of course this is simply Peer Gynt himself. It is the poet's way of telling us that after the mid-time of our life a man is never alone; that there is always himself, the man he has been, and himself, the better man he has not been and might have been. Out at sea, and especially when, as happened to Peer Gynt's ship, a storm has broken loose and spars are going by the board, is a sure time and place for meeting that stranger who is a man's own self.

The ship is wrecked. Peer Gynt and the cook hang on to the keel of an upturned boat. But it can only bear one, and Peer Gynt takes care that he is the one. Seated

there, the mysterious stranger joins him and begins to talk about things. Peer Gynt reaches land, and things begin to ferment in his soul. There was a time when he was more or less master of his own faculties, a time when he could use his subtilty to extricate him out of difficult places. But, as I said in our last study, we never know how we are going to behave. Those very faculties now turn upon Peer Gynt and employ all their subtilty to drive him out of his own corners, to expose his own sophistries to himself and to leave him no hiding-place from reality. He begins with awful clarity to see through himself. He sees that he has never been anything. Thinking himself master of himself, he has on the contrary been the victim of this and that and everything. He picks up an onion and begins to peel one layer from another, always discovering still another, and that the whole thing is a thing of layers without any central personality. And he perceives that that is a picture of himself.

> "What an enormous number of swathings!
> Isn't the kernel soon coming to light?
> I'm blest if it is! to the innermost centre
> It's nothing but swathings each smaller and smaller."

He tries to rally the old Peer Gynt who could sophisticate his own feelings; but in vain. He cannot but be serious, even superstitious. He sees grey thread-balls, and they keep saying to him, "We are the thoughts thou should'st have brought us." He sees withered leaves, which also charge him: "We are a watchword: thou should'st have proclaimed us." The winds sigh, and they seem to say: "We are the songs thou should'st have sung." "We are tears," say the dew-drops, "unshed for ever." The broken straws on which he treads speak up to him: "We are deeds, thou should'st have achieved us: Doubt hath throttled, hath crippled us." And at last he hears the wail-

ing of his old mother's voice: "You've driven me the wrong way," it complains.

In this mood he encounters a strange symbolical figure. Ibsen calls him the Button-moulder. He carries with him a ladle in which are placed for melting the souls of people who, like Dante's neutrals (who were too bad for Hell), have in this world been nothing, have never with energy been either good or bad.

There is, says this Button-moulder, one destiny for those whose will has been good: and there is another destiny for those whose will has been bad; but for those who have never taken up a strong stand in life, either good or bad, who have simply been for themselves at every moment, there is no destiny but to be melted down into mere material, as you melt down a defaced coin. The charge, that is to say, which Peer Gynt's awakened conscience makes against him is that he has been—nothing!

There follows a time, we are asked to imagine, when Peer Gynt is searching for something either good or bad which he can bring to the Button-moulder's judgment, claiming that there and then did he, Peer Gynt, assert his true soul, that he may claim on the strength of that one thing a man's place and destiny. But his own ruthless and subtle mind, which formerly served him well, is now against him. He can find in all his career no individual, personal act, no act which with all its consequences he accepted and stood by. Time and again the Button-moulder crosses his path, reminding him that the hour cannot be much longer delayed.

One day in his wanderings he hears through the mist the voice of one singing. Something awakens within him. Following the direction of the sound, he reaches a hut, and coming to the doorway he sees within, Solvejg the sweet maiden who loved him, now old and blind. Though her

eyes are without vision, she knows that it is he,—he for whose coming she has waited all those years. "It is he! it is he! Now blessed be God!" she cries. But in a voice hoarse with concern he interrupts her. He asks her for the tale of his heartlessness towards her, so that he may submit even that to his judge. But she protests that he has never wronged her; that, on the contrary, her love of him has made her life the great thing it has been.

With this, his last hope seems lost, when it comes suddenly upon him that perhaps Solvejg can tell him where his true self has been. And here let Ibsen speak:

Peer Gynt. Lost! if you cannot guess riddles.

Solvejg. Ask them.

Peer Gynt. Ask them? ay, verily! Can you tell me where Peer Gynt has been since last we met?

Solvejg. Where he has been?

Peer Gynt. With the mark of his destiny upon his brow; e'en as he sprang from God's thought? Can you tell me that? If not, I must wend me home, must sink into the land of mists.

Solvejg. Oh, that riddle is easily read.

Peer Gynt. Then say what you know. Where have I been as myself, whole and true? Where have I been with God's stamp on my brow?

Solvejg (smiling). In my faith, in my hope, in my love.

Peer Gynt (starting back). What say you? Ha! they are juggling words. To that boy in your heart [1] you yourself are the mother.

Solvejg. His mother I am. But who is his father? 'Tis he who pardons at the mother's prayer.

Peer Gynt (as a ray of light from the rising sun falls on him). My mother, my spouse, thou innocent woman! Oh, shield me, shield me in thy bosom! (He grips fast hold of her and buries his face in her lap. Long silence as the sun rises).

Solvejg (sings softly). Sleep thou, sleep, my darling boy. I will rock thee, I will watch. The boy has sat on his mother's lap. They two have played the whole livelong day. The boy has rested on his mother's breast the whole livelong day. God bless thee, my joy! The boy has lain so close to my heart the whole livelong day. Now he is so tired. Sleep thou, sleep, my darling boy! I will rock thee, I will watch.

[1] "Boy in the heart"=idea.

The Button-Caster's voice (from behind the house). We meet at the last crossway, Peer ; and then we shall see—I say no more.

Solvejg (sings louder as the day strengthens). I will rock thee, I will watch. Sleep and dream, my darling.

It is true that Peer Gynt has still to meet the Button-moulder. He has still to stand up at the great Assizes. What then is his new confidence ? It is this : that in any world in which the Button-moulder has a place there will be a place likewise for Solvejg.

There are two rocks on which man must cast anchor,—or be wrecked,—woman and God. For many souls, those two rocks are outcroppings of the same underlying reef.

JOHN A. HUTTON.

STUDIES IN CHRISTIAN ESCHATOLOGY.

VII. UNIVERSAL RESTORATION.

IT is a question of some real interest, whether Christian faith involves any particular belief respecting the destiny of those who persist in hostility to God. If the doctrine of verbal inspiration has gone, and we no longer feel obliged to give a place to every isolated Bible statement, it may be contended that the gaze of faith is bent solely on the Christian prospect, and that about everything outside the pencil of light cast by Jesus, and visible only to His followers, it must be wholly agnostic. In the main, I should hold, this contention is sound ; but a single reservation ought to be attached to it. Not even here can we escape from the logical principle that the knowledge of opposites is one. If faith predicates something of the redeemed, it must tell something also about those who spurn redemption. The words in which their lot is described may be preponderantly negative, but they contain a real meaning. And the positive knowledge available

for the believing mind in regard to "the obstinately wicked" may perhaps be stated as follows: It must be evil for those who are evil, as long as their evilness remains. If God be the Power whom we meet in Jesus, fixed opposition to His will must, while it lasts, entail suffering. This is true if the next life has a moral constitution.

But taking this principle, which comprehends, as I think, all the Church can be sure of regarding the adversaries of Christ, we find that, if we are resolved to have a theory, it may be applied in three forms or three directions, and that of the resulting rival hypotheses no single one thus far is entitled to exclusive favour. First it may be said: It is evil for the evil, while their evilness persists, but it does not persist for ever, since all at last turn to God, saved as through fire. This is the doctrine of Universal Restoration. Next it may be said: The lot of the evil is evil, as long as they exist, but we have reason to believe they do not exist for ever. They together with their evilness are finally extinguished. This is the doctrine of annihilation or Conditional Immortality. Lastly, it may be said: Evil beings remain so endlessly, and they endlessly suffer for it. This is the doctrine of Eternal Punishment. Whatever may be said of these views, they can at least be all subsumed under the inexorable moral principle just formulated. In different modes they all proclaim that as long as a finite spirit is in conscious antagonism to God, the fact will register itself in penalty. Nor is this penalty mechanical; it is the reaction of Divine holiness upon sin.

At this point two considerations join to support the general finding at which we have arrived. One is that all three views have been held by acknowledged Christian thinkers. The theology of the subject has invariably tended to work out in one of these three forms. Certainly this

does not show them to be all equally probable, but it suggests something in each which makes it attractive to Christian thought. But the other question has scarcely been asked, or has at least not been debated, whether all three may not be construed as differing applications of one basal principle, and whether the principle itself is not all we can be certain of.

The second consideration is that the same three opinions have appealed for support to the New Testament, and have all professed to find it. I do not say they are right, but the fact is unquestionable. What does it mean ? It means that the policy of deciding between these divergent eschatologies by simply opening the New Testament will not serve. Apart from the fact that the authority of New Testament teaching is spiritual, not mediated by proof-texts or imposed on faith as if by statute, what we have to do with is a *prima facie* impression that isolated passages in Gospels or Epistles seem to favour each of the three views. As it has been put : " Reading these sets of passages with one theory already in mind, as most men do, we instinctively accommodate the remaining two to this one ; we read it into them, and think that we find it there." [1] It is more than doubtful, for example, whether St. Paul believed in the annihilation of the impenitent ; but it is plain some good exegetes think he did, and unless one's own exegesis is put forward as infallible, it is impossible to deny to their view all plausibility. Hence the question cannot be solved by the method of citing texts, and in point of fact this method has not solved it.

It may be rewarding to scrutinise in turn the distinct theories above mentioned ; they all stand for live issues. We first turn to the doctrine of Universal Restitution.

If at this moment a frank and confidential plebiscite of

[1] Illingworth, *Reason and Revelation*, 229.

the English-speaking ministry were taken, the likelihood is that a considerable majority would adhere to Universalism. They may no doubt shrink from it as a dogma, but they would cherish it privately as at least a hope. How strong the desire is to believe in the salvation of all was recently shown by the sermon of a prominent English preacher—all whose sympathies are orthodox—on the loss of the *Titanic* in which he expressed the confident hope that all the victims of that lamentable disaster would be saved, as having called on God in the hour of death. On the psychological tenability of his view we need say nothing. It certainly cannot be known that he is right, yet it is not impossible.

From early times there have not been lacking champions of Universalism against the more sombre doctrine which ranked as correct. Minds imbued with the Greek love of harmony naturally turned to it. Alexandria was its home. Origen felt it should be taught esoterically, and that if proclaimed to all it might seduce some into ruinous laxity.[1] But he was quite clear that the development of souls does not end with this life ; there remains a purification of fallen spirits ; all are led back to God, rising from plane to plane. "Stronger than all the evils in the soul," he writes, "is the Word, and the healing power that dwells in Him ; and this healing He applies, according to the will of God, to every man. The consummation of all things is the destruction of evil."[2] Universalism lay in the logic of Origen's system ;[3] it agreed with his conception of God, which wholly subordinated righteousness to love, with an interpretation of human freedom that left it to the end mutable and unfixed,

[1] *c. Cels.* VI. 26.

[2] *Ibid.* VIII. 72.

[3] It was condemned by the Synod of Constantinople in 543. Origen had left open the possibility of future falls, for though an infinite number of aeons has elapsed, still an infinite number is to come.

and with a view of sin that reckons it as weakness and darkness rather than definite forceful antagonism to God. The two Gregories and some members of the school of Antioch shared the opinion of Origen. The West energetically disapproved it, and the pantheist Scotus Erigena buttressed it with arguments which can scarcely have helped it into favour. It received no countenance from Thomas Aquinas or the Reformers, though Anabaptist leaders preached it openly, but singularly enough was a favourite (if also secret) doctrine with some prominent Pietists of the eighteenth century, who believed they had Bengel on their side. A few of them claimed to have had confirmatory visions.

The theory in modern times owes its classic statement to Schleiermacher. He was a theological determinist of the purest strain, and obviously the transition to Universalism is simpler for a determinist than for any one else. If there is but one will in the universe, and this a will of Almighty Grace, it is very credible that at the long last "the love of God will triumph over the dying struggles of the human rebellion." Schleiermacher puts all the arguments in their most powerful and appealing form. We meet in his pages the familiar contentions to the effect that all men are predestined to salvation in Christ, and that the Divine purpose cannot fail; that no creature can be possessed of absolute freedom; that sin in time can never merit an eternal punishment. But what is peculiar to him is the exquisite sympathy and force with which the psychological argument is stated.

If, as may be assumed, future punishment is spiritual in kind, and pertains to conscience, the lost must be regarded as actually better than they were on earth, when conscience gave them no pain; and the pain of conscience which supervenes after death thus raises them above the old

self. But if they are better, it is unjust that they should suffer more. The living movement of remorse is a good which God will acknowledge. Turning now to the saved, he urges that sympathy with the lost must trouble their joy, all the more that its keenness is not mitigated, as it may be here, by a sense of hope. It may doubtless be argued that if there is such a thing as eternal ruin, it is essentially just, since none may gain the vision of God but those who share His righteousness. But this, far from quenching our sympathy, rather warms and intensifies it. He who suffers innocently is upheld to a wonderful degree by fellowship with God and the consciousness of his own integrity; whereas in the case supposed, one who is bearing the just reward of his deeds can have no such inward comfort. It is moreover impossible to conceive personal survival of death save as including memory of the past, a past in which some of the redeemed were linked by the closest ties to some of the lost: and when we look back and recall a time when we were as little regenerate as they, this also adds a profounder grief to our pity. Not only so, but the very dispensation of grace which brought life to us passed them by; and the bitter thought cannot be wholly silenced that by their loss we have gained, for the absolute interdependence of the various elements of the Divine plan obliges us to affirm a real connexion between the grant of life to some and the refusal of it to others.[1] His conclusion is that the difficulties of believing that any human soul will be condemned to endless woe are insurmountable, and such a doctrine ought not to be held or taught publicly without statements from Christ's own lips much more decisive than any we actually have. The difference between souls is one rather of earlier and later reception into the

[1] It is at this point that Schleiermacher's argument is most distinctively his own.

kingdom of Christ—a distinction inseparable from the idea of a world developing in time.[1]

The attempt has been made to cast upon Schleiermacher's general argument, and specially on the place he gives to sympathy, the stigma of sentimentalism. But he does not seem to go much beyond the passionate cry of St. Paul: "I could wish that I myself were anathema from Christ for my brethren's sake."

It is owned even by convinced adherents of Universalism that at best the support of the New Testament is dubious. The Gospels contain words which, at least on a first inspection, seem clearly to assert the eternity of punishment, and an offset to this has been found in problematic allusions to forgiveness after death, the omnipotence of Divine love, and the absolute triumph predicted for the Kingdom. There is a tendency to press isolated words in parables, or sayings of Jesus primarily relating to other themes. The particularly unyielding character of the Synoptic record has been explained by saying that the Gospel sources represent a time when the apostles had only imperfectly broken with the prejudices of Judaism; it was long before they apprehended the real mind of Jesus, who in terms had accommodated His teaching to their inherited beliefs. Or it has been maintained that what the New Testament offers, as in the case of the Trinity, is but seeds and beginnings of doctrine to be evolved later; it being forgotten that no real parallel exists, inasmuch as the revelational conception of the Trinity is nowhere implicitly negated, as dogmatic Universalism quite definitely is in the words: "These shall go

[1] In Germany, so far as I know, Universalism has been definitely argued for by no prominent writer on Dogmatic since Schweizer, the leading exponent of Schleiermacher's principles. This is remarkable, for the hold of Universalism on the general mind is probably greater than ever, and has quite certainly grown within the past generation. On the other hand, Conditionalism is favoured by a large proportion of recent German theologians.

away into eternal punishment" (Matt. xxv. 46). But at least in the Epistles a different prospect is thought to be opened up, and it is in fact upon Pauline texts, almost exclusively, that the case has rested.

Much importance has been attached to 1 Corinthians xv. 28, where the ultimate state of perfected redemption is indicated by the words, "that God may be all in all," with apparently an implied prophecy that all men, without exception, will at last share in the Divine life. It obviously is a crucial point whether this is a legitimate deduction from the quoted phrase. Other verses are these: "As in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive"; "Through one act of righteousness the free gift came unto all men to justification of life"; "God hath shut up all unto disobedience, that He might have mercy upon all"; "That in the name of Jesus every knee should bow" (1 Cor. xv. 22; Rom. v. 18; Rom. xi. 32; Phil. ii. 10). With these is taken the saying reported in the Fourth Gospel: "I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto myself" (xii. 32). It must be allowed that the primary significance of these verses appears to be as much in favour of Universalism as various sayings in the Gospels are against it, and that if they stood alone in St. Paul's teaching they would leave no reasonable doubt as to his mind. It is not surprising that they have been interpreted as containing so ample a view of the Divine purpose as to involve the final recovery of all men. But when we look at their context and meaning more closely, three facts emerge.

In the first place, a more accurate exegesis proves some of them to be irrelevant. Thus 1 Corinthians xv. 22 means simply that as all united to Adam by physical ties suffer death, so all united to Christ by spiritual ties shall be made alive, and Romans v. 18 means the same thing. Those who do not belong to Christ are not in view. Again,

Romans xi. 32 is undoubtedly a great affirmation of the universality of God's will to save—to save all, whether Jews or Gentiles; but since redemption for St. Paul is conditioned by faith, it throws no light on the question how far that saving will is to be accomplished and whether all men will yield to the Divine love. So far as language goes, the phrase "that God may be all in all" is satisfied by the doctrine of the annihilation of the wicked. Equally with Universalism, it teaches that in the end no existent human life will remain unpenetrated by the Divine powers. Secondly, in certain Pauline utterances there is no ambiguity at all. Verses like these cannot be evaded: "If our gospel is veiled, it is veiled in them that are perishing"; "Who shall suffer punishment, even eternal destruction from the face of the Lord" (2 Cor. iv. 3; 2 Thess. i. 9). In such passages we seem to hear an echo of Jesus' parables of the Wheat and the Tares, the Wise and Foolish Virgins, the Marriage Feast and the man without a wedding garment. One has only to scan a list of terms used by St. Paul to describe the fate of the unbelieving to have all doubt as to his view removed.[1] Thirdly, it is incredible if that a lover of his race so unwearied in compassion as the apostle had cherished a conviction of the ultimate redemption of all, he should nowhere have allowed a hint of it to escape him, or freely indulged in statements of a diametrically opposite tenor. These statements, it may be noted, occur not merely in early writings, whose point of view St. Paul might later have transcended, but in the very letters which are thought to yield proof of his Universalism. It is a fundamental principle of interpretation that passages which superficially admit of different constructions ought to be viewed in the light of those which are unequivocally clear. In the present instance we cannot transgress the rule with-

[1] See Kennedy, *St. Paul's Conceptions of the Last Things*, 313.

out making St. Paul responsible for self-contradiction of the grossest kind.

It must also be held that various attempts—as by Oetinger and Maurice—to evacuate the word "eternal" of its natural sense have come to nothing. As is well known, it has been urged that "aeonian" signifies not without end, but something whose end is hidden or inconceivable by us; that it is best translated by words like supra-temporal, transcendent, perfect; that at most it means lasting for an age or ages, not strictly everlasting. Naturally it is pointed out in reply that "æonian" is the epithet uniformly attached also to "life" or "salvation," where on every ground a limited sense is impossible. How apostolic writers could have expressed the eternity of bliss and woe otherwise than by terms they have actually used, it is impossible to conceive. Even if this particular word can be forced into meaning less than it says, and the endlessness of destruction for St. Paul left an open question, it is beyond the power of interpretation to extrude from it the notion of *finality*. Let the time import or arithmetical aspect be put in abeyance, still we are faced by that of moral quality. And if this implies any time character at all, it is necessarily one that "fills the mind and imagination to the furthest horizon and beyond it," leaving no ulterior prospect.

It is strictly true, then, to say that Bible proof of Universalism cannot be found. At most it may be contended that alongside of passages which conceive the punishment as everlasting others exist which appear to be in harmony with the doctrine of Conditional Immortality.

The universalistic view, as we have seen, is probably much more wide-spread to-day than ever before; and as long as it continues to be held as a private opinion, a wish or hope or hypothesis which brings relief to the feelings

and excludes other intolerably painful views, no one surely can desire to quarrel with it. It points in a direction wistfully scanned by all. So long as men believe in God and love their fellows they will find it hard to conceive the ultimate failure of the Divine mercy to win any whom it seeks, or the complete atrophy in man of the capacity to be God's child. Surveying human life and its conditions, they will be apt to reason that "if freedom has issued in the practical universality of sin, we may at least hope that it will issue, through the divine grace, in the universality of salvation."[1] Hope set in this key is a more venial infringement of the all but total ignorance with respect to the lot of the impenitent which, as I urged at the outset of this paper, is ordained for faith. But its place has been often taken by a confident dogmatism. The position has been set forth that Universalism is known to be true, and that accordingly it may claim to rank as part of the Gospel which men have a right to hear. This position must be examined briefly.

And first, let us put aside one or two arguments as unsound. Thus it will not do to say that even unquestioning acceptance of Universal Restitution must weaken a man's zeal for the Christian propaganda. It is likely enough to have done so in certain cases, as extremer forms of Calvinism did. But we need only recall names like Erskine of Linlathen, Crossley of Manchester, Blumhardt in Germany—all convinced Universalists but also active promoters of evangelism—to feel that as a whole the charge is sweeping and unjust. These men, if we are to credit their own story, felt a deeper zest in service due to the new hope. The other charge, that Universalism favours moral laxity, goes a step farther, and would be formidable if proved, but it is only fair to point out that no Christian teacher has ever denied that impenitent sin will be punished hereafter. On

[1] Wheeler Robinson, *Christian Doctrine of Man*, 338.

the contrary, Universalists have joined the rest in proclaiming a penalty which is sure and awful. What they decline to believe is that in the strict or unqualified sense it will be everlasting.

On the other hand, dogmatic Universalism may justly be called a departure from Christian ground, as Christianity is revealed in the New Testament. The apostles are clear as to what redemption is. They are clear as to the terms—terms divinely wide and gracious—on which the sinful are pardoned, united to God, filled with that Spirit which is an earnest of eternal life. Apart from this, they have no conception at all of what it means to be redeemed. And when schemes are drawn up whereby all men eventually must be swept into the Divine Kingdom, they appear to have lost touch with the moral realities of New Testament religion. It is in this sense that the proclaiming of Universalism as a certainty is rightly repelled as disloyal to the Gospel, for nothing will permanently commend itself to the believing mind which tends, as such a dogma must, to lower the ethical significance of the present life. The preacher has failed who leaves a moral impression at war with that which Jesus left; and Universalism, taken as a message for the world, is at war with Jesus' teaching about the future. The suggestion that He may have educated us beyond Himself, enabling us to take wider views, is hardly worth discussion. To call it improbable or unconvincing is a weak expression. Whatever our instinctive wishes, we may well shrink from supposing that we have attained to worthier or more ample conceptions of the Divine love, its depth and height, than were attained by Jesus.

No one can miss the fact, plainly visible in history, that the advocates of Universalism have mostly been unwilling to announce it publicly. This was the attitude of Origen, of Bengel, of Zinzendorf. In other words, it did not impress

them as part of the Gospel; for one cannot even imagine any part of the Gospel—enforcing itself as such because vitally implied in the redemptive experience of Christ—which it is not at once a duty to proclaim and a boon to hear. But to be told that the salvation of all is certain makes no man more willing to be reconciled to God. It does not help him to believe that this is the accepted time. It puts the urgency of grace into the future at the cost of the present. And the whole conception of esoteric doctrine is alien to Christianity. Inevitably it leads to the notion of a double truth, a public and a private truth; of course with the understanding that only the private one is true.

Again, it is but fair to point out that Universalism as a dogma has tended to argue the question on a sub-moral plane. It has too much operated with a Divine love which is a thing, a nature force comparable to magnetic attraction, and advancing to its goal with overwhelming and previsible certainty. Whatever be the analogies employed—physical or chemical in the old rationalism, biological since the application of Darwinian theory to religion—it must be objected that they reach a solution of the problem by eliminating one aspect of the facts. It is not that they have the love of God on their side, while their opponents have His holiness. The very point is that love which forces its way is not the love revealed in Jesus. Human freedom, on this view, is something destined to be swallowed up in grace; it is lost, not found, in the redeeming activity of God; the two are rivals, one of which must go under, while the other triumphs by the abolition of its opposite.[1] But do we know enough to say a man may not wrap him-

[1] But it is worth pointing out that the reality of freedom is equally denied by the dogmatic assertion of the opposite view, that men cannot change after death; which may be thought another reason for agnosticism.

self in a defiance that renders him inaccessible to the motives of the Gospel ? I do not say it is so ; but to maintain categorically that a time *must* come when the human soul will yield to moral suasion it has resisted throughout life is to exhibit a very deficient sense of our ignorance. Observation, as far as it is a guide, justifies no such assurance. We meet with bad men in whom good still lingers, and who give us a clear impression that repentance never is impossible ; we also meet bad men, who have tasted deeply of sin, its impotence and failure and misery, yet have not been softened but only confirmed in evil. Grant that educative Divine influences persist on the farther side of death, laden with infinite mercy ; grant that hearts may be changed there and wills blended with the will of God ; still the very reasons for admitting the possibility of this are also reasons for allowing that change may be resisted, and that permanently. If it be felt that this is to limit omnipotence, it must be replied that not all conceptions of omnipotence are Christian, and that some real limits are involved in the creation of man. We must not make salvation a nature-process, embracing God and man in a necessary drift of change.

No argument counts for more, I imagine, than that which puts Universalism forward as the only view by which the government and Fatherhood of God is relieved from partial frustration. Short of a redemption leaving no one out, it is said, the Divine purpose fails. But this really is to gain an unprovable conclusion by turning it into an axiom. If it is compatible with holy love to create a race into which sin may find entrance, because its members possess a nature constituted in self-determination, it may also be right that personality should never be invaded at any stage. It may be no more true to say that God fails because He cannot force men to trust Him than to say so because He

cannot alter the laws of number.[1] In any case the great problem would be, not that evil had no end, but that it had a beginning.[2] We need to remind ourselves once more that the Christian hope can appeal to no other source or guarantee of truth than the experience of redemption which has been evoked by the Gospel. This experience, as a present fact, is in no way affected, much less undermined, by any uncertainty or ignorance to which we have to resign ourselves. We have no right to measure the infinitude of Divine love by the hidden possibilities of the future, or at all to condition it by what may yet transpire with respect to men not now in Christ. We believe in the endless love of God, for it has touched and saved us in His Son, We can be certain of this, now and here; it is a fact of knowledge which no doubt as to something else can in the least

[1] Here is how a philosopher deals with the point. In his *Pragmatism* (pp. 290-295) the late Professor James supposes the world's author to give us the option of taking part in a world not certain to be saved, "a world the perfection of which shall be conditional merely, the condition being that each several agent does its "own level best.," And he asks: "Should you in all seriousness, if participation in such a world were proposed to you, feel bound to reject it as not safe enough? Would you say that, rather than be part and parcel of so fundamentally pluralistic and irrational a universe, you preferred to relapse into the slumber of nonentity from which you had been momentarily aroused by the tempter's voice? Of course if you are normally constituted, you would do nothing of the sort. There is a healthy-minded buoyancy in most of us which such a universe would exactly fit. The world proposed would seem 'rational' to us in the most living way." Later on he puts a series of questions: "May not the claims of tender-mindedness go too far? May not religious optimism be too idyllic? Must *all* be saved? Is no price to be paid in the work of salvation? Is the last word sweet? Is all 'yes, yes' in the universe? Doesn't the fact of 'no' stand at the very core of life? Doesn't the very 'seriousness' that we attribute to life mean that ineluctable noes and losses form a part of it?"

Of course, what really matters here is whether the choice proposed and the questions asked are respectively proposed and asked in view of the authentically Christian idea of God, as One with whom "all things are possible."

[2] Cf Newman, *Grammar of Assent*, 422.

impair. Otherwise hope would wrongly be made the basis of faith, instead of its fruit and unfolding.

Thus we return to the note struck at the outset, a note of nearly complete agnosticism. Sin, while any sin remains, entails suffering and exclusion, for we worship One with whom evil cannot dwell. Whether it will or will not remain for ever, we cannot know; nor is there reason to think that on earth we shall ever know. No one certainly is in a position to affirm that there must be those who eternally remain unsaved. This would be much more than to admit the possibility of eternal sin; it would plant intrinsic moral dualism at the heart of things.

H. R. Mackintosh.

THE EPISTLE TO THE PHILIPPIANS: A REPLY.

Dr, Kirsopp Lake, in the June number of the Expositor, has given us a suggestive and interesting survey of the problem of the Epistle to the Philippians as it affects the authenticity, integrity and date of the letter.

It is pure gain that in such a difficult question, dependent for its solution on subtle distinctions and complex considerations, the writer should be dispassionate in his dealing with the material and impartial in his presentation of the critical views held with regard to it. This, in the view of the present writer, is no small part of the merit of the author's larger work on *The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul.* He lays the material before his readers, tells them what expert critics think of it and what theories they deduce from it, indicating at the same time how far he himself goes along with them; but always leaving, and even stimulating, the student to form his own conclusions.

The present writer is thus conscious of a very real debt of gratitude to the Professor, but he finds himself at variance

with much that is advanced in the present paper, while he is strengthened in his belief that the traditional view as to the integrity and place of origin of this Epistle is not dethroned by such arguments as those brought forward before our notice with such perspicuity by the writer.

Though I think that Dr. Lake's general considerations on the question of authenticity are misleading and the analogy, or rather comparison, of St. Paul and Napoleon inapplicable, it opens up too wide a subject to be dealt with in this paper; and I wish to confine myself to the problems of integrity and date. And I can best state my objections to the line of argument on these two points by taking them in the reverse order adopted by the author.

Taking, then, the *date* of the Epistle as it is conditioned by the place of origin, we have to choose between Rome and Ephesus. And this raises the important question of imprisonment at the latter place. Are we in a position to admit the probability of St. Paul having been imprisoned there? For my part, I think that the arguments and facts brought forward in its favour fail to secure for themselves any sure standing ground or to weaken the case for the traditional view.

As is well known, the fact most relied upon to justify belief in an imprisonment at Ephesus is the statement of St. Paul in his first Epistle to the Corinthians (xv. 32) that he "had fought with beasts at Ephesus." Hitherto this statement has been interpreted generally, though not universally, as a metaphorical reference to his cruel ill-treatment at the hands of the people of that city. But if it can be accepted literally we are clearly bound so to receive it. But can we? The obvious hindrance to our so doing lies in the fact of St. Paul's Roman citizenship. Dr. Lake would meet the difficulty by assuming that St. Paul in this case may not have been able to prove his status of citizenship.

To myself the plea seems an argument of despair. In all the cases mentioned the claim of St. Paul is never challenged, and all that we know of the position of affairs at Ephesus point to the unlikelihood of any such difficulty occurring there. At that time only heinous crimes were punished by exposure in the arena. What ground have we for supposing that by any ingenuity of his enemies an accusation of that extreme nature could be trumped up against him? If, moreover, they had done so, is it conceivable that the inveterate enemies of the Apostle at Jerusalem would have been ignorant or silent about it? What better support could they have had for their own accusations against him, or what more likely to prejudice him in the eyes of such men as Felix and Festus than the record of a trial and condemnation to the arena at Ephesus? Added to this we need to remember that Ephesus was no small isolated place, and communication with Jerusalem, Antioch or even Tarsus no very great matter in such a contingency. We have to do with a legal process not the action of an irresponsible functionary covering a few critical hours. Roman officials had to walk warily, and it would have required a fearless, if not reckless, man to disregard the claim to citizenship once lodged by the accused, and to condemn him to the arena without first according full opportunity to substantiate his claim. In the face of all these most unlikely contingencies we happen to know that St. Paul could not have run the risk of arbitrary treatment at the hands of a despotic official in this particular place since his circle of friends included men so high placed as the Asiarchs of the district.

Nor can the silence of St. Luke be so lightly passed over as Dr. Lake would have us think. Certainly "St. Luke does not tell us everything," but only those things which he regarded as suitable for his purpose. But he is wonderfully consistent in the pursuit of his plan, and most

readers would agree that this would naturally find a place in that plan as defined by Harnack.

As Dr. Lake thinks that St. Paul's phrase need not involve more than that he incurred the risk of being thrown to the beasts, he would have been on more sure ground if he had placed the Apostle's escape in the evidence which he was able to secure to prove his citizenship.

To the silence of St. Luke about this imprisonment must be added that of St. Paul himself in both his address at Miletus and in his second letter to the Corinthians. To the proud sensitive nature of the Roman citizen of Tarsus the lowest depth of humiliation had been reached when, in the night, he allowed himself to be let down in a basket from the walls of Damascus to escape the hands of the governor Aretas. Is it not strange that if this far greater indignity and degradation had been inflicted on him that he should have passed it over in silence?

A further question arises as to whether any such accusation as would render the Apostle liable to be thrown to the beasts could be spoken of as "bonds in Christ," or could have been alluded to in so general a manner to the Philippians without explanation.

Apart from the question of imprisonment the references to the financial succour sent to him by the Philippians point rather to Rome than Ephesus. The statements fit the circumstances of the former better than the latter. There had been a cessation of gifts with a considerable lapse of time intervening before they had been "revived," and St. Paul tactfully seizes on the lack of opportunity as the explanation. So far as we are acquainted with them, the condition of things at Ephesus contradicts, while that of Rome supports, the situation. In the former place the Apostle had friends of good position, moving in a social circle far removed from poverty; but he reminded his

disciples that he had not availed himself of their aid, but had worked with his own hands to supply his necessities.[1] Ephesus was no great distance from Philippi and means of intercourse between the two places easy; nor was the interval of time sufficient to allow of a cessation and revival of kindly intercourse in the ordinary sense of the words. But in Rome the exact opposite was the case; he was a prisoner, far removed from friends, dependent for eighteen months on the chance kindnesses of strangers like Onesiphorus (2 Tim. i. 16) and cut off during the long winter months from opportunity of communication with his Asiatic and Macedonian friends.

Thus, while an imprisonment is essential to the Ephesian theory, even if the difficulties surrounding it are overcome, others of no small significance remain.

While the references to the Prætorian Guard and to Cæsar's Household can be no longer regarded as decisive factors in the case, the presumption in favour of Rome has still to be reckoned with. And it is pressing the new facts too far to say that the statement with regard to the soldiery would suit Ephesus better than Rome because of the great disparity of numbers in the two camps. St. Paul does not say that he had become personally known to the whole Prætorian Guard, but that "his bonds in Christ," i.e. the circumstances of his detention and the cause of it, "his case," as we should say, had been made manifest throughout the whole Guard. This would be no exaggerated statement if in the course of eighteen months one in every twenty, or even ten, of the garrison had been brought into personal contact with him. Through these it might fairly be said that his case had become known throughout the camp of 9,000 men.

[1] How could he have said this if at the very time he had accepted help from others?

To pass now to the question of integrity doubts about which are raised chiefly by the abrupt transition of thought at chapter iii. 2. The impugners of the integrity of the letter make use here of a geological figure and speak of a new "seam" appearing at this place. But not very happily, for they have to admit that they cannot trace the seam or say where it ends, the fact being that the original strata immediately crop up again. There is, indeed, an unusually abrupt and vehement outburst against his opponents on the part of the writer, but it is at once followed by a passage comparable, for the spiritual elevation of its thought, with anything that St. Paul has written. The real problem here is to find some explanation of this outburst and the cause for the warning against "dogs," "evil-workers," and the "concision." To say that the passage (iii. 2–iv. 4) is an interpolation is no solution of the difficulty, for the sharp interruption of the writer's subject could not have been less apparent to the editor than to present readers, so that its insertion becomes only the more unintelligible. The brief exhortation could have been introduced far more appositely in more than one other place in the Epistle.

That the passage is thoroughly Pauline is admitted on all hands, and the explanation which finds most favour is that it is a piece cut out from a genuine second letter to the same Church. Dr. Lake, following Hausrath, inclines towards this method of cutting the knot; and he supports the theory by adducing both external and internal evidence, but depends chiefly on a general consideration which in his opinion favours the possibility of a telescoping of two authentic letters into one.

His argument from the analogous case of 2 Corinthians vi. 14–vii. 1 may be dismissed in a few words. To bring forward this other extremely intricate problem is in reality merely to create a prepossession in favour of a probability here and

no more. But there is no similarity in the two cases. The atmosphere of the two Churches, as well as their relationship to the Apostle were totally dissimilar. Strife, rivalries and confusion within, together with disputed authority, denunciation, estrangements and reconciliations, were the distinguishing marks of the former; whereas unbroken allegiance, with steady spiritual progress and mutual confidence, even to affection, pervaded the latter. While confusion in the literary remains of the Church of Corinth would faithfully reflect the early Christian life and apostolic intercourse there, so simplicity and directness would those of the latter.

After all, the combination of incomplete parts of distinct letters is only a working hypothesis for getting over an insoluble difficulty in the particular case of Corinth, and it would be altogether precarious to base any explanation of a single passage in a letter of an entirely different complexion on that.

With regard to the external support of the theory Dr. Lake is altogether unfortunate in his argument. He inquires whether there is any external evidence to support the partition theory, and answers that "there is a little." It is indeed a very little and he naturally does his best to make the most of that little. But not quite fairly. He misquotes his author, and is silent about interpretations of the passage by fully qualified scholars which are fatal to his argument. The evidence, of course, is that of Polycarp, who in his own letter to the Philippians is quoted as saying that St. Paul wrote certain advice to them "in all his Epistles." The sentence must have been written carelessly by Dr. Lake from memory, for the word "all" does not occur in the original. It is a more serious fault that he should have given his readers no hint that this passage has been thoroughly discussed by competent scholars, and that men so far removed from each other as

Bishop Lightfoot and Professor van Manen are agreed that the phrase does not necessarily imply that there was more than one Pauline letter to the Philippians known to Polycarp. The translation of the passage given by Lightfoot will commend itself to many as admirably fitting the context. Polycarp had mentioned St. Paul, and adds, "who, when absent, wrote to them instructions which they would do well to study for their edification in the faith." But if the reader thinks it necessary to give the more restricted meaning to ἐπιστολάς and translate it by "letters," then it is equally natural to understand, with Dr. van Manen, that Polycarp has in his mind "a group of Epistles written by St. Paul" and the passage suggests how early in his opinion the circulation of St. Paul's Epistles took place among the Churches.

In this connexion may we not fairly ask how Dr. Lake would account for only one letter, and that apparently the one we possess, being known to Marcion and Tertullian, if the two in their original forms were used by Polycarp. And in view of all the facts would it be too much, or be discourteous, to say that the external evidence for more than one Pauline letter written to the Philippians, so far from being small, is just worth nothing at all?

We are then driven back on the structure of the Epistle itself and have to inquire whether the internal evidence of its being a composite work, and the general consideration of the conditions under which the two letters would become public property, are sufficiently strong to override the unbroken tradition that the Epistle as we have it was the letter written by St. Paul.

It is all very well to write out the Apostle's words without the omission of the awkward passage, and then to rewrite it with its inclusion so as to enhance its awkwardness and to assure us that "something of a literary nature has

gone wrong." But if we go back to the beginning and read carefully enough to get ourselves into the attitude of the writer, we may be—not perhaps less startled but certainly less surprised—at the energy and abruptness of his warning. What do we find in these two first chapters? Very early in the letter we perceive that, for all the joyousness of heart and hopeful confidence, there is in the mind of the writer a deep undercurrent of anxiety and distress. He desires to keep on the surface and deliberately fixes his own and his readers' attention on the bright and happy turn of affairs. But both for himself and them the times are critical and the margin between success and failure extremely narrow. The malignity and shamelessness of his personal enemies might, as they intended, only too easily have led to the utter defeat of the Gospel, the failure of his mission, and his death. The greatness of the peril is his measure of the victory in sight, and of his joy in it. So too with the Philippians; his present joy in their spiritual progress is measured by the tremendous issues at stake. It is in no serene atmosphere that they have advanced to their happy position, nor for lack of danger: even now "strife and vainglory" may quickly spoil all; no machination of a resourceful enemy will be wanting to rob them of their citizenship in Christ: they must not be terrified[1] by these adversaries, but hold together, playing the athlete, as one man: his own part may shine out more gloriously, but, in fact, they are engaging in exactly the same conflict, and must work out their salvation with fear and trembling. Moreover, just as it is buoyant hope that has sustained him through all perils, so must they rejoice evermore.

Without wishing to minimise the abruptness of the shock which startles the reader in this vehement outburst of iii.

[1] The word occurs here only.

2, it is clear that if the above summary faithfully represents the thought of the first two chapters, Dr. Lake's method of approaching it tends to exaggerate the difficulty. For all its abruptness, it is no more than a passionate cry—in a louder tone and a higher key—characteristic of the writer and comparable to other exclamations found elsewhere in his writings.

We now come to the general consideration of the literary position which in Dr. Lake's opinion permits us to regard our present Epistle as a composite work. The process described is attractive for its simplicity and naturalness, but will not bear close scrutiny.

The manner in which we come to possess the collection of St. Paul's letters is briefly as follows:—In the first stage his letters were valued because they happened to contain good and valuable advice. In this period the receivers of his letters would naturally use their discrimination, preserving, and conveying to others, what in their judgment was of permanent value and importance, and discarding much that was ephemeral. But then the time would come when all that had been written by him would be treasured up simply because it was his. Thus each Church would become possessed of a bundle of material, in addition to some more important letters. Churches would exchange these, sending copies only—"for of course they would not send the originals." This period of interchange would be brief, so that the final collection made up of a main letter, of "odds and ends" and even fragments perhaps never written by St. Paul, which had got in by mistake, would be complete and constitute the *Corpus Paulinum* as we have it to-day.

This, no doubt, gives us a delightfully simple evolution of an untrustworthy document, or rather series of documents. But the question immediately presents itself: What about

the original letters? and What were the possessors of these doing while incorrect collections, formed in this haphazard manner, were gaining vogue? We have but to put these questions to see the utter unreliability of the theory. We know that from the first the original letters were read openly in the Church (cf. 1 Thess. v. 27) and were probably kept in the archives with the sacred Scriptures of the Old Testament. Even allowing fully for the difference between the literary atmosphere of the second century and that of our own time, can we ascribe so great ineptitude in literary matters to men of such intellectual calibre, as, for instance, Irenæus, Origen, and Clement of Alexandria, as this indifference to the correctness of their material would involve?

The truth is that from the outset the analogy is false and ignores the chief factors of the case; e.g, the authoritative position of St. Paul and the jealousy of the several Churches over the letters received from him. We have not to do with the letters of a private person, however important, but of a man intensely confident of his Divine authority and unhesitatingly claiming it in his intercourse with the local Churches founded by him, no less than over individual disciples, as a solemn and sacred trust committed to him by Christ Himself. All alike fully recognised this; so much so that in the subsequent period leaders of the Church were aware that they could make no stronger appeal to any community than to their pride in their Founder and the fact that they had in their possession a letter written by him.

In the face of Dr. Lake's conception of this semi-private gathering of literary remains one is set wondering what has become of the discussion over the sharp distinction drawn by Marcion and others between the letters written to individuals and those to the Churches.

Still less, when we come to look into details, does the theory give satisfaction. Dr. Lake rightly speaks of "a very short time" intervening before all material from St. Paul's hand would be treasured by those possessing it. But we may be more precise, and safely assume that this would certainly date from his martyrdom, which in our particular case would give us some twelve years at the furthest since the first letter to the Philippians was written. Is it conceivable that in such a short time it would be possible for the original letters to have become ignored and their place taken by a bundle of heterogeneous oddments intermingled with the actual main portions of the authentic first letter?

We may have to differ from the standards accepted by the best Biblical scholars of the third and fourth centuries, who were mainly responsible for the formation of the Canon of the New Testament, and to modify their conclusions in several directions; but surely the most safe and prudent course would be to take fully into account all the information at their hands, and not venture to reconstruct the Apostolic literature on the general considerations adopted by Dr. Lake in his paper.

GERARD BALL.

NOTES ON THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

XVI. The Upper Room (John xiii.–xvii.).

In these chapters, there emerge a number of questions. Is the record of the washing of the disciples' feet historical, and why does the Fourth Gospel alone contain it? Why is this Gospel silent regarding the institution of the Lord's Supper, and at what point in the narrative should it be inserted? Is the discourse assigned to Jesus authentic, and is the present the original order?

(1) As regards the first question, not only is the action characteristic of Jesus, but the details bear all the marks of the eyewitness. The introductory verses (1–3) give the evangelist's interpretation of the consciousness of Jesus in performing this service, and have his theological peculiarity; but even here his insight seems to deserve our trust, as the contents of the discourse which follows afford a solid foundation for such an interpretation. The writer in his *Studies in the Inner Life of Jesus* (351–355) has suggested that the Fourth Evangelist was himself the householder, who provided the Upper Room. (i.) The absence of a slave to perform the menial office assumed by Jesus was a failure in hospitality (cf. Luke vii. 44) which Peter, though prominent in the incident, did not report, as that would have appeared "as a censure of a fellow-disciple, and one whom, owing to his position in Jerusalem and influence with the priesthood, it was desirable not to offend," and which the evangelist records as a personal confession. For, even if there may have been danger in introducing a slave into the room, the host ought to have assumed the task himself. (ii.) The reference in verse 23, "there was at the table reclining on Jesus' bosom one of His disciples, whom Jesus loved," is also probably to the host. "Would this not be the place for

the host, even if he had surrendered to Jesus the presiding function? Might not his claim for that favoured position explain the jealousy of the other disciples?" (*op. cit.* p. 351), and so have aggravated their disinclination, due to conflicting ambitions, to render this humble service? It is a common assumption, due to transferring to the ministry of Jesus the ecclesiastical traditions of a later age, that only the twelve can have been present with Jesus in the Upper Room, and that accordingly the reference must be to John the son of Zebedee. "Had this disciple been John, the son of Zebedee, known as one of the apostles, such an allusion would seem an affectation; but if the disciple was known as such only after many years to the circle of his own disciples, whose reverence and affection conferred on him the distinctive title 'the disciple whom Jesus loved,' it seems natural." In dealing with the connexion of the evangelist with the high priest, the question will be raised, why his personality is thus shrouded in secrecy. It is also probable, as has been already suggested, that the description is not the evangelist's, but his disciple's. (iii.) In verse 28 the evangelist asserts that none of the disciples knew why Jesus gave Judas the sop, and sent him on his errand of treachery. Evidently he is himself an exception. "The beloved disciple alone heard Jesus' words, and probably by sign Jesus had made him understand that the secret was to be kept, especially from inquiring Peter, who, had he known, would probably never have allowed the traitor to escape alive" (p. 359). May we not add the name of John the son of Zebedee, who was ready to call down fire on the inhospitable Samaritan village (Luke ix. 54)? The evangelist himself had learned from Jesus the truth of the necessity of His death, and thus in submission to the Master's teaching did not seek to hinder the departure of Judas. It is probable that he was not an eyewitness of Gethsemane because when he left the Upper

Room it was to go to the High Priest's house to be better informed of the plans of the enemies of Jesus, who had now got a tool in Judas. It is possible to find an intelligible consistency in the allusions made in the narrative to the evangelist.

(2) Turning now to the second question, why is the Lord's Supper not recorded? the following reasons for the evangelist's silence may be suggested. (i.) He wrote at a date long after the apostolate of Paul, and in a community, and to communities, to which Paul had ministered, and to which Paul's account of the Lord Supper, as found only in 1 Corinthians, but as probably given to all the churches to which he had delivered his Gospel, was thoroughly familiar. There was no need of repeating an account which had become a part of the order of worship of the Churches. (ii.) It may be even that superstitious ideas were so attaching themselves to the ordinance, that the evangelist was unwilling to give them any sanction. May not his attitude be represented in this matter by the logion of Jesus (vi. 63), whatever may have been the occasion of its utterance? If verses 53–56 in chapter vi. contain an authentic explanation of the significance of the words of institution by Jesus Himself to the beloved disciple, it may not have been by accident or by association of ideas alone that the passage drifted to its present context; but the evangelist may intentionally, to avoid misunderstanding, have detached the saying from any connexion with the supper in the Upper Room. There was some reason why he did not, because he felt he could not make use of this incident for the purpose of his Gospel; and this seems as likely a suggestion as any which can be offered.

(iii.) It has been suggested that verse 34 refers to the institution of the Lord's Supper. "It has been conjectured," says Westcott (*St. John*, p. 198), "that the 'new command-

ment is the ordinance of the Holy Communion which was instituted to the end that Christians might love one another' by recalling in that the crowning act of Christ's love. If this be so, the words, *that ye love one another*, give the purpose and not the substance of the commandment. It is however difficult to suppose that such an institution would be spoken of as a 'commandment' (ἐντολή, 1 John ii. 7; iii. 22)." Westcott's objection seems altogether insufficient, and the suggestion is most attractive. If we accept it, then the departure of Judas was prior to the institution of the supper, and he took no part in it. Matthew and Mark both place the announcement of his treachery before, and Luke alone after, the supper. If we may here appeal to psychological probability, it is more probable that the spirit of Jesus was oppressed by the presence of the traitor, that only when he had gone there came to Him the exaltation of spirit indicated in verses 31 and 32; and that it was in this mood that the new commandment was given. Do not these words imply the accomplished sacrifice and salvation of which the supper is the memorial? Although it is but a conjecture, yet it is probable that the institution of the supper is to be placed in this context.

(3) Many who have difficulty about accepting some of the teaching of Jesus presented in the Fourth Gospel hesitate about challenging the authenticity of the discourse in the Upper Room; Wendt, for instance, is prepared to accept the discourse with the exception of the passages referring to the betrayal by Judas, and the closing words of John xvi. 13: καὶ τὰ ἐρχόμενα ἀναγγελεῖ ὑμῖν (*St. John's Gospel*, p. 163); and the writer himself feels warranted in regarding the discourse as a whole as more fully an authentic report of Jesus' teaching than appeared probable when he dealt with the subject in his *Studies of the Inner Life of Jesus*. (i.) The considerations there advanced, that the characteristic

vocabulary of the evangelist appears in the reproduction of Jesus' teaching, that reminiscence passes over into reflexion, that germinal thoughts of the Master's have been developed in the experience of the disciple, that sayings from another context have been attracted by association of ideas—must still be maintained; although it now appears to him that probably the teaching has been less modified by all these influences than at any one time seemed certain to him. (ii.) It is altogether likely that Jesus in the Upper Room said a great deal more to His disciples than the Synoptists record, that the evangelist, with keener personal sympathy and finer spiritual discernment, was more deeply impressed by, and so was more thoroughly retentive of, this teaching than the others who heard it, and that all unwitting he wove into the texture of the discourse teaching which Jesus had given to himself in private converse on other occasions. This last statement demands some justification as regards the two points assumed. The writer, some years ago, dealt in public discourse with a theological topic of considerable difficulty, and afterwards in private converse with one of his hearers explained, illustrated, and justified his previous utterance. In the report which this hearer afterwards sent to a paper the private talk was blended with the public speech. The case of Mary of Bethany (Luke x. 39), who "sat at the Lord's feet and heard His word," and who by her deed of love showed an insight which Jesus did not find in the company of the twelve, raises the presumption that outside of that circle there were intimates of Jesus to whom He could lay bare His heart as He could not to others. (iii.) In the report of the discourse—the announcement of the betrayal by Judas, the words of comfort, the calls to faith, the command of love, the demand for fruit, and the promise of a speedy reunion, and of the other Paraclete, the assurance of the advantage to Himself as well

as to them of His return to the Father—there is nothing which can be regarded as beyond the circle of Jesus' interest and knowledge in the Upper Room. It is the familiar filial consciousness which finds expression. The announcements of the Passion in the Synoptists were always accompanied by the assurance of resurrection; and this implied a renewed intercourse, if under other conditions, with His disciples (cf. Matt. xxviii. 20). The Baptist declared that the Messiah would baptize, not with water only, but with the Holy Ghost, and with fire (iii. 11). And Jesus recognised the operation of the Spirit in His own ministry (xii. 28), and promised His disciples the Spirit, who would speak in them in times of persecution for their defence (x. 20). After the Resurrection the disciples were expectant of the power from on high, the descent of the Spirit (Luke xxiv. 49; Acts i. 4, 5). If the Spirit's operation in the apostolic Church presents a double aspect, the abnormal spiritual gifts (including the prophetic referred to in xvi. 13) and the inward enlightening and renewing influence, it is not at all improbable that the latter conception was present in the teaching of Jesus as well as the former. Wendt's objection to the last clause of xvi. 13 seems invalid. The prediction of Judas' betrayal, to which he also takes exception, is paralleled in the Synoptics. While we must admit a theological pragmatism in the Gospel, it is not necessary to find in xiii. 21–30 the "purpose to lay an express emphasis on the fact that Jesus was not deceived and outwitted by the traitor" (*op. cit.* pp. 161–2).

(iv.) Recognising that there are probably various strands in the discourse, it must be admitted that after rearrangement of several of the passages there is a continuity and consistency in the argument which makes it impossible for the most part to offer any detailed analysis; but there are verses here and there which do not fit into their context,

or betray so distinctly the evangelist's rather than Jesus' own standpoint, that we may with a certain measure of confidence affirm that they did not belong to the original discourse. In chapter xiii. verse 19 betrays the writer's pragmatism, as does xiv. 29. Is it likely that Jesus explained to His disciples that He had uttered the prediction, not because it was rooted in, and grew up out of, the occasion, but in order that in the future the fulfilment might confirm their faith? Possibly in both cases the evangelist's explanation was changed from the third to the first person, and so made to appear a saying of Jesus (such explanations are found throughout the Gospel; e.g. ii. 21, 22; xii. 33). Wendt connects verse 20 with verse 17, and gets rid of the intervening verses as an interpolation; but the connexion he suggests is rather far-fetched; and if we regard verse 18 as authentic, verse 21 should immediately follow it, and verse 20 must appear the interpolation. Not only is it inappropriate to the context, but it is similar to the saying, Matthew x. 40, which is in what seems the proper setting. Verses 34 and 35 might appear an intrusion also, as Peter's question in verse 36 seems to follow on Jesus' declaration in verse 33; but it is probable that it took Peter some time to realise the import of Jesus' words, and he interrupted at a point unsuitable for his question. In chapter xiv. verse 21 takes up the thought of verse 15, and the intervening verses seem, if not an interpolation, yet a digression. Similarly verse 26 breaks the continuity of verses 25 and 27; so also xvi. 1 attaches itself naturally to xv. 25, and verse 16 to verse 6. These four passages about the the Spirit (xiv. 16–20, 26; xv. 26–27; and xvi. 7–15) may possibly have belonged originally to another context, and have been inserted here where there were points of contact. The question does obtrude itself, would Jesus give the whole company of disciples teaching about the Spirit so much in

advance of what we find afterwards current in the apostolic Church? Regarding the expanded metaphor or allegory in chapter xv. 1–8 we may ask, as we have already done in regard to x. 1–16, whether it may not have been originally in the parabolic form. It is probable at least that the figure and the interpretation were not so blended together in Jesus' utterance as in the evangelist's report. (v.) The high-priestly prayer of chapter xvii. also presents some difficulties. It is not impossible, or even improbable, that, when the company had risen from the table, Jesus did pray aloud, and so seek to strengthen the disciples for what was awaiting them. The language of the prayer is more like that of a soliloquy in God's presence with no reference to the presence of others than that of public devotion; but we cannot deny the possibility that, moved by His deep feeling, Jesus did lay aside all reserve, and did lay bare His heart before His disciples. We cannot assume, however, that we have the *ipsissima verba*, unaffected altogether by the channel of their transmission, the reflective mind of the evangelist. Yet the prayer does resume the varied teaching that had just been given; and if we can accept that as authentic, we need not hesitate about the genuineness of this utterance. One verse there is, which must be regarded as a gloss of the evangelist's. The writer cannot believe that the theological definition of verse 3 can have fallen from the lips of Jesus. Could He have used of Himself the title Jesus Christ? MacGillivray (*Expository Times*, April, 1914, p. 333), after referring to his personal experience in interjecting an idea suggested by a speaker into rough notes of his speech, concludes, "John, in recording the prayer, must have enjoyed intense spiritual elevation, and it may be this sentence, which ordinarily would be placed in the margin as a pious ejaculation, was from the very beginning a part of the text."

(4) While, with these qualifications, we may accept the report as a whole as authentic, there is very good reason for maintaining that there have been considerable displacements, and that to restore continuity to the teaching we must rearrange a number of the passages, In his *New Translation of the New Testament* Dr. Moffatt inserts chapters xv. and xvi. in the middle of verse 31 of the thirteenth chapter. Chapter xiv. follows xiii. 31b–38, and is followed by chapter xvii. He offers an explanation in his *Introduction to the New Testament*, p. 556. (i.) The words in xiv. 31, "Arise, let us go hence," were a summons to the disciples to rise from supper, and to start for the garden of Gethsemane. While it is probable that as the whole company stood Jesus did offer the prayer contained in chapter xvii. it is extremely improbable that He would then deliver the discourse contained in chapters xv. and xvi. The passage xiv. 25–31 sounds like the conclusion of the discourse. Is it likely that Jesus would have uttered the reproach in xvi. 5, "None of you asketh me, Whither goest Thou ?" after Peter had asked the question in xiii. 36, "Lord, whither goest Thou ?" or Thomas had made the inquiry in xiv. 5, "Lord, we know not whither Thou goest ; how know we the way ?" The perplexity expressed by the disciples in xvi. 18 seems incongruous after Jesus' declaration in xiii. 33 and xiv. 18, 19. There is general agreement that chapters xv. and xvi. should precede chapter xiv. ; but there is difference of opinion as to the place in chapter xiii. where they should be inserted. (ii.) There are three theories current. Wendt (*op. cit.* p. 101 ff.) would place these chapters between verses 35 and 36. This suggestion ignores the incongruity of having xvi. 18 after xiii. 33, although this is not an insuperable difficulty. The allegory of the Vine in xv. 1–8 follows very appropriately on verse 35 ; and Jesus' mood of exaltation in verse 31 can be very fitly explained as due to the relief He experienced

when the traitor departed and He was left with faithful disciples. A serious objection, however, is that 36 links itself so closely to verse 33, as has already been indicated. It also "reduces xvi. 29–33 and xiii. 36–38 to the level of mere episodes between xiv. 1–2 and xvi. 27–28" (Moffatt). Bacon places the two chapters between verses 20 and 21; but also puts verses 36–38 after xvi. 31–33. But, unless with Wendt we treat verses 21–30 as an interpolation not belonging to the source, it properly follows verses 18 and 19 (the interruption of the sequence by verse 20 having been already explained); and it is probable that the departure of the traitor did take place before Jesus began fully to unburden His soul to His disciples. The severance of verses 36–38 from verses 31–35 is a further objection. Moffatt's arrangement—chapters xv. and xvi. between 31a and 31b of chapter xiii.—is the same as Spitta's. One objection to this arrangement is that the mood of exaltation which is uttered in verses 31–32 seems probable as an immediate reaction from the withdrawal of the traitor, but it fits into the context given to it in the rearrangement. In favour of it are the following considerations. The incongruity of xvi. 18 after xiii. 33 and xiv. 18, and the introduction of xvi. 5 after xiii. 36 or xiv. 5–6 is avoided; the sequence of xiii. 21–30 and 18–19, and also 36–38 and 31–35, is maintained; the declaration of xiii. 31b, 32 follows fitly on the confidence of the Father's presence and victory over the world expressed in xvi. 32–33, the prediction of Peter's denial appears more probable in the closing conversation than before the more formal discourse.

To the writer accordingly Moffatt's rearrangement commends itself as the most probable. His summary of the discourse as thus rearranged clinches his argument. "After the withdrawal of Judas, Jesus in view of the wine at table (Mark xiv. 25, Luke xxii. 18, Didaché ix. 2) utters the

parable of the Vine (xv. 1 f.), beginning with a special and warning allusion to the recent apostasy of his friend (an unfruitful branch, xv. 2 = xiii. 30–31, xv. 6 = xiii. 27), and urging brotherly love as the bond of life (xv. 9 f., carrying on xiii. 14 f.; cf. also xiii. 10–11, echoed in xv. 2–3, xiii. 17–18 in xv. 4–5, xiii. 18 in xv. 16, and xiii. 16 in xv. 20). The connexion of thought between xiii. 1–30 and xv. grows in fact more vivid as the two passages are set in juxtaposition: thus the love of the disciples suggests to Jesus (xv. 18 f.) the hatred shown them by the outside world, whose persecution forms the next topic (xv 18–xvi. 3), passing over into the compensations for the bodily absence of Jesus from His afflicted followers (xvi. 4–xvi. 33). This stream of counsel and warning closes with a word of triumph (xvi. 33 = xiii. 31b.–32), which runs out into a renewed appeal for mutual love among the disciples. Then follows Peter's protest (xiii. 36–38), exactly as in the Synoptic tradition (Matt. xxvi. 31–35), after Christ's mournful anticipation (xvi. 32). The final discourse of xiv. ends in the prayer of xvii. (cf. xiv. 30 = xvii. 1, xiv. 6 f. = xvii. 2 f., xiv. 13 = xvii. 4). In the solemn pause before the exit—a pause too short for such a discourse as that of xv. and xvi.—Jesus utters this sublime rhapsody of faith, and then (xviii. 1) leads the disciples out to face the end." (*op. cit.* p. 557).

(5) This discussion suggests three considerations of a more general character. (i.) The Gospel so often presents Jesus in a polemic and assertive attitude that it is an immeasurable gain to be able to regard this discourse as for the most part authentic, and thus to become acquainted with Jesus in His more tender, gracious, consolatory and attractive aspect. We may claim that the present object of Christian faith was then all He now is, in historical reality. (ii.) While the discourse would have value "as the Evangelist's inspired interpretation of his real experience of the indwelling and

inworking of the living Christ by His Spirit just as the Apostle Paul's exposition of the Gospel of the grace of God in Christ Jesus." (*Studies in the Inner Life of Jesus*, pp. 372–3), yet it is for the confirmation of faith to be able to regard that experience as the fulfilment by the living Christ of promises, assurances and comforts, given by the historical Jesus. Could there have been such fulfilment in the experience had there not been the prediction in the history? (iii.) Even had John, the son of Zebedee, as presented in the Synoptics, been capable of apprehending, appreciating, and appropriating, and thus preserving and transmitting such teaching, would he, as the close companion of Peter, not so have influenced him as to make impossible the partial presentation of the teaching and work of Jesus, for which Peter as the source of Mark was responsible? Two close companions could not have been the sources of two so divergent streams of tradition.

Alfred E. Garvie.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE PROLOGUE TO THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

I.

The relation of the Prologue to the main body of the Fourth Gospel has been a matter of debate ever since Harnack wrote his famous article in the *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* in 1892. Harnack instituted a comparison between the theological ideas involved in the statements of the Prologue, and the theological ideas which underlie the rest of the book, and came to the conclusion that they were out of harmony. The conception of Christ as the incarnation of the pre-existent Logos is never found, so Harnack argues, except in the opening verses of the Gospel. The only conclusion which is possible, he suggests, is to suppose that the Prologue was not intended to express the author's own theological position, but was designed merely to produce a favourable impression upon the minds of educated readers.

The general opinion among recent scholars is that Harnack has not made out his case. The contradictions which he finds between the theology of the Prologue and that of the rest of the book are very largely due to his own methods of exegesis. There can be little doubt that Harnack weakened his position by exaggerating the differences. The solution too which he proposed is most unsatisfactory. To write a preface as an *ad captandum* appeal to culture and then contradict it in almost every subsequent chapter would have been foolish in intention and disastrous in effect. The writer could have selected no better method of defeating his own ends.

But though Harnack has been answered, the problem remains. We are bound to suppose that the writer intended the Prologue to be a summary of the fundamental theological

ideas which he was about to develop and illustrate in the narrative. Why is it that he introduces some conceptions, that of the Logos, for instance, which never reappear, and omits others which are " writ large " on almost every page ? The first half of the question admits of a simple answer. The Logos idea is the writer's own interpretation of Christ, and he has sufficient sense of historical possibility to know that that interpretation could never have been used by Christ Himself. That he attributes to Christ some utterances which He could never have spoken is, of course, beyond question ; but it is also beyond question that he imposes upon himself a certain limitation, and freely recognises that there are some ideas which it would be absolutely unhistorical for him to put into the mouth of the Master.

The second half of the question constitutes a much greater difficulty. No one can read the Prologue without being startled by its omissions. The things it leaves out are almost as striking as the things which it inserts. If, as is almost universally assumed, the Fourth Gospel is written by the author of the first Epistle of John, it is remarkable, to say the least, that a writer who laid such tremendous emphasis on the significance of the death of Christ in the Epistle should not have made the slightest reference to the subject in the theological statement which forms the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel. Could one who wrote with such intense feeling the words, " If any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous, and He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world," have passed over in absolute silence so vital an element in his faith in what purports to be a theological exposition of the Person of Christ ? It is true, of course, that he describes Christ, in contrast to Moses, as the bringer of " grace and truth," yet though the term " truth " is explicated in verse 18, no exposition is given of

"grace." The Christ of the Prologue, as we have it, is the Revealer, not the Savour. Could the writer have stopped at this point, especially when later passages in the Gospel make it quite clear that Jesus was to him the Saviour of the world? Why should the Prologue end with the Incarnation, when the Incarnation was certainly not the last article in the writer's creed? Moreover, there are other characteristic ideas of the Fourth Gospel which find no place in the preface. The conception of "eternal life," for instance, which is so prominent in the Gospel and the first Epistle is entirely missing in the Prologue. It is no explanation of the omission to argue that no opportunity presented itself for its introduction. The writer made an opportunity to introduce his conception of the "new birth," and he might quite easily have introduced the idea of "eternal life." Another striking omission is the absence of any reference to the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit, which is so prominent a feature in the theology of the latter part of the Gospel.

The omissions in the Prologue constitute the real problem. How can the Prologue be a summary of the writer's theological position or an adequate introduction to the Gospel, when so many of the essential elements in his faith are completely ignored?

II.

I venture to suggest that the true solution of the problem is to be found in the supposition that the Prologue, as we find it in the first chapter of the Fourth Gospel, is incomplete and does not represent the writer's full theological statement, as it came from his pen. To find the remainder we have to turn to a later chapter. The second portion of the original Prologue seems to me to be contained in the paragraph in chapter iii. 13–21. To demonstrate the truth of this hypothesis it will be necessary to prove (*a*) that the

paragraph in question does not belong to the position which it at present occupies, (*b*) that it does fit on most aptly to the conclusion of the Prologue in the first chapter.

This section, as even the most conservative scholars admit, cannot possibly be part of Christ's address to Nicodemus. Even Westcott decides "from its secondary character apart from all other considerations that it contains the reflections of the Evangelist and is not a continuation of the words of the Lord." But are these "reflections of the Evangelist" appropriate in their present position? There is nothing in the conversation between Christ and Nicodemus to suggest them. They are not a commentary upon anything which has transpired during the incident. On the contrary, there seems to be an obvious contradiction between this paragraph and verse 12. The words "If I have told you earthly things and ye believe not, how will ye believe if I tell you heavenly things?" seem to be intended to break off the discussion with Nicodemus and not to lead up to the statement which follows.

But if this section is out of place in the third chapter, it seems to fit on most admirably to the conclusion of the Prologue in i. 18. The statement of i. 18, "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him" is taken up and repeated in the words of iii. 13, "And no man hath ascended into heaven, but he that descended out of heaven, even the Son of Man which is in heaven." The presence of the article at the beginning of the verse "*and* no man hath ascended," shows that these words were originally attached to a previous clause. No such attachment is to be found in the third chapter. The attachment with i. 18 is perfect.

There are many theological conceptions too in this section which seem to link on with the statements of the Prologue. The comparison between Christ and Moses in i. 17 is carried

on further in iii. 14. "As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, so must the Son of Man be lifted up." The phrase "only begotten Son" occurs twice in this paragraph, though it is found nowhere else in the gospel except in the Prologue i. 18 (assuming ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός to be the true reading in this passage). The contrast between light and darkness which is brought out so vividly in i. 4–5 is developed in greater detail in iii. 19, 20. A further interesting parallel is the occurrence of the phrase "believe on the name" in both sections. The fact that the parallels between the two passages are so remarkable, and that the second seems to work out, according to the usual Johannine method, the line of thought commenced in the first, while there is a perfect point of attachment between the two, makes it extremely probable that they originally formed a single whole, and that they have been artificially separated from each other owing to the methods adopted by the author of the Fourth Gospel.

III.

Was there a third section to the original Prologue? The answer must almost certainly be in the affirmative. A strong case can be made out, as is done by Mr. Warburton Lewis, in his suggestive essay on "Disarrangements in the Fourth Gospel" for supposing that the section iii. 22–30 is out of place in this particular setting, and that it has been transferred by accident or design from its original position after ii. 12. The geographical situation certainly favours the proposed rearrangement. In iii. 22 we are told, "After these things came Jesus and His disciples into the land of Judæa." This is not the expression that we expect after the previous paragraphs which describe the work of Jesus in Jerusalem. A movement from Jerusalem to Aenon can scarcely be described as an entrance "into the land of

Judæa." The language used by the writer of the paragraph would be much more appropriate if it followed ii. 12, and described a journey from Galilee to the south. It may seem at first sight perhaps that the opening words of verse 31, "He that cometh from above is before all; he that is of the earth is of the earth, and of the earth he speaketh," continue the contrast between Christ and John the Baptist, which is the theme of the preceding section; but it is scarcely likely that a writer who in i. 6 spoke of the Baptist as a "man sent from God" would here allude to him as "he that is of the earth." The similar words addressed by Jesus to His opponents in viii. 23, "Ye are from beneath, I am from above; ye are of this world, I am not of this world," clearly show that the phrase "he that is of the earth" cannot refer to an ally and a sympathiser like John the Baptist, but indicates rather the men who are described in verse 19 as "loving darkness rather than light, because their deeds are evil." The numerous parallels between the language and thought of the two sections in chapter iii. which are now separated by the foreign paragraph—v. 22–30—have been well worked out and set forth in Mr. Lewis's book, and there is no need to repeat them here.

The conclusion, therefore, which I venture to offer is that what may still be called the Prologue (though probably it was originally a kind of theological tract) consisted of (*a*) i. 1–18 (omitting *vv.* 6–8 and 15), (*b*) iii. 13–21, (*c*) iii. 31–36.

IV.

But how are we to explain the presence of the intervening passages? Is it conceivable that this theological tract could have been so completely dissevered and its component parts placed at such a distance from each other?

There are one or two recognised facts which may help us to find a solution of the problem. The interesting addition

of the *pericope adulteræ* at the commencement of the eighth chapter proves that historical narrative was sometimes introduced into the text to illustrate and point the moral of abstract statements. There can be no doubt that the passage is inserted as a commentary upon the words of Jesus, "Ye judge after the flesh; I judge no man."

A second fact which is gradually receiving recognition from scholars is the belief that there have been serious displacements in the arrangement of the Fourth Gospel. It is almost certain, for instance, that the sixth chapter originally preceded the fifth. A considerable number of critics, including Spitta and Moffatt, hold that the section in chapter vii. 15–24 has been transposed from its natural position at the end of chapter v.

The two facts seem to me to afford us a hint which may explain the dislocation of the Prologue. We have already seen that its second and third sections in chapter iii. have been separated by an interpolation which originally belonged to a different context. Can we go a step further and discover a reason for the insertion of the narrative portions of the first and second chapters? When we turn to the Prologue in chapter i. it seems quite obvious, as Wendt and other scholars have pointed out, that the allusions to John the Baptist in verses 6–8 and 15 have been inserted prematurely. It is difficult to suppose that the writer could have broken off his profound theological statement to make a passing allusion to John the Baptist, and then have returned to take up the thread of his argument just where he had left it, and that he should have done this twice over. It seems highly probable that these references to John the Baptist were originally, like the *pericope adulteræ*, marginal notes, introduced in furtherance of the polemical aims of the author of the Gospel and his desire to sharpen the antithesis between Jesus and John the Baptist. If this be so,

if the early allusions to the Baptist are simply historical comments added for the purpose of illustrating the theological statements of the Prologue, may not the remainder of the intervening narrative belong to the same category? The testimonies of the disciples, for instance, may very well be the historical proof of the statement, "We beheld His glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." The writer relates how the disciples (himself included, for we are bound to assume that he is the unnamed disciple in i. 35-40) directly they came into contact with Jesus instinctively saw in Him "the glory as of the only begotten," and leapt at once to the conclusion that He was the "Son of God, the King of Israel." The same explanation accounts for the narrative of the miracle at Cana of Galilee, where the significant phrase is added, "This beginning of miracles did Jesus in Cana of Galilee and manifested forth His glory." The story of the conversation between Jesus and Nicodemus is a most appropriate commentary on the words of the Prologue, "which were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, but of God." The section concerning John the Baptist i. 19–34 may be explained perhaps on the same lines as the narratives which recount the testimony of the disciples. Another hypothesis is, however, more probable. Assuming that the insertions in i. 6–8 and 15 were originally marginal notes, added for reasons already stated, we may suppose that the paragraphs which describe the preaching of the Baptist are the expansion and illustration of these statements. The introductory phrase "This is the witness of John" takes up and develops the previous statement in i. 15, "John beareth witness of Him." There is only one section which cannot be explained as a commentary on some statement in the Prologue, viz., the section which describes the cleansing of the temple. The difficulties connected with the presence of this section

at so early a date in the narrative are enormous on any theory of the structure of the Gospel. May we not suppose that we have here a further dislocation, and that the passage got into this particular context by a later accident ?

V.

The reconstructed Prologue (to keep the common name for it) reads now as follows :—

" In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by Him ; and without Him was not anything made that hath been made. In Him was life, and the life was the light of men. And the light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness apprehended it not. He was the true light which lighteth every man coming into the world. He was in the world, and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not. He came unto His own, and they that were His own received Him not. But as many as received Him, to them gave He the right to become children of God, even to them that believe on His name, which were born not of blood nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. And the word became flesh and tabernacled among us (and we beheld His glory, glory as of the only begotten of the Father), full of grace and truth. For of His fullness we all received, and grace for grace. For the law was given by Moses : grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. No man hath seen God at any time : the only begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him. And no man hath ascended into heaven, but He that descended out of heaven, even the Son of Man which is in heaven. And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of Man be lifted up : that whosoever believeth may in Him have eternal life. For God so loved the world that

He gave His only begotten Son that whosoever believeth on Him should not perish, but have eternal life. For God sent not His Son into the world to judge the world; but that the world should be saved through Him. He that believeth on Him is not judged; he that believeth not hath been judged already because He hath not believed on the name of the only begotten Son of God. And this is the judgement that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light because their works were evil. For every one that doeth ill hateth the light and cometh not to the light lest his works should be reproved. But he that doeth the truth cometh to the light that his works may be made manifest that they are wrought in God. He that cometh from above is above all; he that is of the earth is of the earth, and of the earth he speaketh; He that cometh from heaven is above all. What He hath seen and heard of that He beareth witness, and no man receiveth His witness. He that hath received His witness hath set His seal to this that God is true. For He whom God hath sent speaketh the words of God, for He giveth not the Spirit by measure. The Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into His hand. He that believeth on the Son hath eternal life; but he that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on Him."

One or two conclusions may be deduced from this reconstruction:—

(1) The Prologue, as reconstructed, forms a harmonious statement of theological belief. The thought marches on without break or interruption. The ideas gradually unfold themselves and sweep on in majestic flow.

(2) It probably forms, as has already been suggested, a kind of theological tract which was drawn up in the first instance to meet the needs of the cultured Christians in Ephesus. An attempt is made to answer all the pressing

problems that confronted the mind of the Church in the early days, i.e., How is Christ related to God ? What was the object of His mission to the world ? What is the significance of the Incarnation and the death upon the Cross ? Why is it that He was so widely rejected ? We may regard the Prologue, therefore, as the earliest summary of Christian theology and the pioneer of the later theological treatise.

(3) Around this theological statement the Fourth Gospel—or at any rate the early chapters of it—gradually grew up. The historical narrative is for the most part a commentary on its main theses.

(4) The apparent discrepancy between the theology of the Prologue and the theology of the rest of the Gospel, to which Harnack drew attention, vanishes. The transition from the conception of the Logos to the conception of the Son of God is now actually made by the writer himself, and the startling omissions in the Prologue of the first chapter are found to be present in its later sections in the third chapter, which are now artificially separated from it.

H. T. Andrews.

THE SECOND COMMANDMENT.

The second commandment of the Decalogue contained two distinct prohibitions; it forbade the making, as well as the worshipping, of images. For an Israelite, therefore, it was as much a transgression of the command to make an image, even though it were not intended for worship, as to bow before one which other people had made. Attention is called, at the outset of this paper, to the two-fold character of this commandment in order that it may plainly appear how widely we are separated to-day from the spirit of those who saw necessity for its teaching. If the letter of the command be emphasised, while it is evident that not many persons nowadays need to be reminded of the impiety —or shall we say the senselessness?—of paying Divine honour to the image of bird or beast or fish, and so, to this extent, the prohibition is merely superfluous; yet the same cannot be said of the injunction to abstain from making representations of natural objects. We have decided, though not as the result of any formal inquiry, that this part of the commandment is no longer binding upon us. We disobey it with quiet consciences. The sculpture galleries of Christendom are not banned by the Churches.

No sane person, surely, would wish to alter, much less to condemn, this modern acquiescence in conduct which the second commandment forbids. We are content to say, if we are challenged, that its harmful character was due to the circumstances and the religious ideas of the time. With the passing of the latter, the former also has disappeared. But thereupon, of necessity, another question is raised, which is less easily answered. If one of its two prohibitions has become superfluous and the other is openly and rightly disobeyed, why do we retain the commandment

as of any authority at all? Has it, in fact, some other value?

Some would answer this question by saying that it is the spirit rather than the letter to which we should give heed, and which invests these verses with their permanent worth. But without in any way denying the truth of this admirable principle in general, we can hardly help recognising that the "spirit" of the second commandment is nothing but the first over again. Nothing is to be put in the place which rightly belongs to God. What is there here which is not already expressed in the words, "Thou shalt have none other gods beside Me"?

It seems, therefore, that even if considerations about the superiority of the spirit to the letter may justify us in ascribing some sort of authority to this passage, even in the twentieth century, yet they do not lead to the discovery of any special contribution which it makes to modern ethical theory. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that it has such a contribution to make, and that this is to be found in the later verses in which the "jealous God" of Israel is described as "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, upon the third and upon the fourth generation of them that hate [Him]; and shewing mercy unto thousands of them that love [Him] and keep [His] commandments."

To many persons this will seem a strange suggestion. Is it not precisely these later verses which seem to outrage the modern conscience? Bluntly and harshly the ordinary man paraphrases them to himself thus: "God punishes people for sins which they have never committed; to others He gives His favour for good deeds which they have never performed." And probably—at least, it is to be hoped that it is so—he goes on to say in his heart: "Decalogue or no decalogue, I will not believe that God is like that. He is just, for all goodness is in Him; and this is not justice.

It represents the imagination of a mind the stage of whose moral development has long ago been left behind."

Certainly it is to be hoped that the ordinary man speaks thus with himself. For there is little likelihood that true thoughts about God will find admission to the mind of any one who has not decided that vicarious punishment (in our every-day sense of the words) is unjust. But if this is so, how can it possibly be true to assert that it is in these verses that the permanent value of the second commandment is to be found? Enough has been said to show that no attempt will be made here to answer such objections in the ways that some controversialists have adopted. There are always those who will turn upon the objector with the words, "Nay, but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?" and will charge him with a lack of faith. But we may remember that the act of intellectual suicide is not an act of faith; and that it is a very weak, and not a strong, faith which would lead us to attribute to God conduct of which we should be ashamed. Nor can any greater satisfaction be derived from that other answer which has sometimes been given by people who, admitting the need, have striven without sufficient knowledge to justify the ways of God to men. It is of no avail to emphasise the words "of them that hate Me," and explain that since it is only the ungodly whom God punishes for the sins of their forefathers, there is no injustice after all. We know full well that no such plea would be allowed as a defence in human affairs.

The difficulty in these verses is resolved only when we understand aright the nature of Divine punishment. As long as that is thought of as an added and separate vengeance, as an arbitrary penalty exacted on account of an affront offered to the majesty of God, so long ought it to be impossible for the character here ascribed to God to seem other

than intolerably unfair. This notion of punishment finds its climax when hell is conceived to be a place to which God sends people, instead of a condition to which they bring themselves. But what, after all, is His punishment of the sinner, as now understood? It is neither more nor less than the suffering of the inevitable and essential consequences of his sin. If a child, through disobedience, falls into a pond, he may be punished by being deprived of some anticipated pleasure. But in this deprivation there is no inevitable, no essential, connexion with his fault. It is arbitrary, added, separate; and for that very reason, however justifiable in human methods of training, it is unsuited to be a type of Divine punishment. For that, we must look rather at some inevitable result of his disobedience, as, for example, that he gets wet, and is obliged to spend time in changing his clothes which he would otherwise have passed more pleasantly. When this distinction has been grasped, it is not difficult to see what God's punishments actually are; and, without making any attempt at completeness, a few may be set down. A drunkard's punishment is his loss of health, of will-power, of other men's respect. A grumbler's is his loss of the happiness of contentment. A selfish man is punished by friendlessness; a liar by general distrust. And so on.

Besides this punishment by results, there is also the breaking off of friendly relationship between the man and God, whenever the transgression arises from carelessness, or the exercise of a deliberate choice; just as the disobedient child, in our illustration, suffers the loss of his parents' approval. It is in the clear perception of these two elements of punishment that we can answer a difficulty which is instinctively felt by many people, and often expressed in such words as, "There is no such thing as forgiveness; the consequences of an act cannot be

evaded or recalled." For we understand that God's forgiveness does not at all imply that there are no such things as inevitable results, nor that the man who is forgiven learns how to "avoid the inevitable"; but it means simply the restoration of the relationship of friendship. If the child is sorry for having disobeyed his father, and is forgiven, that is only to say that father and child are friends again. But the waste of time in changing wet clothes has to be endured none the less; only it is less dreary than it would otherwise have been.

Now if the second commandment told us that God's attitude towards a man, of approval or disapproval, was sometimes affected by the sins of his ancestors, we should be right in rejecting its teaching as monstrous. But it is concerned with the other element of punishment, the endurance by each man of the results of his actions. And at this point we need to be reminded of another great truth. Our life is a social process. We live in the presence of our brethren. And though we act as separate individuals, yet the consequences of our actions cannot be confined to ourselves. If I give my dinner to a starving man, it is an inevitable result that my capacity for love is developed, and that is God's reward: it is also an inevitable result that the man's hunger is relieved. If I spend on beer the money which is needed to support my children, it is an inevitable result that I lose my self-respect: it is also an inevitable result that my children suffer in health. The good and the evil results of conduct must be shared; we can no more restrict them to ourselves than we can separate the active "I kill" from the passive "He is killed." Life and character alike demand that this should be so. We cannot conceive of a murderer without a victim, of a robber without a person robbed, of a benefactor without a recipient of his benefit.

This truth, that for good or evil we are members one of

another, must long ago have been perceived. In it there was seen to lie a powerful incentive to goodness, and an equally powerful deterrent against crime. "Let us not sin; for, if we do, the evil results will fall on others as well as ourselves. Let us perform acts of love and goodness; for, if we do, others and not ourselves only will reap the benefit of them." That, it may be, is the way in which we should express these ideas to-day. But in the summary of the Jewish law, they were otherwise, perhaps more crudely, expressed. "The consequences of men's conduct, what are they? Surely nothing less than the Divine rewards of the virtuous and punishments of the wicked. But these consequences, it seems, cannot be confined to the individual? Very well: let us remember that if we sin, others will be punished as surely as we; that if we fear God, others as well as we will enjoy His favour."

We need not quarrel with the words that were used, if, as it has been the purpose of this paper to show, they embody an early attempt to express truths that will never die. They are truths, moreover, of especial importance at the present time. On the one hand, a right conception of punishment is a powerful solvent of some modern ethical and theological difficulties. On the other, the truth of the solidarity of human life justifies and inspires the most beneficent forms of man's activity.

C. F. Russell.

ARISTARCHUS.

There are three references to Aristarchus in the Acts. In xix. 29, in the account of the riot at Ephesus, we are told that "Gaius and Aristarchus, men of Macedonia, Paul's companions in travel," were seized by the mob and rushed into the theatre. In xx. 4, Aristarchus is referred to as a

Thessalonian, and in xxvii. 2 as a Macedonian of Thessalonica.

In every reference to Aristarchus, therefore, his connexion with Macedonia is mentioned. Apart from these references, and the fact that he was with St. Paul in his imprisonment at Rome, thereby earning for himself the remarkable title of "fellow-prisoner" (Col. iv. 10, 11; Philem. 24), nothing more is told us of him. There are, however, two references to unnamed personages in the life of St. Paul, and an inquiry of identification may lead to further knowledge of this companion, if he should be the most likely man to satisfy the conditions of the situations.

(1) Is he the man of Macedonia who appeared to St. Paul in the vision at Troas?

Ramsay [1] identifies this Macedonian with St. Luke on the following grounds: (i.) the first appearance of the "we" passages in connexion with the vision at Troas is intentional. It shows that "Luke entered into the drama of the Acts at Troas." (i.) "There was only one way in which Paul could know the man by sight to be a Macedonian —the man in the dream was personally known to him." (ii.) There is reason to think that Luke had personal knowledge of Philippi, at least that he had some connexion with the city; if, then, Luke was a Macedonian, he might be the man of Macedonia.

That Luke was a Macedonian remains to be proved; there are far stronger reasons for his connexion with Antioch.[2] There is very little to be said for Ramsay's second argument; the words spoken by the man in the vision are sufficiently plain and show that the speaker was a Macedonian. It might even be added that the descriptive part of Acts xvi. 9 is not due to St. Paul but to the historian. As to the

[1] *St. Paul the Traveller*, pp. 200–203.
[2] Harnack, *Luke the Physician*, pp. 20–24.

third argument, Ramsay, for instance, points out that there is a trace of local pride in the description of Philippi as "the first of the district" when at that time Amphipolis ranked first. Vincent[1] has, however, called attention to the difficulties which attach to any but the usual interpretation of "first" and "district," and concludes that it was the prominence of the city which led St. Paul to choose it as the starting point of his missionary work in Macedonia, "πρώτη may mark an emphasis on its colonial rank as possessing the *jus Italicum* (notice the emphatic position of κολωνία)." There is another explanation suggested by Blass, who proposes that πρώτης should be read instead of πρώτη; so that the description of Philippi would read, ἥτις ἐστὶν πρώτης τῆς μερίδος; Philippi was a city belonging to the first of the four districts into which Macedonia was divided.

Further, if Luke was a native of Philippi, how is it that he accepted the hospitality of Lydia and was unaware that by the river-side there was a place of prayer?

If the man of the vision was not Luke, is it possible to identify him with Aristarchus? There may be some ground for such identification if it is allowed that the three references to Aristarchus in the Acts which do not mention him solely by name, but speak of him as a Thessalonian and a Macedonian, had some underlying purpose. Why does the historian refer to him in this way? Luke must have had some reason for so doing. Is there anything in the fact that two of the passages are closely connected with the "we" sections of the Acts? It seems remarkable that Luke should so persistently refer to one who was a personal friend of his in this way. That Luke possessed dramatic insight is clear from the plan of the Acts, and it is quite in accordance with his method to give a preliminary hint before definitely

[1] *Philippians*, pp. xix., xx.

introducing us to one of the chief events or actors in his history. It is perhaps not amiss to point out that Ramsay himself has suggested that the reading of Acts xix. 29 in some MSS. might be accepted, namely, "Gaius and Aristarchus, a Macedonian," a suggestion which implies that Aristarchus was specially known by the said designation.

The argument is not by any means conclusive. But it seems *prima facie* impossible to dismiss the thought that St. Luke, by using the term Macedonian only three times (Acts xvi. 9, xix. 29, xxvii. 2) and twice applying it to Aristarchus, may have meant to imply that Aristarchus was more than *a* Macedonian and was the Macedonian of his history. He is one of the enigmas of the Acts, and the distinctive title "Paul's companions in travel" (which he shares with Gaius) imply that he was more constantly with the Apostle than the Acts and Epistles warrant us in believing (see below).

(2) Is Aristarchus "the brother whose praise is in the Gospel" (2 Cor. viii. 18, 19)?

The context refers to the great collection which seems to have been confined to the Churches of Macedonia and Achaia[1] (Rom. xv. 26). As this brother was connected with the collection and 2 Corinthians was written from Macedonia, he was in all probability a Macedonian; the omission of the name in a letter written from Macedonia is significant; the great probability that 2 Corinthians was written at Thessalonica,[2] coupled with the fact that Aristarchus was a Thessalonian, makes the identification possible. Lastly, the Greek word for "companions in travel" (Acts xix. 29) is found in 2 Corinthians viii. 19,

[1] Redlich, *St. Paul and his Companions*, pp. 166–168.

[2] 2 Cor. viii. 2 speaks of the poverty of the Macedonian Churches, and we know that the Church at Thessalonica was poor.

a verse which refers to the brother whose praise is in the Gospel, and nowhere else in the New Testament.

Acts xix. 29, *Συνεκδήμους τοῦ Παύλου.*

2 Cor. viii. 19, *Χειροτονηθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν συνέκδημος ἡμῶν.*

We find Aristarchus in Macedonia, Corinth and Ephesus, probably in Jerusalem at the time of Paul's arrest; he accompanied the Apostle on his voyage to Rome, and was with him at Rome itself. He well deserved the title given him by Luke.

The weight of evidence favours the identification, but clearly something must be said about the claims of others. Scholars have favoured Luke and Trophimus.

Let us examine the case of Luke, without being much influenced by the Collect and Epistle for St. Luke's day. The argument hinges on the phrase "in the gospel" and has been much influenced by the opinion of Jerome, Origen, and Ignatius. For example, Jerome, in his preface to St. Matthew, states of Luke, "Natione Syrus Antiochensis (cujus laus in evangelio)." It will be sufficient to answer that the phrase does not mean "in his Gospel," but in extending the Gospel: it is impossible to read into the words the existence of a written Gospel. One other consideration is conclusive: there is no "we" section in Acts xx. 1–3, and we may reasonably infer that Luke was not in St. Paul's company when 2 Corinthians was written.

Dean Stanley favours Trophimus on the following grounds: (1) Trophimus was a Gentile; (2) he was an Ephesian and therefore likely to have been the bearer of 1 Corinthians or to have accompanied St. Paul from Ephesus now; (3) he was well known in Jerusalem; (4) he was specially connected with the great collection; (5) he was with St. Paul on his return from this very visit to Corinth; (6) Aristarchus, Secundus and Sopater are excluded because they are distinguished from

Macedonian Christians. To these we may answer: (1) Aristarchus was not a Jew ;[1] and even if he were this would be no objection; (2) that Trophimus was an Ephesian does not bear on the argument, for 2 Corinthians was written from Macedonia, and there are no reasons for his claim to be the bearer of 1 Corinthians; (3) Trophimus in Jerusalem was recognised by his fellow-citizens; (4) Aristarchus was as much concerned in the great collection as Trophimus, and (5) accompanied St. Paul on his journey from Corinth; (6) the exclusion of Macedonian Christians is unintelligible. "When Paul sent Titus from Macedonia to promote the collection in Corinth, he was in a position to send with him two companions belonging to that country." [2]

To conclude, we may summarise our conclusions by saying that Aristarchus was possibly the Macedonian of the vision at Troas, and probably "the brother whose praise is in the Gospel."

E. Basil Redlich.

EXEGETICA.

Matthew v. 39.

In the January number (p. 89) I called attention to a difficulty which has been felt about the "right" cheek being struck. Since writing the note I have come across a passage in Origen, which shows that this difficulty is not new; it was evidently present to the mind of that expositor. In the *Philocalia* (i. 19) he uses this command of Jesus to prove the thesis that a number of sayings in Scripture cannot be interpreted literally, because in that case they would be meaningless. He has quoted from the Old Testament some

[1] Col. iv. 11 probably refers to Mark and Jesus Justus, and the words ἐκ περιτομῆς οὗτοι μόνοι are probably parenthetic.

[2] Weizsäcker, *Apostolic Age*, i. p. 299.

passages to prove his point, and now passes to the New. We find similar instances, he observes, in the Gospels. *Τί ἂν εἴη ἀλογώτερον τοῦ . Μηδένα κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἀσπάσησθε* [Luke x. 4]· *ὅπερ ἐντέλλεσθαι νομίζουσιν οἱ ἀκέραιοι τὸν σωτῆρα τοῖς ἀποστόλοις ; ἀλλὰ καὶ δεξιὰ σιαγὼν τύπτεσθαι λεγομένη ἀπιθανωτάτη ἐστί · παντὸς τοῦ τύπτοντος, εἰ μὴ ἄρα πεπονθώς τι παρὰ φύσιν τυγχάνει,τῇ δεξιᾷ χειρὶ τύπτοντος τὴν ἀριστερὰν σιαγόνα.* The saying is most incredible, as a literal command, because you naturally strike a man's left cheek, not his right, with your right hand. Origen's argument seems to imply that he regarded the blow as an attempt to hurt or injure. But it also proves that for him the impossibility of interpreting the command literally rested upon this physical incongruity.[1]

Luke xxiv. 21.

ἀλλά γε καὶ σὺν πᾶσιν τούτοις τρίτην ταύτην ἡμέραν ἄγει ἀφ' οὗ τἆῦτά ἐγένετο.

The sense of the passage is clear. I have translated it somewhat freely : " But He is dead, and that is three days ago ! " The difficulties are grammatical. There is something to be said for the view that *Ἰσραήλ*, from the clause immediately preceding, is the subject to *ἄγει*. " But of course Israel has passed three days since all this took place." Unless *ἄγει* is to be taken impersonally, which does seem the least unnatural rendering, the only alternative is to supply " Christ " or " Jesus of Nazareth " from the *αὐτός* of the foregoing clause. The textual variants (omission of *σὺν πᾶσιν τούτοις*, or of *πᾶσιν* alone, or of *ταύτην*, addition of *σήμερον* before or after *ἄγει*) do not affect the rendering. The *ταῦτα* refers to the condemnation and execution of

[1] For the slap with the back of the hand, cf. *Le Tartuffe* (Act II. Sc. 2), where Orgon says :

" Pour chatier son insolence extrême,
Il faut que je lui donne un revers de ma main."

The stage direction is : " Il se met en posture de lui donner un soufflet."

Jesus (ver. 20). "It is three days since this occurred, so that any hopes we might ever have cherished have faded." This catches up the previous *τούτοις*, but makes the intervening *ταύτην* look awkward; if the authorities for its omission were stronger, we might delete it as a gloss, introduced to emphasise *τρίτην*, especially as D and the Syriac, which omit it, insert the equivalent and more grammatical *σήμερον*.

Acts i. 7.

χρόνους ἢ καιροὺς οὓς ὁ πατὴρ ἔθετο ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ ἐξουσίᾳ.

Compare Philo, *Quaest. in Gen.* vi. 13, *θεὸν παρ' οὗ καὶ οἱ καιροὶ καὶ οἱ χρόνοι.* It is worth while noting this parallel, as none of the recent editors, not even Windisch, seems to have detected it.

1 Corinthians xiii. 3.

Καὶ ἐὰν παραδῶ τὸ σωμά μου ἵνα καυθήσομαι, ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω, οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦμαι.

Even martyrdom may be spoiled by a spirit of ostentation, or by the absence, from whatever reason, of love. One of the most remarkable comments upon this sentence is the unconscious note furnished by the letter of the churches of Lyons and Vienne, more than a century later (Eus. *H.E.* v. 1). In describing their martyrs during the recent persecution, they expressly connect love with no fewer than three of the most prominent in the list. The first is the young aristocrat, Vettius Epagathus, "filled with love for God and his neighbour" (*πλήρωμα ἀγάπης τῆς πρὸς τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν πλησίον*). He had a reputation for saintliness equal to that of John the Baptist's father; the words of Luke i. 6 are applied to him. But the Church adds, he had more of the Spirit than Zechariah, and "showed this by the fulness of his love (*διὰ τοῦ πληρώματος τῆς ἀγάπης*), in deciding willingly to lay down his life in defence of the brothers." The next example of love is the heroic slave-

girl Blandina, "through whom Christ proved that what men reckon mean, obscure, and contemptible is adjudged great glory by God, on account of love to Him—love shown in its strength." Thirdly, the martyrdom of Alexander the physician is chronicled; "he was well known to almost everybody for his love to God." Here we have cases from both sexes and from different ranks in life, where martyrdom is distinctly connected with love.

2 Corinthians viii. 3.

Ὅτι κατὰ δύναμιν, μαρτυρῶ, καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν κ.τ.λ.

For *κατὰ δύναμιν* in this sense of contributing or providing "up to one's means," a fresh parallel has turned up in the marriage contract of 260 A.D. (printed in *Oxyrhynchite Papyri*, x. pp. 207 f.): "Let the married pair then live together blamelessly observing the duties of marriage, and let the husband provide the wife with all necessaries in proportion to his means." (*συνβιούτωσαν οὖν ἀλλήλοις οἱ γαμοῦντες ἀμέμπτως φυλάσσοντες τὰ τοῦ γάμου δίκαια, ὁ δὲ γαμῶν . . . χορηγεί[τω] τῇ γυναικὶ τὰ δέοντα πάντα κατὰ δύναμιν.*)

Colossians iv. 1.

οἱ κύριοι, τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὴν ἰσότητα τοῖς δούλοις παρέχεσθε.

Cicero could not have added Paul's motive—*εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ὑμεῖς ἔχετε κύριον ἐν οὐρανῷ*—but in the *De Officiis* I. xiii. 41 he has a paragraph which is not far from the Apostle's principle. "Meminerimus autem etiam adversus infimos iustitiam servandam. Est autem infima condicio et fortuna seruorum, quibus non male præcipiunt qui ita iubent uti, ut mercennariis: operam exigendam, iusta præbenda." Paul has just told the Christian slaves at Colossæ to do their work properly; his words *τὸ δίκαιον παρέχεσθε*, addressed to the masters, are practically equivalent to Cicero's *iusta præbenda*, though the addition of *καὶ τὴν ἰσότητα* raises them to a higher plane.

1 Thessalonians ii. 7–8.

ὡς ἂν τροφὸς θάλπῃ τὰ ἑαυτῆς τέκνα, οὕτως ἱμειρόμενοι ὑμῶν εὐδοκοῦμεν μεταδοῦναι ὑμῖν οὐ μόνον τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ψυχάς.

Paul did more than instruct the Christians at Thessalonica, but Victor Hugo's words about the influence of Cimourdain upon his pupil, in *Quatrevingt-Treize*, illustrate the Apostle's simile. "L'esprit allaite, l'intelligence est une mamelle. Il y a analogie entre la nourrice qui donne son lait et le précepteur qui donne sa pensée. Quelquefois le précepteur est plus père que le père, de même que souvent la nourrice est plus mère que la mère."

1 Timothy i. 3.

καθὼς παρεκάλεσά σε προσμεῖναι κ.τ.λ.

For this use of *καθὼς* at the beginning of a sentence containing instructions a fresh parallel has turned up in *Oxyrhynchite Papyri*, x. (1299, 9–10), where we read: *καθὼς ἐνετιλάμην σοι κ.τ.λ.*. Here also there is no main verb, as we might expect.

Hebrews xiii. 23.

μεθ' οὗ ἐὰν τάχιον ἔρχηται ὄψομαι ὑμᾶς.

The writer makes his visit apparently conditional upon the ability or willingness of Timotheus to visit them also in the immediate future. Was it safer to travel in company? Or was the motive simply the desire of companionship? A similar question is raised by the note of a Greek woman, Zoïs, to her brother Ischyrion (A.D. 30, *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, x. pp. 243–244), in which she writes: "If you want to go to Alexandria, Apollos, son of Theon, is going to-morrow," *ἐὰν δὲ θέρῃς (θέλῃς) εἰς Ἀλεξάνδρεα⟨ν⟩ ἀπελθεῖν, Ἀπολλὼς Θέωνος ὑπάγει αὔριον.* The fact that Apollos is going evidently is expected to weigh with Ischyrion.

James Moffatt.

OLD TESTAMENT AND BABYLONIAN LANGUAGE.

II.

1. In examining the positive side of the question which now occupies us, the point of departure, in my opinion, is that the people of Canaan *possessed a language of their own* at least from the Amarna period onwards (circa 1400 B.C.). For the Canaanitish language shows itself as a living tongue even among *those* Canaanites who, in the Amarna letters or in the texts found at Ta'annek, used the Babylonian language and script. Proofs of its existence are found in large numbers in the Canaanite glosses and other features which have been noticed in the cuneiform texts already mentioned. For example, we find in them, along with a considerable number of Babylonian words, a Canaanite expression as explanatory, e.g., *abadat*, "she perished," is placed after *chalḳat* (Amarna, letter 181, line 51), or *anaji* is met with as an interpretation of the Babylonian *elippu*, "ship," [1] and in the Ta'annek texts, for example, the Canaanitish-Hebrew expression *arzi* may be read instead of the Babylonian *erizu* for "cedar." [2] A further proof of the existence of this special language of the Canaanites may be seen in the proper names of these people, as, e.g., Malkisedek or Adonisedek. Naville thinks, indeed (*La déc.*, p. 27), that he can set aside this instance by assuming that the Canaanitish proper names which have come down to us are of Hebrew origin. But this is a risky and, in some cases, quite inadmissible theory. For instance, we cannot trace back the word *adon* in these

[1] Franz Böhl, *Die Sprache der Amarnabriefe* (1909), pp. 81–84.
[2] Frd. Hrozny in Sellins' *Tell el-Ta'annek* (1905), p. 38.

proper names to the Hebraising of a Babylonish-Assyrian expression, because the same expression *adon*, "Lord," apart from its use in proper names, is familiar in the Phœnician inscriptions.[1] Is it suggested that we are to regard it there also as Hebrew imported goods ?

The Hebrews, then, according to all that we know about them, spoke from the first a branch of middle-Semite, which was closely allied to the Phœnician-Canaanitish tongue. All those sources of the history of Israel, which are of special value in describing cases of changing culture,[2] testify that in intercourse with the Canaanites the Hebrews needed no interpreter, and among the Hebrews of the earlier time we find not a trace of any change of language. And further, so far from there being any indication of a solidarity between the Israelite and the Babylonish-Assyrian language, we find actual testimony in Israel's literature that this language was regarded by the Israelites as another, an incomprehensible and an unknown tongue. This may be proved from the following three passages.

Isaiah announces to the enemies of the prophets that the Eternal will speak to this people "with stammering lips and another tongue" (xxviii. 11). This does indeed mean, in the first place, that God would be compelled to use the language of threatening instead of His early words of promise. But that explanation does not exhaust the meaning of the passage.[3] For in order to emphasise that meaning, the expression "in another tongue" would naturally have sufficed. The words "with stammering lips" would not have been necessary for that purpose. The mention of "stammering lips" points to the strangely-sounding words

[1] Cf. A. Bloch, *Phönizisches Glossar*, p. 19, etc.

[2] Many examples are enumerated in my *Geschichte der alttestamentlichen Religion kritisch dargestellt"* (1912), p. 5 f.

[3] In contradiction to Riessler in the *Tübinger Theol. Quartalschrift*, 1911, p. 495.

of *that* people whom the Almighty is to employ as the executor of the threatened punishment. The inflictors of that chastisement were the Assyrians, and therefore it is right to recognise in Isaiah xxviii. 11 an allusion to the Assyrian tongue, the words of which had for Israel a foreign sound. This is all the more probable because in another passage of the Book of Isaiah, Israel is threatened with the advance of "a people of a deeper (i.e. impenetrable) speech than thou canst perceive" (xxxiii. 19). There is no real authority for referring this passage to "the enemy of the last time" (Riessler, *l.c.*). In any case, the Assyrian language, even according to Isaiah xxxvi. 11, was one unknown to the Israelites, of which they made no current use. For when the ambassadors of Sennacherib in the year 701 brought an enticing message to the inhabitants of Jerusalem, they did not speak Assyrian, but Jewish-Hebrew.

The assumption that the Babylonish-Assyrian language was used by the Hebrews in the earlier centuries may be refuted, moreover, by the following consideration. For the earlier time we can trace no influence of the Babylonish-Assyrian language on the storehouse of Hebrew speech, unless the chanîkh (Gen. xiv. 14) reminds us of ḫanakuka, "thy comrades in arms," in the Ta'annek Letter (VI. line 8). The linguistic elements in which such influence shows itself with a high degree of probability or with certainty are traceable only from the seventh century onwards, therefore from the time in which, after the founding of the new Babylonian kingdom, the intercourse between Israel and Babylonia became direct and continuous. Hence we may derive that word *ʿaschtê*, which accords with the Babylonish-Assyrian *eschten*, "one," and appears in Hebrew in one expression for "eleven." For the form *ʿaschtê ʿasar*, and *ʿaschtê ʿesrê*, appears for the first time, if we begin with reliably dated writings, in Jeremiah i. 3; xxxix. 2; lii. 5;

Ezekiel xxvi. 1; xl. 49; Zechariah i. 7; 1 Chronicles xii. 13; xxiv. 12; xxv. 18, and xxvii. 14. We can see clearly that this form of expression is the later, if we take the trouble to set side by side all the passages of *both* forms for "eleven" (*achad ʿasar* and *ʿashtê ʿasar*, etc.).[1] It is certain that Babylonian elements are to be found in the language of Ezekiel. Although the number of Babylonian expressions which this author adopted from his environment are fewer than has sometimes been supposed, still some are undoubtedly genuine, especially *agappîm*, "wings of the army"=armed "troops,"[2] etc. I have examined this matter in detail in my *Geschichte*, p. 405.

The proper language of Canaan, the existence of which is proved by the above-mentioned glosses to the Amarna letters and elsewhere, *may* have been used *along with* the Babylonian, and we have already shown (I. no. 1) that this was actually the case in Egypt, the native and the foreign language being used together. But according to Naville,[3] the native language of Canaan was only a spoken and *not a written tongue*. If, however, the Hebrew language existed at all in Canaan (and its existence is admitted by Naville), that language might also be used as a means of expressing written thought; in other words, it might serve as a written tongue. To such a possibility all will agree. Many dialects which have a very limited circulation are employed in verse and in local papers (as, for instance, the remains of the Celtic tongue in Great Britain), and such use *may* be made of *every* dialect. This fact is not contradicted, but rather confirmed, by Naville's reference (*Arch.*, p. 7) to the popular dialect of Geneva, for a poem was composed in that very dialect in the year 1602.

[1] Cf. e.g. my *Hebräisches Lehrgebäude*, II. p. 211.

[2] Seven times in Ezekiel xii. 14–xxxix. 4, and cf. the Babylonian *agappu*.

[3] Naville, *La déc.*, p. 25, and *Archæology*, etc., p. 8.

Naville repeats, none the less, in ever-varying forms and applications, his favourite theory that Hebrew was not in the earlier times a written language. He tries to prove his argument by saying: "Hearing of this great deliverance, Deborah did not sit down to write a poem (Judges v. 2 ff.). She breaks out into a pæan of praise and joy. She sings, 'Awake, awake, Deborah, utter a song!' She is carried away by her feelings, and such a mighty exultation can only be expressed in language spontaneous and familiar to her, such as she, as well as the triumphant Israelites, speak every day. She does not consult the books which may exist at the time, she does not shape her sentences in accordance with the words of the law, of which she was probably absolutely ignorant; she sings."[1]

But all these words have no foundation in the facts. If Deborah composed a poem in the language of her contemporaries, she *did* actually create a literary product in that language. It is a totally *irrelevant* question whether she consulted books or not. Therefore her presumed ignorance of the words of the law would have *no* bearing on the matter in hand, even if it were not a merely fanciful supposition. To ascribe to the prophetess and judge (iv. 4) such ignorance as regards the legislative principles of the Mosaic religion, is all the more rashly venturesome because she herself mentions "the writer" (v. 14). The idea that the poem did not receive its present form until a later age puts a no less unjustifiable strain on the facts. The language of Deborah's song differs in no important point from the mode of expression common to other ancient poetical portions of Hebrew literature.[2] We have therefore no right to separate that poem of Deborah from the products of the written language,

[1] Naville, *La déc.*, pp. 25, 31; *Archæology*, etc., p. 9.

[2] Cf., e.g., Gen. xlix. 3 ff.; Numbers xxi. 14b, 18, 27–30; Deuteronomy xxxiii. 6 ff.

and to assume that there existed, besides the Hebrew used in Deborah's song, a foreign tongue as "the written language" of the Hebrews.

Naville himself indirectly admits this (*Arch.*, p. 9), when he concludes his comments on Judges v. 2 ff. with these words: "We might be tempted to regard the Deborah song as a portion of a written literature, if the discoveries of the last twenty years had not revealed to us the enormous use made in Palestine of the Babylonian cuneiform."[1] But we ask, in the first place, How can the fact that Deborah's song is written in the Hebrew language be set aside by the discovery of the Amarna letters? Under no conditions can that possibly be done. *Two* facts confront us, and they must be reconciled with each other. Such a reconciliation, we note secondly, is possible, if only the value of the Palestine discoveries of cuneiform texts is not exaggerated as it has been by Naville and his predecessors. The principal fact overlooked by these writers is that no cuneiform text has been discovered which contains a portion of the Hebrew literature, or may be attributed with certainty to an Israelite.

Naville fails utterly in his attempt to set aside the fact that even in Deborah's song Hebrew appears as a literary language. That song of triumph, as even the sharpest critics acknowledge,[2] is an actual echo of the historical situation there celebrated. We see, therefore, that in the beginning of the period of the Judges, at the latest, there existed *a written language* of the Hebrews. In any case, then, Naville is wrong in his assertion (*Arch.*, p. 3, etc.) that "all the writers in Israel who composed books before the age of Solomon used the Babylonian language."

2. The new theory and the history of Hebrew *writing*.

[1] *La déc.*, pp. 25, 31; *Archæology*, p. 9.

[2] Th. Nöldeke, *Die Semitischen Sprachen*, 2nd edition (1899), p. 32; Ed. Meyer, *Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstämme* (1906), p. 487; Driver, *Introduction*, etc., 8th edition, p. 171 (1909).

(*a*) The supporters of the new opinion lay emphasis constantly on the simple fact that the records in the old Hebrew tongue, which have been discovered up to the present during the excavations, belong only to the ninth century B.C. This is certainly true, for the most ancient writings in the old Hebrew alphabet are the *circa* 70 ostraca which were discovered in 1910 at Samaria by an American expedition under the leadership of Professor Reisner, and which were written, as clear indications prove, in the reign of Ahab (ca. 876–854). Next in age come the following examples of old Hebrew writing: the Mesa-stone of ca. 850; the Siloah inscription from the time of Hezekiah (2 Kings xx. 20; 2 Chron. xxxii. 30; Sir. xlviii. 17); the Gezer calendar, which was discovered in 1908 by Mr. Macalister, and which, from the form of the letters, must be placed in the seventh century B.C.; [1] the two seals which were found at Megiddo (Tell el-Muteselim), and the thirteen jug-handles which were found during the excavations at Jericho, but which are not of great antiquity, although they cannot be exactly dated. But the question cannot be settled by merely stressing the single fact that up to the present no more ancient documents in early Hebrew characters have been discovered (Naville, *Arch.*, p. 13, etc.). Are there not two other possibilities?

(*b*) It is possible that the Hebrews, even if in earlier centuries they used the Babylonian language and script, had other writings as well in which both the Hebrew language and the Babylonian script were employed.

Among the Hethites at least the fact has been observed, that in one part of their original documents and contracts they have used the Hethite language and the written characters of the Babylonians. So we find it in the texts which were discovered at Boghaz-Köi.[2] It was indeed more

[1] W. H. Bennett, *The Moabite Stone* (1911), Appendix, pp. 84–86.
[2] Winckler in *Mitteilungen der Deutschen Orientgesellschaft*, no. 35, p. 43 f.

probable that in the literary usage of the Hebrew language an alphabetic script (which the Babylonish Assyrian cuneiform was not) should be used. It was especially natural that the most distinctive principles of Israel, which formed the foundation of its separate religious and moral position, should be fixed in the "national script" (Benzinger, p. 178). But was there such a script in Israel during the earlier centuries ?

(*c*) The Phœnician writing, with which the early Hebrew was virtually identical, may possess a remoter antiquity than critics have ventured to assume in recent decades. The circumstances which lead us to such a conclusion are as follow :—

(*a*) The fact must not be lost sight of in this investigation that the *argumentum e silentio* affords no decisive proof. New excavations may bring to light examples of old Hebrew documents. This possibility deserves mention all the more because portions of the Israelite literature which were written in the Babylonian language and script have not yet been found. (*β*) We must, furthermore, not assume with Naville (*La déc.*, p. 25) that in the letters of Amarna and Ta'annek the complicated script of the Babylonians would not have been used if the simple Phœnician script had existed. For it was neither complication nor simplicity which determined the choice of the mode of writing used in this correspondence between princes and vassals. Far more important was the widely extended current *knowledge* of the mode of writing concerned. Therefore in these letters that script was chosen which corresponded to the language then accepted as the most widely intelligible means of communication between the rulers of different nations.

(*γ*) The Phœnician early Semitic alphabet is not a daughter of Babylonian cuneiform, as Friedrich Delitszch and others suppose.[1] As along with the Sumerian-Babylonish

[1] Hommel, Winckler and Benzinger, *Archäologie* (1907), p. 174.

cuneiform a special development shows itself in the script of the Elamites,[1] so the Phœnician script had its origin *side by side* with the Babylonian, and most probably in dependence upon the simplified written characters of the Egyptians, who discovered the principle of alphabetic writing.[2]

Further (δ) this Phœnician, early Semitic script, according to sufficiently reliable traces, was gradually developed during a long period, before it attained the form which meets us in its oldest monuments.[3]

Proof of the slow development of the Phœnician-Semitic script lies before us, first of all, in the fact that the Southern Semitic writing did not grow up out of an alphabet such as we see on the Mesa-stone, but from another branch of the Phœnician-Semitic stem. This development turns our gaze back "to a period long before that of Mesha."[4] And, further, the Phœnician alphabet seems to have been accepted by the Greeks between 1200 or 1000 B.C.[5] Then, too, the writing material which, according to recent observation, was used in Phœnicia at an early date, makes it improbable that cuneiform was employed there except in diplomatic

[1] Ferd. Bork in the *ZDMG*, 1910, 579 f.; A. Jeremias, *Handbuch der altorientalischen Geisteskultur* (1913), p. 1.

[2] Ed. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, I. 2 (1909), § 203. Another independent kind of writing was also discovered by Flinders Petrie in the neighbourhood of Sinai. On account of its wholly undeveloped signs he dates it from about ca. 1500 B.C. (*Researches in Sinai* (1909), p. 131).

[3] In this view Hartwig Hirschfeld, in his acutely reasoned essay "Recent Theories on the Origin of the Alphabet" (*Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*, 1911, p. 965), agrees with S. Zerbe, *The Antiquity of Hebrew Writing and Literature* (1911), p. 154 f.

[4] F. Prätorius, *Das kanaanitische und das südsemitische Alphabet*, in *ZDMG*, 1909, p. 191.

[5] Zerbe, *op. cit.*, p. 136; W. Larfeld, *Griechische Epigraphik*, 3rd edition (1914), p. 208. "The transition is older than the seizure of the west coast of Asia Minor by the Greeks, which took place about 1000 (according to Eduard Meyer, *Geschichte*, I. 336: 1100); for the Greek settlers brought their alphabet with them from the mother country to their new home" (p. 209). "The adoption of the Phœnician alphabet by the inhabitants of the eastern Hellenic continent" dates "from about the eleventh century."

correspondence such as that of the Amarna letters (see above, I. 1). For in the account of the Egyptian Wen-Amon[1] about his stay in the Phœnician town of Byblos (ca. 1100 B.C.) five hundred rolls of papyrus which had been imported from Egypt to Phœnicia are mentioned, and papyrus was unsuitable for the use of cuneiform.[2] And even among the Hebrews we hear nothing whatever as to the use of clay-tablets for writing upon.

We learn, therefore, from the most recent studies of the history of *writing* that the Israelites may possibly, in recording their national history, have used at a very early date, e.g., in the age of Moses, an older form of the Phœnician alphabet.

Is it likely, on the other hand, that the Phœnician script was unknown to the Israelites before the age of Solomon? Naville gives an affirmative answer to this question (*Arch.*, p. 13), when he says, "The Canaanite writing cannot be traced in Palestine before the time of Solomon, that is, not until there were close relations with the Phœnicians."

But relations had long existed between the Canaanites on the seashore and some regions of Israel. In Jacob's blessing of the tribes (Gen. xlix. 3 ff.) we are told that the tribe of Zebulon "shall dwell at the haven of the sea . . . and his border shall be unto Zidon" (v. 13). In Deborah's song (Judges v. 17) we read that the tribe of Dan "remained in ships" (presumably as a mercenary in the service of the Phœnicians). Apart, then, from the fact that Hiram, king of Tyre, was "a friend of David" (1 Kings v. 15; Luther's Bible; v. 1, A.V. and R.V.), there existed long before the age of Solomon a manifold association between Phœnicia and Israel, and before that time the latter people had opportunities of knowing the Phœnician alphabet. In answer to

[1] E.g., in Gressmann, *Altorientalische Texte*, etc. (1909), p. 225 f.
[2] This is admitted by Naville himself (*Archæology*), pp. 13, 19.

Naville's theory already quoted, some positive facts may be set out.

The historical books of Israel inform us that in the reign of Solomon various things were brought from Phœnicia: cedars of Lebanon and costly stones for the building of the temple, and also an artist of semi-Israelite birth (1 Kings v. 6, 17 f.; vii. 13 f.). But nothing is said about the importation of the Phœnician script; and we, as historians, must content ourselves with that which the sources narrate about the time in question. The duty of keeping to the sources is all the more imperative because the historical books of the Hebrews have expressly noted many steps of progress on the pathway of civilisation, as will be shown more fully in the following paragraphs. It follows, then, that it is neither necessary nor possible to set up the theory that the Phœnician alphabet was first known to the Hebrews in the age of Solomon.[1]

3. Other arguments from Israel's history and tradition.

(*a*) Let us next consider the chief positive argument against the new assumption, that the literature of the Hebrews up to the age of Solomon was composed in Babylonian and was translated at a subsequent date into Hebrew. This argument lies in the fact that such an exchange is *never mentioned* or in any way indicated in the historical books and the Hebrew literature generally.

Never in the whole early Hebrew literature do we meet with the suggestion that portions of it were translated out of another language.

Is the opposite suggested, for instance, in Proverbs xxv. 1 ? ["These are also proverbs of Solomon, which the men of Hezekiah, king of Judah, copied out."] No. Hezekiah's scribes were simply instructed to gather together into a new collection such proverbs as they might find in other places.

[1] See Naville, *Archæology*, etc., pp. 26 and 203.

For the correct reading is, "These also are proverbs of Solomon, which the men of Hezekiah brought forward again."[1]

The Septuagint describes the nature of the work undertaken in the word ἐξεγράψαντο,[2] and adds to "the proverbs" *αἱ ἀδιάκριτοι* as well. That expression most probably signifies "the undivided or unseparated," and this attribute is based on the fact that in this collection a thought is often set forth in more than two lines, as, e.g., in xxv. 6 f., 9 f., 21 f.; xxvi. 18 f., 23–28, etc. It is much less likely that by *αἱ ἀδιάκριτοι* is meant "the incomprehensible" ("unintelligible," Naville, p. 193), and this expression has no reference in any case to the nature of the script and lettering in which these proverbs were written. For we remark in the first place that the Greek expression affords *in itself* no sure ground for the assumption that "Solomon wrote in cuneiform" (Naville, *Arch.*, p. 194), and, secondly, there are various things which tell against the view, as, e.g., the word ἐξεγράψαντο itself—a circumstance which Naville has overlooked, while he seeks to use another point in the Greek rendering in support of his theory. He tries even to exploit the *transtulerunt* of the Vulgate in his own favour. But this word may also be correctly applied in its local sense, and if it were used in a figurative sense this would be inaccurate. For *hectîḳ* does not mean "to transfer from one language into another."

Nor can we find a hint of any such action in the famous expression *mephorāsch*, which meets us in Nehemiah viii. 8. There we are told that the Levites "read in the book of the law of God distinctly."[3]

[1] Hectîḳû, cf. the Assyrian, etc., in my *Hebr. Wörterbuch*, 335a.

[2] So Nowack, Wildeboer, Frankenberg, *in loc.*, "they selected, or made an extract." ("sie exzerpierten.")

[3] "Distinctly" is also given by Batten in the *International Critical Commentary on Ezra and Nehemiah*, 1913, p. 356. The translation "by sections" is discussed in my work, *Die moderne Pentateuchkritik und ihre neueste Bekämpfung*, 1914, p. 69 f.

First, the word *mephorāsch* does not mean primarily "translated," if we regard the usual meaning of the verb here employed, according to which it means "to separate, to decide." Secondly, the Hebrew language had been at the time (ca. 444 B.C.) still in use for centuries, and therefore did not require any translation before Israelites. Thirdly, there is in the Old Testament another expression for "translated," i.e., methurgām, and *this expression is verily used in a neighbouring passage, where the reference really is to a translation* into another language, namely, the Aramaic (Ezra iv. 7). Naville is wrong therefore in interpreting the word *mephorāsch* again as "translated" (*Arch.*, p. 178). It is useless for him to represent the rendering of the law from "the Aramaic or popular form, the literary form of Babylonian cuneiform, with the Jewish tongue" (see below), as if it were not "really a translation." Such a theory could only be set up by one who was unacquainted with these branches of the Semitic language.

(*b*) The Hebrew sources contain, further, not the slightest trace of the suggestion that the Israelitish literature or a portion of it had been transferred from Babylonian cuneiform into the old Hebrew alphabet.

It is true that some critics (cf. Riessler, *l.c.*, p. 496) have recently discovered a "hint" of such a transcription in the reference to Ezra as a *sopher mahir bethorath mosche* (Ezra vii. 6). But how can the words of that passage, "And he was a ready, i.e., a rapid, scribe in the law of Moses," possess that sense? Even if the word *sopher* is meant to indicate the idea "scribe" there given to it in Ezra vii. 6, it could only mean one skilled or practised in his art of writing, just as in Psalm xlv. 2 the same expression is used with exactly the same meaning. But it is more probable that the expression *sopher* in that saying on Ezra is used in its second meaning, "one skilled or learned in the

law." [1] For the addition "in the law of Moses" does not explain itself quite naturally, if *sopher* is translated merely "scribe." For how could such a one be skilled only in this particular work of transcribing the Pentateuch? In no case, however, is there any "hint" in the words of Ezra vii. 6 that the law of Moses had been *re-written* by Ezra from Babylonian cuneiform into another language. This sense cannot even be put into the words if we call to aid 4 Esdras xiv. 42 (Riessler, *l.c.*). According to that passage Ezra dictated the law, which had been lost, and which he had re-discovered, to five men, of whom we read, "Scripserunt quae dicebantur excessiones noctis, quas non sciebant." Riessler gives the words this meaning, "they recorded the matter dictated to them in signs which they did not understand." But the words are these, "They wrote what was spoken (by me), happenings (or appearances) of the night, which they did not know." [2] Here also we find *nothing* about a *transcription* of the law.

The fact that the ancient Hebrew literature never mentions anywhere that portions of that literature had been translated from one language into another, and re-written out of one script into another, is very important on three main grounds.

In the first place, this silence is of weighty import because the literature of Israel contains surprisingly numerous references to the occurrence of changes in the progress of events and of the culture of Israel. For we find there a very large number of notices on change in the names of places (Gen. xiv. 2b, etc.), change in the names of the months, of the titles of God, of customs, etc.[3] And are we to suppose that in the entire literature of this nation there would be no

[1] Cf. on this developed meaning of *sopher* my *Geschichte*, etc., p. 416 f.

[2] "Excessiones noctis" is translated "night visions" by Zöckler in the *Kurzgefassten Kommentar* of Strack and Zöckler on the Apocrypha.

[3] A collection of instances is given in my *Geschichte*, p. 5 f.

reference whatever to such an exceedingly important cultural change in the life of the people as an alteration with regard to the language and the alphabet ?

Secondly, we observe that another transcription of the law is actually announced in the later books of Israel. For in the Talmud (bab. Sanhedrin 21b) we read that "in the beginning the law of Israel was given in the Hebrew language." In this script it was given to the Samaritans, and from this fact we can see more clearly than ever what that "Hebrew script" was. For we know that the Samaritan alphabet corresponds in its main features to that of the old Hebrews and Phœnicians, as we may read it on the Mesa-stone and elsewhere.[1] "In Ezra's days," that passage from the Talmud goes on, "the law was given to Israel in a different kind of writing." This is designated as *ashshuri*, and this attribute "Assyrian" is put instead of *arammi*, "Aramaic"—as was possible later, and indeed actually happened. In the later centuries the expression "Asshur" was applied to the Babylonian and even to the Persian kingdom (2 Kings xxiii. 29; Erza vi. 22), and thus the Aramaic script which was used in the new Syrian realm might be designated "Assyrian" (*ashshuri*). Thus we see, *thirdly*, that even in reference to the transference of the law from one mode of writing into another a notice is preserved in Israelitish tradition, but this notice distinctly states that the law was first written in Hebrew characters. Not only is there *an absence of the slightest hint* as to a transcription of the law out of Babylonian cuneiform into another alphabet, but that mode of transcription is *clearly set aside* by a distinct testimony to the Israelitish transmission.

In my judgment these facts are of sufficient weight to decide the question.

[1] Riessler is therefore quite mistaken (*loc. cit.*, p. 496) in his view that the passage from the Talmud we have mentioned does not contradict the assumption that the law was first written in Babylonian cuneiform.

Along with them there are other circumstances, of lesser importance no doubt, which must not be wholly neglected in our estimate of Naville's theory. In this class I put especially Naville's view as to the place occupied by the *Aramaic* language and writing in the cultural history of Israel. We need only look up the expressions "Aramean, Aramaic language, Aramaic alphabet" in the index of his book *Archæology, etc.*, and we shall at once recognise the significance of this factor. The most important points to which attention should be called are the following:—

(*a*) In the first place, he says repeatedly that "Moses called himself an Aramean like all the Israelites of his age" (*Arch.*, pp. 21, 204). In proof of this he quotes the words, which in Deuteronomy xxvi. 5 are put into the mouth of the Israelites in reference to Jacob: "*arammi obēd abî.*" These words are on the whole correctly translated in the Revised Version, "An Aramean ready to perish was my father," but *obēd* would probably be still better interpreted "straying" or "wandering" (cf. Ps. cxix. 176, where *obēd* means "separated from the flock" [1] ["I have gone astray like a lost sheep"]. But this is of minor importance. The main point is that the words of Deuteronomy xxvi. 5 look back to the long exile which Jacob endured in the Aramean country.

That interpretation seems justified by the immediate context of the passage quoted, which contains a *direct* reference to another exile of Jacob. The opening words of verse 5, as is clear from the context alone, do not refer to Jacob's ethnological position, but to his actual place of abode. The passage has a *local* meaning. In support of this view many other places might be cited, according to which the Hebrews, descendants of Arphaxad, etc., ranked *along* with the Arameans as a particular branch of the

[1] See Paul Haupt in *ZDMG*, 1910, p. 704.

Semites (Gen. x. 21 ; xiv. 13, etc.). Have we not a testimony to the fact in the frontier settlement drawn up according to Genesis xxxi. 44 ff. between Laban and Jacob ? No difficulty on this point is raised by Naville's allusion to Josephus, who remarks, before his account of Jacob's emigration to Egypt, that the Israelites were " Mesopotamians and not Egyptians."

(β) Second, and of more importance, is the relationship of the Old Testament writings to the Aramean language.

Naville characterises the relationship in this way. If the so-called priestly code was written in the fifth century by Ezra, it was written in the Aramaic language.

For Ezra came from Mesopotamia, where *Aramaic* was the literary language (*Arch.*, p. 105). This statement might be excused as a misprint, if he had not written the following sentence on p. 178, " In my opinion the law was written in Aramaic, the popular form, the book-form of cuneiform." But this connexion of Aramaic with the language of cuneiform is purely fanciful. He thinks he can prove his statement in the following words, " Even if we admit that Old Hebrew was a script and an idiom for books, we do not see how Ezra could pass from the Canaanite alphabet to square Hebrew, which is a modified form of Aramaic, without having first passed through the stage of Mesopotamian Aramaic " (p. 181 f.).[1]

But who says or is compelled to say that Ezra employed at once the later square Hebrew ? He naturally accepted that form of the Aramaic script which was then in use, but there is not the slightest ground on that score for the deduction that a stratum of the Pentateuch, or the whole Pentateuch, was written in the Aramaic language. All the passages which Naville has written further on this point (pp. 24, 50, 115, 183 f., etc.) are mere repetitions of the same

[1] Naville ignores the ostraca of Samaria, etc.

assertion, and are very far from establishing the fact that Ezra used Aramaic in writing out the Pentateuch. The actual Aramaic portions which exist in the book named after Ezra (iv. 8 ff., etc.) show *on the contrary* the difference that exists between them and the Hebrew texts. And besides, the portion that begins with Ezra iv. 8 is expressly indicated as "*translated* into Aramaic" (ver. 7).

Naville moves in a perfect circle of errors, and whence do they arise? First of all from his failure to give due consideration to the clear words of Genesis xxxi. 47, Isaiah xxxvi. 11, and Ezra iv. 7. Even the first of these three passages shows clearly that the Hebrew and Aramaic languages must be carefully distinguished from one another, for the Hebrew Jacob expresses "heap of witness" by gal *êd*, but the Aramean Laban uses the expression *jegár sâhadûtha*. Further, according to Isaiah xxxvi. 11, the Aramaic idiom was for the mass of the Hebrew people an unknown quantity, and only the higher state officials knew Aramaic, because it had become an unduly circulated medium of diplomatic intercourse. For that very reason documents addressed to the Persian government were translated into Aramaic (Ezra iv. 7).

Secondly, the fact that the Jews in Elephantinê wrote Aramaic is mistakenly interpreted and exploited by Naville. According to him the Aramaic language was brought to Elephantinê as their mother-tongue by the Jews who emigrated to Egypt.[1] But we need not recur to the well-known theory that the founders of the community at Elephantinê belonged for the most part to Samaria, as it is very probable they did, and that Aramaic was better known to them than to the inhabitants of Judæa, owing to the settling of colonies in the north and east of Samaria (2 Kings

[1] *Archæology*, pp. 145, 163, 173. Moreover a trace of Hebrew has been discovered in the Elephantinê sources by Strack (*ZDMG*, 1911).

xvii. 24). The following factor only needs to be mentioned in explanation. The colonists in southern Egypt used Aramaic partly because they entered into correspondence with Persian officials, and partly also they wrote Aramaic as Israelites abroad, where Aramaic was a more familiar Semitic dialect than Hebrew.

We see, then, that both the events out of which Naville seeks to derive an entirely new conception of the origin of Old Testament literature (*Arch.*, pp. 9, 139, etc.)—the discovery of the Amarna correspondence and of the papyri of Elephantinê—have no such significance as he attributes to them. The Hebrew language and the Phœnician old Hebrew script are robbed by him of their importance for the origin of the Old Testament. But they will not permit themselves to be set aside.

I do not now criticise the numerous observations made by Naville in the course of his work on the origin of the Pentateuch. For it is unmethodical to scatter by the way such isolated passages throughout an investigation, in order to arouse suspicion against a great conviction—the newer theory as to the Pentateuch (*Arch.*, pp. 24, 71, 118, 130, 204). It is the less needful for me to discuss in detail these remarks of Naville, which have no direct concern with the answering of the question as to the relation of the Old Testament to the language and script of the Babylonians, because this subject, "Modern Criticism of the Pentateuch and its Latest Opponents," has recently been elucidated by me in a special book. ED. KÖNIG.

BOLDNESS IN THE DAY OF JUDGMENT.

(1 JOHN iv. 17.)

IN the fine collect for St. John Baptist's Day the Baptist is characterised as speaking the truth and boldly

rebuking vice—a true note of greatness in preacher and prophet, and essentially characteristic of the Christian life as manifested immediately after the day of Pentecost. In contrast to the cowardly attitude which impelled them to forsake their Master the Apostles now "spake the word of God with boldness" (Acts iv. 31), so that "the rulers marvelled when they perceived the boldness of Peter and John, and had perceived that they were unlearned and ignorant men" (Acts iv. 13). Again, Barnabas commends Saul to the Apostles in Jerusalem because "he had preached boldly in the name of Jesus" (Acts ix. 27). In the mission work of the Church "speaking boldly" continues to be the characteristic note, as at Antioch in Pisidia, at Iconium and at Ephesus (Acts xiii. 46; xiv. 3; xix. 8).

In these and other passages the Greek words used are *παρρησία*, and the verbal and adverbial forms *παρρησιάζεσθαι* and *παρρησίᾳ*. The literal meaning of *παρρησία* is open, unreserved talk, what Shakespeare calls "free speech and fearless." Although in at least one passage—John xi. 53—the word, in its adverbial form, has the meaning of doing a thing openly and without concealment apart from any suggestion of speech it does not in itself connote necessarily courage or audacity, as its rendering in the English Version seems to imply. It is used of our Lord speaking plainly in contrast to teaching by parable (John xvi. 20), and of St. Paul "using great boldness of speech"—i.e. plain, intelligible speech— "not as Moses, who put a veil upon his face" (2 Cor. iii. 12).

But as speaking without reserve either to friend or foe, often needs courage—in the former case it is often at the risk of losing friendship, in the latter at the risk of a penalty —the idea of "boldness" is generally present. Plutarch, for instance, who has much to say upon the word, discusses the question how far it is wise and right to speak plainly

to a friend about his shortcomings, and advises caution. Euripides, who uses the word rather frequently, connects it with the thought of freedom. It is the glory of the Athenian citizen to be unrestrained in speech (see Ion. 421 f., ἐλεύθερο | παρρησίᾳ θάλλοντες οἴκοιεν πόλιν | κλεινῶν Ἀθηνῶν), as it is the glory of the Christian freely to preach the Gospel.

But although those thoughts of outspokenness, of courage and of freedom, implicit in παρρησία are typical of all that is best and greatest in the history of Christian thought and action the further use of the word in connexion with the relation of the human soul to God brings us into a region of deeper and more spiritual interest, and one in which the suggestiveness of παρρησία has hardly been sufficiently considered.

All great thinkers have recognised that the best and purest human happiness is centred in that unrestrained and unreserved converse which is only possible in close and intimate friendship. One of our novelists writes, "All estrangement was for ever at an end between them: forgiveness meant joy unspeakable, even above every earthly joy. They understood one another, seldom found much to say, but were always at ease in each other's company." Such unreservedness of friendship is the supreme aim of life.

> From quiet homes and first beginning,
> Out to the undiscovered ends,
> There's nothing worth the wear of winning
> But laughter and the love of friends.[1]

And some have seen that this earthly enjoyment and confidence of friendship finds its counterpart in "heavenly places." Of John Smith of Harrow it has been said: "His master passion was to know God, to depend upon Him, to do His will; to whom God was as near and as

[1] Mrs. L. B. Welford.

dear as his best known friend." In common with many other mystics Brother Lawrence uses the same language. "We ought," he said, "to act with God in the greatest simplicity, speaking to Him frankly and plainly and imploring His assistance in our affairs just as they happen. God had never failed to grant it, as he had often experienced."

This conception of interchange of thought in ideal human friendship, and the possibility of transferring the same quality of friendship to our relations with God is justified by a further use of *παρρησία* in the New Testament. As a term of friendship it is necessarily reciprocal. For all true friendship implies co-operation:

> Our hands in one, we will not shrink
> From life's severest due;
> Our hands in one, we will not blink
> The terrible and true.
> What each would feel a heavy blow
> Falls on us both as autumn snow.[1]

The possibility of bringing this human joy of perfect friendship and mutual converse into a divine relationship was created by the words of Jesus when He called His disciples friends. "Ye are my friends if ye do the things which I command you. No longer do I call you servants (or slaves); for the servant knoweth not what his lord doeth; but I have called you friends; for all things that I heard from the Father I have made known unto you" (John xv. 14, 15). Here was *παρρησία* indeed, an unreserved declaration to "friends" of *all* that the Father had revealed to the Son. The manumission of the slaves or bondservants of Christ to be His friends was a momentous event in the history of religion, in the relation of God to man. And the first incident in that newly revealed relation is one which was impossible before. It marks the transition from the law to the Gospel. There can be no true converse between

[1] Monckton Milnes.

master and slave, no freedom of discourse or mutual confidence and trust. Friendship implies community of interest, perfected sympathy, even at its best and highest, identity of personality (*καθὼς ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τούτῳ*, "As He is, so are we in this world," 1 John iv. 17). Although, therefore, the word itself does not occur in this passage it is a signal instance of its exercise and throws important light on its use in the passages of the Epistles which we are about to consider.

In three passages the word is used in reference to awe-inspiring moments, in which fear and not confidence (*παρρησία*) might be expected to be present, namely, the solemn entry of the High Priest into the Holy of Holies (Hebrews iv. 16), and the Day of Judgment (1 John ii. 28; iv. 17). On both of these occasions the believer is entitled to cast away fear and to have the confidence which perfect love and the sense of pardon alone can give.

The first of these passages (Hebrews iv. 16) is rendered in R.V., "Let us therefore draw near with boldness (*μετὰ παρρησίας*) unto the throne of grace, that we may receive mercy and may find grace to help us in time of need." Although the derivative sense of "boldness" is predominant here, the primary thought of unreserved converse is implied both by the character of the High Priest, who, like a sympathetic earthly friend, "can be touched with the feeling of our infirmities, and hath been in all points tempted like as we are," and also by the fact that the "boldness" expresses itself in prayer for "help in time of need." The same sense of confidence in prayer occurs in 1 John v. 13 foll. There the confidence arises from the conscious possession of eternal life (v. 13); and again the parallel is found in the confidence with which we approach a beloved and intimate friend when we make request of him. We know with the certainty of experience that he will grant the request because we have

the same views and purpose and will. So the believer is assured that his prayer will be answered, "if we know that He heareth us whatsoever we ask" (v. 15). The unusual grammatical construction (*ἐὰν οἴδαμεν*) must signify that we *do* know. It is hypothetical only in form.[1]

In 1 John iv. 17 we have a definition of *παρρησία* (*parresia*) which places it on a still higher level as an expression of Christian thought. It is the word used by St. John here and in ii. 28 to bring home to his readers and disciples the attitude of the believer's soul in the presence of God in the day of judgment—whatever the reality may be which that symbolic phrase is intended to convey.

It raises a picture of the soul brought, not before the tribunal of an offended judge, but into the presence of an intimate and familiar friend—a different note from the mediæval presentment of the "Rex tremendæ Majestatis" before whose judgment seat

> Quantus tremor est futurus
> Quando judex est venturus
> Cuncta stricte discussurus.

In chapter ii. 28 St. John bids us view this assured confidence in the day of judgment as a result of the divine indwelling love. Here it is the fulness and completion of love (*ἐν τούτῳ τετελείωται ἡ ἀγάπη ἵνα παρρησίαν ἔχωμεν*). Love has resulted in an approach to identity between the believer and God Himself (see chap. iv. 17, as cited above), just as intimate friends become closely assimilated in character. In such an attitude fear can have no place (*ἡ τελεία ἀγάπη ἔξω βάλλει τὸν φόβον*), because, as the Apostle says, fear brings with it corrective punishment (*κόλασιν*). Fear would be the natural feeling of a criminal in the presence of a judge, or of a slave in the presence of his master, but not in the intercourse of a friend. Even constraint and shyness are a kind

[1] The conditional particle suggests a doubt, the indicative mood removes it.

of fear involving the possibility of correction and so inconsistent with perfect friendship. The ideal friend is one

> Who never found fault with you, never implied
> Your wrong by her right.[1]

It will be seen, then, that *παρρησία* or confidence takes rank, as the expression of the best and holiest and most impressive of Christian thoughts, side by side with *ἀγάπη*, of which it is a necessary consequence, and with *κοινωνία* (fellowship or communion), of which it is the expression. Boldness in the day of judgment is the confidence of loving friendship.

ARTHUR CARR.

THE CREED AND DR. SANDAY.

THE following thoughts on the mental crisis which has been brought about by the publication of Professor Sanday's Reply to Bishop Gore's Open Letter are in all humility commended by a learner and teacher, who believes in the Apostles' Creed, to the consideration of other learners and teachers who so far forth share a common faith.

In this article I take my stand on the Apostles' Creed for the following reasons :—In the first place, in the Anglican communion, of which I am a member, the Apostles' Creed has a primary and personal appeal such as attaches to no other formula except the Lord's Prayer. And what I have to say on this occasion is intended to appeal to the ordinary man. The longer Creed, which is recited by the congregation in the Service of Holy Communion, is of course also an expression of individual belief; but it is the Apostles' Creed that is repeated by the individual at his baptism, confirmation and on the bed of sickness.

Again, if I mistake not, this Creed is very generally accepted by the large Protestant communions that have,

[1] Mrs. E. B. Browning.

on various grounds, separated from the Church of England, yet still adhere to the Catholic faith in the Trinity and the Incarnation. And to the members of these communions I also address myself. The Apostles' Creed embodies the minimum of what is necessary to an adequate answer to the question, "What think ye of Christ?" and that is the essential thing in Christianity. Whatever makes Jesus Christ seem to us less near, less living, dimmer, is rightly rejected by the man that is "in Christ," even though he has not the learning or the skill to defend logically the grounds of his rejection. When we are hard pressed by the tempestuous winds called Criticism or Reunion, and are considering which of our cherished beliefs or practices we may, or must, cast overboard, we shall do well to steady our judgment by recalling the memorable words of St. Ignatius of Antioch, "Wheresoever Jesus is, there is the Catholic Church."

Bishop Gore's *Open Letter on the Basis of Anglican Fellowship in Faith and Organization* deals, as we all know, with three burning questions. But, in connexion with what I have just said, I think it quite necessary to appeal to my readers not to allow their prejudices on questions B or C to affect their opinion of what Bishop Gore has to say on question A. It is, I am sure, possible to disagree with a man on one issue and agree with him on another; unfortunately there are few evidences of this fairness and detachment of mind in our religious Press.

Bishop Gore's position is that "the claim which is being made by certain of our clergy in the name of Liberal Christianity," that disbelief in what are called "nature miracles" "is no bar to the exercise of the ministry"; this claim, Bishop Gore maintains, is incompatible with loyalty to the Church of England.

The Modernists whom Bishop Gore has in view maintain

that such miracles as our Lord's feeding of the five thousand, or His own birth of a virgin mother, and the resurrection of His dead body from the grave, are for us to-day incredible.

In his reply to Bishop Gore, Dr. Sanday openly takes the side of these extreme Modernists, and explicitly says that his own present belief about the Birth and Resurrection "is not all that the Church of the past has believed. I must not," he adds, "blink this fact." That is to say, although he speaks of "the Supernatural Birth and the Supernatural Resurrection," he makes it quite plain that he believes that Jesus had a human father, and that His dead body saw corruption.

Here a little plain speaking is necessary to meet plain thinking. A conception caused by the action of a human father does not result in a supernatural birth, no matter how holy the father and mother may be, no matter how much their union may be sanctified by the approval and even the direction of God. The children of Christians are holy (1 Cor. vii. 14); but their births are not supernatural. There is a similar ostrich-like attitude towards obvious facts in talk of the Supernatural Resurrection of a man, no matter how great morally and spiritually, whose dead body is believed to have "turn'd to clay."

Symbolical language is necessary when we are picturing that which is not in the sphere of the bodily senses. Thus the names "Father," "Son," "Holy Spirit" are symbolical; so is the idea of heaven being a place into which one ascends, and Hades a place into which one descends; but the virginity of Mary is no more symbolical than is the procuratorship of Pontius Pilate.

The negations of Catholic belief published by Dr. Sanday have of course been made before. They were made, as regards one nature-miracle, by the Jews, as St. Matthew

tells us, the moment the disciples of Jesus proclaimed His resurrection; they have been made by Muhammadans, infidels and heretics ever since. Within the last few years these negations of elementary Christian doctrine have been more or less boldly, more or less ambiguously, expressed within the Christian Church by those who are called Modernists; but never before by a leading Professor of Divinity of the Church of England, a great scholar, regarded with respect and affection by an immense circle of readers all over the world. There has been nothing like it since the perversion of John Henry Newman to Rome. If Dr. Sanday's fall has not produced as great a splash as did earlier theological sensations, it is because Christian doctrine has been crowded out of the minds of many intellectual Christians by the fascinating and bewildering details of criticism, and also because the proportion of the general reading public that takes an interest in religious questions has been growing smaller and smaller since the date of the publication of *Essays and Reviews.*

I have compared the cases of Newman and Sanday. The two cases are alike, not merely in the extent of disturbance of individual beliefs caused by them, but also in the inevitableness of the fall in each case. I shall not again bring in any personal element into the discussion; but this must be said: that just as Newman's *Apologia* showed that his mind had always had a Romeward bent, so anyone reading Dr. Sanday's pamphlet can perceive how his purely intellectual and critical attitude towards Christianity was bound to lead a sincere and candid mind to a shipwreck of faith.

The following passage (p. 21) is most illuminating in this respect: "All my career has really been leading up to this subject; but I made up my mind from the first to approach it in a deliberate and gradual way. I thought that I would not attack the central problem first, but last.

Whatever might be the best method for others, I had little doubt that this was the best for me. I began at the foot of the ladder. I first sought to make myself at home in the field of the Lower Criticism, and then to rise to the Higher. I thought that the first thing we wanted was accurate texts, and then to assign these texts to their proper surroundings in place and time. This was preliminary to the construction of an historical background. But everything that could be regarded as *a priori* or philosophical I was content to leave in suspense."

From the critical point of view these sentences are admirable; they speak of a noble purpose which has been faithfully carried out; but, at the same time, they betray a fundamental divergence between the views of Dr. Sanday and of St Paul, let us say, as to the place of faith in the Christian consciousness. The Christian faith does not bid us to be "content to leave in suspense everything that could be regarded as a *priori*"; as the apostolic writer says, "He that cometh to God must believe" about Him much that is *a priori* and philosophical.

It would be improper, as it is unnecessary, for me to speak of this matter as it affects the sincerity of the officials of the Christian Society. But it is not out of place to attempt to say something that may help to confirm the faith of the ordinary members of the Christian Church in statements of the Creed which have been always held to be essential to an adequate conception of the Person of our Lord. The ordinary man has not acquired the subtlety of mind which enables some people to live comfortably in the top storey of a house the foundations and lower storeys of which have been removed.

Modernism, in one point of view, stands for a reasonable, and indeed necessary, expression of the mind of man—the demand made by each generation that it is entitled to restate

old beliefs in the language of its own time, the only language which it understands. Moreover, it is reasonable that in the revaluation of the records of the past we should use the fresh stores of knowledge which have come to us in the providence of God through the researches of learned men.

If Modernism meant no more than the full and free application to the interpretation of ancient literature of modern methods and modern knowledge, all fair-minded men would be Modernists.

But it means much more than this ; it means the testing of religious truths not by modern knowledge, but by the assumptions of some modern men, assumptions which were made centuries ago by unbelievers.

It is this general principle of Modernism in its relation to the Creed with which I propose at present to deal. It would be impossible in one paper to discuss in detail the several articles of the Creed which are affected by the acceptance of Modernist principles.

What I desire to emphasise is, in the first place, that the denial of the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection of our Lord, in the sense in which the Church has always understood those facts, is not a result of historical inquiry or research at all, but is the immediate consequence of an assumption, or working principle, of some historical critics, the assumption that miracles have never happened.

Research or inquiry can only be made concerning persons or events that were seen and heard by the bodily senses. Thus the statement that " Jesus suffered under Pontius Pilate " is a fair subject for historical research ; but, from the very nature of the case, historical research is powerless to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the miraculous nature of our Lord's conception, or the precise nature of the change that took place in the body of Jesus after it was laid in the tomb of Joseph of Arimathea.

Again, if you begin to apply to the Creed some of the materialistic assumptions, or prejudices, of some modern historical critics, there is no logical reason why you should not go on to adopt all the postulates of materialism without exception.

A man may be an uncompromising materialist and at the same time have a great reputation as a historian; many historians and historical critics are as a matter of fact avowed and aggressive atheists. To such men the notion that there is a God in the theistic sense is just as incredible as is the resurrection of a dead man.

If, in 1914, loyalty to historical science demands the abandonment of, or explaining away of, "Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost. Born of the Virgin Mary," and "The third day He rose again from the dead," next year, with equal or more reason, historical science may compel us to explain away "God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth"; the truth being that a historical criticism that postulates the principles of materialism is incapable of being used as a test of religious truth. The application of a mathematical test to the Creed would be equally satisfactory in its results.

It has been well said that the best tonic for low spirits as regards the propects of the Church is the study of the Church's history; and in this connexion it may be helpful to remember that even the Church of the apostolic age had its own problem of Modernism. One of the indications of this fact is a remarkable verse which has been restored to us by the Revised Version, 2 John 9: "Whosoever goeth onward and abideth not in the teaching of Christ, hath not God." Bishop Westcott notes in his commentary, "These false teachers proposed to enter on new regions of truth, leaving the old."

"The teaching of Christ," in this place, does not of course

mean that which the Church teaches about Christ, but that which Christ taught. But there is included in that which Christ taught, not merely the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, but our Lord's claims for Himself, His assertions and implications as to His own unique relationship to God the Father, to the universe and to man.

All this became at once part of what the Church teaches about Christ; so that it is true to say that practically what is condemned by St. John is teaching which, under the specious pretext of advance, ignores or contradicts the elementary statements about the Person of Christ which the Church has always made.

I am well aware that opposition to anything that calls itself progress or advance must in these days justify itself to reason. There is a natural disinclination on the part of sensible men to the fixing of limits to inquiry and research. Heresy hunting is not a form of sport that commends itself to men of broad views and wide sympathies. Repression, even when it is effective, which it seldom is, carries with it unpleasant reactions on the character of those who are the agents in repressing.

Apart from this, it is also pointed out that experience has shown that the heresy of yesterday often becomes the orthodoxy of to-day; we are reminded that those who denounce Modernism now were themselves denounced as innovators when they were younger men.

But there is really no parallel between the two cases. The textual and literary criticism which has revolutionised our conception of the Bible is based on knowledge of facts which have come to light during the last century; but no new facts have come to our knowledge respecting the manner of our Lord's birth and death; it is inconceivable that we should ever know, with the intellect, more about these things than St. Luke or St. Paul knew; and in point of

fact the belief of the Church has never varied on these primary fundamental points, as it has on such questions as the nature of the Atonement or of Inspiration. Research and inquiry have led to a restatement as to the meaning of the inspiration of the sacred Books, because books, from their very nature, belong to the sphere in which research can operate; but the assumption that miracles do not happen, and have never happened, is not based on research, but on a philosophy.

And this of course involves the truth of the converse statement, that belief in Christianity is ultimately based not on strict historical evidence, but on a theory of the universe and of man's place in it. We orthodox Christians act on assumptions, as well as Modernists do; we believe, however, that our assumptions are a revelation from God.

We say with truth of Christianity that it is a historical religion, meaning thereby that it is founded on facts which actually happened at definite moments of time in the world's history. In this sense the miraculous conception of Jesus Christ and His miraculous resurrection are historical. But from the materialistic point of view the only historical statements in the Creed are: "Jesus . . . was . . . born of . . . Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead, and buried."

The other statements about the manner of our Lord's birth and death are merely consistent with the transcendent position assigned to Him in the consciousness of the Church. Leaving out of consideration the tremendous assumption that there is a "God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth," nothing could be more *contra naturam* to the materialist than the notion that a man who died about 1900 years ago should be now present everywhere, all-knowing, all-powerful. This is a part of what we Christians believe about Jesus Christ. Our beliefs about Him affect our

beliefs about everything else; and the Christian theory as to the manner of this Divine Person's entrance into the world of sense, and the manner of His exit from it, is eminently reasonable in view of the Christian estimate of Him. If you assume the tremendous miracle of a revelation given by God to man, the ordinary intelligence demands consistency all through.

The very notion of an incarnation of God in man, as distinct from the inspiration of a particular man, involves a real yet mysterious fusion of the human and divine, expressed in a bodily transaction, since we are in bodies ourselves.

Any man who is known or belived to be the son of a human father and mother, and whose dead body is known to have undergone the natural process of decay, could not be to his fellows more than a divinely inspired man; he could not be thought of as a unique incarnation of the Supreme. Certainly no one could *begin* to believe in him as God Incarnate.

In the case of Jesus Christ, His resurrection was the passing of the human into the sphere of the divine. The proof of this fact, this act of transition, as a fact that took place at a definite point of time, comes of necessity before the acceptance of a statement regarding His conception, which was the passing of the divine into the sphere of the human. And so St. Paul says that Jesus Christ was "declared to be the Son of God . . . by the resurrection of the dead."

But, of course, none of these matters can stand at the judgment bar of merely intellectual criteria. But human intelligence is not the judge of all things. The intellect is only a part of man's nature; religion makes its appeal to a judgment of the whole man, his whole nature, moral and spiritual, as well as intellectual. And we have in this present crisis one more exemplification of the profound and

reassuring words of the apostle : " The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God : for they are foolishness unto him ; and he cannot know them, because they are spiritually judged."

NEWPORT J. D. WHITE.

A NEW DOCUMENT ON CLEMENT OF ROME, HIS RELATIONS AND HIS INTERVIEW WITH SIMON PETER.

I.

FOREWORD.

THE original manuscript containing the life of Clement the Doctor, or Clement of Rome, printed in this article, is preserved at Mardin, in the monastery of Deiruz-Za'faran, the ordinary residence of the Monophysite Patriarch of Antioch. This Syriac manuscript is in parchment, with Estrangelo letters ; and since it is unfortunately truncated at the end it has no date ; its general title is *Book of Lives of Saints.* By some of its palæographical characteristics, we are able to ascribe it to the tenth or at latest the eleventh century. It is in a generally bad condition of preservation, and the Syriac scholar is reduced to a guess about some words that are utterly blotted out to-day.

We think that this document can claim a certain importance by its more or less accentuated affiliation with the Clementine *Recognitions* and *Homilies* ; on the other hand, the divergence of narration which distinguishes it from the Pseudo-Clementine writings is very often so important that it deserves the serious study of critics.

In reading all these pieces of Christian antiquity, and in comparing them with one another, we are puzzled to settle categorically the question as to which of them has got in its narration the more trustworthy historical thread, and

which of them follows more faithfully the traditional current of thought, in the second century of the Christian era.

Here are some discrepancies of narration which make our document differ from the Pseudo-Clementine compositions :

1. The name of Clement's mother is Mattidia ; in our document her name is Mitrodora.

2. The woman who educated the two brothers of Clement, Faustinus and Faustinianus (in our document as in the *Recognitions*, Faustinus and Faustus) is, in the Clementine writings, Justa the Syro-Phœnician ; our document calls her only a widow and does not give any name.

3. When the two brothers grew up, they became, according to the Clementine writings, fellow-disciples of Simon Magus ; this information is unknown to our document, which mentions nowhere this sorcerer.

4. In the Clementine writings, Faustus, the father of Clement, is said to have left at home Clement, his youngest son, when he set sail in search of his wife and his two children. Our document informs us that he took Clement with him.

5. The manner in which Clement and his relations became acquainted with Simon Peter, and met with one another after they had been separated from each other, is told in a very different form, as is easily noticed by every critic when he compares this document with those already known.

Critics, too, will doubtless remark that this document is cast in a mould far more Jewish than the Pseudo-Clementine *Recognitions* and *Homilies* can claim. This characteristic is sometimes not a despicable criterion in ascribing historical lucubrations to a determined epoch. In this respect the reader will surely notice that Peter is always called Simon or Simon Cephas, and never Peter or Simon Peter. Syriac scholars who are not accustomed to find very

often in Syriac literature this old name applied to the head of the Apostles in such an exclusive manner will no doubt bear a certain testimony to the archaism of the narration. The illustrations are generally drawn from the Old Testament, and sometimes in such a constant way that we are tempted to attribute the paternity of our document to a man living not very far from a Judæo-Christian atmosphere.

Our document has also some points of contact with the spurious acts of Placidus (after his baptism, Saint Eustachius) and his wife Theopistis, with his two sons Agapius and Theopistus, who lived under the reign of Hadrian.

All these coincidences will perhaps establish that the tale of a man losing his wife and two children, and recovering them afterwards through the good fortune of having adopted some Christian beliefs, was the outcome of a folklore which seems to have formed the staple of the evening conversation of many a Christian in the first centuries of our era.

The Syriac style of this document is pure, and foreign to that exuberance of incorrectness and stiffness which characterise some Syriac translations of Greek originals; and the critic who would maintain that this document has originally been written in Syriac will not hurt philological science very deeply.

To make known this document in an English translation, and to indicate the main sources for criticism, form our chief purpose in this study; to enter into more comparative details, and to attempt to show, in a more emphatic manner, the mutual dependence of these pieces, is a field open to every investigator of old Christian traditions.

The principal sources for the criticism of these pieces are: J. B. Lightfoot, *The Apostolic Fathers* (vols. i. and ii.); Hans Waitz, "Die Pseudo-Klementinen," *Text. u. Untersuchungen zur Gesch. der altchr. Litteratur*; A. Harnack,

Chronologie der altchr. Litteratur (II.); Hort, *Clementine Recognitions*; Margaret D. Gibson, *Studia Sinaitica* (No. V.), etc.

TRANSLATION.

Again a story about Clement, the disciple of Simon Cephas, and about his parents and his brothers, how they have been evangelised.

There was in the city of Rome a rich man called Faustinianus, and the name of his wife was Mitrodora. They openly worshipped idols, and though they did not know God, they served Him truly and justly; and they gave alms to the poor from their riches, like Job. They received strangers and the poor like Abraham, and the word of Scripture which says: He who serves God behaves justly, has been fulfilled in them, with this other: Abraham believed in God, when still pagan, and He gave him the price of his justice. And as Abraham and Sara have been tested by Isaac, so they also were without an heir, in order that justice might be performed in them, and righteousness might increase through them.

If the hired man does not work, he cannot claim his salary. It is written that just people did not receive any reward till they served, and wicked people did not receive, too, any chastisement till they sinned. If Adam had not transgressed, he would not have been driven out of Paradise, and if Cain had not committed murder, trepidation would not have dwelt in his limbs. The robber did not enter into Paradise till he confessed. So was it with these upright people, Faustinianus and his wife: their reward was like their toil; and since I have narrated their kind of work, I shall tell now their exploits. He who has clean ears for the words of love, let him approach and hear a pleasant story, and delight in it.

These righteous people were without children, and for a long time they were distressed. After a certain time, God wished to comfort them and to show that He had not kept back their reward from them. Mitrodora, then, had in her womb two babes, as Rebecca had Esau and Jacob. She gave them names, to the elder Faustinus, and to the younger Faustus. Afterwards she brought forth another child and she called him Clement.

Then the Evil One, the enemy of justice, wished to make them stumble by his craftiness, and to insinuate himself to these good people. The Lord promised to Eve and Adam the Paradise of Eden, and the Evil One degraded them from their ranks, and God sent His Only Begotten, saved them and made them go up to a place higher than the first. The Devil suggested to the brothers of Joseph to sell him, and God made him a redeemer in the day of desolation. (The Devil) wished, too, to dishonour Mitrodora by a detestable adultery, and this motive distracted her, and she returned to God.

Faustinianus had a brother, and the Evil One counselled him, and he conceived a passion for the wife of his brother; and though he earnestly solicited her, the faithful woman never wronged her husband, and she thought of a means to vanquish the Evil One. She made a false pretence, as if she had dreamt it, to take her boys and to go away from her husband, in order that by her absence the fire surrounding her, through the rash man, would be extinguished.

Now, one day Faustinianus came home, according to his custom, and noticing that his wife was sad, he asked her what was the cause of her sadness. She answered him: "I am sorry, my lord, for I shall be separated from thee and far from thy conversation." Then Faustinianus became angry, and began to threaten and to say: "Who is it that has designed to sever thee from thy spouse? I swear

by the mighty gods of all Rome to give up to terrible judgment him who designed this against me and also to plunder his substance in order that he may not speak against a man stronger than he." Mitrodora said to him: "Let your wrath not be kindled, because he who will separate us one from another is stronger than thou. Listen to me, my lord, and I shall tell thee the dream that I dreamt. I saw a man of fire seizing in his hand a sword of fire, and his lips sprinkling dew. He showed himself to me like a furnace, and said to me and earnestly ordered me: 'To-morrow take thy two boys, Faustinus and Faustus, and go away from Rome; leave thy youngest son and thy husband in Rome, and do not come back to thy spouse till I warn thee. The man that I saw told me all these things, and (he added), "If thou dost not listen to everything I have told thee, I shall destroy thee with thy sons and thy husband." I am very sorry, because he whom I saw did not explain how long I shall be separated from thee. Lo, the dream is unveiled, explain it thyself, since thou art wise."

When Faustinianus heard that, he was amazed, wondered, feared and said: "This is hard to be explained by wise men; and even the mighty gods of Rome do not understand what this vision means. I heard that there was one God in the earth . . . (*illegible word*) . . . perhaps this dream . . . (*illegible word*) . . . is by the dreams . . . (*illegible word*) . . . showed himself in this year. Because those who know science say that the true God who created the heaven and the earth wrought a wonderful miracle everywhere, and that this is one of his disciples. Take then thy two boys, as he told thee, and go away from Rome, so that he may not be angry; because if he be angry, the earth will shake; and the sea will be empty, if he rebukes it, since he is its lord. Lo, our fellow-kinsmen who are in Athens, the great . . .

(*illegible word*) . . . to them as the man of dreams told thee. Take provisions for one year or two, and slaves and maids will come afterwards and serve thee. Take care of thy children and of thyself. Become like a mild dove which diligently takes care of its nestlings and feeds them by the pecking of its mouth. Become like a sparrow which hides its nest from the spectators, and keeps its nestlings from the hunters by its shrewdness." By such words Faustinianus warned his wife, and both, in the grief of their separation one from another, spoke to each other. Faustinianus was very pained and Mitrodora did not wish to disclose a hidden mystery; and God incited them to this fact, in order that their righteousness should be unveiled to everybody.

And when Faustinianus agreed to send his wife, he endowed her with provisions, gold, slaves and maids, and gave her her two children. When she parted from her husband she said to him: "Good bye, O man of my childhood, and keeper of my youth. Who can know if we see again one another; like a father . . . (*illegible word*) . . . to the youngest son."

She put to sea with her two boys, and when the ship moved two days in the sea, in the morning of the third day the sea grew rough and began to roar as a lion towards a boy, and the waves began to be vehemently wild . . . (*illegible word*) . . . and from everywhere billows and surges fell down destroying. Then Mitrodora cried and said: "It is told that thou art God, son of Mary; if thou art God, come to our help and rescue; if height, depth, sea and land listen to thee, the slave obeys his master and does not revolt against him." And she said with a great grief: "Woe is me, I wished to be drawn from a corrupted pond of sins, and lo, I am sinking in a sea of water, where there is no rescuer. Woe is me, I proved an evil stumblingblock to my two children." And when waves tossed her about

on every side, she cried in the name of Jesus, the Nazarene, and stretched her hands and embraced her sons. She began to talk of her beloved ones : " Neither the hour in which I have separated my boys from their father (was good), nor this death which has hemmed me from every side. If thou (O Jesus !) rescue me with my children, Heaven forbid that I worship or sacrifice except to thy name."

When, in a prostration, she was praying before God with sobbing, the waves struck the ship from every side and it broke up, and those who were inside floated upon water like bits of grass, and the mother and her children were hidden one from another, the mother from her children and the children from their mother. And God made a sign to the sea not to destroy them, as He had ordered it for Jonas, and it listened to Him. He therefore bade the sea to keep them, and not inflict any harm on them without His order ; because God can keep anybody in the sea as if he were in a firm ground, since sea and land obey Him.

When, then, they were tossed in the sea during all the night, salvation dawned on them in the morning. The right hand that has been stretched to Simon, and he was drawn up, has been stretched to the woman and her sons ; and according to the mercy of the will of God, they reached the harbour of Tripoli.

Seamen went out in the morning and saw them weeping at the seashore. A widow took them, honoured them and brought them up with a great care. She gave them names, and she called the one Anicetus and the other Aquilas.

Now, their mother, according to the will of God, reached the town of Aradus (Arad). She began to weep for her boys, saying : " Where shall I go to seek your corpses, O my beloved sons who are drowned in the sea ? Behold, I am deprived of my beloved and of my acquaintances. Woe is me, I was like a ship bearing riches, and the storms

of the sea squandered my riches and took away my treasures, and, lo, I am like a vine whose beauty hail has destroyed. Would that I had swift wings like those of the young eagles, to go and see thee, O Faustinianus! when wandering after us and sending slaves bearing goods! but those going back to thee and bearing bad news, when thou art sending despatches to the inhabitants of Athens about us, and these are sending to thee bitter letters, when thou art caught by the day of mourning and grief, and encircled by all pains and hardships!"

While Mitrodora was distressed by these (things) and by some others of this kind, the inhabitants of the town of Aradus heard, and gathered round her and asked her, saying: "What is the matter, woman? and which is thy country? Behold, thy voice spreads to all our town." And she told them truly all her story, and they began to console her, but she afflicted herself with cries and lamentations.

Then a widow accosted her and started to comfort her, saying: "I am a widow like thee, and I am deprived of husband and of children; come to me and let us live together in bereavement and spend our life in bitterness." Mitrodora went to her, and was, out of necessity, begging her bread. When she noticed that her strength was failing, she went and sat at the gate of the town, so that she might take alms from the people. But where she suffered the more, there deliverance dawned on her by means of Simon, the head of the disciples.

After Mitrodora had spent two years in this great hardship, Faustinianus got together goods and sent them through his slaves. When the messengers reached Athens, they asked the kinsmen of Faustinianus about Mitrodora; they answered them; "We have not seen here this woman and we have heard nothing about her." The messengers went back weeping and bearing letters full of pains and

of news of anguish. When they called on Faustinianus and he read these letters, he was pained, he wailed and wept bitterly. He wrote letters to all parts, to all countries, and all villages. Messengers scoured all countries, ran through all quarters and came back with weeping. Faustinianus began then to weep bitterly for himself, took his youngest son and went about wandering and asking everybody: "Have you seen a woman and her children drowned, or roving along the roads?" When he was walking and asking thus, his youngest boy, too, was lost, and from his painful hardship he did not notice that.

When, then, the boy Clement strayed, a seaman took him and got him into a ship, and in that very night they sailed for the country of Syria. And when Simon was teaching at the seashore, in towns, the seaman took the boy and gave him to Simon, and he became his disciple. He was the first disciple of Simon Cephas. And Simon took the boy Clement and went to Tripoli in order that he might evangelise there.

When he was teaching, the woman who brought up his brothers came and gave them up to become the disciples of Simon Cephas. The grace of God gathered together the three brothers. The head of the Apostles and they three ate and drank together and did not know each other.

And Simon went away to go to Aradus and to preach there the true faith; for the grace of God called him to comfort the distressed mother by means of her three children.

When Simon and Clement were in their way, Simon said to Clement: "My brother, behold, thou hast been twenty years with me, and I did not ask thee what was thy country, or where thou comest from, or if thou knowest that thou hast parents and kinsmen." When Clement heard that he began to weep bitterly and said to him:

"Listen, my lord, and I shall speak before thee: I am from a great family of the city of Rome, from the royal family, the son of Faustinianus the great; the name of my mother is Mitrodora; and besides, thy servant had two brothers, the name of the elder was Faustinus and of the other Faustus. My mother dreamt a dream, and it became the cause of her death; she saw a man of fire riding on horses of fire and he said to her: 'Arise, take thy children and go away from Rome.' My father had kinsmen in Athens; he gave her provisions with the brothers elder than I, and he sent her to Athens; and since she has left us we have not heard any news about her; my father sent messages to all countries, and no one could tell that he had seen them; then my father took me and went away wandering and asking everybody about them. When walking, I and my father, on the seashore, I have been out of his sight, and through the pain of his heart he did not notice me in that moment; but when a seaman noticed me, he took me, placed me in a ship and brought me to thee; such a pain and such trials befell me! now God alone knows if my parents survive or not."

And Simon was amazed, and glorified God, and began the child to tell in grief and sorrow: "I have hope in God that thou shalt soon meet thy parents, if they are alive."

When Simon and Clement reached the gate of Aradus, they saw Mitrodora sitting, and Simon said to her: "Woman, thou art young in thy age, and thou chosest this act of ignominy for thee; why likest thou not to live?" She answered Simon: "My lord, if thou knewest the hardships that I have borne, and the pangs that my eyes have seen, even if thou hadst a deadly poison, thou wouldst have given it to me, so that I should drink it and be delivered from this pain."

The divine Apostle said to her: "O woman, reveal thy

story to me, and I have a remedy of life that I shall give thee ; drink of it and be rescued from thy pain."

And the woman began to tell successively all her history. When the divine Apostle heard that, his mind became glad and he glorified God for having soon answered his prayers. When the woman was telling all this, Clement was in the town with his friends. Simon Cephas said to her : " Woman, thy pains are bitter and thy ailment is great, but I hope that God will comfort thee in thy pains."

When Simon was yet speaking to her, the young Clement returned back to him. Simon then said to him : " Tell me, my son, all that thou toldest me in the way."

And the young man began to tell all that he had borne. And Simon said to Mitrodora : " Listen to what this young man is telling. When she listened, her heart glowed towards this young man, her son, and she recognised him. The son, too, recognised his mother.

And the mother began to say to her son : " Come in peace, thou who takest away my pains and wipest the tears from my eyes ; come in peace, O dead man who hast lived again and comforted thy parents by the resurrection ; I worship the God who made me worthy of thy sight ; I believe in Him, since those who strongly believe in Him will not be confounded ; I am Mitrodora, thy mother. I hope that He who counted us worthy to meet each other will count us also worthy to see thy brothers."

And Simon took Clement and his mother and went to the young men, his brothers. Before they reached them, they looked at Clement and his mother with him, and they began to grumble, saying : " Who is this woman who speaks to Clement and walks with him ? Behold, twenty years ago, we are disciples together, and we did not see him either speaking to a woman or looking at a woman ; can she be his mother ? "

When Clement reached them, his brothers asked him without knowing that he was their brother: "Tell us, our brother, who is this woman who is with thee?" "What great mystery, my brothers! How great is the Providence of God—to whom be glory! Who will not wonder! Who will not glorify God for His mercy and for the great compassion that He has for his clay! Three beautiful bunches were cut off from their vine, and April came according to its custom and made them blossom in their branches. How beautiful are three mild doves which flew from their nest, and when they escaped the sparrow-hawk, they gathered at the voice of their mother! How beautiful are three young eagles which have been bred far from their parents, and when their wings have been sufficiently strong, they came and caused their parents to rejoice! a poor woman who during twenty years has been deprived of her children; the grace of God gathered them in one hour and they came to her." Thus Clement answered his brothers, not knowing that they were his brothers. "My brothers, this is my mother!"

His brothers began then to ask him: "Tell us, our brother, behold, we have lived together for twenty years, and we did not ask thee from what country thou wast, and what thy family was in the world. Tell us this now, and we will tell thee from whence we are." And Clement began to tell to his brothers, not knowing that all were brothers the one to the other.

Their mother was standing apart and hearing the words of their mouths. "As to me, O my brothers, I am from the city of Rome; my father was called Faustinianus, and my mother Mitrodora; I had two brothers, and their names, for one, was Faustinus, and for the other, Faustus; and through a dream that my mother dreamt we have been scattered among the nations. And now, by the will of God, I have found my mother and have recognised her."

His brothers went on with tears in their eyes: "Our brother, from thy words, if they are true, thou art our brother, and we are thy brothers; I am Faustinus, and this thy brother Faustus. When we went out (of Rome) and sailed during two days in the sea, our ship broke up . . . (*illegible word*) . . . and we were scattered among the nations."

Their mother heard these (words), and her arms were restored, for they had been for a long time withered. She embraced them weeping and said to them: "Be sure that I am your mother Mitrodora that was sent to Athens with you, by your father." And they glorified God, for He had gathered them into His sheepfold.

The three brothers asked Simon, their master, that he would baptize their mother. And when they found a place fit for baptism they showed it to their holy master, who baptized Mitrodora. And he sent the three brothers with their mother to Laodicea. He stood up to pray and designed to go after them when his prayer was finished.

When he prayed, he said: "O God, in the hands of whom all the ends of the earth are; O God, the most merciful, answer me my prayer from Thy treasure, so that as Thou gatheredst these by Thy mercy, make the husband of Mitrodora, if he is alive, come and see his wife and his children. If he is still kept in life, may a sign from Thee make him present in order that he may receive Thy yoke and work with Thee in Thy vineyard." And God quickly heard the voice of the Apostle, and a divine sign caught away Faustinianus from Rome and brought him to Simon.

And when Simon was walking in the road, behold an aged man dressed in old patches and in a worn-out garment with much dust on him, like the poor, stood before him. Simon asked him: "Who art thou, man, that thou wanderest in the hills? Art thou a robber, a thief or a shedder of men's blood?"

The old man answered Simon in great sadness and said to him : " I am neither a thief nor a robber, but thy servant is from the city of Rome. I had a wife with three children, and when she was asleep she dreamt a bad dream, and for that we have been scattered among the nations. This happened twenty years ago, and behold, I went after them and I cannot find them ; and to-day when I was in the country of Rome, something like a right hand caught me and flung me into this country. Behold, I am under some phantasms and agitated, since I do not know where I am."

Simon said to him : " If somebody comes now and shows thee thy wife and thy children, what wilt thou give him ? " The old man answered : " God is witness, that I have no other thing than that I shall become a slave before him for ever."

Then Simon took him and arrived at his lodging, and raised his voice saying : " Come, Mitrodora, and see Faustinianus thy husband ; pick up thy beloved ones and come to meet him, since like an eagle he crossed sea and land for thy sake."

All at once she flew like a dove and took her nestlings with her ; and when she saw Faustinianus dressed in old patches and surrounded by poverty, she asked him in grief : " Tell me, O man, what is thy country ? for I think that thy limbs have borne many pains. I craved long since to see my spouse, but the figure that I notice in thee is not his."

Then the old man said to her : " If thou art Mitrodora, I am Faustinianus."

Mitrodora said to him : " Where are the glory and the beauty that thou didst put on ? Where are the gorgeous clothes in which thou wast dressed ? "

The old man answered her in grief : " Since the day when thou and thy children were separated from me, I

have been pained and weeping for you ; I crossed the seas and I scoured the lands ; height I trod, and depth my soul sounded ; thirst overpowered me, hunger weakened me, nakedness made me suffer, heat burned me, cold dried me, so that I might find you ; I did not find quietness up to now."

Mitrodora said to him : " Come, O tree, and see the branches which have been separated from thee ; they have become a staff, and behold, they sustain us."

The old man approached and tenderly kissed his sons, and began to weep upon them as if they were departed people rising from the dead, and said : " Come in peace, O slain ones, who have returned back ! O dead people who have been resuscitated ! Blessed are my eyes, for I have seen you to-day. I glorify God since He gave you to me to sustain my age, to take away my pains, to console my affliction."

And Simon Cephas baptized the old man, their father ; and all, the mother, her children, and their father became pure sanctuaries and dwellings to the Holy Spirit, and they reached a high rank and have been widely renowned in sanctity.

We all, let us glorify God, who comforts distressed people, and takes away the pains of those who trust in His name. Glory be to Him for ever and ever. Amen.

ALPHONSE MINGANA.

STUDIES IN CHRISTIAN ESCHATOLOGY.

VIII. CONDITIONALISM.

THE theory of Conditional Immortality has from early times been recommended to the Church as a *via media* between Universalism and the ecclesiastical doctrine of Eternal Punishment. Briefly, the theory is this. By nature man

is not immortal, but the gift of eternal life is conferred in regeneration; and although the unregenerate may possess a life which does not perish with the body, it has no root in God, and must cease to be, those who impenitently defy the Divine love being destined to final annihilation. It has been stated with great religious power by the late Dr. Dale, who adopted it after long hesitancy. Speaking in his own name and that of others who concurred in his opinion, he said: "We have reached the conclusion that eternal life is the gift of the Lord Jesus Christ, that this life is not given to those who reject the Gospel, but is given in the new birth to those who believe and who are thereby made partakers of the Divine nature. We warn men that while they continue in impenitence, they fail to secure it; and if they continue impenitent to the end, they are destined to indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish. . . . While it is possible to separate a man from his sin, God's love clings to the man, while God's anger lies on the sin; but when this becomes impossible and the man and the sin are *one*, then there is nothing left but for the evil to be consumed by the fires of the Divine wrath. The final expression of God's abhorrence of sin will be the moral flame in which those who cannot be separated from their sin will be consumed."[1] This has been described by an antagonist as "the most wretched and cowardly of all theories"; but even those who reject it will feel that theology at all events ought to be spared language better suited to the violence of political controversy.

When however we turn to Scripture, which defenders of Conditionalism usually claim to have on their side, it becomes plain that the difficulties before them are immense. They are bound to demonstrate a series of positions which taken separately, and still more taken all together, have at least

[1] *Life*, 312, 313.

the look of being nearly hopeless. For it has to be proved that by "life" the Bible means just "existence" and by "death" just "non-existence," or, as it has been expressed, "the breaking-up of the human *monad*." It has to be proved that when Scripture speaks of the wicked as suffering "destruction" or "perdition," these terms ought to be construed with the barest literalism, and that verses in which this is out of the question are negligible exceptions. On the other hand, it has to be shown that Bible expressions affirming the eternity of punishment are *not* to be taken literally, and do not mean what they say. In addition, good reason must be given for holding that the relevant teaching of Scripture was meant to overturn the universal belief in the immortality of all, which undoubtedly prevailed at the time and in the circles in which that teaching was promulgated. All this constitutes an exacting task. Indeed, the conclusion can hardly be avoided that the Biblical part of the Conditionalist argument is by all odds the least impressive, and that that argument would in fact be strengthened if the claim to rest on Scripture were quietly allowed to drop.

Nothing certainly is so evident as that in the Bible "life" means a spiritual state (with its "physical" counterpart of course), marked by intensive quality, and deriving this quality from the relationship in which the living person is conceived as standing to the living God. "Life" is used frequently as the equivalent of "eternal life"; that is, it connotes blessedness, activity and vigour of which the believer is participant in virtue of his unity with God through Christ. This fixes the meaning of its opposite, "death." Death is the absence of what we have just seen forms the specific content of life. It is the withdrawal of everything that imparts value to life for the religious mind. Contact with God is lost, and with it all that is wrapped up

in the word "blessedness." No terms of description are too vivid or powerful to point its misery and ruin. It is destruction, perishing, the last calamity. Naturally, this state can only be indicated by a Christian apostle in words of a predominantly negative cast. He must speak of it as the antithesis of salvation. But the definite loss of conscious being is nowhere associated with it. As Professor A. B. Davidson has said of the Old Testament writers: "For all that appears the idea that any human person should become extinct or be annihilated never occurred to them." [1] For them, to survive apart from God is to abide in death. And since death is "abiding," and not non-existence, New Testament writers can speak of men having passed "from death unto life," and ascribe "tribulation and anguish" to the life of the lost in a world to come. In short, to render life and death by existence and non-existence is to represent the Bible mind as fixing its chief interest not in spiritual realities but in a bare and hard ontology. Death is to be undone, to be in ruin, to miss everything that can be called well-being; but it is not to vanish in extinction. Thus one of the main pleas of Annihilationism, that to call death what is a kind of suffering life is absurd, will not bear scrutiny for a moment in the light of Bible teaching. Even common speech refutes it. We speak of a dead tree, or dead flesh, because these things have parted with all that constituted their value or charm; but they have not ceased to be. What has happened is a rupture of the tie linking them to life.

After all, the New Testament was written by men who had been bred upon the Old; and the Old Testament idea of Sheol, albeit with radical defects, had contained at least the idea of survival. With modifications, it reappears

[1] Expositor, V. i. p. 333 (quoted by Kennedy, *St. Paul's Conceptions of the Last Things*, 125).

in the parable of Dives and Lazarus. In the New Testament, then, the dead really live; but they live otherwise than on earth. There is no lapse into nothingness.

Conditionalists, as is well known, have sought to meet the force of what seem unequivocal New Testament expressions, predicating death as a state of personal being, by giving them a special turn of meaning. If such texts as these are cited: "Let the dead bury their dead"; "Awake, thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead"; "When the commandment came, sin revived, and I died" (Luke ix. 60; Eph. v. 14; Rom. vii. 9)—expressions that seem to convey the sense of a distinct and fatal break with God—it is replied that here the meaning of death is proleptic. No one will deny that in usage of this sort there is an element of prolepsis. When the woman who lives in pleasure is said to be "dead while she liveth," it is certainly implied anticipatively that if she continues in her ways the end will be an irrevocable passing out of touch with God, through what we call physical death. But this does not permit us either to resolve the whole content of the word "dead" into anticipated experience, or to say that what is anticipated is extinction. For one thing, the godless quality of life which entails impending doom is actual now. It is as real as it will ever be, and is contained within the significance of "death." Further, in St. Paul's deep word: "Sin revived, and I died," the aorist (ἀπέθανον) clearly points to a past event. An experience recorded in language filled with emotion so intense cannot have been merely one of anticipation. It occurred then and there; its meaning was within itself. It was such as to force the cry: "Who shall deliver me out of the body of this death?" Nothing which is construed purely as a future contingency can stir feeling so keen and actual.

It is perhaps unnecessary to labour the point that various

New Testament phrases, which speak of "eternal punishment" or "an eternal sin," or of a state on which the wrath of God abides not merely do not bear witness to Conditionalism, but are irreconcilably opposed to it.

There is one fact, however, which may, even if it be unconsciously, have aided the rise and progress of Conditionalism. This is the circumstance that in some of his most characteristic forms of statement St. Paul seems to recognise only a resurrection of the just. For him, the Spirit in believers is the earnest of their rising, as it was in virtue of the Spirit of holiness that Christ was installed, by resurrection, as the Son of God with power (Rom. i. 4). "*In Christ* shall all be made alive." That is to say, the ideas "life" and "salvation" interpret each other. But we have no right to draw the inference that those who do not rise are doomed to annihilation. They abide in death—in that dark condition of ruin which St. Paul names ἀπωλεία. No prospect opens to them of resurrection unto life.[1]

This is not the place for a discussion of theories belonging to Greek or Indian philosophy, in which the annihilation of the soul after death was taught, irrespectively of its goodness or badness. But within Church history proper there is something like consent that Arnobius, at the outset of the fourth century, was the first to teach Conditionalism

[1] Similarly one strain of teaching in the Fourth Gospel bears that only the righteous shall have part in the resurrection. Thus in v. 25 it is said: "The dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that hear shall live"; cf. vi. 54: "He that eateth my flesh and drinketh My blood hath eternal life, and I will raise him up at the last day." On the other hand, certain passages appear to carry on an older and more primitive belief to the effect that resurrection is universal, as when immediately after the first verse just cited it is said: "All that are in the tombs shall hear His voice, and shall come forth" (v. 29). It has been asserted, but not proved, that this second kind of passage is due to interpolation. But it is only confusion of thought to say that even the first class points to a doctrine of conditional immortality.

on explicitly Christian grounds. In his judgment, the soul was too full of defects to have been created by God, and it is not immortal *per se*; endless being is the exclusive privilege of the followers of Christ, unbelievers and heathen ultimately going out in nothingness. The next important name is later by centuries—Faustus Socinus (1539–1604). In addition to arguments now very familiar, he urged that if Christ and His apostles seem to speak as if the soul were naturally immortal, this is but didactic accommodation to primitive ideas. On the last page of the *Ethics*, Spinoza pretty definitely takes up the annihilationist position. "The ignorant man," he writes, "is not only distracted in various ways by external causes without ever gaining the true acquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives as it were unwitting of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be. Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal necessity never ceases to be." The voice is the voice of metaphysics, not of faith; but in the nineteenth century Conditionalism came into favour with many Christian writers, and no small impression was made. In England it was earnestly expounded by Mr. Edward White, in his well-known book *Life in Christ* (1875), and among those who shared his views were Archbishop Whately, Prebendary Row, and Mr. J. B. Heard; in France, it gained the support of Petavel-Olliff, Janet, Renouvier, Secrétan, and Bruston; in Germany, of Rothe, Schultz, and several of the more noted recent dogmaticians. Some of these last, unwilling to affirm the theory outright, have pointed to it as an alternative well worth considering: so Ritschl, Wendt, Kirn, and Haering, and in a few passages Troeltsch also has made an approach to it. It has occasionally been argued that

natural immortality, so far from being an original element of the Christian message, was a speculation of Platonism gradually invading the Church.

Conditionalism has undoubtedly gained by its praiseworthy desire to concentrate interest on the positive core of faith. Immortal life, as believers hope for it, *is* life in Christ. That sufficiently explains the occurrence in the New Testament of phrases like "worthy of the resurrection," "children of the resurrection," "if by any means I might attain to the resurrection of the dead." Apostolic faith, its eye bent on the hope certified by Christ, finds promise of "life" in Him alone. We look for an existence wholly controlled and imbued by Him. To remain for ever what we are would be intolerable; but in our empirical selves there is nothing that could qualify us as participants in the higher order where He reigns; we can reach it only through reception. The specific kind of immortality of which Spirit-possessed life is an earnest—*this* is dependent on a certain attitude to God, and our sense of it wavers with the intensity of our religious life. Hence immortality, *in the characteristically Christian meaning of the word*, may be truly described as conditional. No one can have it who is not united to Jesus by faith.

And this means that Conditionalism has done a service by unrelenting antagonism to the idea of natural immortality in its traditional form. In the career of a being like man nothing can be "natural" in the sense of a nature-process. There can be no part of experience which arrives simply of itself, and colour is lent to that erroneous idea only because we viciously abstract this or that physical event, such as decay or death, from personal life as a whole. Immortality in this automatic sense we should all deny; it could only be asserted, I fancy, by the eminent

philosopher who one day said that he felt now he could prove the immortality of the soul, if only the non-existence of God were granted him. If the soul of man is immortal, as the New Testament writers assumed, it is because of the Divine character, and not because the soul has certain ontological qualities which make persistence a necessity. And those who believe all men shall live for ever really do so, not in view of the empirical constitution of human nature or as a consequence of its evolutionary ascent, but in view of God, to whom man has essential relations.

Further, dislike is now generally felt for one or two arguments with which Conditionalism used to be fought. The theory has been held responsible, for instance, for a decline of missionary zeal in its adherents. As long as people were convinced that the heathen, if unconverted, were doomed to an eternity of woe, so long, it was said, the churches had an overwhelming motive to appeal to. But this motive must be weakened or altogether extinguished if the new doctrine is permitted to mitigate the darkness of the future, and to promise extinction rather than conscious pain. But the point is ill taken. In fact, as every one knows, it was just in the centuries of post-Reformation orthodoxy, when people were surest of the terrible fate awaiting heathendom, that least was done for the missionary cause. Besides, how many of our best missionaries are actually moved by the desire to save men from endless pain? The supreme sanction of missions is the command of Christ, and the passionate desire to tell those who have not heard it that with God there is plenteous redemption. We dare not say that since we have become less sure than formerly that all who die without faith will perish miserably, we no longer feel constrained to obey the will of Christ. Nothing in our view of the world to come could ever modify the duty of imparting to those outside the faith our know-

ledge of the love of God, of striving to lighten their sense of guilt or to solace their sorrow and their fear.

Again, nothing but ignorance of the varied forms assumed by Conditionalism can have prompted the charge, that as a doctrine it abolishes future penalty for sin. Among its advocates, few or none have contended for the annihilation of the wicked at death. Doubtless we may ask: If man is not universally immortal, why should the sinful survive death at all? but this question, however apposite or damaging, leaves unaltered the fact that Conditionalists have almost invariably taught the survival of the wicked, and the imposition of punishment after death.[1] They urge that punishment will take another form than tradition has supposed; but to say that God cannot tolerate to all eternity a dead limb in a redeemed universe is undeniably to assert future punishment of the direst kind. Adherents of Conditionalism, that is, reject the popular view that sin is its own sufficient penalty. They believe that a universe ruled by God must necessarily react upon the sinner, but they see no reason to suppose that this punitive reaction must necessarily take place during earthly life. To some minds, indeed, the charge of eliminating penalty will seem the exact opposite of the truth, since to them the prospect of annihilation, after whatever lapse of time, would seem an even more terrible form of retribution than endless torture.

Nevertheless, the case against Conditionalism is so strong as to veto its acceptance. Whatever may be said of isolated phrases, the general drift of Bible teaching is really such as to leave no option. It is simple historical accuracy to say that the New Testament writers assumed the immortality of the soul; for them the existence of the soul after

[1] Later we shall see that this is rather a weakness than a strength, but at present I am concerned solely with facts.

death, in bliss or woe, was unending. Some of the most recent exponents of Conditionalism virtually grant this by abandoning silently the effort to make out Scripture proof. By doing so they get rid of an embarrassment: on the other hand, it is an immense drawback to a theory to have against it the religious conviction of Scripture as a whole. Apart from inspiration, an idea totally foreign to the mind of the New Testament is much more likely to be wrong than right; just as a proposed new canon of poetic art which could be brought into no intelligible relation to the work of Aeschylus, Virgil or Shakespeare must have against it the secure judgment of mankind.

Again, the Conditionalist argument has appealed, not without success, to an age preoccupied with biology. It goes easily in biological terms and may be justly regarded as carrying out the idea of "the survival of the fittest" into its ultimate form. In the worlds of nature and spirit equally, we are told, many lives come to nothing, and their failure can be traced to a lack of correspondence with environment. God is the environment of the soul, and inability to adjust itself to Him before the great crisis of death means that the soul, by natural law, passes out of being. Christians respond to the conditions of spiritual existence; they develop the faculty of being immortal; the incorrigible show no similar plasticity and duly cease to exist. Immortality, in short, is an acquired characteristic.[1] Now in matters transcendent, or of extreme

[1] Many of the difficulties here rival those of ultra-Calvinism, and are of the same kind. If God foresaw that certain souls would one day be cast forth as refuse, why, it will be asked, were they created? Many advocates of Conditional Immortality have argued, in regard to these human failures, that "their true function is to be found in their ministry to the more advanced." But this simply will not do. If Jesus was right, the principle that persons are to be treated only as ends, never merely as means, is much more than a law of moral conduct; it is a principle on which God deals with His human children.

complexity, a wise man will hold that the facility, completeness and rationality of a solution is a sure sign of its narrowness and shallowness. The argument just outlined will appear impressive only to those who ignore the distinction between things and persons. If man is a person, conscious, moral and reponsible, then his relation to God is essential, not fortuitous, and while that relation may wholly fail to become what it ought to be, it persists with the persistence of man himself. His freedom asks for nothing less than the infinite potentialities of eternity; character, in the worst man alive, has in it a spiritual force for which unending activities are not too great a field. There is no escaping the dilemma—either man is made for immortality: he is moral by constitution, and therefore intrinsically a member, good or bad, of the abiding moral world which has God for its abiding centre. Or he is not made for immortality: change and decay are his native sphere, and apart from Christ he is in point of fact as finite as the beasts. He is an intelligent animal who *may become* a child of God: but taking him as he is, in his unregenerate condition, there is no appreciable sense in which he *is* God's child. The Father's relation to him is accidental, and may lapse.[1]

But a view which thrusts the notion of caste into the human family puts the sense of brotherhood in danger. I should imagine that the man who adopts the Conditionalist position with serious conviction, regarding it no longer as a hypothesis but as an indubitable certainty, must find it hard to maintain his sense of the greatness of the soul—not this soul or that, but all souls. He can never be sure

[1] It must be observed that the assertions of Conditionalism are categorical assertions; it is sure that the unregenerate cannot possibly survive. The point is one at which, dissatisfied with agnosticism, it insists on fixing what can and what cannot be. This dogmatism is a grave objection, for no one can *prove* that man may not be immortal in virtue of the relationship to God which constitutes his manhood.

whether the individual before him is or is not so great that he will live for ever. Could the truth be known, his importance might suddenly undergo an inglorious diminution, for it might turn out that extinction, not immortality, was his destiny. Belief in annihilation, therefore, can only be tolerable to a lover of his race if the very thought of its particular application is kept away. In evangelism, at all events, we must operate with some other view. We must speak to every man with the eager, glad assumption that he is as immortal as we are, and that even to admit the possibility of a secret difference between him and ourselves would be to give way to unpardonable pride. Nothing else is in line with Christ's estimate of the incalculable worth of each soul.

The distinction between souls mortal and immortal—in mankind, that is, as it actually exists at any given moment—has been buttressed by reference to another distinction, that between types of character. Character in a bad man, it is held, is obviously subject to a process of wasting, and in common speech this is indicated by words like "dissipated" or "dissolute." The bad man goes to pieces; his moral being is gradually disintegrated; and the ideal limit in such a case is complete extermination. But to this it is surely a valid answer that character and personality or selfhood are not the same. Even in regard to character itself the above-mentioned physical metaphor must be applied with caution. We really mean by it that a man's moral nature is degenerating; we do not mean that he is coming to have no character at all. He has imparted a certain moral quality to the capacities for either good or evil he brought with him into the world, and this quality is increasingly bad. Yet a bad man suffers no reduction of the faculties to think, feel or will. His faculties, it is true, are more and more misdirected; but evil as he is, he may be

clever, passionate and wilful. Selfhood or personality remains. The bad will may, by a violent figure, be said to abrogate or extinguish itself, in the sense that its search for self-satisfaction is inevitably stultified and defeated: but we can set no bounds to the intense persistence of hate or enmity. The opposite can only be maintained on what is really a deistic view of life. God will then be a spectator, looking on impotently or at least inactively, while men at last withdraw themselves, by self-dissolution in nothingness, at once from the reach of His retribution and the appeal of His love.

In addition, it has been felt that Conditionalism gives no help with the problem of half the human race. Men are immortal who have laid hold of Christ; what then of those to whom He is quite unknown? If it be said, they will be judged by their aspirations after good, is not the number of those who lack all aspiration very limited, outside Christendom as within? Does a heathen who is not without virtue lose his immortality simply because he has heard of Christ but at the moment of death has not received Him? How far must contact with the Christian message go to destroy a man's chance of living beyond the grave?

In truth, the effect of Christ's mission, according to this theory, is so strange and full of paradox as to be almost unintelligible. "Had I not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin," says Jesus in the Fourth Gospel; and the suggested principle is apparently of wider sweep than we had known. It cannot be doubted that when the Christian era opened the great majority of men held the immortality of the soul, but, if the Conditionalist view be sound, we shall have to make room for the supposition that one result of the proclamation of the Gospel—and necessarily a designed result—has been to extinguish this belief in many minds; or at least that this *ought to* be the result.

If the Conditionalist theory be accepted by a non-Christian, it convinces him that he at all events will not live for ever. So that, on these terms, one aspect of Christ's work was to bring *mortality* to light. Wherever the theory prevails, the instinctive belief of men in an unending future life for all has been dispelled, and it was part of Jesus' achievement to dispel it. We may reasonably put this aside as too paradoxical for truth.

These difficulties are seriously increased by the further discovery that according to nearly all Conditionalist writers the wicked shall rise from the grave for punishment of an indefinite duration. That is to say, they *are* capable of survival even in the absence of faith. Immortality is no real constituent of their nature, yet, since righteousness demands it, they do live after death. Which means that Conditionalism, as a French writer points out, has all the inconveniences and none of the advantages of a compromise. The logic of the theory—and logic is its strength—insists that unbelievers perish at death, that spiritual coincides with physical extinction; and this, though savouring of materialism, is at least consistent. But the consistency is too much for Christian feeling; hence, while the immortality of all is denied the survival of all is emphatically affirmed. The impenitent do not rise *quâ* men, for man as man is perishable; they do not rise *quâ* believers, for they are not such; they rise, therefore, by the act of Divine omnipotence, in order to receive the just reward of their deeds. This is put forward in the name of justice; but it carries with it the unwished-for result that all who die in sin, be their degree of guilt what it may, are overwhelmed at last in a common and equal doom.

Most people will feel the purely religious objections to be even stronger. This suggestion that men live again, but only for a season; this notion "of a soul immortal

enough to live through death, but not immortal to live on for ever"; this picture of human beings who are temporarily resuscitated in order to endure a penalty which is retributive and no more, and are then dropped back into nullity—surely they are all incongruous with the Fatherhood of God made known in Jesus. Our minds cannot rest in a view that involves, as even the doctrine of eternal punishment does not, a final and complete breaking-off of all moral relations between the soul and God. We need not raise the question of what God can or cannot do. We need not inquire whether it is in His power to destroy souls, in the bare literal sense of that sad word. It is enough that we may not ask men to look forward to an act of Divine despair.

So far one can see with moral clarity; the rest is darkness. On the general question whether the penalty of "sin without excuse and without change" will be unending, we must adopt an attitude of complete agnosticism. We are impelled, on the one hand, to assert the inexorable reality of Divine judgment; by an equal force we are drawn to proclaim the infinitude and eternity of the Divine love. It is well to turn the solemn side of this twofold possibility towards ourselves; not less well to present its aspect of grace and hope to the mourner and the weak-hearted. I do not myself feel that preaching in harmony with the spirit of the New Testament will insist on more than this, that something morally dread and dire, not to be bodied forth in earthly speech, awaits those who deliberately reject the Lord Jesus Christ. If we wish to keep the true perspective of faith, we shall fill our minds, as we gaze onward, not with the lot of the faithless, but with the destiny of all who are Christ's at His coming.

H. R. Mackintosh.

THE SENSE OF SIN IN GREAT LITERATURE.

III.

"La Morte."

There is a sentence in Nathaniel Hawthorne's most notable story which I recall from a remote memory, with which I may begin this study. The words are somewhat to this effect; God help two people, a man and a woman, if one or the other should ever learn that there is a more beautiful kind of love than that to which they have accustomed each other. He goes on, of course, to say that that higher way, once it has dawned upon one or the other, will make the lower way intolerable, and a tragedy, secret or open, will follow, unless those two can find some deeper foundation on which to rebuild the shattered fabric of their common life. Now I know of no idea which has expressed itself so persistently in the literature of the soul as just that idea, that there is a quality of spiritual light which, when it falls upon a human life, begins there and then to disturb, to provoke, to protest, to appeal, to arouse shame and anger, and at the same time hope and the passion to be different. When that ray of white light falls upon a soul of a certain quality,—and the great affirmation of Christianity is that every soul is at its depths of that very quality,—there begins to work at its centre a kind of revulsion which soon acquires such force as to tear a way out for itself, overturning, if need be, the habits of a lifetime, and facing as a very light and even grateful thing the retribution of society and the astonishment and forsaking of friends. Until the moment when that light dawned, the man was able to control his thoughts about himself. He had his times of uneasiness; but he had learned how to deal with himself at such times. It was enough simply to cease from some practice

which aggravated the uneasiness, or for a season to adopt some slight severity towards himself which seemed to have the effect of misleading, and, for the time, satisfying the inner demand of his nature. But when this white light falls upon him, when this predestined messenger knocks at his door, half-measures no longer meet his case. He must either rally all that is evil within him to insult and browbeat the messenger of God—as when Peter kept up his denial for a time by the help of oaths ; or he must throw wide open his door, and say in any language which the stress of the occasion discovers to him : "My Lord and my God!"

There is no single fact about human nature to which one may quote such a unanimous testimony from all great literature as to this fact, that the soul of man lies open, with an incurable openness, to the challenge and appeal of the holier way.

The face of Beatrice let loose in Dante a moral tide which, I will not say made him drag his anchors, but compelled him to carry his anchors quite unconscious of their weight into that great sea whose further shore was Heaven.

Pagan as he was, Goethe also knew himself too well not to perceive that this was the deepest thing in man, his liability to be smitten to the centre of his being, and sent out upon his new career by the vision of something holier than had come into his philosophy. "Let me save you, Margaret," he pleaded in the dungeon where his poor victim, crazed with grief awaited death, "let me save you." "How save me ?" she asked, "by the help of that low way of life which has been our bane ?" "Yes, let us flee : let us resume life on the old basis," Faust pleaded. To which Margaret answered : "Henry, I shudder at thee!" And in that shudder she placed a live coal on the altar of that not very honourable heart.

It is this very idea, and the fertility of his applications of

it, which for myself I have always held to be the distinctive message of Robert Browning. Caponsacchi can go on living his double life with only slight spasms of discomfort, until one day he sees the sweet pure face of Pompilia. Whereupon the world begins to give way under him. Away along the corridors of his life tapers begin to light up the darkness. The life he had been leading becomes in one moment impossible for ever.

Sebald could still hold down the man of God within him, could still confuse his conscience with reasons and examples from the behaviour of the world, until Pippa went by that Spring morning, singing. Whereupon there was kindled in him, and through him in Ottima, a moral fire which made death more desirable than one further hour of the old dishonour.

Ned Bratts and his wife could brazen out the disgrace and punishment of this and that, until in Bedford Jail, they met John Bunyan, who took down "the Blessed Book" and spoke to them about God, about Christ, about forgiveness; whereupon it was with them also as if something had been killed for ever, and something had been born.

In what will be the last of these studies we shall see how Bernard Shaw has made a handsome acknowledgement of this ultimate liability of the human soul, that, given the proper occasion, a beautiful, moral tenderness may be let loose in a most unlikely heart, by its contact with something gentle and uncorrupted; in the particular case, by the feeling of a child's fingers on a wild man's neck.

In the light of the literature of the soul we recover our confidence. There will be no apostasy of the human race. There may be experiments. There will be. There will, in consequence, be many a sore head, and many a sore heart. But "securus judicat orbis terrarum." We never know the day of the Son of man, the day when here and there the

human soul may come to itself, when here and there man may cry out for a new bondage in God, as with a more strident voice; he has been crying for a freedom from God. For once again we have seen what we have seen, and we can never be as though we had not seen it. Each epoch of time has its own voice, its own emphasis: but there are ancestral voices to which man is for ever even terribly susceptible.

In a controversy between the wind and the tide the issue is never really for a moment in doubt. There may be much noise, but the deeper influence has its way. For a wind is local; whereas a tide is connected with the moon, and the Sun, and the stars: and there are great times when moon and sun and a group of stars are in conjunction and pull one way. In the firmament of the soul such great times are always coming.

* * * * *

Octave Feuillet's "La Morte" may not belong to the very greatest order of fiction: the story is too conscious of its own moral. And yet the story deals with such a universal interest and does such justice to the conflicting standpoints that it will bear pondering for many a long day.

The author tells us explicitly that he has brought together two well-defined types of character, so that he may observe or predict how things will turn out with them. And so far as he is quite faithful to his own imagination he has shown us in miniature how similar lives on the wide scale of a general society will also work out. The story deals with a marriage; and there at once we are at the real heart of the controversy between the different ways of looking at life. For any way of looking at life which claims general acceptance is to be judged, and soon or late will come to be judged, by its ability to carry us through those elementary human functions, one of which is enshrined in Christian marriage.

"La Morte," then, consists for the most part of letters in which Bernard, Vicomte de Vaudricourt (whom we shall simply call "Bernard") tells his own story. He describes himself as one who quite early in his manhood had come under the agnosticism of the nineteenth century. He had tenderness enough to shed tears when it seemed to him no longer possible to believe. He bids us take his word for it, and we do, that it was not merely to justify his own way of living that he abandoned his faith. He describes himself, in short, to use a phrase, as an average man about town. Of an old family, rich, and the prospective heir to a wealthy uncle, he meets, with a view to marriage, Mademoiselle Aliette de Courteheuse (whom we shall henceforth call Aliette).

Belonging to a family of equal standing, Aliette is a sensitive and ardent Catholic. She was the devoted daughter of a father who himself had been a recluse, defending himself from the contamination of the time in the history and literature and circumstances of what seemed to him an infinitely better time,—for it was by comparison an age of faith—the seventeenth century. But let me transcribe a scene. Aliette is showing Bernard the library of the Château. He has remarked upon the richness in materials of the seventeenth century.

"Your father must have had a great predilection for the century of Louis XIV?" I said.

"My father lived in it," she replied gravely.

And as I looked at her with a somewhat uneasy surprise, she added—

"And he made me live in it with him."

The eyes of this strange girl filled with tears as she spoke.

She turned away and took a few steps to repress her emotion; then, coming back, she pointed to a chair, sat down herself on the library footstool, and said—

"I must describe my father to you."

She paused a moment, as if lost in thought; then, speaking with

unaccustomed freedom, hesitating, and blushing visibly whenever she was about to pronounce a word which might appear a little too serious from such young lips, she continued,

"My father died from the effects of a wound which he received at Patay. To tell you this, is to say that he loved his country but he did not love the time in which he lived. He had a great love of order, and he saw none anywhere. He had a perfect horror of disorder, and this he saw on all sides; more especially towards the end of his life, everything which occurred, all that was said and all that was written, was sorely opposed to his opinions, to all that he respected, and to all his tastes. Deeply grieved by the events of the present, he took refuge in the past; the seventeenth century corresponded more particularly to the kind of society in which he would have preferred to live; a society well-ordered, polite, believing and lettered. As time went on, he liked, more and more, to shut himself up with that period. He liked, more and more, to see the moral discipline and the literary tastes of his favourite century take precedence in his house. You may possibly have remarked that he encouraged this fancy even in the picture-frames and decorations. From this window you can see the long straight alleys, the boxwood edgings, the clipped yew-trees, and the wych elms of our garden. You can see that we have in our flower-border none but the flowers of that time—lilies, peonies, hollyhocks, marigolds, pinks—in short, those which are called parson's flowers. Our old sylvan tapestries are also of the period. You see, too, that all our furniture, from the wardrobes and the sideboards to the consoles and the easy-chairs, is in the most severe style of the time of Louis XIV. My father had no taste whatever for the refined affectations of modern luxury. He believed that excessive comfort enervated the mind as well as the body. That is the reason," added the young girl laughingly, "that you have such uncomfortable chairs in our house. Yes, naturally. You are going to speak of compensations—Very good!"

Then resuming her grave tone—

"In this way, my father tried to carry out the illusion of living in the epoch upon which his thoughts were always running. Need I say that I was my dearly loved father's confidant—the sympathising confidant of his troubles, the indignant confidant of his annoyances, the happy confidant of his joys! It was in this very room —amidst these books which we read together, and which he taught me to love—it was here that I passed the happiest hours of my youth. Together we sang the praises of those days of faith and tranquillity, of those safe and happy moments when the pure and beautiful French language, refined taste, and high-bred politeness were the mark and fame of our country, and which have since then ceased to be so."

She paused, slightly confused by the warmth with which she had uttered the last words.

I said, merely for the sake of saying something—

"You fully account for the impression often made upon me by your home, and which, at times, took the form of an hallucination—an agreeable one, I confess. The internal appearance, the style, and the whole keeping of the house carried me back so completely for two hundred years, that I should not have been much surprised to have heard Monsieur le Prince, Madame de la Fayette, or even Madama de Sévigné herself announced at your drawing-room door."

"Would to Heaven it could be so!" said Mademoiselle de Courteheuse. "How I love all those good people! What delightful company they would be! What pleasure they took in elevated ideas! How immensely superior they were to the fashionable people of the present day!"

I was anxious to try and calm down her enthusiastic retrospect, so little flattering to my contemporaries and to myself, so I remarked—

"The time you regret certainly had exceptional merits, which I appreciate as fully as you do; but still, we must admit that underneath this society which was so well balanced, so well ordered, and apparently so select, there existed the very same sorrows and disorders as in our own. I see here many memoirs of that time, but, of course, I do not know which of them you have read—or not read—and consequently I feel slightly embarrassed.

She interrupted me—

"Oh," she said simply, "I know what you mean quite well. I have not read everything here; but I have read enough to know that my ancient friends had their passions, their weaknesses, their errors, just like the people of to-day. But, as my father used to say, all these were founded upon a serious and solid basis, which always righted itself. Great faults were committed, but there was also genuine repentance. There existed an upper sphere, where everything came right in the end—even wickedness."

On its becoming known to Aliette's family that Bernard did not share their form of faith, and was not even a Christian, all thought of marriage between them is opposed. Bernard, on his side, most scrupulous as he is not to encourage the illusion that even such a marriage as this, which he greatly desires, will alter his mind on matters of belief, is nevertheless ready to pledge his honour that he will leave his wife entire liberty there, and will never by word,

or action, or innuendo, seek to injure or deflect her mind. On this basis the marriage is agreed upon and takes place. But not until an uncle of Aliette's, a high dignitary of the Church, has given his consent. This in his case rested upon the hope, which he communicated to Aliette herself, that there was no saying what influence such a wife might have.

Thus those two set out into life ; and we are asked again to confess by the witness of another illustration that two cannot go far together unless they be agreed.

They make their home in Paris, and there very soon comes the rift within the lute. Aliette tries bravely to live her own life, defending and nourishing her soul, and at the same time to go out with Bernard, meeting the world on its own ground. Bernard sees clearly what it is all costing his wife, and in course of time becomes impatient. Now and then he allows some reckless word to escape, for which he never fails indeed to rebuke himself. Aliette likewise, even more scrupulous than he, in terror of losing her husband's love, or of failing in her duty as a wife, makes heroic attempts to compromise with the higher insistences of her nature, and steels her spirit to mingle freely in her husband's world, which was just the world.

But it seemed to her like being on board a sinking ship where the officers instead of doing their duty were making themselves drunk with the crew.[1]

One day, their conversation having fallen upon the moral condition of the poorer classes, with whom Aliette's charitable disposition brought her into frequent contact, the young wife ventured to say that, unfortunately, lessons in materialism were given to the people only too often by the higher classes of society.

"You are quite right," said Bernard, "and I really do not know where we are all going to at this rate, nor what terrible things will happen next ; but, as we can do nothing, the best way is not to think about it."

"Like Louis XV. ?" replied Aliette. "But are you quite sure that nothing can be done ? Do you not think that the abolition of all religious belief, of all hope beyond this life, of all recourse to

God, has a great deal to do with this furious and all-absorbing eagerness for present enjoyment, at which you yourself are alarmed ? ''

" On the contrary, I am convinced of it," said Bernard. " But what then ? What are you driving at ? Is it my fault if the earth turns round ? Is it my fault if unbelief reigns high and low, and invades all classes ? Do you mean to insinuate that I ought to set an example to the people ? An example of *what* I should like to know, since I believe in nothing ? The example of hypocrisy and sacrilege ? ''

Aliette turned very pale and made no answer.

" My dear," he went on in a hard tone, " you are contending for the impossible. You are a Christian in reality in the midst of a society which is so only in name. You cannot reform the century in which you live. You cannot turn Paris of the nineteenth century into a Port Royal, of which you would be the Mother Angelique. Do for goodness' sake give up the idea ! And especially I beg of you give up the idea of bringing me back, me personally, to your way of thinking. You are possessed with the mania of converting me, and, to speak frankly, it annoys me a little, for I am conscious of it under your slightest words and actions . . . Give up this idea once and for all : do not think about it any more, and you will see what a relief it will be to our two unhappy lives."

Aliette could only look at him with the tearful, beseeching eyes of some dumb creature at the last extremity. His natural good temper returned to him, and sitting down beside her, he said in a gentler tone—

" I am wrong, dear. As to conversion, one must never despair of anything or anybody. Do you remember Monsieur de Rance, for instance, who is of our own day ? Well, before becoming the reformer of the Trappists, he had been like myself, a worldling and a great sceptic, what was then called a libertine. For all that, he became a saint ! It is true that there was a terrible reason. You know what brought about his conversion ? ''

Aliette made a sign that she did not know.

" Well, he came back to Paris after an absence of some days and found her whom he loved dead . . . her head severed."

" If I were sure," said Aliette, " that my head would have the same power, I should be glad to die."

One only needs insight to foresee how things will end. Aliette's health gives way under the strain of this discordant life. On a certain night which brought incidents to which Bernard confessed he had no right to expose his wife, Aliette swooned away. It was long before she recovered, and

when at length she did regain consciousness, it was to beseech her husband with tears to allow her to live her own life.

They returned to the country. The days that followed were the happiest she had ever known. The quiet and regularity of her life, the care of Jeanne, her little girl, occupied and soothed her. Bernard too for a time seemed to be satisfied. But soon the weather of his soul changed, and events followed close upon one another towards the catastrophe. Their little daughter fell suddenly ill of a diphtheria which threatened to carry her off. An operation became immediately necessary. It was too late to bring a surgeon from the city. Bernard hastened to a neighbouring house where a stranger, a celebrated doctor, with his niece or cousin, was staying temporarily. This man, Dr. Vallehaut and his niece Sabine returned with Bernard, and the child's life was saved.

Dr. Vallehaut is a man of science who, like Bernard, has lost all faith in revealed religion ; but the absence of faith has not yet robbed his life of ideals. The quest of pure truth, the hope of devoting the results of his research to the good of man, serve in the case of one of his temperament to keep him free from cynicism and any low way of conceiving life. It is left, as we shall see in a moment, to his cousin Sabine to carry out the principles of religious negation to their logical issue in life and action.

Dr. Vallehaut has still effectively within himself the moral reminiscences of religion. Sabine, who belongs to the next generation, has no such reminiscences : she is the author's warning of what we are to expect in the *second* generation of a materialistic and irreligious community.

But to resume.—A friendship as deep as was possible among such discordant people grew up between Aliette and her husband on the one hand, and the Doctor and Sabine.

Bernard in particular sees a good deal of the Doctor's cousin, and both of them hover on the edge of folly.

In consequence doubtless of the strain, Aliette's health gives way. At first there is no ground for alarm; the Doctor reassures them and leaves his cousin, who, by the way, is betrothed to him, to act as nurse, her duty being to give the patient a potion at intervals. Aliette, however, does not recover. One day Bernard, taking the potion from Sabine's hand, gives it to his wife, who, as she takes it, looks into his eyes with a searching gaze which almost freezes his blood. She drinks the potion, and next day dies. It had contained aconite, a slow and untraceable poison which had been placed there by Sabine.

According to his daily custom, Monsieur Tallevaut conducted his ward to the door of her room, kissed her forehead, shook her by the hand, and withdrew to his own apartment.

About an hour and a half afterwards, when he thought Sabine would be asleep, Dr. Tallevaut, who had not gone to bed himself, left his room with great caution, went down the long passage and descended the stairs. The candlestick, which he held in his hand, illumined the pallor and contraction of the face. He entered the large room, on the ground-floor, which served him as a drawing-room and library, and from there, raising a heavy tapestry curtain, he passed into the laboratory. He went straight to a kind of sideboard of old oak, which filled up one of the angles of the wall, and in which the dangerous substances which he used in making up his medicines and in his experiments were locked up. This sideboard was fastened by one of those locks which have no key, and of which it is necessary to know the secret combination. After he had turned the revolving plate of the lock, Dr. Tallevaut seemed to hesitate for some seconds before opening the panel of the cabinet;—then, with a violent gesture, he opened the panel. His pale forehead immediately became of a livid tint; in one of the rows of bottles which were ranged on the highest shelf his first glance revealed an empty space. At the same moment there escaped from his agitated and convulsed lips a word uttered feebly as a breath—

"Aconite!"

All at once it seemed to him that he heard a slight noise in the interior of the house. He extinguished his candle, and listened attentively. A few minutes afterwards, he distinctly heard the gliding of a furtive step, and the rustling of a silk dress in the next

room. He went quickly to the door and waited. The night was beautifully fine, and was illuminated by a crescent moon, which threw its white rays across the windows and into the laboratory. The curtain of the door was raised and Sabine appeared ; at the same instant the hand of Dr. Tallevaut was laid heavily upon the arm of his ward.

The young girl uttered a stifled cry, and in her first alarm dropped a small bottle which fell with a ring on the stone floor. She drew back, and ran into the next room. Near the large centre table, she stopped abruptly, and leaning heavily upon it with one hand, she faced her approaching guardian.

In the library, as in the laboratory, the windows opening into the garden had no shutters, and the polar clearness of the sky spread a half-light in patches across the room. Monsieur Tallevaut could perceive an air of wild bravado on Sabine's face and in her eyes.

" Unhappy girl," he said to her in a hollow voice, " defend yourself. Say that you have made some mistake ; aconite is also a medicine ; you have seen me employ it, myself, sometimes. You have perhaps been imprudent, careless, and you were afraid that I should blame you. That is why you were hiding yourself. Come speak ! "

" What is the use ? " she answered, with a disdainful wave of the hand ; " you would not believe me ; you do not believe your own words."

The unhappy man sank down into the easy-chair in which he was accustomed to write, talking aloud to himself in his deep trouble.

" No," he murmured, " it is true. It would be impossible ; she could not have made so great a mistake ! Alas ! she knew only too well what she was doing. With what infernal skill she chose the poison, the effects of which should imitate the symptoms of the disease itself, be mistaken for them, and aggravate them, very gently, till death resulted ! Yes, it is a crime ; an odious, premeditated crime against that gentle, lovable creature ! "

And after a silence—

" Oh what a miserable dupe I have been ! "

Then, raising his head towards Sabine—

" Tell me at least that her husband is your accomplice ; that it is he who has induced you to commit this infamous deed ! "

" No," said Sabine, " he knew nothing of it. I love him, and I know that I am loved by him. Nothing more."

Dr. Tallevaut, after minutes of speechless dejection, resumed firmly, but in a distinctly altered voice—

" Sabine, if you have counted on a criminal weakness on my part, you have not known me ; my duty, from this moment, is to hand you over to justice ; and however horrible such a duty may be, I shall perform it."

"You will think twice, uncle, before doing so," the girl said coldly, standing on the other side of the table, and facing her guardian, "for if you give me up to justice, if you give society the pleasure of witnessing such a trial in court, you must foresee what the world will say: it will say that I am your pupil, and it will say nothing but the truth!"

"My pupil, wretched girl? Have I ever taught you other principles than those which I practise myself? Have I ever given you, by precept or example, other lessons than those of uprightness, justice, humanity and honour?"

"You surprise me, uncle. How is it that such a mind as yours has never foreseen that I might extract, from your doctrines and from our common studies, conclusions and teachings different from those which you drew from them yourself? The tree of science, uncle, does not produce the same fruit upon every soil. You speak to me of uprightness, of justice, of humanity, of honour? You are astonished, that the same theories which have inspired you with these virtues have not inspired me with the same? The explanation is, however, quite simple; you know, as well as I do, that these sham virtues are, in reality, free to be acquired, or not; since they are only instincts, veritable prejudices imposed upon us by nature, because she requires them for the preservation and the carrying on of her work. It pleases you to submit yourself to these instincts, and it does not please me to do so, that is all."

"But have I not told you, and repeated to you a thousand times, you wretched creature, that duty, honour, even happiness consisted in submission to these natural, these divine laws?"

"You have told me so: you believe it; I believe the contrary. I believe that the duty, the honour of a human being is to rebel against such servitude, to shake off these fetters with which nature, or God, as you like, leads us and oppresses us, in order to make us work, in spite of ourselves, towards an unknown end; towards a work in which we have no interest. Ah yes! you have indeed told me, and repeated to me, that for you it was not only a duty, but a joy, to humbly contribute, by your works and your virtues, towards I know not what divine work, I know not what superior and mysterious point, towards which the universe is progressing. But, really, those are pleasures to which I am perfectly insensible. I care very little, I swear to you, to deny myself, to force myself to suffer all my life, in order to prepare a state of happiness and perfection for I know not what future humanity—a state which I shall not enjoy, festivals to which I shall not go, and a paradise into which I shall have no entrance."

Under the influence of the emotions which agitated her in this awful moment, her speech, at first calm and icy, became, little by

little, more animated, and gradually assumed a character of violent exultation. She had quitted her first attitude, and commenced to walk, with slow steps, from one end of the library to the other stopping at intervals to accentuate her remarks by an energetic gesture. Monsieur Tallevaut, still motionless in his easy-chair, answered her only by vague exclamations of indignation, and his eye appeared to follow, with an air of stupefaction, this spectral shadow now disappearing in the darkness, now plainly visible in the pale light which came from outside.

"Must I tell you everything?" she continued. "I was mortally tired: tired of the present, of the past, of the future. The idea of passing my life here, poring over your books or over your furnaces, with the perspective of the final perfection of the universe for my whole satisfaction and for all my comfort, this idea was insupportable to me. Such a life may suffice for a being who is all brain, like you; but for those who have nerves under the skin, blood in the veins, and passions in the heart, never. I am a woman, and I have all the aspirations, all the passions of a woman; these are even more powerful in me than they are in others, because I have neither the superstitions nor the prejudices which, with others, may deaden them. I dreamt of great love, I dreamt of a luxurious life, of amusements, of elegance, in the midst of the pleasures of society. I felt that fate had bestowed on me all the gifts which would enable me to enjoy these things in their fulness, and I was called upon to renounce them for ever. To what end would this independence of spirit which I had acquired have served me then? Of what use was all my science, if I did not extract from it some opportunity for my ambitions, some weapon for my passions? An occasion presented itself. I loved this man, and I felt that he loved me. I felt that, were he free, he would marry me. And then—I did what I have done! A crime? Nothing but a word! What is good, and what is evil? What is true, or what is false? In reality, you know very well that the code of human morality has to-day become nothing but a blank page, on which each one writes what he likes, according to his intellect and his temperament. Individual catechisms are the only ones left to us. Mine is the very same which nature teaches me by her example; she eliminates everything which annoys her with impassible egotism; she suppresses everything that opposes itself to her aims; she crushes out the weak to make room for the strong. And be assured, it is not now for the first time that this doctrine obtains with really free and superior minds. It has been said since all time, Good people are taken away.' No! it is the weak ones who disappear, and they only do what is their duty; and when one assists them a little, one only does after all the same thing as God. Read your Darwin over again, my uncle."

On reading such a passage as that one feels that, far from it being strange and irrational that people should ever have gone to war about religion, the one thing which men might at any time quite justifiably go to war about is just religion and the moral implications of religion. After reading such a passage,—and the inferences seem to me to be quite logical, and granted the premisses, quite inevitable,—one feels that thorough-going unbelievers may yet have to be exterminated for poisoning the wells and threatening to bring human life to a standstill.

After a suitable lapse of time, Bernard marries Sabine; and once again we have the materials for a tragedy which will balance the earlier one. This later tragedy we shall not pursue.

A short time only is needed for these two to cease even pretending to respect one another; and on Sabine's individualistic theories of life, the moment a relationship ceases to bind, it ceases to be binding. They separate. Bernard's heart turns to his little daughter whom he has left with Aliette's mother in the old Château. The child is in the care of an old nurse, Victoire, who had been Aliette's nurse. On Bernard's proposing to take away his child, Victoire vigorously objects, saying that if he persists in taking the child, she, Victoire, will then believe what she has not yet allowed herself to believe, that he, Bernard, was an accomplice with Sabine in the poisoning of Aliette.

The Pope in "The Ring and The Book" describes how once upon a time he stood in Naples. It was a night of the blackest darkness; no town, no sea, no sky! Suddenly there was a lightning flash by which for one moment he saw everything. Just so did those words of the old nurse light up the mystery of poor Aliette's last days. He remembered her last look, and in that moment something began to break, to melt, to yield within him.

"She died, believing me guilty! It is a frightful idea! I cannot bring myself to think of it; so fragile, so tender, so gentle a being. Yes, she said to herself, 'My husband is a murderer. What he is giving me to take is poison, and he knows it to be so.' And she died with this thought, her last thought: and never, never will she know that it is not true. O, Lord God Almighty, if You exist, You see what I suffer: have pity on me. Ah, that I could believe that all is not finished between her and myself; that she sees me; that she hears me; that she knows the truth."

Thus the dead Aliette began her reign. For, as I have said more than once in these studies, we do not know ourselves, and do not know how we shall behave in the great waters.

The race is older than the individual. It may need some great thing to break up that hard crust with which our conventional life overlays and conceals the qualities of our essential and abiding human nature. But life is full of experiences, any one of which may become such a ploughshare in the hand of God.

Bernard, exhausted by grief, fell a prey to disease. Something sinister made its appearance in his throat. Feeling his end draw near, he sent for Aliette's uncle, the Bishop. He wished to die in Aliette's religion. And so she had her way; or, God had His way through her.

Here, once again, we have been considering a case which in its essentials need not be at all unusual or curious. It is another illustration, on the testimony and authority of a true imagination, that the human soul moves in an orbit round a central sun, so that at the limit of its apogee it is already coming back.

Of this also, we have had another illustration, namely, that a life of moral disorder is already discovering and creating its own tragedy, out of which it will at length cry out.

And of this, finally, we have had an illustration, and it prepares us for the studies which shall follow,—that for every one who in this world has wronged another there is but one way back to self-respect, to peace, to God, and it, by kneeling in perfect humility before the face, alive or dead, of that one whom he has wronged.

And there again we enter that Valley of the Spirit, at the head of which and against a wonderful sky, stands for ever the Cross of Calvary.

JOHN A. HUTTON.

WHO WAS NIMROD?

I. NIMROD AND AGADE.

THE tenth chapter of Genesis, the table of peoples, contains two apparently independent notices on the Kushites. According to the documentary hypothesis the first notice (*v.* 7) belongs to P, the second (*vv.* 8–12) to J. At any rate it is very probable that the pericope *vv.* 7–12 has not been written *uno tenore*. The author of the table of peoples loosely combined two traditions. On the one hand he knew the Arabian and African Kushites enumerated in *v.* 7. On the other he knew that Kush had begotten Nimrod. The text does not bear any trace of an attempt to bring the latter in connexion with the genealogy of the former. I believe the author intentionally avoided identifying the two bearers of the name Kush. And provisionally I leave *v.* 7 out of consideration when inquiring into the identity of that Kush who begot Nimrod.

It is clear that *vv.* 8–12 deal with the beginnings of the Babylonian and Assyrian powers. Let us regard these verses in the light of the cuneiform inscriptions. The latter tell us that the Assyrians and Neo-Babylonians regarded Sharrukîn or Sargon of Agade or Akkad (about 2700 B.C., if not

earlier) as the real founder of the Babylonian empire. For that reason it is to be asked, whether the Biblical notices on Nimrod do not contain a reminder of the Akkadian conquests.

Besides Genesis x. there is no passage in the Old Testament where the name of Nimrod occurs but Micah v. 5. There Assyria is named "the land of Nimrod." Now the time of Micah partly coincides with that of Sargon of Assyria. Since 722 B.C. Sargon and the Sargonides reigned for more than a century at Nineveh (cf. Gen. x. 11 f.). Is it a mere accident that in this very time the name of Nimrod reappears in Hebrew literature? Is it not better to think that the prophet knew the connexion between the figure of Nimrod and the Akkadian conquerors?

Add to this that the beginning of Nimrod's realm, according to Genesis x. 10, was formed by Babel, Erech, Akkad and Kalne in the land of Shinear. Apparently Akkad is here the city of Akkad (Agade), which has given its name to the dynasty of Sharru-kîn. It may be objected that in Genesis x. 10 Babel appears in the first place and Akkad only in the third. But this precedence of Babel is to be explained by the greater general importance of that city. After the rise of the first dynasty of Babel (2225–1925 B.C.) it could easily happen, especially in an oral tradition, that Babel and Akkad interchanged places. Then, in a more ancient form of the tradition, the succession was: 1. Akkad, the main residence of Sharru-kîn and his successors; 2. Erech, the capital of the Sumerian ruler Lugal-zaggisi, whose empire was destroyed by Sharru-kîn;[1] 3. Babel, which in the kingdom of the latter occupied an important place;[2] 4. Kalne, about which nothing certain can be said.[3] In accordance

[1] V. Scheil, *Comptes rendus* (Acad. des Inscr. et Belles-Lettres), 1911, p. 613 ff. Cf. A. Poebel, *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung* (=*OLZ*), 1912, col. 482.

[2] L. W. King, *Chronicles concerning early Babylonian Kings*, vol. ii., p. 8.

[3] J. Skinner, *Genesis* (1912), p. 210. O. Procksch, *Die Genesis*, p. 74 f.

with the historical connexion, which seems probable to the present author, we may ask whether Kalne is perhaps identical with such an ancient political centre as Upi or Lagash.

II. Nimrod and Kish.

As we have an indirect evidence that the Biblical Nimrod has something to do with the dynasty of Agade, we may now make an attempt to identify Kush, the father of Nimrod. Very probably he is to be taken for a personification of the ancient city of Kish in Northern Babylonia. As to the historical connexion between Kish and Agade we lack information in many respects. But at all events it must have been a close one. In the present demonstration the following points are to be emphasised. 1. In the list of kings, published by Scheil in 1911, the North-Babylonian dynasties of Kish and Agade are separated one from the other only by the reign of the South-Babylonian king Lugal-zaggisi, which is said to have lasted twenty-five years.[4] 2. According to a notice in the same list Sharru-kîn, before founding the dynasty of Agade, was gardener and butler to the temple of Zamama,[5] who is known to have been the city-god of Kish. 3. The city of Kish was rebuilt by Sharru-kîn.[6] 4. In the inscriptions of the Philadelphia University Museum, mentioned by Poebel,[7] Sharru-kîn is titled *lugal kiš* as well as *lugal agade* ^{ki}; the latter title means "king of Agade" and the former probably emphasises an ideal relation to the historical kingdom of Kish. 5. Rimush and Man-ishtusu, the next successors of Sharru-kîn, regularly called themselves *lugal kiš*.[8] 6. The fourth king of Agade, Narâm-

[4] Scheil, l.c., pp. 610–615.
[5] Ib., p. 615 f.
[6] Poebel, l.c., col. 484.
[7] Ib., col. 481 f.
[8] F. Thureau-Dangin, *Die sumerischen und akkadischen Königsinschriften* (= *SAKI*), p. 160 ff.

Sin,[9] is regarded by Poebel [10] as a son of Sharru-kîn and by the present author [11] as a son of Man-ishtusu. In either case he was the son of a man who called himself *lugal kiš*. *Cum grano salis* we may say that a king of Kish was the father of Narâm-Sin.

In a posthumous work the late Hugo Winckler [12] has drawn attention to the fact that the above-mentioned city-god of Kish has a place of honour even in the inscriptions of the Hittite kings of the thirteenth century B.C. Since the name of this god was still honoured in Asia Minor about 1,500 years after the age of Sharru-kîn, it is not at all improbable that the inhabitants of Syria and Palestine in the time of the Hebrew conquest remembered the name of his city. The only difficulty lies in the different vowels of the names Kish and Kush. It may be supposed that the name of Kish since olden times was pronounced Kush by the Western Semites.[13]

In connexion herewith the question may be put: For what reason did the author of the table of peoples put *vv.* 8 ff. next to *v.* 7? Was the similarity of the names his only reason? Or did he perhaps know that there existed a very ancient historical connexion between the city of Kish and the Kushites enumerated in *v.* 7? The latter hypothesis is supported by a Babylonian tradition, according to which the kingdom of Kish was founded in the legendary times immediately after the Deluge.[14] Now it is remarkable that in the Biblical table of peoples Kush, being the first son of Ham (Gen. x. 6), stands equally near to the time of the Flood.

[9] Narâm-Sin possibly was the fifth, but more probably the fourth king of Agade. Cf. *OLZ*, 1913, col. 148, the second note.

[10] L.c., col. 483.

[11] *OLZ*, 1913, col. 148.

[12] H. Winckler, *Vorderasien im zweiten Jahrtausend*, p. 70 ff.

[13] Cf. the Jewish pronunciation of the Assyrian name Sharru-kîn (Is. xx. 1).

[14] Poebel, *OLZ*, 1912, col. 484 f.

From this coincidence it may be inferred that the author of the table of peoples, when joining *vv.* 8 ff. to *v.*6 f., wanted to express the reminiscence of an ancient historical connexion. I believe that it was not his purpose to identify the two bearers of the name Kush, but to emphasise that ancient connexion.

III. Nimrod and Narâm-Sin.

The question may now be put: Can we paraphrase the statement "Kush begot Nimrod" (Gen. x. 8) in this way: "The kingdom of Kish begot the empire of Akkad"? I believe we can from an historical point of view. Etymologically, however, the names Nimrod and Agade bear no relation to each other. We may then set out to examine the names of the individual Akkadian kings. The names Sharru-kîn, Rimush and Man-ishtusu afford us no aid. But between the names Nimrod and Narâm-Sin there may be found some connexion, if it be permitted to call the Arabian language into assistance. That language has to mediate between Akkadian and Hebrew.

In the period of the Akkadian empire the genitive form of Narâm-Sin was Narâmi-Sin.[15] But South-Semitic people would understand the latter form as the genitive of *narâmisun*, the *pluralis fractus* of such a form as *narmusun*.[16] The Arabian form *narmusun* would correspond to the Hebrew *nirmos*. And *nirmos* is not too far removed from *nimrod*, if we suppose that the name became the object of an etymological play on the roots רמס (*ramas*) and מרד (*marad* or *maradh*). *Nirmos* might be understood as "a trampler" (of his fellowmen) and *Nimrod* as "a rebel" (against God).[17]

[15] Poebel, *OLZ*, 1913, col. 297.

[16] Or perhaps *narâmisum*, *narmusum*. But the difference between final *m* and *n* is of little importance. As to the alternative use of the singular and the plural of certain proper names, cf. F. Hommel, *Enzyklopaedie des Islam*, 7° Lieferung, p. 394*b*, and Gesenius-Buhl, *Handwörterbuch* 15th edition, p. 612*b*.

[17] A. Dillmann, *Die Genesis*, 5th edition, p. 183.

By the Akkadian conquerors the nations were "trampled down." And Narâm-Sin was addressed as a god in contemporary inscriptions.[18]

But do we indeed have a reason to believe that the tradition concerning the Akkadian empire was delivered to the Hebrews in connexion with the name of Narâm-Sin and by intervention of South-Semitic people? I think we have. Contemporary and later inscriptions record the successful expedition of Narâm-Sin against the land of Magan, which was probably a portion of Eastern Arabia.[19] On the other hand the Old Testament tells us that Peleg, an ancestor of Terah and Abraham (Gen. xi. 16–26), was the brother of Yoktan (Gen. x. 25), whose descendants were settled in a portion of Southern or rather South-Eastern Arabia (Gen. x. 30).[20] It is not unlikely that the descendants of Peleg at some time sojourned in the neighbourhood of their cousins, the Yoktanites. In these regions they may have heard of Narâm-Sin's "trampling down" the people of Magan and his "rebellion" against God.

It even seems possible to me that they were witnesses of the facts. If Abraham was a contemporary of Hammurapi (2123–2080 B.C.), as we have abundant reason to believe, it may be supposed that the separation between Peleg and Yoktan took place in the time of the Akkadian empire. If we accept the statement that Terah lived 205 years (Gen. xi. 32), the result is that he was born at no later date than 2300 B.C. Now it is true that the genealogy in Genesis xi. 16–24 mentions only three members between Peleg and Terah. But I am convinced that this genealogy is very incomplete, and that the statements in *vv.* 18, 20, 22, 24 may be explained in this way: Peleg was thirty years old

[18] Thureau-Dangin, *SAKI*, p. 168, k. l. m. n.
[19] King, *A History of Sumer and Akkad*, p. 241 f.
[20] Skinner, l.c., p. 221. Procksch, l.c., p. 82.

when he begot that son, by whom he became an ancestor of Reu, etc.[21] On this theory it is not at all unlikely that the separation between Peleg and Yoktan happened in the 27th century B.C., and that the Palgides (as we may call the descendants of Peleg), moving northward, passed by regions which had been laid waste by Narâm-Sin.

IV. Nimrod and Asshur.

The result of the above inquiry is, that the statement "Kush begot Nimrod" (Gen. x. 8) may be paraphrased in this way: "The kingdom of Kish begot the empire of Narâm-Sin." We may ask, whether it is not better to say: "A king of Kish begot the king Narâm-Sin." Both paraphrases are in accordance with historical facts. And indeed I believe that the figure of Nimrod originally corresponded to the person of Narâm-Sin. But in course of time the conception of Nimrod must have been enlarged. Genesis x. 11 f. presents such a perspective, that we are led to conceive of Nimrod as a personification of Narâm-Sin's dynasty.

In the verses just mentioned we are told that Nimrod afterwards left his Akkadian country and emigrated to Assyria. The translation "he went to Asshur" is postulated by the context [22] and is in agreement with the designation of Assyria as "the land of Nimrod" (Micah v. 5). This expression supposes that Nimrod had found in Assyria his new country. And it clearly appears from Genesis x. 11*b*, 12, that he established himself permanently in this new world. It was not a mere expedition against Assyria, but it was an emigration *in optima forma*. In agreement with the results above reached Nimrod's going to Asshur is to be understood in this way, that the Akkadian power was transferred from Babylonia to Assyria. What does that

[21] Cf. the omission of three generations in Matthew i. 8.
[22] Skinner, l.c., p. 210 f. Procksch, l.c., p. 75.

mean? Was the relation between Akkad and Assyria similar to that which the Romans held to exist between Ilion and Latium? Did the last members of the dynasty of Agade, when their dominion succumbed to the blows of a Southern enemy,[23] emigrate to the North and establish a new monarchy in Assyria? Was this the way by which the title of a *lugal kiš* came to the land of Asshur? Have we here the deeper grounds of the Assyrian claim to the dominion over the world?

We are told by Esarhaddon (681–668 B.C.) that a certain Bêl-ibni, a son of Adasi, was the founder of the Assyrian monarchy and the ancestor of the Sargonides.[24] There is some reason to believe that this Bêl-ibni in a later tradition was confounded with another Bêl-ibni, a Babylonian king, who belonged to the dynasty of Isin[25] and probably reigned 2197–2173 B.C. The confusion might be explained by the supposition that Bêl-ibni, the son of Adasi, actually was of Babylonian origin. So we may ask whether he was a descendant of the Akkadian kings. Possibly he was a grandson of Shudurkib,[26] the last king of Agade (about 2525 B.C., if not earlier).

In the next centuries the Assyrian state seems to have become subject to Mitannic influences. Leaving Bêl-ibni, the son of Adasi, out of consideration, the most ancient figures we know in Assyrian history are two sacerdotal rulers, whose names, Ushpia and Kikia, have a Mitannic aspect. From the texts mentioning them it is clear that they lived before the reign of Ilu-shuma, king of Assyria, and his contemporary Su-abu (2225–2211), who founded the first dynasty of Babel.[27] On the other hand there is no reason

[23] Scheil, l.c., p. 615 f.

[24] King, *Chronicles*, vol. i., p. 66.

[25] King, ib. p. 62 ff., compared with his *History*, p. 312, the second note.

[26] Pognon, *Comptes rendus* (Acad. des Inscr. et Belles-Lettres), 1912, p. 416 f.

[27] King, *Chronicles*, vol. i., pp. 120 ff. 136, 140 f., and vol. ii., p. 14.

to believe that Ushpia and Kikia lived as early as the middle of the third millennium B.C. If the Akkadian immigration supposed by the present author really took place, it should probably be placed before the days of Ushpia and Kikia.

C. VAN GELDEREN.

THE TWO GREAT REFUSALS.

MARK X. 17–27 ; MATT. XIX. 16–26 ; LUKE XVIII. 18–27.

JESUS had been beyond Jordan, and would seem to have been about to set out on His fateful last visit to Jerusalem. A man, whose age we may place perhaps at thirty to thirty-five years, and, according to Luke, one of "the Rulers of the Jews," heard that Jesus was about to leave the district. At the last moment he came running to Jesus and threw himself on his knees before Him. His mind was troubled by a question that he had in vain tried to solve. How much he knew of Jesus and His teaching we cannot tell, but he addressed Him in terms of affectionate appreciation, saying, "Good Master, what shall I do that I may inherit Eternal Life ? "

His position as a Ruler and his wealth—for he had great possessions—left him longing for that which neither social standing nor wealth can give : he was awake to the cry of the soul and wanted it answered.

Jesus repudiates—perhaps we may say He even resents—the title "Good." "Why," He asks, "why callest thou me Good ? "

Does not the repudiation stagger us ? Does not the title seem to us most fitting ? Do not we find the echo of it in our own hearts, as we think of Him ? And so do we not feel puzzled that Jesus called it in question ?

Well ! we are not the first to feel the difficulty of the

situation. One even of the Evangelists felt it—Matthew, namely—and he felt it so strongly that he even dared to change our Lord's words. He makes Him say, "Why askest thou me concerning that which is good?" The Evangelist may have meant well, but he has failed at a critical point in his narrative.

Is it possible to find a likely reason for the recoil of our Saviour's mind from the ascription offered by this eager, earnest, sincere young Ruler? Can it have been that Jesus was just escaping from some temptation which had stirred Him to His depths? We know that temptation constantly recurred in His life. It was not the case that He had but one prolonged battle at the beginning of His public ministry and that thereafter He stood undisputed victor over the world, the flesh and the devil. It is pathetic to read how He chose the Twelve "that they might be *with* Him" and that later He turned to them and said, "Ye are they which have continued with me in my temptations." Luke tells us pointedly that after the strain of the great Forty Days' temptation the devil departed from Him "*for a season*"; and when, later, Simon tried to turn Him aside from the Cross, He called the Apostle "Satan" and bade him get behind Him, for he was a "stumblingblock" to Him.

How terribly real the temptation presented on the lips and in the solicitation of the Apostle had been, we see in the deep agitation of the Saviour's reproof. He would not have spoken as He did had there not been something more than Simon's voice crying, "Spare Thyself," and had He not felt in Himself the shuddering recoil from the Cross which corresponded with, and answered to, the pleading of the Apostle's love that He would pause and withdraw in time.

Some such vivid experience, in which He felt how human He was in His dependence upon a higher strength than His own; some recently deepened sense of the momentary

upholding He, in common with all His brethren, required by the Father's encircling arms; some more prevailing vision of goodness that, in God alone, dwells serene and free from the infirmity that besets all human life—this *may* have been the reason why Jesus Christ cried to this young man, "Why do you call me *good*? There is none *good* save one—God."

But though Matthew has missed the *Saviour's* "great refusal" it is from his narrative alone that we are able to follow the *second* great refusal in the incident; viz., that of the young Ruler himself. He has asked, "What shall I do" or "what good thing shall I do, that I may inherit Eternal Life?" The Jew of this period thought of God as keeping for every man a debtor and creditor account. Every good deed he did was recorded in his favour; every evil deed was recorded against him; and on the striking of the balance depended the issue of life or death.

Jesus repudiates such a conception; but He says to the inquirer, "If thou wouldest enter into life keep the commandments." The man asks, "Which?" and then Jesus, brushing aside everything ritual or national, points him to the broad, general laws which in every civilised community are recognised as the foundation of individual and social sanity. No state, no personal worth, can stand except where honesty, purity, reverence for life, honour for parents and love for one's neighbour are cherished.

This, this Ruler has seen; and what he has seen is right he has tried to carry out. Whatever temptations have clung around him from his position of authority and from his wealth he has wrestled with and thrown, and he tells Jesus so. "All these things have I observed from my youth." But God has set Eternity in every man's heart, and this pilgrim of the Infinite asks "What lack I yet?"

His assurance was accepted, and Mark adds, "Jesus, stead-

fastly looking upon him, *loved* him." How much the words mean! It is very rarely indeed that Jesus is said in any of the Gospels to love an individual. In John we read that He loved Martha and Mary and Lazarus, and there is an unnamed disciple who is spoken of as "the disciple whom Jesus loved," but I do not recall any other such use of the word except that here.

How much then, I repeat, the words mean! What sense of congeniality of mind between the man and Himself they witness to; what earnest gladness in battles nobly fought, in a character trained to high ends. Jesus knew, from what He had paid for conquest in His own life, what this man must likewise have paid; and His heart went out to him, not in mere liking but in love. And not least He loved him, I venture to think, because of what lay in the question, "What lack I yet?" There spoke the very same voice of unquenchable aspiration that Jesus was ever conscious of as crying to God in His own child-heart: the soul following hard after the unattained and the unattainable; the sense of the Infinite, of which some glimpse and portion has been won, but which, in its fulness, eludes and yet compels the soul's quest. Jesus recognised the man's brotherhood of spirit, his present hold of life, of which, because he had tasted it, he longed to drink a full draught.

And then in this love for him, and because love ever seeks the loved one's highest, completest good, He summoned him to His own side. "Get rid of all that holds you from the highest attainment of which you are capable. Sell all you have; give to the poor; come, follow Me, and you shall have heavenly treasure."

As He looked on him with the discerning eyes of love, He saw what aptitude he had for a great service.

The possible future man, as well as the actual present man, lived before Him. He saw in him what made Him use the

same great words as He had used to Simon and Andrew, James and John, "Come, follow Me"; but of none of these men do we read, "Jesus, looking on him, loved him," and I cannot but think that Jesus felt in regard to this man that there was that in him which would, if it could but be drawn out, make him the very head of those who were bringing in the Kingdom of God, and not less give to His own mind for intimacy of friendship and for appreciation of those things He held closest and dearest, another mind such as no one of the Twelve could give.

From no other with whom He was brought into casual contact did Jesus, so far as we know, ask as much as He did from this man. To no other was He so drawn. In no other did He find so much that might yield Him rest of heart. And He made love's venture—with what earnest prayer and hope!—and threw open the inmost places of friendship, and the secret of a service whose treasure was the wealth and joy of His own life.

Alas! and alas! The call was too high; the career too exacting. Mark tells us the man went away with a frown on his brow and sorrow in his heart. Did he think only of the price to be paid and not of the reward to be won? Did he fail to overhear the note of personal appeal in the Teacher's voice?—the quiet, scarce audible tone that said, "The Son of Man wants a friend with whom He may speak, heart to heart, of the things that are His very life; one to commune with Him of His exodus which He is to accomplish at Jerusalem. You can be that friend. Will you be?" Though he might still have turned a deaf ear to the summons that, obeyed, would have set him side by side with Paul, yet, had he but listened and stayed to think of what Jesus was telling him he might be to His own heart, would he have turned away as he did?

When he went back to his great possessions did he forget

that look, that steadfast look, of longing and of love in the eyes of the "Good Teacher"? Did the "Good Teacher's" voice become drowned in the common voices of the day? When night came and all was quiet, in the darkness and the silence did both come back and an unseen presence wrestle with him till the breaking of the day? We do not know. But life can scarce have been again what it had been. His riches would surely seem somehow less worth retaining; the pleasures that they would procure, innocent and worthy though all might be, would have less power to delight. Other friendships would seem less satisfying because *that* Friendship had been declined. And when sentence had been given against Him, and the eyes that had gleamed with a great hope had worn once more the look of rejected love as they were set on a disciple who had denied Him, and the "good Teacher's" winsome voice was silenced in death, what thoughts and memories surged in this man's soul? Was he one who thereafter in the early days of the Church sold his possessions and laid at the Apostles' feet the price he had once declined to place in the hands of the poor? and while carrying through life the chastening memory of what might have been, did he now take the lowest place of all in the service of the little community of which he might well have been the chief? Again we cannot tell.

But is it without point that Jesus spoke no word of upbraiding as His gaze followed the retreating figure with the slow step, and the bent head and the sad face; but rather, knowing what this life to which He had challenged him cost to live (for is it not written that "Though He was rich yet for our sakes He became poor?") He covered his retreat with words that told the hardness of the task declined, and that made it plain to the understanding mind how He cherished a great confidence in the God with whom all things

are possible and a great hope that the last might yet be among the first ?

Still, this challenge, this summons for our life's absolute devotion to the service of God, comes from the same lips.

Is it possible for us, out of the disciplined soul, to yield the Son of Man gladness and rest ?—the gladness, the rest of being like-minded with Himself ? He no longer walks the earth, inviting alike the weary and heavy laden, and the strong and brave and resourceful to come to Him ; asking companionship in high thoughts and enduring ideals, no less than offering peace and pardon. But through Him ideals of manhood and womanhood are ours to cherish and fulfil. And these are what He lived for, and died for *and lives for still.* His challenge and His summons to-day are to take these to our minds and hearts and to hold all we have and all we are for their furtherance.

All we have—not great possessions, it may be, but just one special aptitude, perhaps—the faculty for joy, the sense of the humour in things, some gift from God of pity and sympathy, some power of friendship. All we are—with some strength to endure amid the shocks of time ; some ability to look on Medusa's face with eyes that do not shudder ; some experience in which others may find refuge in their day of stress.

All this He seeks from us for that ideal of man, that ideal of woman, which He saw, and which He now asks us to see, believe in, and devote ourselves to.

A. A. Dauncey.

"WILL THE SON OF MAN FIND FAITH ON THE EARTH?"

It seems to be the uniform idea of all commentators that this question, concluding the parable of the Importunate Widow in Luke xviii. 1–8, is "a sorrowful one," implying in Jesus the "painful consciousness what a want of faith He would meet at His *Parousia*." It is understood to be "pessimistic," to be "added by an editor who had xvii. 26–37 in mind," with its description of a wicked world suddenly overwhelmed in the midst of its sin.

If so, it is entirely unique in the New Testament, and quite out of harmony with its context. The parable to which it is attached is an encouragement to importunate prayer for the righteousness (*i.e.*, vindication, ἐκδίκησις) and salvation of God promised in Isaiah lvi. 1. This salvation, in spite of delay, is near, and sure to come. The argument is *a fortiori*. If even an earthly judge, careless of justice, will avenge a widow merely to be rid of the annoyance of her importunity, how is it conceivable that God should remain deaf to the entreaties of His own chosen people that cry to Him day and night? The framer of the parable ends with a triumphant: No; this is inconceivable. The heavenly, righteous Judge cannot possibly refuse His own people's entreaty for justice. "I tell you He will avenge them, and will do it speedily."

At this point comes in the half verse (8*b*) that, according to all interpreters to whom we have access, introduces the plaintive if not pessimistic note that grates so discordantly. We need scarcely wonder at the conclusion of one of the

latest and best interpreters of the eschatological sayings of Jesus, who, in spite of a very laudable conservatism, feels constrained to

> regard these closing words as a sombre reflection suggested by some apostasy amid persecution, a grim comment on the speedy (ἐν τάχει) vindication just spoken of, expected in the Kingdom's advent, in contrast with what the glorified Lord would actually find at His glorious appearing after the prolonged delay had damped the early enthusiasm.[1]

If Dr. Winstanley's interpretation of verse 8*b* could be granted, we too could hardly avoid his conclusion that it

> looks very like an appendage by way of a preaching or reading "aside," and rather dismal at that, for it contradicts the hopeful stimulus of the story to persevering prayer.

But surely the burden of proof is on those who adopt this interpretation if any other be admissible.

Our objection to amputation is not on general principles merely, but specifically because suppression of verse 8*b* will leave the parable deprived of its natural conclusion. It is not in accordance with the teaching of Jesus to inculcate importunity in prayer *without* the complementary duty of bowing to the wiser will of God. In particular it accords neither with His teaching nor His contemporaries', to omit this limit upon importunity when the cry is: "Avenge me."

By analogy of a long series of contemporary treatments of the same problem, the difficulty to be met here is the delay of the *Parousia*. End the parable with verse 8*a*, and you leave nothing but a bald reassertion. The real objection remains unmet. The speaker reasseverates with stronger emphasis than before the conviction that God certainly will fulfil His promise of "righteousness and salvation" (Isa. lvi. 1). But he keeps silence on the main point, which is: *Why*, then, does the cry for justice of God's ill-treated saints remain so long unanswered?

[1] Winstanley, *Jesus and the Future*, p. 136.

The objections to leaving the parable in this truncated form have double force from the fact that other contemporary treatments of the question—and a long series can be cited, both Jewish and Christian—are by no means without an answer. Indeed the answer is almost stereotyped. In substance it is always the same, whether the theodicy be Jewish or Christian in origin. With sundry variations of form it amounts always to this: "God is not slack, as some think, to fulfil His promises of vindication, but is longsuffering (μακροθυμεῖ), not willing that any should perish, but desirous that all should come unto repentance."[1] In the later Old Testament and Jewish apocalyptic writings this doctrine of the "forbearance" (ἀνοχή) of God takes the form of the eschatological expectation of the Great Repentance. In order that the Day of Yahweh may not smite the earth with a curse, He will send before His own Coming that Elijah, who in the days of Ahab "turned the heart of Israel back again" (1 Kings xviii. 37). Elijah will turn the heart of the children to the Father (God) and the Father to the children (Israel), so that the Coming may indeed be light and not darkness.[2] In 2 Esdras a still more specific explanation is given for the delay on the same general basis. Sick with hope deferred the prophet reminds God of His promise to deliver Israel from its ill-treatment and oppression:

> All this have I spoken before thee, O Lord, because thou hast said that for our sakes thou madest this world (Gen. i. 26 ff.). As for the other nations, which also come of Adam, thou hast said that they are nothing, and are like unto spittle (Isa. xl. 15) . . . And now, O Lord, behold, these nations which are reputed as nothing, be lords over us and devour us, while we, thy people, whom thou hast called thy Firstborn, thy Only-begotten, and thy fervent Lover, are given into their hands. If the world now be made for our sakes, why do we not possess for an inheritance our world? How long shall this endure?[3]

[1] 2 Pet. iii. 9.
[2] Mal. iv. 6, reading the singular as in Ecclus. xlviii. 10.
[3] 2 Esdr. vi. 55–59.

The answer given to the impatient seer is in substance the same as that long before given to his predecessor Enoch:

> The hearts of the holy were filled with joy that the number of righteousness had drawn nigh (i.e., the required number of the elect was nearly complete), and the prayer of the righteous was heard, and the blood of the righteous required before the Lord of Spirits.[1]

This required number of the elect is determined in *En.* lxi. 1–5 by actual measurement, as well as by numbering. Angels are sent with "cords and ropes of the righteous" to ensure that even

> those who have been destroyed by the desert and devoured by the fish of the sea or by wild beasts may return, for . . . none can be destroyed.

In lxii. 8 it is a harvest of "the holy and elect," all of which must be reaped.

In like manner with Enoch, Esdras is comforted for the delay of "the day of vengeance of our God"[2] by the assurance that the "chambers of good souls" must be filled up before the world prepared for them can be brought in.[3]

The nearly contemporary Christian Apocalypse of John has a similar answer to the cry: How long, how long? The souls of the martyrs from beneath the altar in heaven plead like "the righteous" of Enoch for the "requiring of their blood":

> How long, O Master, the holy and true, dost thou not judge and avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth?

The answer is an exhortation to patience until the completion of their number:

> It was said unto them that they should rest yet for a little time until their fellow-servants also and their brethren, who should be killed even as they were, should have fulfilled their course.[4]

Where the line is less sharply drawn than in the apocalypses between the people of God and a hostile world, the delay is

[1] *Eth. En.* xlvii. 4. [2] Isa. lxi. 2. [3] 2 Esdr. iv. 35 f. [4] Rev. vi. 10 f.

explained by analogy of the slow processes of husbandry. Fig-harvest cannot be until the swelling twig has matured its fruit (Mark xiii. 28 f. and parallels). Wheat-harvest cannot be until "four months" (John. iv. 35), and the wise husbandman has patience, not demanding harvest activities before the time (Mark iv. 26–29; cf. Jas. v. 7 f.). In Matthew we have two parables in each of which this general lesson of patient waiting for the *Parousia* is given special application to the problem of "the things which offend." The parables of the Tares and the Worthless Fish (Matt. xiii. 24–30, 36–43, 47–50) give practically the same answer as *Enoch* and Second Esdras to the question: Why does not God give judgment now? The answer is: First must come the *completion of the number of the elect*. In Christian sources the desideratum mainly in view is sometimes, as in Matthew x. 23, Acts iii. 19–21, the ingathering of the still salvable remnant of Israel. More often it is the ingathering of the Gentiles. For a long and important series of passages, of which we must speak more particularly, make the main reason for the delay of the *Parousia* the ingathering of "all that are afar off, as many as the Lord our God shall call." [1] These wanderers include not merely, nor even primarily, the scattered sons of Israel, but the remnant of the Gentiles. For the great theme of Deutero-Isaiah, the conversion of the Gentiles, had no more disappeared from Jewish than from Christian thought. In a whole series of passages from Synoptic tradition this doctrine of the ingathering of the Gentiles is applied specifically to the question of the delay of the *Parousia*, so that we may fairly call it the normal and even stereotyped answer to the irrepressible question: "Where is the promise of His Coming?"

Thus in the so-called Apocalyptic Discourse, or Doom Chapter, of the Synoptic Gospels (Matt. xxiv. 14 = Mark xiii. 10)

[1] Acts ii. 39.

it is interjected into the warning of suffering and persecution which must be "endured to the end." For, says Matthew,

> This gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world for a testimony unto all the Gentiles, and then shall the end come.

The same utterance is given in earlier and simpler form by Mark:

> First must this gospel be preached to all the Gentiles.

Luke, it is true, in his version of the Doom Chapter substitutes a prediction of the

> treading down of Jerusalem by the Gentiles, until the times of the Gentiles are fulfilled.[1]

But Luke also employs the doctrine of the 'forbearance' in the opening of his second treatise in the form of an answer to the disciples' question: "Lord, dost thou at this time restore the kingdom to Israel?" Their impatience is rebuked by the reminder that "to know the times and seasons" is something reserved to God alone. The part for disciples is to be "witnesses" for the gospel:

> in Jerusalem and all Judaea and Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth.

So, finally, in the fuller form of the early Longer Appendix to Mark, now accessible in the recently discovered Washington Manuscript:

> And they began to make excuse for themselves, saying, This world of lawlessness and unbelief is under the power of Satan, who will not permit things which are unclean under the spirits to receive the true power of God. Therefore reveal thy righteousness (i.e., vindication; cf. Isa. lvi. 1) even now. So said they to Christ. And Christ answered them saying, The limit of years of Satan's power is fulfilled, but other terrible things are near to happen, and the sinners, for whose sake I was delivered up to death that they might turn to the truth, and sin no more, so that they might inherit in heaven the spiritual and imperishable glory of (i.e., belonging to) righteousness. . . .

The sentence is incomplete. It requires a verb signifying "must be evangelised." The ordinary text continues:

[1] Luke xxi. 23

And he said unto them, Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature.

The foregoing instances are surely enough to prove that neither Synagogue nor Church was at a loss for an explanation of the delay of the *Parousia*. By the date to which we must certainly bring down the Gospel of Luke there could be no question as to the nature of the answer any normal Christian would render to the objection: Why does the heavenly Judge so long defer the intervention for which His people entreat Him day and night? The answer would inevitably be in line with the theodicy of Romans ix. 11: "A hardening hath in part befallen Israel, until the fullness of the Gentiles be come in." The Coming of the Son of man cannot be until the "witness" has been effected before all the world. As for this "witness" we are not limited to canonical documents. A Christian writing approximately contemporary with our Book of Acts represents the apostles as sent out because condemnation of the world without opportunity for repentance would not be just. For the first twelve years they are to preach to Israel

that if any of Israel repent and believe in God, through my name, his sins may be forgiven. After twelve years go forth into the world that no one may say: We did not hear it.

The mission is as in Mark xvi. 16:

That they who hear and believe may be saved, but that they who hear and believe not may bear witness, having no opportunity to make the defence "We did not hear."[1]

In view of all this evidence we may fairly speak of the doctrine that the Coming of the Son of man must be deferred until the "making ready for the Lord of a people prepared for Him"[2] as a fixed element of Christian doctrine in the period of the Lukan writings. Indeed the doctrine is

[1] *Kerygma Petri*, Fragments 6 and 7 *ap.* Preuschen, *Antileg.* p. 53 f.
[2] Spoken of the work of Elijah redivivus in Luke i. 17.

scarcely more than a Christianised form of that which forms the very nerve of Pharisaism, that the divine intervention only awaits an obedient people. We encounter it under the form of various rabbinic sayings promising the Coming of Messiah so soon as all Israel has once performed a given commandment, or so soon as the Day of Atonement has once been perfectly observed, or the like. It is certainly what we should expect to find in some form at the close of a parable dealing like that of the Importunate Widow with the question: Why does God delay to avenge His elect?

But we must return from our protests against excision to the question of interpretation. A rendering for which no exegetical authority can be cited must in the nature of the case be proposed only with diffidence, and subject to correction by the recognised masters of New Testament grammar and philology. Under this reserve, however, it is permissible to point out that the accepted rendering and interpretation of Luke xviii. 8 is not the only admissible one. Our conviction is that the verse is in substance an equivalent for the checks upon impatient clamour for the divine judgment already cited, a reminder that "first must the gospel be preached" and must be "believed on in the world."

Classical Greek grammar would call for a Potential Optative with *ἂν* (corresponding to the English Potential) to express this sense; but it is notorious that the Optative, particularly the Potential Optative, is extremely rare in the New Testament.[1] The usual practice of the New Testament writers, who are more or less affected by Semitic usage, is to employ a simple Future Indicative (corresponding to the Semitic Imperfect) where the Greek (or English) employs the Potential. Thus in Matthew xxvi. 53 we have

[1] Burton, *Moods and Tenses of N.T. Greek*, § 178 f., knows of but ten instances, all in the Lukan writings and all but one or two in indirect discourse.

"My Father *shall* even now send me (παραστήσει) more than ten legions of angels." Here Greek—or English—usage requires "My Father *would* send me"; for the condition is implied: "*if* I should beseech Him." An equally marked case appears in John vi. 68: "Lord, to whom *shall* we go (ἀπελευσόμεθα). Here it is perfectly clear that Peter is not proposing an actual, but only a supposititious forsaking of Jesus. Again, Greek and English require the Potential: "to whom *should* we go?" for the condition is tacitly implied: "*if* we should forsake thee." These instances make it abundantly clear that we have no right to expect the nice distinctions of Greek (or even those of English) syntax in Luke xviii. 8, which, as Dr. Winstanley observes, is not Lukan in style or vocabulary, but (as we are disposed to think) reflects the characteristics of a Semitic source.[1] Plenty of analogies exist for rendering: Howbeit if the Son of man came (ἔλθων expressing condition) would He find faith (or the faith) on the earth?

We see at once that this rendering, instead of leaving Luke xviii. 8 in hopeless contradiction both with its immediate context and with the whole attitude of the age, brings it directly into line with the whole series of passages we have been quoting. The form of the sentence is of course elliptical. We must either take the participle ἔλθων as expressing the condition of the protasis, or else supply it in some such form as: "If there were no delay," or the like. But ellipsis is just what we should expect. It characterises every instance but one out of the ten Potential Optatives in Luke–Acts. These are all the instances known to the New Testament,[2] and in every case save one we have

[1] We may venture to suspect the clause καὶ μακροθυμεῖ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, which concludes ver. 7. Elsewhere the "longsuffering" of God is always adduced as a reason for the delay of the Judgment. Here it is longsuffering *toward the righteous* (ἐπ' αὐτοῖς), May not the translator have confused the pronouns?

[2] See Burton, *ubi supra.*

ellipsis of the protasis. The only Potential Optative of the New Testament where the protasis is expressed is Acts viii. 31: "How should I be able (πῶς γὰρ ἂν δυναίμην) *if no one guides* (ὁδηγήσει) *me*?"

But turn rather for a complete parallel to the passage already cited from Matthew xxvi. 53.[1] There we have not only the Future Indicative used for the Potential in the apodosis, but also ellipsis of the protasis, "if I should beseech Him." And not only so, but in the very next clause we have an even closer parallel: "How then (sc. *if the legions of angels did rescue me*) should the Scriptures be fulfilled?"

By analogy it would seem an admissible paraphrase of Luke xviii. 8 to render:

> I assure you He will avenge them speedily. Howbeit (*if there were no 'forbearance of God'*) the Son of man, when He came, would not find the faith established on the earth; and how could that be?

To justify this paraphrase we may cite Liddell and Scott *s.v.* on the force of ἆρα interrogative, as implying "impatience on the part of the questioner," and Lightfoot's comment on the word in Galatians ii. 17: "ἆρα expresses bewilderment as to a possible conclusion." Here the insupposable conclusion is that the Son of man should come, and find no "people prepared for Him." The reasoner demands to know whether this would not be the case if the importunate had their way. His "impatience" is with those who show their own lack of patience by the murmur: "Where is the promise of His Coming?" The tone of the utterance, consequently, is not "pessimistic," but optimistic; not faithless, but believing. It stands in line with all the other rebukes of impatient importunity by reminding the clamorous of "God's husbandry, God's building."

If it be further objected to our rendering that "the faith" (ἡ πίστις) would hardly be employed at so early

[1] Above, p. 297.

a date as equivalent to "the brotherhood of believers," it should suffice simply to refer to Galatians i. 23.

Benj. W. Bacon.

PHARISEES AND SADDUCEES.

Some fifty years ago the question of the Pharisees and Sadducees was discussed by Geiger and J. Wellhausen. Geiger was first to show that it was not justifiable to characterise the Pharisees and Sadducees as hypocrites and indifferents, as was usually done by Christian scholars, who referred to the New Testament and to Jesus. Geiger defended the theory that the Sadducees were the Jewish aristocracy and the Pharisees the democratic scholars and the lower classes supporting them. The Pharisees were supposed to have desired to educate the people by their religious teaching and the aristocratic Sadducees were said to have objected to this kind of religious emancipation, as they wished to rule on the ancient lines.

Wellhausen held the same view. His study *Pharisäer und Sadducäer*" appeared in 1874. It influenced the opinion of scholars in various countries and his thesis, that the Pharisees were the party of the Scribes and that the priests and the aristocratic circles of Jerusalem were the Sadducees was assumed with the same readiness as his views about the analysis of the Hexateuch. This opinion disagrees with the New Testament.

In the New Testament the Pharisees and Sadducees are called "sects." St. Paul says in Acts xxvi. 5, "After the straitest sect of our religion I lived a Pharisee." It is generally accepted that the term "sect" is not well chosen, as "sect" implies a doctrine, a certain number of members and an organisation. The Pharisees and Sadducees, how-

ever, are supposed to have been parties, holding some general principles, without possessing the character of a sectarian organisation. Professor J. D. Prince has remarked that the rendering in the English Version in Acts xv. 5, xxvi. 5 is unfortunate, as αἵρεσις means here "a party which professes certain philosophical principles."

It is difficult to see how this view can be thought to give a good explanation of Acts xxvi. 5. "To live a Pharisee implies the observance of customs and regulations as were assumed by Pharisees. The observance of such customs and regulations is the character of a sect. We know these customs from the New Testament, the Mishna and Josephus.

It was against the rules of the Pharisees to eat with people not belonging to their sect, they used to wash their hands before eating (Matt. ix. 11 ; xv. 1), they fasted often (Matt. ix. 14), they were strict in keeping the Sabbath (Matt. xii. 2, 10) and observed many regulations as to tithes, oaths, etc. (Matt. xxiii. 5, 16, 23). The Pharisees and Sadducees profess a certain doctrine (Matt. xvi. 12 ; Acts xxiii. 8) and are always ready to defend their theories against each other. They have disciples (Matt. xxii. 16), hold meetings (ibid. v. 34, 41) and possess an organisation and rulers. In Luke xiv. 1 the house of one of the rulers of the Pharisees is mentioned. This seems to leave no doubt about the fact that at least the Pharisees were a "sect" in the proper sense of the word.

Nevertheless this view is generally supposed to be erroneous. Professor Prince says, "It is certainly an error to characterise the Pharisees as a religious sect because that word implies a divergence in creed from other followers of the same cult. This was distinctly not the position of the Pharisees, as they were really from their first development representations of orthodox Judaism, who distinguished themselves from the mass of their co-religionists rather

by the strictness of their observances than by any deviation from accepted doctrine" (*Enc. Bibl.* 4322). Here the customs of the Pharisees are explained as strict orthodoxy. The Sadducees, on the other hand, are supposed to have been not strict (H. Oort in *Theol. T.*, 1914, p. 219). The name Sadducee is said to be misleading as it seems to imply a sect, it really being only possible to become a Sadducee by birth. One was born a Sadducee, Kuenen says (*G. v. Isr.* II. 341); "only those belonging to the descendants of Aaron or to the aristocratic laity could be Sadducees."

The documents of Jewish sectaries, published by Professor Schechter in 1910 induced me to a renewed study of the problem. I found that I had been perfectly wrong in following the common view. The evidence of the New Testament is wholly confirmed by Flavius Josephus and the Mishna. The Pharisees and Sadducees are mentioned as religious sects, with a diverging creed. If we will apply the terms orthodoxy and liberalism, we should describe the Sadducees as the conservative orthodox and the Pharisees as the more liberal-minded people, adapting the old religion to new conditions.

We must refer in the first place to Josephus, *Vita*, i. 2. He is an important witness, as he was a Pharisee himself. Nineteen years of age he became a member of this sect and lived according to their regulations. He joined the Pharisees after having tried the various sects then existing, the Essenes, Sadducees and Pharisees. This first trial was disappointing and he decided to live with a hermit. After a period of three years he joined the Pharisees.

In another place we are told that the members of the sect numbered 6,000 (*Antiq.* xvii. 2, 4). They refused to swear obedience to the Emperor and therefore were fined. The fine was paid by the wife of Pheroras, a brother of Herodes. The whole Jewish people took the oath, but

the sect of the Pharisees did not swear (*οἵδε οἱ ἄνδρες οὐκ ὤμοσαν, ὄντες ὑπὲρ ἑξακισχίλιοι*). The term *οἵδε οἱ ἄνδρες* shows that the whole sect of the Pharisees refused to take the oath. We cannot understand how this place is to be explained by the common theory, that the Pharisees were no religious sect, but were a party formed by the orthodox Scribes and the lower classes. Sometimes the place is translated as referring to some 6,000 who did not swear (6,000 of them), but the term *οἵδε οἱ ἄνδρες* does not admit this translation. The Pharisees here evidently are a separate class of people. They cannot be supposed to be a party, containing the Scribes and the lower classes, for in this case we could not be told that the "whole Jewish people" took the oath except the Pharisees.

Josephus mentions in several places priests who were members of the sect of the Pharisees. *Vita* xxxix. mentions the Pharisaic priest Jozarus. Ibid. xliv. it appears that the high priest Ananus belongs to the sect of the Pharisees. Hölscher has shown in his study on Sadduceeism (*der Sadducäismus*, Leipsic, 1906) that at least seven of the high priests, who functioned since the beginning of the reign of Herodes, were no Sadducees.

This was not only the case in the period of Herodes but also at a much earlier date. In Jos. *Antiq.* xiii. 10, 5 we find that the high priest John Hyrcan was a pupil (*μαθητής*) of the Pharisees. Being insulted by one of the older members of the sect he joined the sect of the Sadducees and withdrew the laws that agreed with the principles of the Pharisees. He even forbade the observance of their regulations.

From another place (*Antiq.* xviii. 1, 4) it is apparent that the Sadducees were by no means the ruling aristocracy, filling all the posts and objecting to the democratic opinions of the Pharisees. There we read that the number of the Sadducees was only small. They belonged to the better

classes but had no influence, for if they happened to serve a post they had to act in agreement to the views of the Pharisees, otherwise they would not have been able to keep up their position (*εἰς ὀλίγους τε ἄνδρας οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἀφίκετο, τοῦς μέντοι πρώτους τοῖς ἀξιώμασι. πράσσεται τε ἀπ' αὐτῶν οὐδεν ὡς εἰπεῖν· ὁπότε γὰρ ἐπ' ἀρχὰς παρέλθοιεν, ἀκουσίως μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀνάγκας, προχωροῦσι δ' οὖν οἷς ὁ Φαρισαῖος λέγει, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἄλλως ἀνεκτοὺς γενέσθαι τοῖς πλήθεσιν*).

Here we see that it was not at all common that the Sadducees held all the posts, and it appears that they had to give up their own views if they became public officers. So this place shows that the common view about a divergence of opinion between the aristocratic high functionaries (the supposed Sadducees) and the democratic Pharisees is highly improbable. We do not see how this divergence could originate if these functionaries were obliged to follow the principles of the Pharisees as soon as they came into offices.

It is also not true that the Sadducees opposed against orthodox opinions of the Scribes and Pharisees, being of a worldly and materialistic character. This accusation is very often lodged against them and is even mentioned in the excellent article on Sadducees by A. E. Cowley in the *Encycl. Biblica*, 4240. The ground for this charge is that they professed the doctrine of the free will and denied the doctrine of fate and predestination (Josephus, *Bell. Jud.* ii. 8–14). This usually is explained as a proof of their worldliness. Hölscher, e.g., reproaches them that they deny every action of God in this world (l.c. p. 7). Cowley refers to "their tendency to keep to the simplest elements of faith, rejecting all admixture of the supernatural." It is certainly true that the Sadducees kept to faith but it is not correct to say that they objected to supernaturalism. They objected, on the contrary, to the

doctrine of fate (εἱμαρμένη), which is on no good terms with supernaturalism as found in the Old Testament. We could rather say that the Pharisees who professed the doctrine of the predestination of all human actions denied the action of God in the world than accuse the Sadducees of religious indifferentism. For the doctrine of fate implies that all things and occurrences exist and happen in consequence of a decree that was taken before the creation of the world or at least long ago. The characteristic feature of this doctrine is the view that these decrees must be executed. No human ruse, no penitence nor even prayer can induce God to alter His decree. The doctrine of the εἱμαρμένη, therefore, is the doctrine of the great mysterious power that is solid as rock and inexorable as a tyrant, that cannot be shaken nor softened, in which is no pity nor mercy, that only knows that everything that was predestined must happen. It is opposite to the doctrine of providence, but it is very often confused with it. Providence means that God provides. He rules the world as a God of righteousness but also as a God of mercy. He hears the prayers of mankind and decides what is going to happen according to His own free will. The God of providence is not bound by a decree that cannot be altered. He is the living God of the Old Testament, the God of love and mercy. The Sadducees held with the supernaturalism of the Old Testament and refused to accept any doctrines that were inconsistent with the holy tradition. The Pharisees thought it justified to deduce from the Old Testament doctrines of foreign origin to suit the requirements of the time, as the doctrine of a future life and the doctrine of fate. We cannot blame the Sadducees for objecting against this. Even their respect for the sacred Books of the Old Testament prevented them from professing this doctrine. They would not have been blamed by modern scholars, as

people of materialistic character, if the common error of confusing the doctrine of providence with the doctrine of fate had not given cause to regard the Sadducees as non-believers in the government of God.

On the same ground as the doctrine of fate was the doctrine of future life rejected by the Sadducees. They kept to the Old Testament view of the Sheol, and opposed against modern innovations of this doctrine, however common the new theories might be in their times. The doctrine of a future life with rewards and punishments is introduced into Jewish theology by the influence of the Persian religion. In the same way the Jewish theological system was enriched by numerous names of angels, spirits and demons. The Sadducees rejected all these things as they were inconsistent with their belief in the authority of the Thora and the Prophets. In doing so they are on the side of orthodoxy and not of liberalism.

If we accept the theory of Wellhausen we are unable to understand the various texts of the Mishna dealing with the controversies between the Pharisees and the Sadducees. In the Mishna the Sadducees are described as people who are in some cases stricter than the Pharisees. This does not agree with the view that they had a tendency to materialism and worldliness. Consequently Schürer persuades us not to believe the Mishna and to accept his theory that the communications of the Mishna are ironic. But if we read the various places, it is not easy to agree with this assertion of Schürer (*G.J.V.* II. 413).

In the treatise Jadajim we find the following points discussed (*Jud.* iv. 7). The Sadducees said : We disapprove of you Pharisees for holding that water poured out into a basin is clean. The Pharisees answered : We disapprove of you Sadducees for holding that a canal that passes through a cemetery is clean.

The Fragments published by Schechter are helpful for the understanding of this controversy. The Jewish sect in Damascus, that is described in this manuscript, taught that it was not allowed to wash oneself in a quantity of water that was insufficient to cover the whole body, that water poured out into a basin was unclean, that water springing from a rock was unclean if its quantity was insufficient to cover the whole body (MS. A, x. 10–13, cf. *Theol. Tijdschr.* 1912, 12).

Evidently the Sadducees of Jadajim hold the same view as the Zadokites of Damascus. Water poured out into a basin is unclean, but the water of a canal is clean as its quantity always is sufficient to cover the whole body. The Sadducees are here by no means less strict than the Pharisees, their opinion about clean and unclean is more rigorous than the theory of the Pharisees. It is not easy to see where the irony would come in here.

The text continues. The Sadducees said: We disapprove of you Pharisees for holding that you are liable to pay damages if your ox or your ass has caused harm, but that you are not liable if your slave or female slave has done harm. If I am liable in the case of an ox or an ass, towards which I am under no obligation, how should I not be liable in the case of harm done by a slave, towards whom I have obligations prescribed to me by the Thora? They answered: An ox and an ass have no intelligence; you cannot compare them to a slave, who has intelligence. If I offended them they could set fire to another man's corn and I would be obliged to pay the damages.

Here again the Sadducees are on the more rigorous side. According to Josephus the Sadducees generally belonged to the better classes. The poor have no slaves, but the Sadducees doubtless had. Nevertheless they put themselves under obligations, which they should have avoided

if their opinions were so worldly and materialistic as is usually assumed. They hardly can have done so ironically.

The next paragraph of Jadajim continues: A Sadducee from Galilee once said: I disapprove of you Pharisees in writing the name of the king and of Moses in the same bill of divorce. The Pharisees said: And we disapprove of you Sadducees from Galilee that you write the name of the king and the name of God in the same column and that you put the name of the King first and the Name of God afterwards. The respect for the name of Moses prevented the Sadducees in Galilee from mentioning his name with the name of a foreign king. This certainly is not consistent with the character of the Sadducees as seen by Wellhausen.

A very remarkable text is Jadajim iv. 6. It shows that one of the most famous Scribes, Johanan ben Zakkai, the founder of the rabbinic school of Yabne, was on the side of the Sadducees, and teaches us at the same time that the Sadducees had a larger collection of sacred books than the Pharisees. The Hebrew term for "canonic" is "making the hands unclean," the sacred books being supposed to communicate a certain unseen fluid to the hands that held the book. The text runs thus: The Sadducees said: We disapprove of you Pharisees for saying that the sacred books make the hands unclean but that the books hammeram do not. Rabban Johanan ben Zakkai said: Is this the only objection we have against the Pharisees? They assume that the bones of an ass are clean but that the bones of the high priest Johanan are unclean. They (the Pharisees) said unto him: Uncleanness is judged by the rate of affection, otherwise one could make spoons out of the bones of his father or mother. He answered them: the sacred character of the books is also judged by the rate of affection. The books hammeram, that are not

beloved, are not supposed to make the hands unclean.

It is uncertain what is meant by the term "books hammeram." Since Geiger the strange emendation "books of Homerus" was accepted by many scholars. I suppose that it is very improbable that the Pharisees and Sadducees have quarrelled about the books of Homerus, as every proof of their interest in and their knowledge of these books is missing. I suggest that we must read "hamminim" (the sectarians) instead of hammeram; Hebrew נ may have easily been corrupted into ר. But this is to remain uncertain. What is not uncertain is that Johanan ben Zakkai argues on the side of the Sadducees and gives a plea for a greater number of sacred books than is assumed by the Pharisees. As a matter of fact we now know by Schechter's publication that the Zadokite sect of Damascus had a sacred book besides the Old Testament, called "the book of recitation."

The text of Jadajim iv. 6 is perfectly clear and simple. It did not suit the common theory, and so translators very often made some small emendations. Schürer translates the words "is this the only objection we have against the Pharisees," thus: "is this the only thing one can object to?" and suppresses the "we" without even warning the reader in a note (*G.J.V.*³ II. 384). The words "the books hammeram that are not beloved" imply that there are books hammeram that are disliked, but the context demands at the same time that it is admitted that there are also books hammeram that are beloved. The argument of Johanan ben Zakkai is that the Pharisees are wrong in accepting that only the sacred books are canonic. Schürer leaves us perfectly in the dark in translating "as the books hammeram are not beloved, they do not make the hands unclean," again translating what is not in the Hebrew text.

In another place we find the views of the Sadducees mentioned as important for the sacred rites at the preparation of sacred water, the water of separation (Num. xix.). According to Para iii. 7 the Sadducees insisted on having the red cow burned by a priest who had been unclean, but who had taken his bath and had to wait until the evening for being clean again. Here again the text was often misinterpreted. But the facts are perfectly clear. The cow is burned by a priest who has taken his bath in the presence of the elders and who proceeds to this business immediately after his bath, and this is done in view of the Sadducees. In some manuscripts this respect for the Sadducees has led to alteration of the text. The words "this is done with regard to the Sadducees, who say that the cow must be burned by a priest, etc.," were altered into "with regard to the Sadducees, that they may not say that the cow must be burned by a priest, etc." The cow actually was burned by a priest, who had taken his bath. The context shows that the alteration corrupts the text. We shall have to admit that in Para iii. 7 the Sadducees have their own views as to the preparation of the sacred water and that the views once were supposed to be so important that the custom introduced by them remained in existence.

Hölscher has misunderstood this text, and therefore we look in vain in his study on "Sadducäismus" for an acknowledgement of the sectarian character of the Sadducees. He explains the text as a demonstration against the Sadducees, to whom he ascribes the opinion that the cow should be burned by a priest, who became clean by waiting until the evening. Here he follows a wrong interpretation of Levy, *Neuhebr. Wörterb.*, s.v. מערב. He assumes that the Pharisees held the view that the priest must have taken his bath, and supposes that such a man was called a טבול יום (who has taken a bath on the day) and that

the Sadducees said that the priest should be מערב שמש. He supposes that this term means a man who became clean by waiting until the evening. But he forgets that no man could become clean simply by waiting until the evening. He refers to Leviticus xxii. 7, but in this place a bath is demanded. מערב שמש means a man who has taken his bath and has to wait until the evening for being clean. The term is fully synonymous with טבול יום, as one may see if one takes the trouble of looking up the places of reference in Levy's *Neuhebr. Wb.* Levy gives the right explanation *sub voce* מערב, but in translating in that same article Para iii. 7 he meddles with the proper meaning, as the common translation would not suit the theory about the character of the Sadducees. We find here a remarkable proof of the influence of common theories even on scholars who are fully equipped to manage things in an independent way.

The Sadducees held other opinions than the Pharisees, but we cannot say that the customs of the Sadducees were less strict or on the worldly side. Josephus tells us that they were more severe when punishment was concerned (*Antiq.* xiii. 10, 6), and we have seen that their doctrine about clean and unclean, the liability of the master and the position of Moses, was by no means compromising with "the world."

Cowley seems inclined to find a means of reconciliation between the theory of Wellhausen and the data of the Mishna and Talmud. He warns us not to identify Sadducees and priests. "Whilst it appears to have been generally the case that Sadducæan views were held by the aristocratic (i.e., primarily, the priestly) party, we must beware of regarding aristocrat, priest, and Sadducee as convertible terms. Many of the priests were Pharisees, as we see, e.g., from the names of doctors quoted in the Mishna with the title priest," but assures us at the same time that "the

separation between the higher and the lower classes of priests are as great as between the aristocratic party and the common people." But this statement does not fully explain the fact that several of the high priests belonged to the Pharisees, as Hölscher has shown, and that they had to yield to the principles of the Pharisees as Josephus tells us.

The theory of the aristocratic and priestly character of the Sadducees was strongly supported by the false identification of the family of Boëthus with the Sadducees. Herodes I. appointed as high priests in Jerusalem a member of a Jewish family from Alexandria, called the family of Boëthus. Their customs and explanations of the Thora were sometimes different from the prevailing Pharisaic views. In the Talmud the tradition of these Boëthusians very often is discussed and disapproved of. But this is no sufficient ground for an identification of this Alexandrian family with the members of the sect of the Sadducees. In a single instance the customs of this family may have agreed with Sadducæan opinions (as seems to have been the case with the explanation of the difficult Sabbath in Leviticus xxiii. 11 as a real Sabbath-day), but the communications of Josephus and the discussions of divergent opinions in the Mishna show that the difference between Sadducees and Pharisees existed long before the time of Herodes.

The Sadducees and Pharisees are first mentioned in the reign of Jonathan (161–143 B.C.). It seems that the sects had originated not long before that period.

The name Sadducees is generally derived from the name Zadok, the priest of King David. Cowley calls the combination of Sadducees with the Bene Sadoq the least unlikely explanation of the name, and I think he is perfectly right. It seems not worth while to discuss other explanations of

no intrinsic value (as the combination with the Persian word *Zindik* (worshipper of Ahuro Mazda), as the Schechter-papyri have shown that the name of Zadok really was used by sects of this period. Not, however, as a name for a number of priests of Zadokitic origin, but as name for people living according to the commandments of Zadok.

We are told that 410 years after the destruction of Jerusalem by Nebuchadressar a teacher of righteousness rose among Israel. Afterwards the descendants of the people, listening to his teaching, turned to Damascus and formed there a sect governed by overseers and observing the book of the law of Sadoq as explained by a " star." They oppose against another sect called " the builders of the wall " and in some instances the controversies between them appear to be parallel to the divergences between the Sadducees and Pharisees. The term builders of the wall reminds us of the Soferim. The Soferim are said to have built a wall round the Law (Pirke Aboth i. 1) and many of the Soferim belonged to the sect of the Pharisees. We have already seen from Josephus that the influence of the Pharisees among the Soferim was very strong, and find the Sadducees discussing with the Pharisees about the cleanness of water exactly in the same way as the sect of Damascus would have argued.

We find the sect of Damascus to possess a sacred book of recitation (Schechter, p. xlvii. (p. xi. 6)) and see that the Sadducees defend a theory for assuming books besides the Old Testament as sacred books.

The sect of Damascus derives its customs from Moses and Sadoq, the name Sadducees probably refers to the same Zadok and observes the commandments of Moses to the letter (cf. Makkoth i. 6).

The sect of Damascus was very severe in keeping the Sabbath. No man was allowed to carry anything from

the house to the outside or from the outside into the house (l.c., p. xi. 7). In Erubin vi. 2 we are told that the Sadducees also used to bring several things from their house into the yard before the beginning of the Sabbath in order to be able to use them on Sabbath.

The fragments of the so-called Zadokite work do not mention the future life nor the names of angels or demons. So there is sufficient ground for the theory that the community of Damascus may be supposed to be a shoot of the old sect of the Sadducees. This does not mean that the sect of the Sadducees, mentioned in the New Testament, must have been organised exactly on the same lines as the sect of Damascus, but opens the probability of connexion between the later sect and the views and principles of the Sadducees. As long as we are misled by the Wellhausen theory the origin of the sect of Damascus remains wholly in the dark; but if we read the texts of the Mishna just as they are, we understand that the New Testament and Josephus were perfectly right in calling the Sadducees a sect.

After all we have said about the Sadducees it is hardly necessary to show that the Pharisees, too, were a sect in the proper sense of the word. Referred already to their organisation under "rulers" (Luke xiv. 1) and to the number of 6,000. It remains to notice that they called themselves "friends" (haberim). The haberim are distinguished from the "people of the country" (am-haares), i.e., those who do not live according to the regulations of the "friends." In Demai vi. 9 we see that the "friends" are a sect, for there the case is discussed that one of the two sons of an "am-haares" is a "friend" and the other not. It is not sufficient for being a "friend" to give tithes, they must be given exactly in the way that is prescribed by them (Demai vi. 6). A "friend" does not sell fruit to an am-

haares, nor does he buy it from him; he does not stay as a guest with him and does not receive him as a guest, when he wears his common garment (Demai ii. 3). The name of the sect supports the sectarian character. Perushim of Parishim is derived from parash, to separate, and means probably the "separated." The sect of the Babylonian Mandaics uses the word Pharishaia also, apparently in the sense of "learned." The verb parash had also the meaning "to teach" (viz., the sacred doctrine). Pharisee, therefore, might mean "the initiated." It is not possible to decide which of both meanings should be chosen. But in any case the name shows that the Pharisees were not only orthodox Jews, as Wellhausen, Schürer and many others suppose. They must have been a sect that was organised as a sect. If interpreters of the New Testament have difficulty in explaining Luke xiv. 1, this is not for Luke xiv. 1 but for the Wellhausen theory about the Pharisees, that does not agree with the texts.

It remains to say a few words about the probable origin of the sects. They are first mentioned in the beginning of the Maccabean period. The persecution of Antiochus Epiphanes and the struggle of the Maccabees gave rise to new hope. The book of Daniel shows that many Jews believed that the new kingdom of God was to come (Dan. vii. 18–27). This belief in a coming world (olam habba) we find repeatedly alluded to in the apocryphal and pseudepigraphic literature of this period. Of course the question rose as to what was to be done to become a member of the new kingdom that was promised by the leaders, but that did not come as soon as was expected. That Pharisees and Sadducees were looking forward to a Messianic age we see from Matthew iii. 7 (many of the Pharisees and of the Sadducees came to the baptism of John). The Sadducees expected a Messianic Kingdom as prophesied by the Old Testament "prophets."

Only those who lived in the time of the Messiah would see the glory of it. The Pharisees assumed that this new kingdom was in heaven, and that the righteous ones, who had died before it came, would be resurrected. This doctrine of future life was rejected by the Sadducees, and the Pharisees therefore held that no Sadducee would come into the olam habba, as he did not admit that resurrection could be proved from the Thora (Sanhedrin x. 1). The important question of the proper way of life in these last days of the present world was answered in various ways. The answer of the Sadducees was the most conservative one. They refused to yield to Hellenistic and Persian influences and were decided to remain "the old people" governed by the laws of Moses, as explained by their teachers, and believing in the prophetic books of the Old Testament. The Pharisees, on the contrary, were open to new theories. The book of Daniel was in their line, they accepted the doctrine of hell and of the resurrection of the body, believed in the existence of thousands of angels and spirits and are less separated from the popular belief of the time than their name seems to suggest. The origin of both sects is of eschatologic character. The Sadducees solved the problem on orthodox lines, the Pharisees had more liberal tendencies and tried to combine the religious belief of their ancestors with new opinions. But both of them failed in finding the way of life, as the New Testament clearly shows.

B. D. Eerdmans.

STUDIES IN CHRISTIAN ESCHATOLOGY.

IX. The Life Everlasting.

We have seen that with regard to those who die in hostility to God a nearly complete agnosticism is imposed upon us by the nature of Christian faith. It does not at all follow,

however, that we are condemned to a like nescience about the experience, after death, of the redeemed. Indeed, the circumstance that the believer is sure of the *fact* of a blessed immortality is plainly against total nescience, since, as in the case of the Theistic problem, reality and content are only partially capable of abstraction from each other; we cannot know *that* a thing is without in some sense knowing *what* it is. We are led to ask, therefore, how far it is possible to say what "heaven" will be like, at least in faint outline. Can we fix the main characteristics of that life beyond the grave?

To raise this question is in no sense an attempt to break down the reserve of Scripture. It is assumed that we know only in part, and see darkly as in a glass. A mediæval legend tells of two monks who had debated much regarding the nature of the heavenly life, one contending that it must be *taliter*, or similar to earth, the other conceiving it as *aliter*, otherwise than here below. They agreed finally that whichever died first should with God's permission appear to the other, announcing which of the two was right. After death, therefore, one of them visited the survivor in a dream, bringing the message: *Nec taliter, nec aliter, sed totaliter aliter.* "Not as thou didst think, nor yet as I, but different utterly." The world to come will be a world full of surprises. But this inevitable ignorance of form or detail leaves the question on our hands whether or no certain determinate beliefs about heaven may not as such be implicit in faith, and be instinctively recognised in that character when they are pointed out, say, by the preacher.

I mean, of course, the genuine utterances of the believing consciousness, not random suggestions of fancy, such as occur in bad eschatological hymns. The region is one where we speak not in science but in faith. On the other hand, just because faith is opposed to sight and yet includes

knowledge, there is something real and true to be said respecting the life beyond. Gazing forward, we see more than a field of shapeless mist.

The unlikeness of heaven to earth has been insisted on so emphatically, in restraint of imagination, that it is worth while to note how religion at its deepest rather assumes a fundamental *likeness*. The preacher who speaks of the next life must speak of it in terms of its affinities in the present. He must prolong our holiest experience beyond the grave, and draw down the heavenly into the days and years we are living now. This the Fourth Gospel does habitually; it refuses to acknowledge any distinction of then and now within the one experience of "eternal life." "Life," man's highest good and God's chief boon, is no earth-born thing in the sense that we can produce or earn it; but we still may have it on earth as a firstfruits, an instalment of the richer possession kept in store. If it is true that "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him," yet to this the apostle adds: "But God hath revealed them unto us by His Spirit" (1 Cor. ii. 9, 10). To the believer in Christ, the quality of the coming life is not alien or remote; he looks on to the fuller bestowment of an experience which already has attested its own content and sufficiency. Now it is from the vantage-ground of this actual experience that we ask how far that glorified form of life, called heaven, can be known. Obviously, to vindicate its likeness to spiritual life here and now is by no means to cast doubt on the truth of its unlikeness, or to miss the fact that present experience, at its loftiest, points forward to a transcendent completion. We gradually become conscious of two contrasts, the perfect solution of which lies in the future: first, that between the inner riches of faith and their defective

outward expression. Existence as we know it is a vehicle so unequal to the life of God as to impede its full manifestation. "It doth not yet appear what we shall be." Next is the distance or tension between seed and fruit, between the creative Divine origination of new life in the soul and its promised consummation. "Not as though I had already attained, either were already perfect." So that to the believer his experience must appear very much a living contradiction. He longs to be perfectly that which he is, to enjoy what in principle is already all his own.

Taking "heaven" as a short name for that perfect future experience of which we now have an earnest, we begin with the position that heaven consists in the unhindered possession of God. No other starting-point is admissible; our hope is specifically religious only as it rests on Him. I am not now speaking of motive but of content, and in the content of Christian hope God is first and last. It is the lesson of all mysticism that He is precious for His own sake, that gifts are nothing save as they are enjoyed in Him. He is Himself salvation, His loving power the fount and guarantee of all blessings.

For spiritual natures, to possess God means to have fellowship with Him, and fellowship as we must think of it includes knowledge, enjoyment and assimilation. Each of these has the promise of completion. Not that we do not know God here; the substance of faith is that in Jesus we apprehend His very mind and heart. Nevertheless it is a limited apprehension; ever and again we are led to confess that He dwells in light inaccessible, that His judgments are unsearchable and His ways past finding out. Hence the prospect of knowing Him face to face even as we are known is something new and very great, the importance of which comes out with a sudden clearness if we

try the experiment of thinking it away. "Whom having not seen ye love" is one thing; "We shall see Him as He is" is another thing, and the difference of the two is the measure of what a Christian means by heaven. The body and the world are great facts that come under the will of God and are to be received with thanksgiving, but they are far from being entirely transparent media for our relation to Him; there is an opaqueness removable only by death. Obstacles will then disappear once and for all. We shall actually see God, and seeing Him will be our life.

In this great hope, the Christian mind is aware of no distinction, as regards the object of future communion, between God and Christ. That distinction is felt to be irrelevant at this point and in this context. It is not that Christ is thought of as vanishing impersonally in the depths of Godhead. No future would have any glow which did not offer a closer intimacy with Him. We are not now so near to Him as we long to be. Every conception we form of Him, on the basis of redemption as an experience, makes way with lengthening life for a conception higher and yet higher, till the conviction is forced upon us that an amazing revelation of His glory is still to come of which all we have hitherto learned exhibits only a faint trace. The future would grow dark if we became persuaded that our communion with Christ was never to outgo the limits of the present, never to be more continuous, more profound, more enthralling. But a faith like St. Paul's pierces the clouds of time and anticipates a fellowship with Christ that is not merely as good as the present, but "very far better." Christ has that to give men, through immediate communion with Himself, which it is impossible even to describe in any language we can use, but which is the necessary crown of His redeeming work. No one need suppose that ideas of this sort are only a pietistic luxury. On the contrary,

we cannot dispense with them if we are to live worthily as His disciples. To remove the hope of seeing Christ beyond the grave, in an unclouded fellowship, is to cut the root of Christian life and power. We cannot imagine a point at which our sense of indebtedness to Him will terminate, or our desire to serve in payment of the obligation. Many things we shall outgrow and leave behind, but not the consciousness of owing everything to God's love in Jesus, the historic Mediator. "Sight" in heaven, as contrasted with "faith" on earth, does not mean that no further need will exist for the attitude of trustful dependence; rather the love of God will for ever reach us through the Son, in Whom Divine mercy and human faith are both perfect.

Still, it must be that one day all baffling difference between Christ and the God He mediates to us will pass away. That difference is felt too often now. "Even in Christ, Who is God manifest in the flesh," it has been said, "we often see the flesh and not God."[1] It is one of our chief troubles that the Father and the Son seem at times to be unlike, and a distracted faith projects behind the Saviour a mysterious and inscrutable realm of Divine life of which Jesus is no index, and from which terrible unknown forces may break out. This fear lest God in part should not resemble Christ, lest He should at times be indifferent or hostile, is the form of unbelief that most easily besets the religious mind. And part of faith's implicit promise is that we shall yet see God and Christ as wholly one. The life and activity of Christ will be known as conveying to us all the love and truth and power of the Godhead. Communion with the Father and with the Son are two aspects of one fact—we *believe* that now, and only sin can cloud our belief in it, but we shall *see* it hereafter as we do not see it now.

[1] Dale, *Christ and the Future Life*, 23.

The knowledge of God in which such fellowship consists is also a personal enjoyment of Him. Love to God, in men made perfect, has no more to struggle with its opposite, and the heart at leisure from sin and selfishness must draw an unmingled gladness from that supreme communion. Not only so; but the knowledge and enjoyment of God, in a world where everything reveals Him, will refine and mould the soul in His very image. As in this life, we shall be changed by beholding; and if the receptivity of the beholders is become quite mature, alike in capacity and will, then at last the glory of the Divine nature will be mirrored truly in the children of the Father. To gaze on God will be assimilation. It is not a mere passive consciousness of God's presence but an active sharing in His mind and will.

One great principle has now emerged clearly. The life everlasting is a life constituted by moral selfhood in which personality lasts on and assumes its perfected form. This, as is well known, has been denied by varied forms of æsthetic mysticism. In recent years Troeltsch has resuscitated an Oriental or Neo-platonic form of theory, according to which human individuality is consummated by absorption; the soul is lost in God, a provisional and temporary fellowship of love on the other side of death being finally replaced by the dissolution of personal life, as finite spirits return to and are submerged in the infinite life of Deity. Union of wills is a mere transition point, and though it may persist for a season even beyond the grave, the last scene in the drama is the confluence of the minor human tributary with the boundless ocean. The only thing to be said of this is that it directly falsifies the Christian thought of God. His is a holy Love, and in virtue of holiness it keeps the limits of moral being and will invade no man's personality, whether in this world or the next. A life which cannot

diffuse its utmost riches within the forms of personal communion, and to which the vital impulses of self-maintenance and self-impartation are only impediments to be swept away, is emphatically not the life of Him whom Jesus loved and trusted. To represent a moral order in which personal love for persons is the supreme unifying principle as being finally supplanted by an ethically disparate order where no place remained for a plurality of finite conscious centres, and still more perhaps to picture this closing dispensation of impersonality as following upon an indefinitely long period after death in which personality still prevails, is to confess the despair of thought. Anti-personal mysticism, so far from clarifying our ideas of the future life, renders clear thinking an impossibility. No doubt a certain sort of mind welcomes the prospect of dissolution as opening a door of escape from eternal *ennui*, but to most the result will seem a moral horror. The truth is, an experience not in any way attached to a self-conscious mind is a *non-ens*. Similarly, the prospect of an ultimate nirvana in which Christ and believers equally should be drowned in unconsciousness must repel both reason and faith. The whole construction is one proof more that no one can override moral realities with impunity, and that only a short step leads from the alleged superhuman to what is really subhuman and sub-ethical. Doubtless all these quasi-Buddhistic arguments might have force if there had been no such person as Jesus. In reality they count for nothing, because in Him we have known the love of God as a love that seeks not the final abrogation of personality but its preservation and enrichment.

Heaven, then, means that the spiritual communion with God in which His children here find blessedness will be prolonged in a new and perfect way. This relation to God is the decisive fact. Yet although the first and deepest fact,

it is not the whole fact on which the believing mind lays hold. We cannot think of God in abstraction from the Kingdom of which He is Head, or conceive the Father apart from His children. Here is the point at which mysticism gives no satisfaction. It has always drawn a picture of the single finite consciousness in solitary communion with God. There is an excellent saying of Dr. Bigg to the effect that the formula of Stoicism was "My soul and God," whereas the Christian formula is "My soul, my brother's soul, and God." The New Testament makes no provision for unattached Christians, never indeed seems to contemplate their existence, its interest being wholly given to a society animated by a Spirit uniting all the members into one body; and in like manner its conception of the immortal future, always, is that of a Kingdom or community in which soul is one with soul in the overshadowing love of God. Love of God is there the controlling force; but to this, as we know even here, love of man is no hindrance, for God's own love, as it has been put, is felt as an enveloping pervasive atmosphere, from which individual loves draw meaning and power. Nearness to God is the bond of finite hearts. It does not contract my interests to be close to Him; rather I am the more capable of intensified and unselfish care for my neighbour as He unites me to Himself. Hence the believing thought of death and all that follows it will include the anticipation of a common life such that, just because each individual is now in unimaginably close communion with God, minds can enter more deeply and truly into each other than present experience admits of, or any experience possible in a finite system in which spiritual intercourse depends on the imperfect medium of words or acts. Here, our faculty of sympathetic consciousness is straitly limited, and what we may call the machinery of love's expression fails, often, in our sorest troubles; part of

heaven's promise is the abolition, for good and all, of these defects and obstacles to mutual care.

In the light of these considerations I cannot but feel that the question "Shall we know each other after death?" has frequently been canvassed with a timorous caution very seriously at variance with Jesus' great thought of God. We may indeed reject that thought; but once we have accepted it as our own, no real doubt as to the coming reunion with beloved dead friends is in keeping with the Christian gospel. Where doubt persists, it is almost certainly owing to the well-nigh incurable individualism that afflicts modern religion. Of this the Bible has no trace. Part of Israel's mission was to rise beyond the self-centredness of Greek ideas of immortality and to unveil the Divine purpose to establish a Kingdom or communal life of the blessed, in which the individual attains the goal only through the whole of which he is a member. Similarly in the New Testament, what is held forth is the prospect of a Divine society, begun on earth, and made perfect hereafter, a society composed of all saintly souls, each ministering to all the love and gifts of God. None can be blessed in isolation. Reunion with lost friends, accordingly, is not a sentimental detail in pictures traced by fancy; it is part of the hope guaranteed in Jesus. If we know the God present in Jesus, we know too, as it has been put, that "He has no private blessings for me apart from the rest of the family."[1] In the unseen world, as here, each new gift unites us not only to the Father, but to all the brothers of His household.

One reason why the fact of reunion has seemed doubtful, is that reunion itself has often been conceived under too gross and earthly forms. "When they rise from the dead they neither marry nor are given in marriage"—this word of Jesus is one we still have need to ponder; and there

[1] Forbes Robinson, *Letters*, 153.

will always be those probably who easily forget that family or social bonds are only emblems of higher unions yet to come. Assuming this, however, it is self-evident to the Christian that Divine love cannot have purposed the ultimate suppression or extinction of that love of man to man which is the noblest outgrowth and fruit of history. If love be the flower of personal life, we can trust the Father to make it more deep and true, and to provide such new modes of being as shall serve to manifest it more transparently. Here, the worst and the best in us often lie hid ; there, the veil will be taken off, and what the unwearied grace of God has made of us will come out into the light, and find entrance into hearts we love. Not only so, but there seems no reason why we may not believe that the more perfect and spiritual aspects of earthly affection should not keep in the future life that personal fragrance they have gathered in the passing years. Permanence, we may rest assured, will be given to whatever is in harmony with the Spirit of Jesus.

It is uplifting to dwell with imaginative reverence upon the new richness of fellowship that is in store for all who are one in God. We may be vividly conscious of kinship with all who love Christ, yet feel ourselves separated from many of them by our fault or theirs ; or it may be that we realise impatiently how narrow are the confines of human love, and how inexorable the laws of space and time forbidding us to win the close intimacy of the good and wise. It is much to know that these limits and infirmities will disappear. Only, if we are to come to the multitude which no man can number, the spirits of just men made perfect, and to find delight in all souls united in fellowship with God, these minds of ours must undergo some unimaginable change. They must somehow be dilated to the measure of a universal love. A recent writer asks : " What if the bliss of heaven means an extension of consciousness in the case

of individual spirits analogous to the omnipresence of Jesus ? " [1]

But in the field of moral life all real communion passes into service. Love to the Father proves its truth by love to His children, and love is only content when it has given as well as received. All sensuous thoughts of future bliss die in this atmosphere. Heaven has no significance for moral beings if the noblest and most unselfish earthly toil has nothing in the world to come that perpetuates its worth and its creative revelation of personality. God will have servants in His heavenly kingdom who are not lost in Him, but saved for life and action. To venture a description of our future work would of course be foolish, and in any case our terms are discredited by their sense-origin. All we know is that the experience within which service is done will be one enriched by the great harvests of history, and in which our task will be a perfect occasion for our powers.

Does not this mean that when men have dreamed of ideal societies and Utopias, in which full and rich life should be mediated by relationships of unclouded trust and unselfish ministry, their dreams were better than they knew ? Those visions of a golden age cannot, it is true, be fulfilled on earth in the completeness of their idea, but they bear witness to an unconquerable hope. They have inspired noble hearts, in face of pessimistic counter-arguments, even if in many instances the motives to which they made appeal have been more social than religious. The Gospel comes to satisfy these longings, on their deepest side. It promises fulfilment of them all in the eternal Kingdom of God, the faultless society of righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost. The schisms and divided aims of earth will be transcended not by the extinction of individual desire, but by the union of all to God, in Whom life and love are one.

[1] E. Bevan, in the *Constructive Quarterly* for Dec. 1913, p. 803.

In His omnipotence we confide to create the outward conditions essential to a perfect and unending fellowship.

The blessedness of such a common life, of which God is centre, has always been pictured by Christian faith as implying the absence of pain. Characteristic words of the Bible point to the cessation of all suffering in the future Kingdom, and they sound a note which the devout heart takes up and prolongs. "The Lord God will wipe away tears from off all faces"; "There shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain: for the former things are passed away" (Isa. xxv. 8; Rev. xxi. 4). True, it would be prudential rather than Christian to make happiness the corner-stone of the future hope, for the anticipation of a Good Time Coming may be, and, in abstraction from God, is, only a piece of sentimentalism which in itself has no religious quality whatever. The gifts of God are ours only as He is Himself our portion. None the less it is a false and unreal spirituality, alien both to Bible religion and to experience, which should predicate *blessedness* of a life wherein pain, sickness, war or crime may still have place. We speak in the sense of Jesus when we represent the eternal Kingdom as the end of all tragedy and privation. His miracles, set by Him in the forefront of His mission, were the morning beams of the better day, the beginnings of God's new world, in which the purest and deepest yearnings of the soul should be answered, and all that pains or oppresses put away for ever. Their design was to relieve hardship and restore the joy of life in God. They gave promise that

> There will at last appear
> The world, the order, which God meant should be.

The Father, according to Jesus, is not holy love merely; He is infinite power as well; and His purpose is to bring in a lasting dispensation where a new humanity will find an

environment without flaw or stain. Certainly much may be said in favour of the belief that as long as sin persists on earth even the blessed in heaven participate in Christ's sympathetic union with His struggling people, and that while "Zion, in her agony, with Babylon must cope," they too taste the spiritual pain entailed by such communion. Certainly we cannot think it otherwise, or ask for a calm not given to Christ Himself; for the servant is not above his Lord. But two things must be borne well in mind. First, if the element of pain, sacrificial and redeeming, touches even the life of God, Who is over all blessed for ever, yet it is as somehow subordinate, merged in a deeper joy. We too have felt how it is gladness to suffer for one we love. There is a profounder life to which in certain conditions even pain can minister, although pain is itself evil. And secondly, sin will have an end; therefore also pain, even of this intercessory and sympathetic kind, will quite cease and pass away. The final consummation of all things must be such as to satisfy even the righteous love of God.

But the absence of hostile conditions is, for spirits made one with God, the equivalent of unending progress. Too often the life of heaven has been figured as a scene of rest so changeless as to be indistinguishable from stagnation; and against this a natural protest is now made not purely in the name of modern ideals of activity, but in behalf of ideas fundamental to Bible religion. Whatever be the inscrutable enigmas of eternity and time, it must still be held that finite personal life is wholly unintelligible apart from change, and for lives inspired by God change is growth. All that is said in the New Testament, for example, as to future reward seems to point in the direction of a state not merely admitting of progress, but requiring it. So far as we can gather, Jesus gave promise of rewards differing in the case of different individuals: thus He spoke of places

in the Kingdom near to Himself which shall be given to those for whom they are prepared (Mark x. 40 ff.). St. Paul, too, declares plainly that each shall receive his own reward according to his own labour (1 Cor. iii. 8).

Hence it may help to lessen the unreality of thought on the subject of heaven, if we cease to figure that higher life as oppressed, so to say, by an unvarying monotony of attainment. The thought of Jesus, that place in His Kingdom is fixed by receptivity for the Divine life attained on earth, may well dissipate that error, suggesting as it does that men will there have before them most varied tasks of acquisition. The sinlessness of all is in no way incompatible with this, for it is only our incurably negative ideal of goodness that leads us to conceive sinlessness as identical with perfection. In any case, we may well believe that for the sinless there will still be "new lessons to be learned, new battles to be fought, new experiences to be gained, new services to be rendered." [1] In a word, it will be a life of change, of progress, of movement. The continuity of this life with the next would be severed at a stroke if the fluid and dynamic conditions of earthly moral experience were on a sudden to be replaced by static and unchanging modes. So, if heaven be a moral life, the gifts of God will still be made our own by decision and appropriation. The goal we can conceive only as a fully known Divine sonship, unimpeded by any least incapacity to receive or to enjoy. Life will move within the fact of perfect love answering to, and subsisting on, the blessed love of God; and in an experience so qualified, effort is one with eternal satisfaction.

In conclusion, it may not be unnecessary to repeat that the Christian Hope is part of the living substance of faith itself. True, eschatological ideas have often been put

[1] Adams Brown, *The Christian Hope*, 173.

forward which have nothing Christian about them, and whose origin is rather to be sought in the influence of the higher paganism. When, however, such things have been cleared away, when we have made up our minds what the Christian Hope is, what it does and does not contain, let us not fail to recollect that it is equally certain with all other realities certified by the fact of Christ. He who looks with faith to Jesus is as sure of the life everlasting as of the forgiveness of sins.

H. R. Mackintosh.

THE SENSE OF SIN IN GREAT LITERATURE.

IV.

The Redemption of our Solitude

(Dostoievsky, Tolstoy, Bernard Shaw.)

I think we have now abandoned for ever that way of dealing with august and accepted facts of human nature, or of society, which was the firstfruits of the scientific spirit, and remained in vogue until a saner and severer scientific method found it wanting.

The formula was, to trace some highly developed state of mind or social institution to its primitive and rudimentary form. Then, with an appearance of logic and candid thinking, to leave us to conclude, in the first place, that anything which is so natural must somehow not be authoritative for man; and, in the second place, that anything which had such a mean beginning, and which at the outset sustained itself by the help of ideas and of a view of life which are no longer possible, cannot be expected to have our moral and intellectual assent in these days when we all know so much.

The method was always the same. Indeed, I believe

its dulness and monotony contributed to its overthrow. It ceased to be interesting. The intention was so obvious, and the process in each case so precisely the same as in every other. It all worked with such neatness and reasonableness, that men's minds began to be quite sure that it was not the whole truth. Man was alleged to have affinities with the lower creatures. It took some time for us to see that this account of man left out any explanation of the very things in man which, as we say, make a man of him. For the decisive thing about man, the characteristic thing, lies, of course, not in those features which he shares in common with lower creatures ; but in those features, those prejudices, and a certain resiliency of spirit, which are entirely his own, and amongst these the indomitable prepossession that he is not a lower creature. When you propose to a company of men to-day that they should regard themselves as mere animals, on the ground that once upon a time they were little if anything better, that company of men may shudder at your words, or they may laugh at you, or, if they happen at the moment to be in one of those fierce moods which descend upon us from time to time, they may even put you to death. And you are bound to explain that shudder, that laughter, and that fierceness in which man separates himself from all other creatures, and reveals something essential and central to his own nature.

By the same reasoning, it was discovered that "morals" was but another word for "manners." The Latin word was given. And we were left with the insinuation that our private and social moralities were simply the strictures which men had placed upon themselves in bygone times in order to dwell together in unity and to hold their own. In any case, these private and social moralities were to be considered as the tenements and dwelling-places of the

spirit of fear, of physical fear, or of religious fear,—and this, of course, had vanished in the general enlightenment.

We need not, however, further illustrate the method of reasoning, though it was applied in every field, and assailed all the securities for essential human life in our laws and in the Christian faith. The method has been frankly abandoned, and in this very sense that it is now employed to support an entirely opposite conclusion. The fact that man has arisen from lowly conditions, and has improved his status, is now made the basis, not for a contempt of ideals: it has become, on the contrary, the ground of a new rhetoric concerning human nature which may run to its own excess. When we say nowadays that man arose from lowly conditions, we put the emphasis upon the fact that he arose. For if he arose, it was by virtue of something within him which was never satisfied with its achievement at any particular stage, something which made him weary of every resting-place; and, if he lingered on, that weariness deepened into shame. And so, in our day, man is being conceived as a being who bears within himself a spirit, an impulse, still fresh and unexhausted, which, simply because it has led him on so far, must continue to lead him on.

Concerning the true nature of that mysterious urgency, we know—apart from the illumination of faith—nothing for certain except this; that it compels man onwards, in the line and direction of his earlier progress, never to the denial or frustrating of any moral dignity to which he had attained, but always to some further and finer application of itself. Man's progress, in short, is seen to lie along the line of a fuller expression, of a more sensitive apprehension of a principle of his nature, concerning which no fair-minded observer can be in doubt as to its tendency in past times, and as to the destiny it is seeking to accom-

plish in the midst of all our failures and protests and secret strife.

It is true that society might again be convulsed by war, and war of such violence and duration that the more delicate achievements of man's moral sense might be entirely lost. Or there might occur in our day, or in a later time, something which invaded and overwhelmed our heaped-up civilisation, as the Goths and Vandals swept over Europe.

In such a day, in a sheer struggle for life, the finer things of the soul would shrink back and hide behind the coarse and more necessary faculties. Round the platter of life the tiger in man would whet his teeth anew. The airy fretwork of the spirit, the more exquisite and subtle perceptions and demands, would all go down in that dark day.

But, unless that day returns, the moral sense in man will become more and more individual and delicate and subtle. His sins, the failures with which he charges himself, will also become more individual and delicate and subtle. He will arrive at a day in the evolution and refinement of his nature,—a day which has in every age dawned upon elect and rarer souls,—when he will live by the guidance of secret and spiritual signs, in an intenser solitude, liable to the thrustings and hauntings of most delicate fears, and to the encouragement and appeal of equally intangible approvals: the condition indeed predicted in a verse of a Psalm which promises that a day is coming when God will guide people with His eye, by the lights and the shadows i.e., on His answering countenance.

And serious men to-day no longer attempt to disparage these delicate and poignant distresses of the soul, by recalling the rude restraints and penalties of primitive societies. They rather perceive that this necessity which from the beginning was acknowledged, this willingness to

accept restraint and punishment, bears witness to something in man which is his true and differentiating sign.

And now, passing by many matters which, strictly speaking, intervene, I propose to bring before our minds one or two further illustrations and corroborations from the more serious literature of our time of the thesis underlying these studies. That thesis I might state in some such words as these: There is a way by which we must go, and that way is, on the whole, the way by which we have come.

For the modern period, Goethe's "Faust" is perhaps the classical illustration of a man setting out to test the findings of human wisdom in the region of morals. In "Faust," you have already those principles of revolt and experiment which reappear in much of our contemporary literature. In "Faust," in addition, you have the forecast of what, according to Goethe, who weighed the matter for a whole lifetime, is sure to be the outcome for the individual and for society of the application of those principles.

"Let me have him," said Mephistopheles, "and I pledge me he will eat the dust and that with joy." Well: eat the dust he did. He marched through blood and rapine to the satisfaction of every appetite. But never with joy, never with a moment of solid peace. "The tiger sleeps when he has devoured his prey, but a man sleeps not after he has sinned." If you retort that, on the contrary, he does sleep, we must answer with all great literature that, in that case, he is not truly a man.

But it is over a hundred years since "Faust" was written; and it may very well be that every age must write its own "Faust" as every man has, in fact, or in imagination, to enact his own "Faust."

There are three works of the imagination written in our own very language of feeling, and in the light of all

that we know who belong to this age. I shall briefly consider them from the point of view of these studies.

I am thinking of Dostoievsky's "Crime and Punishment," Tolstoy's "Resurrection," and Bernard Shaw's "The Showing Up of Blanco Posnet."

When men go deeply enough into the human soul, they find the same things: and when they go still more deeply, they find the same thing. That final thing, I would call, an awful loneliness and sense of God. But not to anticipate. Those three works are three determined experiments in living, determined adventures into the region of ultimate things, and in each case, I hold, the voyaging soul comes upon a limit and barrier in the very nature of things, which limit and barrier is—God. Now, in saying that this limit and barrier is God I am not saying something which would be only equal to saying that "X" is "X." I mean something more vital and constructive. I mean that in each of those studies of the soul a man in his passionate progress in one direction encounters a limit and barrier which simply blocks his way. But it is not a wooden barrier, or a stone wall: nor is it merely a precipice beyond which stretches chaos and old night. He is met by a living barrier, by something which has the qualities of a Person, something which has the effect of dealing with him in his despair and bankruptcy, something which can not only stop him but can turn him back. And not only turn him back, as one might come back sullenly and heavily, but turn him back, as in the case of Raskolnikov and Nekhludov, with a strong and sober gratitude to God for the moral inexorableness of things: and as in the case of Blanco Posnet, with a shining countenance.

In Dostoievsky's novel, moral nihilism forms the central theme. The hero of the story is a student whom all kinds of unhappy conditions have made miserable and tired of

life. In this frame of mind he takes up an attitude of revolt, not merely against the external order, such as social conventions, rights of government and the rest, but against the entire conception of personal responsibility. All the moral judgment and feelings which education has implanted in him now seem to be ridiculous childish prejudices, contemptible weakness, to emancipate himself from which is the mark of a free and strong mind. Encouraged by such reflections, he kills an old repulsive usuress in order to obtain money, but, at the same time, also to test his own theory, to test this idea which for a long time he had been handling and accustoming himself to, wearing down his own scruples, and working himself up to greater and greater boldness—the idea that one only needed to be strong enough and hard enough to go his own way and to prosper. "I wanted to know," he afterwards says in discussing the matter, "whether I was like all of them, merely vermin, or a man, whether I was able to break through the barriers, or not,—whether I would really stoop to gain power, or not; whether I was merely a trembling creature, or whether I had a right . . ." and so on. He commits the crime. No one saw him strike the blow. Besides, she was an old woman, one of a despised race too, and plying a disreputable trade. And these were circumstances which, from the moment after his deed, he had at once to summon to his aid, to keep back the first tricklings of the dark flood of reaction and remorse.

But he never has an hour's quiet. He must talk. He must talk even to a friend, who as a detective is engaged upon the case. He must set out again and again to see that detective friend, to talk about the case. The police fail. Raskolnikov might have escaped—except for himself and the inveterate demand of his own spirit that he shall not be alone, that he must talk, and, talking, must speak

about the things that are most urgent to himself. Speaking about these things, he cannot hide his feelings, until at last, noticing how it gives him a little happiness even to speak about the case, and a little more happiness the more he seems to implicate himself, he one day goes the whole length, and first betrays himself, then confesses everything, —and this to an accompaniment of moral happiness and ease so tumultuous and wonderful that he feels that he had never lived until that moment. When he confesses his guilt to his friend, the detective, the detective only replies, "I knew it all the time. The first day you came to see me, after the crime, I suspected you. When you began to speak of it, I became quite sure. I didn't lay hands upon you, for I knew that you were one of those who would have to come at last!"

"When I kept silent," says some one in the Thirty-second Psalm, "my bones waxed old through my roaring all the day long. For day and night, Thy hand was heavy upon me. My moisture was turned into the drought of summer. I acknowledged my sin unto Thee, and mine iniquity I did not hide. . . . I said, Thou art my hiding-place." So speaks a man to the mysterious One who haunts him in the deep places of moral solitude.

There is another voice from a Psalm which I recall: "These things thou hast done and I kept silence. Thou thoughtest that I was altogether such an one as thyself. But I will reprove thee, and set them in order before thine eyes."

And all great literature seems to have as its burden just this, that such beings we are, and in the hand of such an One.

In the last of his greater works Tolstoy has advanced, for those who did not acknowledge the teaching of the New Testament, the moral demand which the human soul must

henceforth make of all who would live honourably and at peace with themselves. I do not say that he was the first to proclaim our duty to make reparation to every one whom we have wronged. Tolstoy was not the first to say that. It was the greatness of Tolstoy that he was not the first to say anything. Anything that is said for the first time, might as well not have been said. It is quite certainly either not true or of no real importance. But it is Tolstoy's greatness, in that late work of his, to have recalled, with a fidelity to the facts of our conscience which is almost intolerably true, the instinct of the soul of man, aroused at length, and indignant at itself, and full of revenge upon itself,—the instinct of man to regard himself as no longer belonging to himself, but to that one, if there be such an one, whom he has pre-eminently wronged.

There is no doubt whatever that if confession ceases to be in some sense public, it is apt to lose its cleansing quality. If we say "it is enough that we confess to God in secret," the answer is, that it is not enough, and was never regarded as enough by finer souls. Besides, it is a bad sign, when we take our religion on its lowest terms. It is a bad sign when we wish to get clear of an offence with the least measure of sacrifice. We may, indeed, get off, but we simply get off. We are fixed there. We stand still.

Again, when we say, defending ourselves, that we are taking the easier way, we must remember that in morals the easier way is never the higher way. Besides, if we will but attend to the voice of our own soul in the hour when we confess ourselves to God, when we smooth out our secret life to the judgment of the Highest, we shall find that our conscience is not yet appeased. We shall hear an instruction from Him who is behind everything, commanding us, were it only to prove our sincerity, to go out and find him or her whom we have wronged.

"If thou art offering thy gift at the altar," said Jesus, "and there rememberest that thy brother hath aught against thee, leave there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way: first be reconciled to thy brother and then come and offer thy gift."

It is when we recall the severity of such words,—and far from standing alone they arise out of the whole message of the New Testament,—that we wonder again how an entire ethical system should have arisen in our day based upon the idea that the ethics of Jesus are too soft and easy. This, though Jesus said more than once that there were circumstances in which a man might find himself when it would be as hard to follow Him as it would be for one to cut off his right hand with his left.

Prince Nekhludoff was summoned to act upon a jury. It was his turn. That is to say, it was one of those apparently casual things which, as we get older, we begin to suspect as having God very emphatically behind them. A prisoner was brought in, charged with murder, and this in circumstances of the utmost degradation. In a moment, as the Bible once again puts it (and if 'you know the Bible, you simply cannot keep it out of any deep consideration of life), in a moment "a dart struck through his liver." It is Maslova, an orphan, at one time a sweet, warm-hearted girl, who had acted as a kind of companion to Nekhludoff's aunts. And it was he, Nekhludoff, who had led Maslova out upon her disastrous way and had set her face towards hell.

Maslova is condemned, though innocent of the crime, and is banished to Siberia. And Nekhludoff accompanies her. A prince, a great landlord, a soldier, sought after by society, and Maslova, one whom he might have dismissed from his mind,—if what so many in our day say about the human soul were the whole truth! Nekhludoff does not hesitate even for a moment. Maslova has never re-

proached him. Even when it comes home to her that he is unhappy, and when she understands, first dimly, but at last quite clearly, that in his own feeling and belief Nekhludoff can never be at peace until she, Maslova, has forgiven him, and even then that he can never be at peace, she tries to put him off his own terrible seriousness, even saying that for herself, it is nothing, and that as for him, he is a prince, and besides she had loved him in that far-off time. But Nekhludoff has seen his way, and for him there is no other. Henceforward, and until God shall release the one or the other from this present world, and even thereafter in the other world, as in Dante's heart-shaking story of Paolo and Francesca, these two must share each other's thoughts, each other's life, and every day and at the last must stand before God hand in hand.

This is what I meant when I said that it had been given to Tolstoy to recall man to that demand which conscience makes upon us, not simply that we shall confess our sin, thereby separating ourselves from it, but that we shall make all possible reparation. If there live in the world one whom we have wronged, that one alone has the power to shut us out from heaven. Or rather, let me say, if God should forgive us our sin, it will be our first, and, until it is granted, our only petition, that we be given some task of prostrate love towards that one whom we, either in ignorance or with a high hand, caused to offend.

Speaking for myself, the terrible moral reality of Tolstoy makes even the Confessions of St Augustine sound far short of what is possible to the soul of man in the region of moral grief.

And now I come to a play of Bernard Shaw's, in which we find the soul of a man behaving in precisely the same way as in those two overwhelming stories.

The scene of the short drama is laid in the far west of

America,—in the midst of a wild and coarse-living community.

Blanco Posnet has stolen a horse, and is now standing his trial in a rough-and-ready court, the Sheriff and jury being men as wild and unscrupulous as himself. Though Posnet has been caught, and there is no doubt whatever of his guilt, still it is difficult to bring the crime home to him: for when he was apprehended he was walking on foot, the horse nowhere to be seen. A witness is pressed to give false evidence against him. She has no difficulty. Blanco Posnet behaves himself all through with an excitement and intoxication which we do not quite understand until later. He breaks out into snatches of a hymn, which he allows them to suppose is pure blasphemy,—as the censor who interdicted the play evidently considered it to be. And yet it is not pure blasphemy. In a moment of something like tenderness Posnet speaks about a woman and a child, but so indistinctly that his hearers can make nothing of it. He keeps saying: "They were not real," and "I see her whenever I look up." The sheriff and jury are getting tired, and about to execute judgment, when there is a stir at the door, which presently opens. A woman enters, pale and hurried. Whereupon Posnet appeals to the Court not to listen to a word she says; that she is not real, and that it is she whom he sees whenever he looks up.

But the woman speaks, and we learn the whole truth, the beautiful and even holy truth. This is what had happened. Blanco Posnet, riding off on the stolen horse, had been stopped on the way by a woman, this woman, who at the time was carrying a little child. She besought Posnet to lend her his horse that she might ride to the nearest doctor with her child. For the child was in the grip of a kind of croup. At first, Posnet spurns her. Why should he, why should any man, especially in this twentieth century,

when so many books have been written to prove that such a thing is absurd, weak, unworthy of the Nietzschean "blonde beast" which is supposed to exhaust the qualities of human nature, why should he be interrupted, brought to a standstill, be made tender, be converted, in fact, by this plea of a woman? And so he tries to push on. But the woman, with the ingenuity of love and of despair, lifts up the child to the man's neck, and Blanco Posnet feels the little fingers playing behind his ears, and in his hair. And with that, something melted, something went soft. He let the woman and child ride off with the horse, and he came back to be hanged. And, to the confusion of all those moderns who think that the fashion in morals of a decadent minority can withstand the ancestral voices of the soul, Blanco Posnet is not ashamed of what he has done. Looking round upon that court of wild men and women, he sees that, like himself, the very telling of the story has made them all go soft.

"Gosh, when I think that I might have been safe, and fifty miles away by now, with that horse; and here I am waiting to be hung up and filled with lead! What came to me? What made me such a fool? That's what I want to know. That's the great secret . . . It wasn't a man . . . He done me out of it . . . He means to win the deal and you can't stop Him . . . Boys, I'm going to preach you a sermon on the moral of this day's proceedings. . . . I started in to be a bad man like the rest of you . . . I took the broad path because I thought I was a man and not a snivelling, canting, turning-the-other cheek apprentice angel serving his time in a vale of tears . . . Why did the child die? Tell me that if you can. He can't have wanted to kill the child. Why did He make me go soft on the child, if He was going hard on it Himself? Why should He go hard on the innocent kid and go soft on a rotten thing like

me? Why did I go soft myself? Why did the Sheriff go soft? Why did Feemy go soft? What's this game that upsets our game? For seems to me there's two games bein' played. Our game is a rotten game that makes me feel I'm dirt, and that you're all rotten dirt as me. T'other game may be a silly game; but it ain't rotten. When the Sheriff played it, he stopped being rotten. When Feemy played it, the paint nearly dropped off her face. When I played it, I cursed myself for a fool, but I lost the rotten feel all the same. . . . What about the croup? It was early days when He made the croup, I guess. It was the best He could think of then; but when it turned out wrong in His hands, He made you and me to fight the croup for Him. You bet He didn't make us for nothing, and He wouldn't have made us at all if He could have done His work without us. By Gum, that must be what we're for! . . . He made me because He had a job for me. He let me run loose till the job was ready, and then I had to come along and do it, hanging or no hanging. And I tell you, it didn't feel rotten: it felt bully, just bully. Anyhow, I got the rotten feel off me for a minute of my life; and I'll go through fire to put it off me again. . . . There's no good and bad . . . but, by Jimmy, gents, there's a rotten game, and there's a great game. I played the rotten game; but the great game was played on me; and now I'm for the great game every time. Amen."

Not a word more shall I say. There is nothing more to be said.

"When I think that I might have been safe, and fifty miles away by now with that horse; and here I am waiting to be hung up and filled with lead! What came to me? What made me such a fool? That's what I want to know. That's the great secret."

That indeed is the secret. I hold that it is an open secret. I leave my case at that.

JOHN A. HUTTON.

THE JERUSALEM VISITS OF JESUS (in St. John).

In the present article an attempt is made to explain why the Judaean ministries of Jesus narrated in the Fourth Gospel are unrecorded in the Synoptic writings. This paper is compiled from notes that were made by the writer in the spring of 1906 when he was studying the four Gospels. In it he seeks to give a reason why the four Jerusalem visits described in the Gospel According to St. John are not referred to in the other Gospels—the reason being, namely, that St. Peter was not with Our Lord on each of these four occasions—as the article attempts to show—and St. Mark who, according to Papias, was the interpreter of St. Peter, not being able to get a detailed account of them from that disciple, or, at any rate, thinking that another would treat this part of the history more adequately, resolved to allow some other writer (probably St. John) more conversant with the facts (owing, perhaps, to his connexion with Jerusalem) to deal with them. St. Matthew and St. Luke, basing their Gospels on that of St. Mark, decided also to leave that portion of the history to the same—another and more competent—writer.

1. Perhaps the best thing he can do at the outset is to describe simply how the matter was suggested to him at all. He was reading one day the passage in St. Mark i. 14 which says, "Now, after that John was put in prison, Jesus came into Galilee, preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom of God." From it he turned casually to the account of Our Lord's first visit to Jerusalem (St. John ii. 13–iv. 54), which, to judge from its position in the narrative, one may consider to have taken place shortly after the marriage feast in Cana of Galilee (St. John ii. 11), that is to say, about Passover,

A.D. 27. As John the Baptist was still a free man at the time of the first Jerusalem visit (St. John iii. 22, 23, 24, especially verse 24), during which excursions into the surrounding country district were made (St. John iii. 23), it seems to be quite evident that this first visit took place at an early date—prior to John's imprisonment—prior to the time when Jesus "called" the Twelve and attached them to Himself as disciples.

If this be so, and if one accept the idea that St. Peter was not yet, at this early period, permanently attached to Jesus, it is quite possible that he was not in Judaea at the time when the events narrated in St. John ii. occurred; and, consequently, would not have any definite facts to give regarding what took place. *The early date of the period, then, at which this first visit was made is itself quite sufficient to explain St. Peter's absence from Jerusalem.* Another small point, however, occurred to the writer's mind which might also help to explain St. Peter's absence; but he has no desire to press this point, especially as there is no necessity for it, in view of what has been already set forth. It occurred to him that the illness of St. Peter's mother-in-law (St. Mark i. 30) might have contributed to his detention at home in Galilee, even if he had been otherwise free and wished to accompany Jesus on the first journey to Jerusalem. This, though perhaps a nice point, is not one of any great importance, seeing that St. Mark i. 14 is itself sufficient to enable one to determine approximately the time of the first Jerusalem visit (St. John ii. 13). If one regards the winter of A.D. 26 as the time of the Baptism of Jesus in the Jordan, it would seem as if the first visit to Jerusalem occurred just shortly before Passover, A.D. 27 (St. John ii. 13); *and St. Peter was not there.*

2. Having got thus far the writer turned, more out of curiosity than anything else, to read the account of the

second visit of Jesus to Jerusalem which is given in St. John v. 1. This journey seems to have been made about the time of Purim (?) (" 'a' feast "), that is, in February A.D. 28. *Was St. Peter with Jesus on this occasion, or was he not?* One observes that, in St. John, the narrative of this visit immediately precedes the account of the Miracle of the Feeding of the Five Thousand (St. John vi. 5). Turning, however, to St. Mark one finds that the Synoptic writer gives, immediately prior to the story of the same miracle, an interesting sketch of the commission to, and Mission of, the Twelve (St. Mark vi. 7–13). Putting these two *facts* together—and, in this connexion, it is surely not necessary to discuss questions, or to seek to establish the accuracy, of chronological order in the Gospel narrative—one quite legitimately concludes that St. Peter was again unable to accompany Jesus to Jerusalem *because he was absent, as one of the Twelve, on an evangelical mission of teaching and healing.*[1]

3. By this time the writer was beginning to be quite interested. His attention was next directed to St. John's narrative of the *third* visit to Jerusalem (St. John vii. 10). One learns from the account (1) that the visit was during the Feast of Tabernacles (vii. 2), (2) it was—the writer is emphatic about this point—*a strictly private visit* (" because the Jews sought to kill him "—St. John vii. 1). The probability is that the disciples, including St. Peter, knew nothing about this visit. Therefore, for the third time, St. Peter's absence from his Master's side is satisfactorily accounted for, the reason being that *Our Lord's visit was of a private character.*[2] St. John would, in this instance, get the information easily from his friends in the city with whom, perhaps, he was staying (St. John xviii. 15, 16).

[1] One notes that, after Purim, Jesus apparently returned to Galilee; for, about the time for the Passover to be held, one reads of His being there once again (St. John vi. § 4, vii. 1).

[2] See footnote, p. 350.

In each of these three instances, therefore, the writer thought he had found good reasons for supposing that St. Peter, being absent every time, was unfitted to supply St. Mark with such detailed information as that writer would need in order to give an account of the three visits to Jerusalem. Knowing that he could not get the information at first hand from St. Peter, but that another (namely, St. John) had it, St. Mark omitted the account of these Jerusalem visits from his Gospel.

4. It was with a certain amount of excitement that the writer now turned to consider the *fourth* visit. It took place at the time of the Feast of the Dedication of the Temple during the winter (St. John x. 22). After the third visit Jesus appears not to have resumed His ministry in Galilee because of popular ferment and Pharisaic opposition which was reaching its climax (St. John vii. 30*a* and x. 19). Still, He must have returned to the northern province. One is inclined to believe that the *détours* to Tyre and Sidon, or, at least, to Caesarea Philippi, occurred during this closing period, namely, between the Feast of Tabernacles (St. John vii. 2) and that of the Dedication of the Temple (St. John x. 22). Such a retreat at this time, for purposes of rest and closer fellowship with "His own," and, at the same time, to avoid the hostile 'Herodians,' is suggested by St. Mark ix. 30 ("and they departed thence and passed *through* Galilee"). The route taken from Caesarea Philippi to Jerusalem on His final journey seems to be indicated in St. Mark x. 1 ("cometh into the coasts of Judaea by the *farther* side of Jordan"), and St. Luke ix. 51, 52, xvii. 11. Professor Burkitt's *The Gospel History and its Transmission*[1] contains some illuminating remarks on this journey of Our Lord. The probability is that Jesus, owing to the fierce Samaritan opposition, preferred, rather than take the western road to Jerusalem, to turn off

[1] See footnote, p. 350.

eastwards across Jordan, *going by Himself*, after arranging to meet St. Peter or the rest—or, perhaps, the Seventy—at a point agreed on beforehand, probably near Jericho. *Where, then, was St. Peter at the time of the fourth visit?*[1] Was he with Jesus, or was he not? In the hope of getting some clear light upon this point the writer turned to St. Luke x. 1 which reads: "After these things"—that is, apparently, after the final journey to Jerusalem had begun, and after the hostile reception at a Samaritan village (St. Luke ix. 53)—"the Lord appointed *other* seventy also and sent them two and two before His face into every city and place." At a first glance the matter looked pretty hopeless.

This fourth visit appeared to coincide with the Mission of the Seventy, as the second visit had coincided with the Mission of the Twelve. We have seen that, in the latter case, the absence of St. Peter is easily explained: he was away on a mission. But, in the former case, there was nothing to show that he was away. *If it could be proved that he was away with the Seventy!* Then the problem would be greatly simplified!! It would then be clearly seen that, Jesus having visited Jerusalem during the absence of St. Peter on the Mission, that disciple would again be unable to give an authentic story of what transpired in the Holy City. It was at this point that a most interesting discovery was made which gave the very light that had been so earnestly sought after. St. Luke x. 1 reads: "After these things the Lord appointed other Seventy *also* (*καὶ ἑτέρους ἑβδομήκοντα*). This is the reading of ℵ A C L Δ Ξ al. b, f, q (Tisch.). BD a, c, e, l, g vulg. syrr. cur. sin., however, have a *varia lectio*, namely, *ἑβδομήκοντα δύο* (W. H. in brackets). *Seventy-Two!* Like a flash the thought came—*Peter and, perhaps, Andrew were the other "two"* (*δύο*)! During *their* absence with the Seventy Jesus paid,

[1] See footnote, p. 350.

what might be termed, a flying visit to Jerusalem, returning speedily with *ten* of His disciples who had previously joined Him to meet the *Seventy-Two* on their return (St. Luke x. 17) at the appointed place. Would not the sending of St. Peter and another old, tried campaigner along with the Seventy —men somewhat inexperienced in mission work, with their spurs still to be won—be the most natural thing in the world for Jesus to do? How the Seventy would profit by the help and counsel of the two better trained men! The principle, be it said, would be very similar to one in actual practice to-day. Something very like this is done at the Glasgow U.F. College, where the Professors are said to accompany their students to churches in the city, in order the more effectually to help and encourage them in the great work of preaching.

The writer's contention is that St. Peter was one of the two (*δύο*) mentioned in connexion with this Mission of the Seventy-Two, and was absent from Jerusalem when Jesus visited the city for the *fourth* time[1]; and, if what he has tried to prove be correct, that disciple was absent on the occasion of each of the three previous visits.

Such is his humble attempt to explain a difficult problem, and, so doing, to establish the historicity of large sections of the Fourth Gospel which state facts that are recorded nowhere else. He leaves it to scholars, among whose number he does not pretend to be, for their consideration and—should it be deserving—criticism. His own feeling about the authorship of these important sections is that St. John, who seems to have had relatives in Jerusalem and acquaintances in official and priestly circles, was the only one of the disciples fitted to deal with this side of the Gospel history. In view of (*a*) St. John's connexions and, above all, (*b*) St. Peter's *four-fold* absence, the latter disciple would consider it best for all references to the Jerusalem visits

[1] See footnote, p. 350.

to come from St. John, and so to St. John the work was deputed accordingly.[1] J. A. S. Wilson.

THE FREER (WASHINGTON) MS. OF THE GOSPELS.

When the news reached this country some six years ago that C. L. Freer, Esq., of Detroit, Michigan, U.S.A., had acquired from a dealer in Cairo various very ancient MSS., including one of the Gospels in Greek, great interest was aroused. It transpired that the British Museum had been outbidden by Mr. Freer. The United States has a quite pardonable ambition to rival older countries in the possession of rare and valuable MSS. As most of those known to exist

[1] Since writing the above I have refreshed my memory with regard to Professor Burkitt's suggested itinerary of our Lord's fourth journey. His conjecture, after considering "general historical probabilities," is (p. 97) that Jesus did *not* approach Jerusalem *viâ* the E. of Jordan (Herod Antipas's Tetrarchy). "It is noteworthy," he writes, "that in this story of the Samaritan village that would not receive our Lord (St. Luke ix. 51-56) *Peter does not appear*, only James and John. I venture to suggest that the historical reason for this was that Peter and most of the other disciples went round by Peraea, that when they arrived at the passage of the river they found Jesus waiting for them in 'the borders of Judea beyond Jordan,' i.e. on the W. side, and finally that one reason why nothing is said about the events of the previous journey is that *our Lord and S. Peter had travelled to the spot from Capernaum by different routes and not together.*" (The italics are mine.) Should this conjecture ultimately commend itself in preference to the older idea regarding Our Lord's route (*Expositor's Greek Testament*, vol. i. p. 244), my theory in this article, so far from being destroyed, would be appreciably strengthened. For the fourth visit to Jerusalem would then appear to have taken place during St. Peter's absence for the reason given by Professor Burkitt and not because of that disciple's being called away to direct the Seventy. Nor, if this ever prove to be the truth, would my theory suffer, so far as the explanation (given above) of the *third* visit goes. For I would then be inclined to accept Hahn's suggestion (*Expositor's Greek Testament*, vol. i. p. 538) that the Seventy were appointed *at Jerusalem* (the italics are mine), and about *the Time of the Feast of Tabernacles* (St. John vii. 2). So that St. Peter's absence would be still more easily accounted for in that case than it is by the reason alleged in my article, to wit, that the third visit of Our Lord was a private one.—J. A. S. W.

in Europe are the property of public institutions, and therefore inalienable, the only hope lies in the sands of Egypt. That this hope is not delusive is sufficiently proved by the fact that the Morgan collection of Coptic MSS. far surpasses in age and quality that of any national library in the world, and by the acquirement of the splendid Gospel MS. which will one day rest in Washington.

Whatever the quality of the text of this MS. had been, its age would have commanded attention. For only two MSS. of the Gospels in Greek are certainly older than this, namely B (Vaticanus) and ℵ (Sinaiticus). Experts have decided—and there is now abundance of material on which to form a judgment, thanks particularly to the discoveries and labours of Professors Grenfell and Hunt—that the MS. belongs either to the fourth or to the fifth century. No one, I believe, has dated it later than the sixth. It is written on thin vellum in sloping pointed uncials, in what is now known as the Oxyrhynchus script. The Gospels are in the Western order, Matthew, John, Luke, Mark. The whole MS. seems to have been written in Egypt by one scribe, except the first eight leaves of St. John, which are written in a more erect character, to fill a gap due to the loss of that part as written by the first scribe. The covers of the manuscript still survive, two wooden panels with paintings.

Thanks to the munificence of Mr. Freer and the public spirit of the University of Michigan, as well as to the scholarly care of Henry A. Sanders, Professor of Palæography in that University, a complete set of splendid photographs of the MS. has now been issued, as well as a companion volume, which is on sale, containing a complete collation of its readings with those of the ecclesiastical text, and other valuable material.[1] Professor Sanders is primarily a palæo-

[1] *Facsimile of the Washington Manuscript of the Four Gospels in the Freer Collection, with an Introduction by* Henry A. Sanders (Ann Arbour,

grapher and secondarily a textual critic. This MS. has an interest similar to that of the Sinaiticus discovered by Tischendorf and that of the Sinaitic Syriac palimpsest. It will give rise to a whole literature, and Professor Sanders will understand that it is from no low opinion of his lists and arguments that I prefer for the present to study the MS. from my own point of view. It is only by such individual judgments correlated with one another that the manuscript will receive its final place in the textual scheme.

The method I propose to follow is to quote the reading of W (for such is the symbol for this MS.) in the passages referred to in the new apparatus to the Oxford Greek Testament (1910), which I have reason to believe is in the hands of many readers of the EXPOSITOR, and then to attempt to draw some conclusion as to the character of the MS. from the data thus furnished.

Matt. i. 8, as text.
11, as text.
16, as text.
18, Ἰησοῦ only.
21, as text *bis*.
25 (1), as text.
bis, τὸν υἱὸν αὐτῆς τὸν πρωτότοκον.
Matt. ii. 11, as text.
18, θρῆνος καὶ κλαυθμὸς καὶ ὀδυρμὸς πολύς. Cf. Syr. vet. Marutha.
20, as text.
Matt. iii. 16, as text, *ter*.
17, as text, *ter*.
Matt. iv. 2, as text.
6, as text.
10, as text.
Matt. iv. 11, as text.
17, as text (so also 23, v. 4, 5, 10, 11).
Matt. v. 19, partly omitted homœoarct;
22, εἰκῇ.
25, as text.
28, αὐτήν.
37, 37 *bis*, 39, as text.
42, δός.
bis, as text.
44, εὐλογεῖτε . . . ὑμᾶς. καλῶς . . . ὑμᾶς. ἐπηρεαζόντων . . . καὶ.
45, as text.
Matt. vi. 1, ἐλεημοσύνην.
4, ἐν τῷ φανερῷ.
6, 8, 10, 11, as text.

Michigan, 1912); *The New Testament Manuscripts in the Freer Collection*, Part i.; *The Washington Manuscript of the Four Gospels*, by H. A. Sanders (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1912) (price 2 dols.).

Matt. vi. 13, ὅτι σου ἐστίν ἡ βασιλεία καὶ ἡ δύναμις καὶ ἡ δόξα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, ἀμήν.
15, 21, 21 *bis*, 25, as text.
33, βασιλείαν τοῦ θιοῦ.
bis, as text (so vii. 6, 13).
Matt. vii. 14, τι.
bis, as text.
21, has the addition.
22, 23, as text.
29, has the addition.
Matt. viii. 4, as text.
5, εἰσελθόντι δὲ αὐτῷ εἰς Καπερναούμ.
8, 9, as text.
10, παρ' οὐδενὶ τοσαύτην πίστιν ἐν τῷ Ἰσραήλ.
11, 12, 22, as text.
28, Γεργεσηνῶν.
Matt. ix. 4, ἰδών.
14, 15, 34, 36, as text.
Matt. x. 3, Λεββαῖος ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς Θαδδαῖος.
4, Κανανίτης.
8, *om.* νεκροὺς ἐγείρετε.
19, παραδώσουσιν, otherwise as text.
23, as text.
25, as text.
29, as text.
bis, as text.
ter, as text.
33, as text.
42, as text.
bis, as text.
Matt. xi. 2, as text.
5, as text.
9, ἐξεληλύθατε προφήτην ἰδεῖν.
15, as text.
19, as text.
Matt. xi. 23, as text.
bis, as text.
27, as text.
Matt. xii. 4, as text.
15, *add.* ὄχλοι.
31, as text.
47, as text.
Matt. xiii. 9, *add.* ἀκούειν.
11, as text.
15, as text.
33, as text.
35, as text.
bis, as text.
36, φράσον.
43, as text.
bis, *add.* ἀκούειν.
50, as text.
55, Ιωσῆς.
Matt. xiv. 3, as text.
24, as text.
28, as text.
29, as text.
30, ἰσχυρὸν σφόδρα.
34, as text.
bis, as text.
Matt. xv. 6, *add.* ἢ τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ.
bis τὴν ἐντολήν.
7, ἐγγίζει μοι ὁ λαὸς οὗτος τῷ στόματι αὐτῶν καί.
17, οὔπω.
30, κωφοὺς χωλοὺς τυφλοὺς κυλλοὺς.
31, as text.
39, Μαγδαλάν.
Matt. xvi. 2–3, *om.* πυρράζει γὰρ ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ πρωὶ σήμερον χείμων, *ob homœoarcton.*
13, as text, but με after λέγουσιν.
bis, as text.

Matt. xvi. 19, as text, but κλεῖδας
20, as text.
21, as text.
Matt. xvii. 12, 13, as text.
15, as text.
21, has the verse.
22, as text.
23, as text.
26, as text.
Matt. xviii. 1, as text.
3, as text.
7, as text.
10, as text.
11, has the verse.
14, as text.
15, as text.
20, as text throughout.
Matt. xix. 3, as text.
4, as text.
9, practically as text, thus: *μὴ* (without *εἰ*) *ἐπὶ πορνίᾳ γαμήσῃ ἄλλην μοιχᾶτε.*
bis, as text, except for *γαμῶν.*
11, as text.
16, as text.
bis as text, but *ζωὴν ἔχω.*
17, *τί με λέγεις ἀγαθόν; οὐδεὶς ἀγαθὸς εἰ μὴ εἷς ὁ θεός.*
bis, as text.
19, as text.
21, as text.
24, *εἰσελθεῖν διὰ τρυπήματος ῥαφίδος.*
29, has *ἢ γυναῖκα.*
bis, as text.
Matt. xx. 16, *πολλοὶ γάρ εἰσιν κλητοί, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἐκλεκτοί.*
17, as text.
bis, as text.
ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ καὶ (for *καὶ ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ*).
Matt. xx. 22, *ἢ τὸ βάπτισμα ὃ ἐγὼ βαπτίζομαι βαπτισθῆναι.*
23, *καὶ τὸ βάπτισμα ὃ ἐγὼ βαπτίζομαι βαπτισθήσεσθαι* (= —ε).
28, as text.
31, as text.
33, as text.
Matt. xxi. 3, as text.
7, as text.
9, as text.
12, as text.
17, as text.
22, as text.
29, 30, as text (except *ἑτέρῳ* for *δευτέρῳ* and the error *ἀπεκριθεὶς*).
31, as text.
42, as text.
44, as text.
Matt. xxii. 7, as text.
12, as text.
13, *δήσαντες αὐτοῦ πόδας καὶ χεῖρας, ἄρατε αὐτὸν καὶ ἐκβάλεται* (= —ε).
30, *ἄγγελοι τοῦ θεοῦ.*
35, as text.
38, *ἡ πρώτη καὶ ἡ μεγάλη.*
39, AYTH.
Matt. xxiii. 4, as text.
bis, as text.
8, as text.
9, as text.
14, comes after verse 12.
23, as text.
25, as text.
bis ἀκρασίας ἀδικείας.
26, as text.
bis, as text.
ter, as text.

Matt. xxiii. 27, as text.
bis, as text.
ter, as text.
35, as text.
38, as text.
Matt. xxiv. 24, as text.
31, *φωνῆς om.*
36, *οὐδὲ ὁ υἱός om.*
Matt. xxv. 1, as text.
39, as text.
40, as text.
41, as text.
bis, as text.
46, as text.
Matt. xxvi. 15, as text.
20, as text.
27, as text.
bis, as text.
ter, as text.
28, *add.* καινῆς.
29, as text.
59, as text.
60, εὗρον] *add.* καὶ (with later differences).
73, as text.
Matt. xxvii. 2, Ποντίῳ Πιλάτῳ.
4, as text.
9, as text.
10, ἔδωκα.
11, ὁ ἡγεμών *om.*
16, 17, as text.
17, as text.
24, as text.
28, as text.
32, as text.
34, ὄξος.
35, as text.
38, as text.
bis, as text.
(42, as text).
43, as text.
Matt. xxvii. 45, as text.
46, as text. [λιμὰ.
μα, doubtless haplography for
ter, as text.
49, as text.
56, as text.
bis, as text.
ter, as text.
quater, as text.
Ἰωσὴφ.
Matt. xxviii. 6, as text.
7, as text.
18, as text.
19, as text.
20, as text.
Mark i. 1, υἱοῦ θεοῦ.
2, ἐν τοῖς προφήταις.
bis, as text.
13, ἐκεῖ ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ.
bis, as text, but in reverse order μ΄ ἡμέρας.
24, as text.
27, τίς ἡ διδαχὴ ἡ κενὴ (*i.e.* καινὴ) αὕτη ἡ ἐξουσιαστικὴ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὅτι. [ἦλθεν.
29, ἐξελθὼν δὲ ἐκ τῆς συναγωγῆς
34, *add.* Χριστὸν εἶναι.
40, καὶ γονυπετῶν αὐτόν.
41, as text.
Mark ii. 4, προσελθεῖν.
14, as text.
16, as text.
καὶ πίνει *om.*
22, as text, but with βάλλουσιν after κἀινούς.
26, (εἰσελθὼν).
ἐπὶ Ἀβιάθαρ
ἀρχιερέως καὶ *om.*
27, ἐκτίσθη.
καὶ οὐχ ὁ ἄνθρωπος διὰ τὸ σάββατον *om.*

Mark iii. 14, δώδεκα] *add.* μαθητάς αὐτοῦ] *add.* οὓς καὶ ἀποστόλους ὠνόμασεν.
15, δαιμόνια] *add.* καὶ περιάγοντας κηρύσσιν τὸ εὐαγγέλιον.
17, Βοανανηργε (*sic*).
18, Θαδδαῖον *om.*
29, as text.
bis ἁμαρτίας.
32, as text.
Mark iv. 9, as text.
17, as text.
21, as text.
28, πλήρης ὁ σεῖτος.
Mark v. 1, Γεργυστηνῶν.
33, as text.
36, as text.
41, as text.
Mark vi. 2, as text.
3, as text.
bis, as text.
14, ἔλεγον.
20, ἠπορεῖτο.
22 αὐτῆς (*only*).
bis, as text (except οδαν for ὃ ἐὰν).
23, καὶ . . . δώσω *om.*
ter, as text.
33, καὶ προῆλθον αὐτούς *om.*
36, as text.
47, as text.
56, as text.
Mark vii. 3, πυκνὰ.
4, *add.* δὲ ὅταν ἔλθωσιν.
bis, as text.
ter add. καὶ κλεινῶν.
Mark vii. 6 ἀγαπᾷ.
bis, as text (except ἔχει for ἀπέχει).
9, στήσηται (*i.e.* -ε).
13, as text.
16, has the verse.
19, as text.
bis, as text.
24, καὶ Σιδῶνος *om.*
28, κύριε (simply).
bis, as text.
31, καὶ Σιδῶνος ἦλθεν.
33, ἔβαλε δακτύλους πτύσας εἰς τὰ ὦτα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἥψατο τῆς γλώσσας (*sic*) αὐτοῦ.
Mark viii. 10, πρὸς τὸ ὄρος Δαλμουναι.
16, ὅτι . . . ἔχουσιν.
22, Βηθαϊδάν.
25, as text.
26, as text (but μὴ).
32, as text.
34, ἀκολουθεῖν.
Mark ix. 3 as text (but ὡς for οἷα, and οὕτω is omitted).
6, λαλεῖ.
15, as text.
bis, as text.
23, as text (but δύνῃ).
24, as text.
29, *add.* καὶ νηστίᾳ.
35, as text.
38, ὃς οὐκ ἠκολούθει ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκωλύσαμεν αὐτόν.
42, as text.
43, εἰς τὴν γέενναν *om.*
44, 46, *om.* as text.
49, as text (except ἁλισγηθήσεται).[1]

[1] Prof. Sanders has failed to understand this. It is the verb behind the mysterious ἁλίσγημα of Acts xv. 20.

Mark x. 1, καὶ (*pr.*) *om.*
2, οἱ δὲ Φαρισαῖοι προσελθόντες.
7, as text.
11, 12, transposed.
14, καὶ] *add.* ἐπιτιμήσας.
19, μὴ φονεύσῃς *tr. post.* μὴ μοιχεύσῃς.
bis, as text.
ter, as text.
20, as text.
22, as text.
bis, as text.
24, τοὺς πεποιθότας ἐπὶ χρήμασιν *om.*, *sed add.* πλούσιον *post* εἰσελθεῖν.
25, as text.
bis, as text.
ter, as text (but τρωμαλιᾶς).
quater, as text.
26, ἑαυτούς.
27, as text almost (thus: παρὰ μὲν ἀνθρώποις τοῦτο ἀδύνατον ἀλλὰ οὐ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ. πάντα γὰρ δυνατὰ τῷ θεῷ).
29, 30, practically as text.
30, practically as text.
50, as text.
51, as text.

Mark xi. 1, as text.
3, τι.
bis, ἀποστελεῖ (*sine* πάλιν).
8, *ab* ἄλλοι δὲ *usque ad finem versus omnino om.*
10, εἰρήνη
18, as text.
19, ἐξεπορεύοντο.
26, *om.*
32, no point after ἀνθρώπων·
bis, ἤδισαν.

Mark xii. 14, as text, but added above the line.
22, as text.
23, as text, practically.
36, ὑποκάτω.
38, as text.
40, *add.* καὶ ὀρφανῶν.
41, ἑστώς.

Mark xiii. 2, ἀφεθῇ οὐδὲ διαλυθήσεται, καὶ διὰ τριῶν ἡμερῶν ἄλλος ἀναστήσεται ἄνευ χειρῶν.
8, *add.* καὶ ταραχαί.
33, as text.

Mark xiv. 4, ἦσαν δέ τινες τῶν μαθητῶν ⌈ἀγανακτοῦντες πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς καὶ λέγοντες.
8, as text (except εἶχεν for ἔσχεν).
23, τὸ ποτήριον.
24, as text.
25, as text.
30, as text.
bis, δίς *om.*
38, no point at either word.
39, as text.
41, *add.* τὸ τέλος. [αὐτόν.
51, οἱ δὲ νεανίσκοι ἐκράτησαν
58, as text.
65, ἐλάμβανον.
68, καὶ ἀλέκτωρ ἐφώνησε *om.*
72, as text (but εὐθέως).
bis, as text.
ter, δὶς *om.*
quater, as text.

Mark xv. 6, ὃν ᾐτοῦντο.
8, ἀναβοήσας.
(12)–(38) *missing.*
39, κράξας.
40, καὶ *quartum*, as text.
bis, as text.

Mark xv. 44, ἤδη.
47, Ἰωσῆ μήτηρ.
Mark xvi. 2, as text.
3, as text.
4, σφόδρα μέγας.
9–20, *leguntur*.
14, an interesting addition here, already recorded in my note.
15, see my note.
17, as text.
Luke i. 17, as text.
28, as text.
35, as text.
45, *nullum punctum*.
46, as text.
56, as text.
78, as text.
Luke ii. 2, *add.* ἡ.
bis, as text.
7, as text.
14, as text.
29, as text.
33, as text.
34, as text.
bis, as text.
35, as text.
36, as text.
41, as text.
43, as text.
48, as text.
bis, as text.
ter, as text.
Luke iii. 1, as text.
4–6, as text (practically).
7, as text.
16, as text.
22, as text.
bis, as text.
Luke iii. 23, as text (but without ὁ).
24–38, deliberately omitted as unimportant[1] or as inconsistent with Matthew.
Luke iv. 1, as text.
11, as text.
13, as text.
18, as text.
bis, as text.
29, as text.
44, τῶν Ἰουδαίων.
Luke v. 10, 11, as text.
14, as text.
bis, as text.
17, as text.
39, as text.
bis, as text.
Luke vi. 1, as text.
4, as text.
5, as text.
17, as text.
bis, *add.* καὶ τῆς Περέας.
21, γελάσουσιν.
22, as text.
bis, as text.
ter, as text.
29, εἰς.
31, as text.
bis, as text.
35, μηδένα.
45, as text.
bis, as text.
46, as text.
48, as text.
Luke vii. 11, τῇ (without ἐν).
bis, as text.
14, as text.
22, εἴπατε. *bis*, as text.

[1] Cf. the omission by Origen and Pelagius of certain salutations in the Pauline Epistles.

Luke vii. 25, as text.
28, as text.
39, as text.
Luke viii. 3, as text.
26, 37, Γαδαρηνῶν.
29, as text.
bis, as text.
31, as text.
43, as text.
45, as text.
51, as text (but spelt Ἰωάνην).[1]
54, as text.
Luke ix. 2, as text.
10, τόπον ἔρημον πόλεως καλουμένης Βηθσαΐδαν.
20, as text.
23, as text.
bis, as text.
26, as text.
27, as text.
28, as text.
29, as text.
35, ἀγαπητός.
37, as text.
54, *add.* ὡς καὶ Ἠλίας ἐποίησεν.
55, 56, as text.
62, as text.
bis, as text.
Luke x. 1, as text.
5, *nullum punctum.*
17, as text.
21, as text.
41, as text.
42, as text (except δὲ for γάρ).
Luke xi. 2, *add.* ἡμῶν ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς.
bis, as text (except for ἐλθάτω).
ter. add. γενηθήτω τὸ θέλημά σου ὡς ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς.
Luke xi. 4, *add.* ἀλλὰ ῥῦσαι ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ.
11, as text.
13, as text.
15, as text.
25, as text.
33, as text.
35, 36, as text.
42, as text.
43, as text.
bis, as text.
44, ὡς μνημῖα τὰ.
48, as text.
52, as text.
53, 54, λέγοντος δὲ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἤρξαντο οἱ γραμματῖς καὶ οἱ Φαρισαῖοι δεινῶς ἐνέχειν καὶ ἀποστοματίζειν αὐτὸν περὶ πλειόνων ἐνεδρεύοντες αὐτὸν ζητοῦντες θηρεῦσαι τι ἐκ τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῦ ἵνα κατηγορήσουσιν αὐτοῦ.
Luke xii. 11, προσφέρωσιν.
bis, as text.
ter, μεριμνᾶτε.
quater, as text.
quinquiens, as text.
18, τὰ γενήματά μου καὶ τὰ ἀγαθά μου.
19, ψυχή *om.*, *sed loco eius habet* σύ.
bis, as text.
20, as text.
21, as text.
24, as text.
26, as text (except for οὔτε).
27, as text.
31, τοῦ θεοῦ.
38, καὶ ἐὰν ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ φυλακῇ ἔλθῃ καὶ εὕρῃ οὕτως μακάριοί

[1] Cf. the discussion in Blass.

εἰσιν οἱ δοῦλοι ἐκεῖνοι (*i.e.* practically text, but for *homœoarcton*).
Luke xii. 39, as text.
58, as text.
Luke xiii. 8, κόπρια.
24, *post* ἰσχύσουσιν *nullum punctum.*
Luke xiv. 5, υἱὸς ἢ βοῦς.
10, ἀνάπεσε.
15, ἄριστον.
20, as text.
bis, as text.
Luke xv. 16, γεμίσαι τὴν κοιλίαν καὶ χορτασθῆναι ἀπὸ.
21, as text.
Luke xvi. 9, ἐκλείπηται (*i.e.* —ε).
12, as text.
21, as text.
22, 23, as text.
24, as text.
25, as text.
Luke xvii. 4, ἑπτακὶς τῆς ἡμέρας.
10, as text.
11, as text.
17, οὐχ . . . οὗτοι.
18, *punctum* (*sed his codicibus sign. interrog. ignotum est*).
24, as text.
31, as text.
36, *om.* (as text).
Luke xviii. 5, ὑποπτάζῃ.
13, οὐκ ἠδύνατο.
19, as text.
30, as text.
Luke xix. 25, *om.*
26, as text.
37, ἤρξατο.
Luke xix. 37 *bis*, ἁπαντᾶν.
ter, as text.
quater, as text.
quinquiens, as text.
43, as text.
44, as text.
Luke xx. 20, ὑποχωρήσαντες.
34, as text.
bis, as text (but ἐκγαμίζονται in both places)
36, μέλλουσιν.
bis, as text (but τοῦ θεοῦ).
46, as text.
Luke xxi. 11, as text.
18, as text.
19, κτήσασθαι (= —ε).
24, as text.
25, ἢ ὡς ἠχούσης.
28, as text.
30, as text.
34, 35, ἡ ἡμέρα ἐκείνη· ὡς παγὶς γὰρ ἐπελεύσεται.
38, as text.
Luke xxii. 4, as text.
16, as text.
17, 18, as text.
19, 20, as text (with trifling differences).
29, no stop at μου, but a distinct stop at βασιλείαν.
42, as text (but τὸ ποτήριον τοῦτο and μι (?) after παρένεγκε).
43, 44, *om.*
62, as text (with the addition ὁ Πέτρος after ἔξω).
68, *add.* μοι ἢ ἀπολύσηται (=ε).
Luke xxiii. 2, as text (but *om.* ἡμῶν).
bis, as text.

Luke xxiii. 5, as text.
9, as text.
10–12, as text.
12, as text.
15, ἀνέπεμψα γὰρ ὑμᾶς πρὸς αὐτόν.
17, *habet post* 16.
19, *deest hic* 17.
34, *om.*
38, γεγραμμένη ἐπ' αὐτῷ (*hoc ordine*) γράμμασιν Ἑλληνικοῖς καὶ Ῥωμαϊκοῖς καὶ Ἑβραϊκοῖς.
42, 43, καὶ ἔλεγεν τῷ Ἰησοῦ, μνήσθητί μου, κύριε, ὅταν ἔλθῃς ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ σου.
43, no punctuation.
bis, as text.
45, καὶ ἐσκοτίσθη ὁ ἥλιος.
48, as text.
53, as text.
55, αἱ *om.*
Luke xxiv. 1, as text.
3, as text.
6, as text (but ἀνέστη for ἠγέρθη.
9, as text.
12, as text.
13, as text.
bis, as text.
ter, as text.
17, ἔσται (= ἔστε).
27, as text (but διερμηνεύειν).
32, as text.
bis, as text.
ter, as text.
36, as text.
bis, *post* αὐτοῖς *habet* ἐγώ εἰμι, μὴ φοβεῖσθαι (—ε).
39, με *om.*
bis, as text.
Luke xxiv. 40, as text (but ἐπέδειξεν).
42, as text.
43, as text.
bis, as text.
44, as text. [ἔδει.
46, οὕτως γέγραπται καὶ οὕτως
47, as text.
bis, punctuation as text, distinctly (but ἀρξάμενον).
51, as text.
52, as text.
53, αἰνοῦντες καὶ εὐλογοῦντες.
John i. 1, 2, punctuated as text.
3, as text.
bis, punctuated οὐδὲ ἕν. ὃ γέγονεν
4, as text.
5, as text.
9, no punctuation.
13, as text.
bis, as text.
14, as text.
bis, as text.
15, as text.
18, εἰ μὴ ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός,
27, as text.
bis, as text.
28, as text.
34, as text.
41, πρῶτος.
42, Ἰωάννου.
45, as text.
51, as text.
John ii. 2, as text.
3, as text.
12, as text.
15, *praem.* ὡς.
17, καταφάγετε (=-αι).
20, as text.

John iii. 3, as text.
4, as text.
bis, as text.
5, as text.
bis, as text.
ter, as text.
quater, as text.
6, as text.
bis, as text.
7, as text.
8, as text.
bis, as text.
13, ὁ ὢν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ *om.*
16, as text.
18, as text.
25, as text.
31, 32, as text, with distinct stop at ἐστίν.
34, as text.
John iv. 1, as text.
bis, as text.
ter, ἢ *om.*
9, as text (but in the order γυναικὸς Σαμαρίτιδος οὔσης).
bis, as text.
23, 24, as text (except:—)
23, αὐτόν] *add.* ἐν πνεύματι.
24, as text.
25, as text.
bis, as text.
ter, as text.
quater, as text.
35, no punctuation.
42, as text.
46, 49, as text.
John v. 1, as text.
2, as text.
bis, Βηθσαϊδά.
3, as text.
bis, ἐκδεχόμενοι τὴν τοῦ ὕδατος κίνησιν.
John v. 4, as text.
27, 28, clearly as text (large gap between ἐστίν and μή).
44, as text.
bis, θεοῦ *om.*
John vi. 4, as text.
14, as text.
15, as text.
51, as text.
52, as text.
55, as text.
56, as text.
59, as text (but Καφαρναούμ).
63, as text.
69, as text.
John vii. 4, αὐτὸ.
8, as text.
16, as text.
21, 22, no indication of punctuation.
38, punctuated as text.
bis, as text.
39, πνεῦμα ἅγιον.
52, as text (but τὰς γραφὰς after ἐραύνησον)
bis, as text.
53–viii. 11 *om.*
John viii. 25, as text (but thus, οτι).
28, no punctuation.
34, as text.
35, ὁ υἱὸς . . . αἰῶνα *om.*
38, ἃ ἐγὼ ἑώρακα ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ταῦτα λαλῶ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἃ ἠκούσατε παρὰ τοῦ πατρός.
38, ἦτε.
ἐποιεῖτε.
44, as text.
57, ἑώρακες.

John viii. 59, without the addition.
John ix. 4, as text.
bis ἡμᾶς.
34, as text.
35, ἀνθρώπου.
John x. 8, as text.
11, as text.
bis, as text.
18, as text (ερει).
22, τότε.
29, ὁ πατήρ μου ὃ δέδωκέν μοι πάντων μείζων ἐστιν.
John xi. 18, as text.
25, as text.
39, as text.
42, as text.
45, ἃ.
50, ἡμῖν.
54, as text.
John xii. 2, as text (but αὐτῷ after διηκόνει).
7, as text.
8, as text.
John xii. 12, as text.
bis, as text.
27, as text.
bis, no punctuation.
28, as text.
32, as text.
41, ἐπεὶ.
John xiii. 2, as text.
bis, ἵνα παραδῷ αὐτὸν Ἴδα Σείμωνος Ἰσκαριώτη.
10, as text.
18, μετ' ἐμοῦ.
26, as text.
bis, as text.
ter, Ἰσκαριώτη.
31, as text.
John xiv. 4, as text.
John xiv. 14, as text (but ἐγὼ for τοῦτο).
bis, as text.
22, as text.
23, as text.
25–xvi. 7 wanting.
John xvi. 8, as text.
bis, as text.
11, as text.
33, as text
John xvii. 7, ἔγνωκα.
11, as text.
bis, as text.
ter, as text (as in 12).
21, as text.
bis, πιστεύῃ.
23, as text.
bis, as text.
24, as text.
bis, as text.
John xviii. 1, τοῦ Κέδρου.
10, as text.
13–24, as text.
24, as text.
28, as text.
John xix. 4, αἰτίαν ἐν αὐτῷ οὐχ εὑρίσκω.
bis, οὐχ.
13, as text.
14, as text.
30, as text.
39, ἕλιγμα.
John xx. 1, as text.
16, as text.
bis, as text.
17, as text.
18, as text.
23, as text.
bis, as text.
ter, as text.

John xx. 24, as text.
29, no punctuation.
John xxi. 15, as text.
16, as text.
John xxi. 16 *bis*, as text.
ter, as text.
17, as text.
25, as text.

Antecedently we expect a MS. from Egypt to show close relationship with BN and their kindred, but when we were informed that the Gospels were in their Western order, visions of a text like that employed by Clement of Alexandria and by the first translators into the Sahidic dialect floated before our eyes. The publication of the text has considerably disillusioned us. For in the first place it is not homogeneous in character. Roughly speaking, the greater part of Matthew goes with the ruck of manuscripts, Mark is agreeably Western at times, Luke is interesting but inconstant, while John is definitely of the BN class. Westcott and Hort long ago pointed out a somewhat similar situation in the oldest uncials as regards different sections of the New Testament, and while it may not be that the four Gospels in our codex were directly copied from four separate rolls of various textual type, it is clear that the texts have come through a deal of experience in the course of their history.

I conceive that the immediate ancestor of this manuscript was, like itself, a codex, with the Gospels in the same order. For it does not seem that in the latter half of the fourth or in the fifth century any one would deliberately choose to give them this order in Egypt, unless for the reason that this was the order of the exemplar. Also it seems that there can be little doubt that the text of Matthew in the first hand of the exemplar was different from what it is in the copy we have. Clearly it had been gone through carefully by a corrector to bring it as far as possible into harmony with the new ecclesiastical (Syrian, Antiochian, Constantinopolitan) type of text which had become fashionable in

the other parts of the Greek-speaking world. And our scribe copied the corrections, not what they were a substitute for, thus following the invariable practice of his class. But the industry of this correcting scribe flagged after he had gone so far. This is what we often find in MSS.,[1] and hence the character of the text of the original hand has been better preserved in the later parts. Mark has suffered least of all, partly because it came last in the codex, and partly because it was the least read and the least appreciated of all the Gospels down to the nineteenth century. This manuscript is interesting, then, because of the number of different strata that appear in it. It will be an advantage to the reader to select from the passages recorded above, first, a number that illustrate the relationship between this manuscript's readings and the Neutral type of text; second, some that show the relationship with "Western" Greek MSS.; and last, some readings that cannot be definitely assigned to either of these classes. Between the second and third groups there is at times no hard and fast distinction. To save space, details of the authorities are not given, except in some striking cases; they are to be sought in the Revisers' *Greek Testament* with select apparatus, above referred to.

"Neutral" readings are found at the following places: Matthew xi. 9, Mark iii. 14 (vi. 20, compare with ἠπόρει ℵBL and the Egyptian versions), vii. 3 πυκνά with ℵ, Luke v. 39 *bis*, vi. 17 καὶ τῆς Περέας compared with καὶ Πιραίας of ℵ (first hand), John iii. 13, viii. 57 ἑώρακες compared with B ἑόρακες, ix. 4 *bis*, x. 22, xvii. 21 *bis*, xix. 39 ἕλιγμα with ℵ*B. Some of these coincidences are most striking.

Examples of readings shared with one or more "Western" Greek MSS. are the following: Matthew vii. 21, Mark i. 40,

[1] A good instance that came under my own notice in 1901 was a Latin MS. at Brussels, 1049 (II. 972).

vii. 4, 6, 9, 24, 28, 33, ix. 38, x. 1, xi. 32, xii. 40, xiii. 2, xiv. 41, 51, Luke vi. 29 εἰς with ℵ*D 700 (the MS. made known by Mr. Hoskier), manuscripts of the Sahidic version, Clement and Origen, vii. 22, xi. 53, 54, xx. 36.

Here follow examples of readings, some of which might very well have been put into the list immediately preceding. With regard to these and their like, two points deserve attention. The text of Mark in this MS. is throughout of consummate interest. It is not perhaps too much to say that it exceeds in interest that of any other surviving Greek MS. It needs to be studied throughout, preferably by a scholar who knows Aramaic as well as Greek. There are some signs that the whole language of the Gospel has been worked over either in an ancestor of this MS. or in an ancestor of the majority of our MSS. Meantime, the two points to which I allude are, first, that our MS. is in a number of cases *the earliest* (even by far the earliest) *Greek attestation for readings previously known only from minuscules;* second, that this MS. sometimes provides *the only known Greek evidence for readings hitherto attested only by a version or Father.* These facts are illustrated by some of the following places: Matthew i. 18 Ἰησοῦ (only) with 74 (a minuscule of the thirteenth century), viii. 5, x. 3, xiv. 30, xv. 39, xxii. 13, Mark i. 27, 29, ii. 27 *bis* ἐκτίσθη with 1 and its family, 700, Old and Peshitta Syriac, Ethiopic, vi. 22, 23 καὶ—δώσω omitted, with the Old Syriac (cf. 1 and its family), 33, ix. 43 εἰς τὴν γέενναν omitted with 1 and its family, 28, some others, and the Old Syriac, x. 14 adds ἐπιτιμήσας with 1 and its family, 13 and its family, 28, 565, the Old Syriac and the Armenian, xi. 3, 8, 10, xiv. 4, 51, agreement with 1 and its family, 13 and its family, 565, 700, Mark xv. 39 κράξας with 565, Old Syriac and Armenian, Luke iv. 44 τῶν Ἰουδαίων with one minuscule, vi. 21 γελάσουσιν, to be compared with γελάσονται of one Old-Latin MS., of the

Old Syriac, MSS. of the Sahidic, of the Armenian and the Ethiopic, of Marcion, Origen, Eusebius, xv. 16, xvii. 17, xviii. 13, xix. 37 *bis* ἀπαντᾶν with Origen, and apparently Origen only (!), xx. 20, xxiv. 39, John viii. 38, xii. 41, xvii. 7 ἔγνωκα with a few minuscules.

The above lists and remarks are a far from adequate treatment of this interesting MS. For further information readers are referred to the article of Mr. Hoskier in the EXPOSITOR for May and June, 1913, and to the complete collation with the text of Westcott and Hort which Professor Goodspeed of Chicago has published in the *American Journal of Theology*, from July, 1913, to April, 1914.

ALEX. SOUTER.

NOTES ON THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

XVII. THE ARREST, THE TRIALS, AND THE CRUCIFIXION (John xviii. and xix.).

(1) IN dealing with this portion of the Fourth Gospel we are on ground common to it and the Synoptics, and are especially confronted with a discrepancy as regards the day and the hour of the death of Jesus. (i.) As regards the first point many scholars give the preference to the view of the Fourth Gospel, that the Lord's Supper was held on the day prior to the Passover (xiii. 1 πρὸ δὲ τῆς ἑορτῆς τοῦ πάσχα, xviii. 28 ἵνα μὴ μιανθῶσιν ἀλλὰ φάγωσιν τὸ πάσχα), and that Jesus died at the time when the Passover Lamb was being sacrificed. This seems to have been also Paul's view (τὸ πάσχα ἡμῶν ἐτύθη Χριστός 1 Cor. v. 7). It likewise appears to be the primary tradition in the Synoptics. According to Mark xiv. 2 (=Matt. xxvi. 5) the plan of the Jewish rulers was to take Jesus by craft, and to put Him to death, but "not on the feast day, lest there be an uproar of the people." "To the secondary tradition in

the Synoptics is due the identification of the Last Supper with the Paschal meal; and to this view there are several objections. Work was going on (Mark xv. 21; Luke xxiii. 56) and arms were being carried (Mark xiv. 47), both of which, as well as a meeting of the Sanhedrin, were strictly prohibited on the feast day. Some of the details preserved by the Synoptic Gospels about what happened on the day of the Crucifixion and the day after tally, in fact, with the primary tradition, and are inconsistent with the special identification of the Last Supper and the Passover. . . . The Synoptic Gospels are inconsistent with themselves, and the Fourth Gospel intervenes in support of the better tradition" (Moffatt's *Introduction*, etc., p. 544). Dr. Moffatt adds a very important general consideration. "The recognition of this has important bearings on the whole question of early Christian tradition, for if, in one case, the typological significance of an event is found to be derived from the event, there is a probability that in other cases an incident is not to be dismissed as unhistorical simply because it lends itself to a religious application or moral" (pp. 544–5). The evangelist did not invent history to illustrate doctrine, but actual history suggested doctrine to him. Dr. Moffatt also finds a confirmation of the Johannine view in the saying recorded by Luke xxii. 15–16, in which Jesus expresses His desire to eat the Passover with His disciples, and also confesses the disappointment of His hope. The writer has preferred to set forth the argument in favour of the view of the Fourth Gospel in the words of a scholar who cannot be suspected, as he himself might be, of a bias to overestimate the value of the Gospel historically. (ii.) According to Mark xv. 25, to turn to the second point, the Crucifixion took place at the "third hour," that is nine in the morning; but according to John xix. 14 at the "sixth hour," that is noon, the trial

was still going on. Not only has Mark three consistent notes of time: Jesus is brought to Pilate "straightway in the morning" (verse 1); the Crucifixion takes place at nine o'clock; and there is darkness from noon till three o'clock (verse 33); but the hour mentioned in the Fourth Gospel does not seem to allow time for all the events which followed before nightfall. Mark's notes of time might be challenged on the ground that as the slaughter of the Paschal lambs began at three o'clock, that hour would also be fixed as the time when the sacrifice of Christ was consummated; but against this view is the consideration that Mark places the Crucifixion on the day following the paschal meal, as he identifies the last supper with it. The difficulty has been evaded in several ways. A corruption of the text in the Fourth Gospel has been assumed (an ancient solution), and John is supposed to have used a different reckoning of time, corresponding to the modern, from midnight to noon, but even Westcott, who favours this explanation, admits that this mode was unusual (*The Gospel of St. John*, p. 282), and Dr. Sanday has given it up (*Outlines*, p. 147). Ramsay appeals to the elasticity of the reckoning of time in the East; but allowing for this to the utmost, could Mark's third hour follow John's sixth? With Dr. Sanday we must leave the question open, only adding that while in this instance the Synoptic reckoning seems more probable than the Johannine, yet that does not justify a suspicion of general inaccuracy in the Fourth Gospel.

(2) While it lies beyond the purpose of these articles to attempt a minute comparison of the Fourth Gospel with the Synoptics to produce a complete harmony of their contents, we may glance at the omissions and additions in the Fourth Gospel in so far as by these we may learn something of the character of the Gospel and the qualifications of the evangelist. Westcott's *Gospel of St. John* on

pp. 249-250 gives a useful summary of these omissions and additions. Without attempting to deal with them all we may select the more important. (i.) Why does the Fourth Gospel omit an account of the agony in Gethsemane; and pass at once to an account of the arrest? (xviii. 1–3). As the evangelist is not ashamed of the humanity of Jesus, but lays stress on it, we are not justified in saying that the agony was doctrinally offensive to him, and so he passed it over. In a previous article it was suggested that xii. 27 sounds like a faint echo of the Synoptic tradition of the scene at which the evangelist was not an eyewitness. A reason may now be suggested for his absence from the Garden at the Agony, and his presence at the Arrest. If he was, as has been argued hitherto, an influential citizen of Jerusalem, connected by some close relationship, as we shall conclude in discussing verse 15, with the high priest, if he was the host at the Last Supper, and if he alone knew why Judas had left the board, what more probable than that, when Jesus went to Gethsemane, he went to the high-priest's house to discover what was being done, and that he came to Gethsemane with, or soon after, the band sent to arrest Jesus? He had not reached the spot when Judas gave the traitor's kiss (Mark xiv. 44; Luke xxii. 48), and so he does not record it. For had he witnessed it, he, who was not inclined to spare the traitor any of his infamy (cf. xii. 6), would not have passed over the shameful act. He had arrived, however, when Jesus made the voluntary surrender. While the motive which he assigns in verse 4 is in accord with his theological attitude, the effect of Jesus' presence he records in verse 6 need not be regarded as doctrine turned into history; for a similar power to overawe a crowd is ascribed to Jesus by Luke (iv. 30); and there are many authentic instances of such influence exercised by a strong personality. Jesus' appeal that

His disciples should be spared (verse 8) is quite consistent with His character, even although the reason given for it in the following verse again betrays the evangelist's standpoint, and if intended to indicate Jesus' motive introduces an artificiality which we may be sure had no place in the "inner life" of Jesus. The mention of the name Malchus (verse 10) is not a suspicious realistic touch; but a proof of the evangelist's more intimate knowledge of the household of the high priest. The words in which Jesus rebukes Peter repeat the image of the prayer in Gethsemane, and so bear the mark of authenticity (verse 11); and it is significant that the fourth evangelist offers us this close link with the Synoptic record. (ii.) Why, again, does the Fourth Gospel alone record the private examination before Annas or Caiaphas (xviii. 12–14, 19-24), and omit any mention of the public trial recorded by the Synoptics? We may here also surely follow the clue which has led us hitherto. The evangelist alone was present as a privileged spectator at the private examination, while the twelve who had forsaken Jesus at His arrest and fled made no attempt to rejoin Him for some time, even if it had been possible for them to gain admission. When Peter did venture back, it was only the influence of the disciple known to the high priest, i.e., the evangelist, which secured him admission to the outer court (verse 16), not the inner chamber, where the examination was going on. It is probable that as soon as the evangelist learned the intentions of this private conclave regarding Jesus, the confirmation of which by the public assembly of the Sanhedrin seemed certain, he did not wait any longer, but made his way to the palace of Pilate to use what influence he had to convey to the procurator the truth about the situation. Do not Pilate's attitude and conversation indicate that he knew more about Jesus than his accusers were imparting; and is

not a reasonable explanation the intervention in some form of the evangelist? It must be admitted, however, that the course of events is not made quite clear in this passage. Is the high priest referred to in verse 19 Annas or Caiaphas? Verses 13 and 24 would indicate Caiaphas; but if Caiaphas examined Jesus in the house of Annas, why did Annas send Jesus bound to Caiaphas (verse 24) to undergo presumably another examination? Even if the high priest was Annas, since he bears that title in Acts iv. 6, and shares it with Caiaphas in Luke iii. 2, why after the examination was Jesus sent to Caiaphas? Further, the division into two parts of the story of Peter (verses 15–18 and 25–27) forces on us the conclusion that here again we are faced with a displacement. Dr. Moffatt (*The New Testament*, p. 139) inserts verses 19–24 between verses 14 and 15, and so makes verses 15–18 continuous with verses 25–27, while omitting 25a as a repetition of 18a. This arrangement requires us to assume that the high priest in verse 19 is Caiaphas; but if he conducted the examination even in the house of Annas, why are we told in verse 24 that it was Annas who sent Jesus to Caiaphas? This difficulty remains. "The dispatch of Jesus," says Dr. Moffatt, "to the latter ceases to be purposeless, as it is in the traditional order" (*Introduction*, p. 558). Surely this claim is unjustified unless verse 24 is placed before verse 19. Then the order of events becomes clear. Taken to the house of Annas for some purpose of which we are now ignorant, and of which the evangelist himself may not have had personal knowledge, as he may not have had as free access to the house of Annas as to that of Caiaphas, Jesus was sent bound to Caiaphas, by whom the private examination was conducted. It is a bare conjecture that Annas had been more active in securing Jesus' arrest than Caiaphas, and that the captors would therefore go to him

for further directions ; but that to preserve the appearance of legality, as soon as possible the prisoner was sent to the high priest himself. It may be added that verse 15 speaks of the court of the high priest, and so presupposes that the removal from the house of Annas to that of Caiaphas had taken place, a further justification of the rearrangement proposed. But if, as is probable, the evangelist was present at the private examination within the chamber, while Peter was outside in the court while it was going on, that is an additional reason for placing verse 24 before verse 19. A minor point in this passage demands a brief notice. The evangelist's description of Caiaphas as " high priest that same year " (verse 13) is no proof of his ignorance of Jewish customs, for the words do not mean that he regarded the high priesthood as an annual appointment, but simply mean that in the recollection of the evangelist the year of the death of Jesus stood out from all other years, and the one thing memorable about Caiaphas was that he was the religious head of the nation in the year which was so significant for its destiny.

(iii.) It has been necessary to refer to the passage which deals with Peter's denial, and a restoration of its unity has been suggested (verses 15–18, 25b–27). John's account does not agree closely with the Synoptics ; but the differences are not such as to challenge his trustworthiness as a historian. As has just been suggested, he was no eye-witness of the scene, but was within the chamber when the examination of Jesus was going on at the same time. If he got his account second-hand even from Peter himself, the condition of the disciple who denied at the time was such that he probably had not so distinct a recollection as always to give a quite coherent account. And it is not impossible that the account came to the evangelists through some servant in the high priest's court. Of such

a scene different eyewitnesses would give very varying accounts. It is not necessary to attempt the task of harmonising. The significance of verses 15 and 16 as regards the personality of the evangelist must be reserved for subsequent discussion.

(iv.) Peculiar to the Fourth Gospel is the account of the first conference of the Jews with Pilate and Pilate's private examinations of Jesus (xviii. 28–38a; xix. 9–11). We may offer the same explanation as before. At the conference and private examinations the evangelist was present, as one who had access to the governor as he had to the high priest. Possibly the language of Jesus has been modified to some extent by the characteristic phraseology of the evangelist, and his distinctive view of the truth and witness-bearing. The conversation between Pilate and Jesus does not appear at all improbable, even if we have not a *verbatim* report of it. Pilate was anxious to discover if Jesus cherished the political ambition charged against Him. Jesus convinced Pilate that no danger to the Roman dominion need be feared from Him. In emphasising the spirituality of His aims He impressed Pilate as a harmless visionary. The contemptuous, sceptical question, What is truth? suits both context and occasion.

Verse 32 betrays the evangelist's theological interest and standpoint. Is it likely that Jesus in speaking to Pilate would have described His enemies as the *Jews* (verse 36), as He is also represented as doing in addressing His disciples (xiii. 33)? A characteristic of the evangelist's terminology has been transferred to the speech of Jesus. The account in the Fourth Gospel covers common ground with the Synoptics as regards the offer of the release of a prisoner, and the choice of Barabbas rather than Jesus (xviii. 39–40); but differs from the Synoptics in placing a scourging, a meeting by the soldiers, and the *Ecce Homo*

(xix. 1–5) between this choice and the call for crucifixion. He alone reports the charge of blasphemy made by the chief priests and officers (verse 7), when Pilate refused to condemn on the political accusation; and Pilate's attempt to probe the matter to the bottom in the second private interview with Jesus (verses 9–11).

Jesus' silence at the beginning in this second inquiry was a rebuke of the treatment of His previous declaration by Pilate (xviii. 38); but it was broken in compassion to remind Pilate, who claimed the authority of judge, that his position involved the obligation of righteous judgment. There is a touch of pity in the declaration that Caiaphas' sin was made the more heinous because he was using the Roman judge as his tool, and in the indirect indication that in consenting to be so used Pilate himself could not remain guiltless. In all these and other additional details there is nothing that need excite our suspicion; as the evangelist had sources of information which the Synoptists lacked, and their accounts cannot be taken as the absolute standard of historical accuracy.

(v.) In the final encounter of Pilate with the Jews (12–16) ending in his weak compliance the fourth evangelist is in substantial agreement with the Synoptists, although differing in detail. His omission of the second mockery after the condemnation, the impressment of Simon, the lamentations of the women and Jesus' compassionate warning, the repentance of the second robber, is no proof of any tendency; but rather confirms the assumption which the writer believes all the evidence warrants, that the evangelist almost entirely reported only what he had himself seen and heard; and this is surely a safer clue to follow in explaining both omissions and additions than the constant ascription of this or that tendency unless the evangelist's pragmatism is quite obvious.

(vi.) Without noticing any further details of the narrative we may concentrate our attention on the words from the Cross reported by John alone, the last charge, the cry of bodily need, the sigh of relief or shout of triumph (xix. 26, 27, 28, 30). That the mother of Jesus was committed to the care of the beloved disciple is not in itself improbable, because the brethren of Jesus had remained unbelieving, and the tragedy of the Cross was likely to harden them in unbelief; because he alone had a home in Jerusalem, to which he could at once take her; and because he, with his more intimate knowledge of the mind of Jesus, could help and comfort her more than any of the twelve. If, whenever the charge was given, he led the mother away to his home (verse 27), his absence for a time from the Cross may explain his silence regarding one or two of the sayings recorded elsewhere. Even if he reported the confession of thirst in opposition to the docetism which he met with in his later years, yet such a cry is altogether probable, as a burning thirst was one of the worst tortures accompanying crucifixion. Whatever meaning we attach to the words "It is finished," whether uttered in resignation or in triumph, there is nothing intrinsically improbable in them. The omission of the cry of desolation need not be explained by the evangelist's Christology; but it may have been uttered during his absence for the reason given in verse 27. Of the phenomenon recorded in verse 34 there is said to be a physiological explanation, and the narrative has no hint of the symbolical meaning which seems to be assigned in 1 John v. 6, although the reference there may be to the Baptism and Crucifixion; and we need not here assume that history is invented to illustrate doctrine.

The 28th verse has a suspicious appearance at first sight, but it vanishes if we accept Marcus Dods' explanation.

" Jesus did not feel thirsty and proclaim it with the intention of fulfilling Scripture, which would be a spurious fulfilment, but in His complaint and the response to it, John sees a fulfilment of Psalm lxix. 22 " (*Expositor's Greek Testament*, i. p. 858). This argument from prophecy appears also in verses 24, 36, and 37, but there is nothing in the details in which such fulfilment is found to warrant the assumption that the history was made to shape the prophecy. In verse 35 the evangelist may appear to " protest too much " ; but it is by no means certain that the verse is the evangelist's. Probably it is an editorial gloss, such as may be suspected elsewhere, an attestation of the trustworthiness of the eyewitness whose record the Gospel claims to be. Why it should be inserted just at this point it is hard to understand. The phenomenon may have appeared so extraordinary as to demand specially reliable evidence. Or a symbolical meaning afterwards attached to it may have seemed so important as to demand such emphasis. Whatever the explanation, we are not compelled to charge the evangelist with an ostentatious display of his own trustworthiness.

(3) We must now consider the significance of the statement in xviii. 15 that " that disciple was known unto the high priest." Is it likely that a Galilæan fisherman would have such acquaintance with the high priest, and such access to his house ? Even if, as has been conjectured, John, the son of Zebedee, looked after the sale of his father's fish in Jerusalem, and the high priest was a customer, is the fishmonger more likely than the fishermen to have had this privileged position ? During the ministry of Jesus this John was with Jesus in Galilee, and if he be identified with the unnamed disciple who followed Jesus, he was with John the Baptist before that; and so he had not so recent a connexion with the high priest's

household as the description suggests. It has again and again been pointed out how familiar the evangelist was with the varied and varying state of opinion and sentiment in Jerusalem, how well-informed he was of the designs of the priesthood against Jesus; and in this article it has already been suggested as probable that he was an eye-witness of the private examination before Caiaphas, and also of the private interview of Jesus with Pilate. This, combined with the statement here, is surely cumulative evidence that he was a person of distinction and influence in Jerusalem. A confirmation of this view may be found in the testimony of Polycrates, bishop of Ephesus, in a letter written to Rome about 190 A.D., that "John, too, who leaned on the Lord's breast, who had been a priest and worn the high priest's mitre (τὸ πέταλον), both witness (μάρτυς) and teacher—he sleeps in Ephesus" (Eusebius' *Ecclesiastical History*, Bk. v., c. 24). Professor Burkitt's comment on this statement is, "Here it is definitely implied that the Fourth Evangelist was a member of one of the chief priestly families" (*The Gospel History*, p. 251). According to this writer the conclusions we may draw about the evangelist are that (1) he had been a Jew of Jerusalem; (2) he had been (as some evidence in his Gospel indicates —his views of the resurrection and angels) an adherent of the Sadducean party; (3) he had been a priest, for he describes himself as known unto the high priest (xviii. 15), and Polycrates ascribes to him even high priestly functions. If it be objected that a disciple of such position would have been expressly mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles, we may recall what has been before said about what appears to be the intentional concealment in the Synoptics in regard to the family in Bethany; and we may further observe that, if this Gospel is to be trusted, there were Judæan disciples, and yet in the history of the early church

these Judæan disciples do not come into prominence. Was there a reason in some family connexion why the evangelist did not openly cast in his lot with the primitive community, and hold a conspicuous position in it? Did he hope by avoiding an open breach with the priesthood to continue the exercise of his influence on behalf of the disciples as we have conjectured he did on behalf of the Master? Can xii. 42–43 contain a personal confession? Such questions are worth pondering.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

LITERARY ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE BOOK OF ECCLESIASTICUS.

xxxvii. 25. *The days of the life of a man may be numbered: but the days of Israel are innumerable.*

Compare the application of this by Matthew Arnold, in his preface to *Culture and Anarchy*, where, speaking of the Hebraising Philistines in British life, he remarks:—

> Ousted they will not be, but transformed. Ousted they do not deserve to be, and will not be. For *the days of Israel are innumerable;* and in its blame of Hebraising too, and in its praise of Hellenising, culture must not fail to keep its flexibility. . . . The habits and discipline received from Hebraism remain for our race an eternal possession; and, as humanity is constituted, one must never assign to them the second rank to-day, without being prepared to restore to them the first rank to-morrow.

xxxviii. 17, 20–21. *Make bitter weeping and make passionate wailing, and let thy mourning be according to his desert, for one day or two, lest thou be evil spoken of: and so be comforted for thy sorrow. Give not thy heart unto sorrow: put it away, remembering the last end. Him thou shalt not profit, and thou wilt hurt thyself.*

> When we have received the last breath of our friend [says Jeremy Taylor in *Holy Dying*], and closed his eyes, and composed his body for the grave, then seasonable is the counsel of the son of Sirach:

"Weep bitterly, and make great moan, and use lamentation, as he is worthy; and that a day or two, lest thou be evil spoken of; and then comfort thyself for thy heaviness. But take no grief to heart; for there is no morning again: thou shalt not do him good, but hurt thyself." Solemn and appointed mournings are good expressions of our dearness to the departed soul, and of his worth, and our value of him; and it hath its praise in nature and in manners and in public customs; but the praise of it is not in the Gospel, that is, it hath no direct and proper uses in religion.

xxxviii. 24. *The wisdom of a learned man cometh by opportunity of leisure: and he that hath little business shall be wise.*

In his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, Burke quotes this and xxxviii. 25 from a book which, apocryphal or canonical, "contains," he is sure, "a great deal of sense and truth"—and quotes them to corroborate this argument against artificial equality:—

The Chancellor of France at the opening of the states, said, in a tone of oratorical flourish, that all occupations were honourable. If he meant only, that no honest employment was disgraceful, he would not have gone beyond the truth. But in asserting that anything is honourable, we imply some distinction in its favour. The occupation of a hair-dresser, or of a working tallow-chandler, cannot be a matter of honour to any person—to say nothing of a number of more servile employments. Such descriptions of men ought not to suffer oppression from the state; but the state suffers oppression, if such as they, either individually or collectively, are permitted to rule.

xxxviii. 25. *How shall he become wise that holdeth the plough, that driveth oxen and is occupied in their labours, and whose discourse is of the stock of bulls?*

Certain it is [says Boswell] that Johnson paid great attention to Taylor. He now, however, said to me: "Sir, I love him; but I do not love him more; my regard for him does not increase. As it is said in the Apocrypha, his talk is of bullocks."

The teeming damp that comes up from the plough-furrow [Keats wrote to his friend Taylor] is of great effect in taming the fierceness of a strong man—more than his labour . . . let him leave the plough, and he will think quietly of his supper. Agriculture is the tamer of men, it enervates their nature—this appears a great cause of the imbecility of the Chinese.

xl. 1–5. *Great travail is created for every man, and an heavy yoke is upon the sons of Adam, from the day that they go out of their mother's womb, till the day that they return to the mother of all things. Their imagination of things to come, and the day of death, trouble their thoughts, and cause fear of heart; from him that sitteth on a throne of glory, unto him that is humbled in earth and ashes; from him that weareth purple and a crown, unto him that is clothed with a linen frock. Wrath and envy, trouble and unquietness, fear of death, and anger, and strife; and in the time of rest upon his bed his night sleep doth change his knowledge.*

Compare the striking use of this passage in the sixth chapter of *Old Mortality*, where the fanatic Burley, after devotions couched "in strong and emphatic language, rendered more impressive by the Orientalism of Scripture," tries to persuade young Morton to join the Covenanting cause, and fails meantime.

He then mounted his horse, and, turning to Morton, repeated the text of Scripture, "An heavy yoke was ordained for the sons of Adam from the day they go out of their mother's womb, till the day that they return to the mother of all things; from him who is clothed in blue silk and weareth a crown, even to him who weareth simple linen—wrath, envy, trouble, and unquietness, rigour, strife, and fear of death in time of rest." Having uttered these words he set his horse in motion, and soon disappeared among the boughs of the forest.

xl. 11–12. *All things that are of the waters return into the sea. All bribery and injustice shall be blotted out; and good faith shall stand for ever.*

Not ours to give or lose is life;
Will nature, when her brave ones fall,
Remake her work? or songs recall
Death's victim slain in useless strife?

That rivers flow into the sea
Is loss and waste, the foolish say,
Nor know that back they find their way,
Unseen, to where they wont to be.

Showers fall upon the hills, springs flow,
The river runneth still at hand,
Brave men are born into the land,
And whence the foolish do not know.—CLOUGH.

xl. 19, 23. *Children and the building of a city establish a man's name ; and a blameless wife is counted above both. . . . A friend and a companion never meet amiss ; and a wife with her husband is above both.*

Note how Sirach, if in accordance with his touch of peculiar harshness he speaks with special virulence of the sins of the bad woman, excels Proverbs in his deepened appreciation of the noble wife. The excellence of the virtuous woman of Proverbs lies, after all, mainly in her industry and diligence. She is above all things the good housewife. Sirach strikes a higher note. It is almost surprising, from the old Jewish point of view, to find him not only putting the companionship of a wife above the companionship of a friend, but also above children. "Friends and companions meet from time to time, but above both is the wife with her husband. Children and the building of a city make a man's name lasting, but a blameless woman is prized above both."—MONTEFIORE : *Hibbert Lectures*, pp. 491–2.

xl. 28–29. *My son, lead not a beggar's life ; better it is to die than to beg. A man that looketh unto the table of another, his life is not to be counted for a life.*

Thou shalt have proof how savoureth of salt
The bread of others, and how hard a road
The going up and down another's stairs.
—Dante's *Paradiso* (xvii. : Longfellow's version).

xli. 3. *Fear not the sentence of death ; remember them that have been before thee, and that come after : this is the sentence from the Lord over all flesh.*

'Tis an inevitable chance—the first statute in Magna Charta—an everlasting Act of Parliament—all must die.—BURTON : *Anatomy of Melancholy*, p. 215.

xlii. 12–13. *Look not upon everybody in regard of beauty, and sit not in the midst of women ; for from garments cometh a moth, and from a woman a woman's wickedness.*

That thou wert beautiful, and I not blind,
Hath been the sin which shuts me from mankind.
—BYRON, in *The Lament of Tasso.*

xlii. 24. *All things are double one against another, and God hath made nothing imperfect.*

In his preface to Butler's *Analogy*, Bishop Halifax quotes this verse, and adds :—

On this single observation of the son of Sirach, the whole fabric of our prelate's defence of religion, in his *Analogy*, is raised.

In his own sixth sermon, Butler observes that

there is a much more exact correspondence between the natural and the moral world than we are apt to take notice of. The inward frame of man does in a peculiar manner answer to the external condition and circumstances of life, in which he is placed. This is a particular instance of that general observation of the son of Sirach : *all things are double one against another, and God hath made nothing imperfect.*

xliii. 26–29. *By his word all things consist. We may speak much, and yet come short : wherefore in sum, he is all. How shall we be able to magnify him ? For he is great above all his works. The Lord is terrible, and very great, and marvellous is his power.*

In the *Spectator* (number 531) Addison remarks that—

Several eminent philosophers have imagined that the soul, in her separate state, may have new faculties springing up in her, which she is not capable of exerting during her present union with the body ; and whether these faculties may not correspond with other attributes in the divine nature, and open to us hereafter new matter of wonder and adoration, we are altogether ignorant. This, as I have said before, we ought to acquiesce in, that the Sovereign Being, the great Author of Nature, has in him all possible perfection, as well in Kind as in Degree ; to speak according to our methods of conceiving. I shall only add under this head, that where we have raised our notion of this Infinite Being as high as it is possible for the mind of man to go, it will fall infinitely short of what He really is. There is no end of His greatness : The most exalted Creature he has made, is only capable of adoring it, none but himself can comprehend it. The advice of the son of Sirach is very just and sublime in this Light. [Then follows a citation of Ecclus. xliii. 26–32.]

xliii. 30. *When ye glorify the Lord, exalt him as much as you can ; for even yet will he far exceed ; and when ye exalt*

him, put forth all your strength, and be not weary ; for ye can never go far enough.

These words [says Butler in his fourteenth sermon] we may apply to the whole of devotion. Our most raised affections of every kind cannot but fall short and be disproportionate, when an infinite Being is the object of them. This is the highest exercise and employment of mind that a creature is capable of.

xliv. 1. *Let us now praise famous men, and our fathers that begat us.*

As the philosophy of the Hebrew Scriptures is contained in the larger part of this book—possibly from older documents—so [says Dean Stanley] their poetry finds a voice in the conclusion, which is beyond question original. It is the song of praise which, beginning with the glories of the Creation, breaks forth into that "Hymn of the Forefathers," as it is called in its ancient title, to which there is no parallel in the Old Testament, but of which the catalogue of the worthies of faith in the Epistle to the Hebrews is an obvious imitation. Here and here only is a full expression given to that natural instinct of reverence for the mighty dead, which has in these striking words been heard from generation to generation in the festivals of the great benefactors of Christendom, or when the illustrious of the earth are committed to the grave.

"Let us now praise famous men and the fathers that begat us." "Their bodies are buried in peace, but their name liveth for evermore." It begins with the unknown sages of antiquity ; it closes with the "Ultimus Judaeorum," as it seemed, of his own generation, Simon the Just. Well might the grandson delight to render into Greek for the countrymen of Pindar and Pericles a roll of heroes more noble than were ever commemorated at the Isthmian games or in the Athenian Ceramicus.

xliv. 14. *Their bodies are buried in peace, and their name liveth to all generations.*

This is the verse inscribed under Macaulay's name upon his tomb in Westminster Abbey : "His body is buried in peace, but his name liveth for evermore."

xlviii. 14. *He did wonders in his life, and at his death his works were marvellous.*

Izaak Walton takes this verse as the motto for his biography of Dr. John Donne. JAMES MOFFATT.

THE RELIGION OF OUR CLASSICS AND THE CLASSICS OF OUR RELIGION.

Not long ago, in a well-known German popular series on theological sunjects, a scholar published a book with the title *The Religion of our Classics*; whereupon it was remarked, by some bitter tongue, that he might have been better employed in writing on *The Classics of our Religion.* A controversy ensued, in which these rival phrases were bandied about by the combatants. But the public, looking on, soon discerned that both phrases were good—both referring to things which are treasured possessions of all cultivated Christians—and the upshot has been the happy one, that a publicist has advertised a new series of books, entitled *The Religion of the Classics and the Classics of Religion.* More than a hundred separate volumes are promised, for the production of which many of the most eminent pens have engaged themselves; and some dozen or score of the books have already issued from the press.

The Religion of our Classics—the Classics of our Religion—these are alluring phrases for us also; and it may be worth our while to linger a little over the ideas suggested by them.

The Religion of our Classics.

The German classics selected by Professor Sell, the author of the work mentioned at the commencement of this article, are Lessing and Herder, Goethe and Schiller; and it would be interesting to consider which would be the four corresponding names in our literature, if the choice were

limited to four. Would they be Shakspeare and Milton, Burns and Scott? At all events, to set forth the religious opinions of these four would be no less interesting or instructive than the study of the four selected from the literature of Germany by Professor Sell. But this quartette could not be chosen without the claim of others to be included being clamoured for by their admirers—names such as Wordsworth and Browning, Thackeray and Carlyle.

It is astonishing how many of the greater figures in our English Parnassus may be cited as express teachers of religion—Spenser and Milton, Cowper and Wordsworth, Ruskin, Carlyle and Emerson, Tennyson and Browning—and it is worthy of note that the proportion of such writers increases, instead of diminishing, as we come near to our own time. Tennyson belonged to the same section of society as the leaders of the Broad Church party; and their thoughts, to a large extent, recur in his poems. Browning, on account of his Nonconformist connexions, was the denizen of an ampler world, and his religious ideas have a depth and penetration more akin to the atmosphere of a Congregationalist meeting-house. It is indubitable that not a few of the trains of thought in the religious poems of both these writers were started by sermons they had heard in church; although they have amply repaid the debt by the multitudes of sermons for which they have supplied suggestions. So frequently is the poetry of Cowper an impassioned reproduction of preaching that he almost separates himself from the poets and has to be reckoned among the pulpiteers. It was by Evangelical doctrine that Cowper was inspired; but, when we turn to High Church doctrine, we recognise Keble and Newman rather as preachers who sometimes versify than poets who sometimes preach. There can be no doubt that a poet can give to a thought a distinction by

which it shines, besides, by the help of rhyme or rhythm, making it easily remembered. It is a deeper question whether the ability of a religious idea to lay hold of a poet's mind is a test of its truth and of its value. Would preachers be justified in putting in the forefront of their message those elements which have proved attractive to poets? Philosophy and poetry have been characterised by a famous thinker as a mirror with two names, differing only in cut and frame; and some would say the same of poetry and theology.

On the whole, however, the impression made by the utterance of religious truth in literature is partly due to its rarity. A theologian or preacher is continually uttering himself on such subjects as a matter of course; and, it is to be feared, a large discount is taken off his words because of their professional character—"He says what he ought to say," remarks the hearer, in company with the Northern Farmer—but the fact that the poet's ordinary subjects are secular gives piquancy to the rare occasions when he touches on religion. Hence, too, the question of religion in any of our poets is most interesting when there is room for debate as to whether the author in question is entitled to be heard on the subject at all. The poet Burns is a case in point. On the one hand, he may be said to have had a heritage in religion; for his father was a religious character; and perhaps it is his father's religion more than his own that is depicted in his greatest religious piece, *The Cotter's Saturday Night*. Then, there is a natural religiousness, of which Burns had a good share. There is, also, an influence of Christianity reaching beyond those who are savingly interested in it; and he was well qualified to give expression to the sentiments arising from this source. But, on the other hand, he gave way to two vices, and ultimately became the victim of them, which are so contrary to the

Christian character that those who succumb to them are generally regarded as being outside the pale ; and the question is, whether one who has thus offended is entitled to be called as a witness for Christian truth.

I for one should be loth to give up the testimony of Burns ; for, in the sphere of ethics at any rate, he has expressed many a truth in terms which touch life to the quick, and sometimes the wisdom which he utters derives weight from his very errors. But it may be that teachers of religion are too eager to commandeer into the service of their subject the testimony of the unwilling or the unfit. Christianity is not so desparately in need of being acknowledged or praised as to accept testimonials without asking questions about the competency of those who grant them. I should question the propriety of citing George Meredith, for example, as a teacher of religion ; and, when, in a book just published in an English edition, entitled *Jesus in the Nineteenth Century and After*, I find pages devoted to the opinions of H. G. Wells, the novelist, on a theme so sacred, I feel inclined to say that I know well enough beforehand not only what Mr. Wells' opinions on Jesus will be, but also what they are worth. The same book descends to testimony still more questionable ; but I disdain to go lower than Mr. Wells. The Scripture says : " The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God ; for they are foolishness to him ; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." Religion is a subject about which all think they know ; and all are, at any rate, for putting their word into the discussion. But the truth is, comparatively few have a right to be exponents of religion ; the privilege has to be purchased at a high price. Mr. W. E. Henley made a ferocious attack on Robert Louis Stevenson, because he had dared to lift up his voice among the saints. Stevenson and he had sinned together ; there had been a

time when they had together frequented Bohemia ; and the less fortunate man could not bear to think of his old comrade in the opposite camp ; but the reason why, in his later life, Stevenson was hailed by the religious world was because it was believed that he had come to know what penitence and humility are ; and these form the password into the ranks of the confessors. To have doubted, to have despaired, to have prayed, to have confessed—without more or less of such experiences the witness of anyone to religion is of no value ; and it is better to go against the enemy with Gideon's three hundred than to sweep up cheap suffrages from every street-corner.

In one of his best-known essays Lord Macaulay raised the question whether poetry would survive the spread of science. The human mind, it was thought, might become so habituated to the contemplation of facts that it would lose all taste for poetry. Of this, however, we have no fear now ; for, by deeper study, it has been ascertained that the objects the factual side of which constitutes science have, at the same time, another side, appealing to the æsthetic sensibilities, the interpretation of which is poetry. And we are now proceeding further in the same direction ; for the conviction is spreading that the same things which present one side to science and another to art have still a third side, which they present to the religious instinct ; and this is the highest side of all. Literature has principally to do with the æsthetic side of things ; but it always dignifies itself when it reaches over to the religious side, and that in so doing it does not cease to be treading on solid ground is proved by the fact that it improves when it touches religion. In all Shakspeare's works there is no character which so completely draws forth the wealth of the author's mind as *Henry the Fifth ;* but the career of Prince Hal is Shakspeare's version of the Prodigal Son. By Wordsworth the highwatermark

is generally recognised to have been reached in the *Ode on the Intimations of Immortality*, a thoroughly religious piece. Among all Scott's work no single novel surpasses *The Heart of Midlothian*, and in *The Heart of Midlothian* no scene equals that in which Jeanie Deans, in spite of her overwhelming love for her frail sister, refuses to save the criminal's life by telling a lie. Hawthorne's masterpiece is *The Scarlet Letter*. Thus is the religion in our classics the most real and lofty element they contain ; and this may be cited as a contribution to the argument that religion is the flower and blossom of human life, and that Christianity is the absolute and the final religion.

The Classics of our Religion

The mention of the other half of our subject reminds me of a work bearing almost the identical title, which has long been one of the favourites in my library—*Our Christian Classics*, in four volumes, by the late Dr. James Hamilton, minister of Regent Square Church, London. This is a survey of all the religious writers of the English race, from Cædmon and the Venerable Bede down to Cowper and Wesley, with specimens of their productions. Far too many are enumerated ; for, when classics are spoken of, not common stones of the brook should be intended but gems from the mine. Yet Dr. Hamilton was singularly qualified for the task he had undertaken ; and he gives a quaint account of his unconscious preparation for it. Speaking of the compiler—that is, of himself—he says : " It was his lot to be born in the midst of old books. Before he could read them, they had become a kind of companions, and, in their coats of brown calf and white vellum, great was his admiration for tomes as tall as himself. By and by, when he was allowed to open the leather portals, and look in on the solemn authors in peaked beards and wooden ruffs, his reverence

deepened for the mighty days of the great departed; and with some vague prepossessions, his first use of the art of reading was to mimic an older example, and sit poring for hours over Manton and Hopkins, Reynolds and Horton. Indeed, so intense did this old-fashioned affection grow, that he can very well remember, being compelled to shut the volume and retire to rest, how night after night he carried to his cot some bulky folio, and only fell asleep to dream of a paradise where there was no end of books, and nothing to interrupt the reader." As this quotation proves, Dr. Hamilton could wield himself a graceful pen. Indeed, though, I fancy, his name will be sought in vain in any literary history of his generation, I venture to esteem him a more accomplished and gifted writer than many whose names do figure there; and, although, as has been hinted, his classics are too numerous, his disposition being to make his geese into swans, yet I do not know where to look for writing more charming than the essays, scattered through these volumes, on his major heroes, such as Richard Hooker, Bishop Hall, Richard Baxter, John Owen, John Milton, John Bunyan, John Howe, Jeremy Taylor, Isaac Barrow, Dr. South, Archbishop Tillotson, Matthew Henry, Isaac Watts, Philip Doddridge, George Whitefield, and Sir Isaac Newton.

These names will suffice to indicate what is meant by the Classics of Religion. There are classical religious writers, and there are classical religious books. A classical religious writer is one who not only may have produced one or two masterpieces, but whose general output has been on so high a level that his works are collected and reprinted after his death, so that those so disposed may have the opportunity of studying his views as a whole or ascertaining his opinions on any particular point; and such a minute and exhaustive acquaintance with a notable and congenial

spirit is certainly a great gain to the disciple. He who never quotes, it has been said, will never be quoted; and it may be safely affirmed that he who has it in him to become a thinker or author himself will usually be found to be an enthusiastic admirer of some great writers who have gone before. There are authors whose volumes are so numerous as almost to supply reading for a lifetime. Thus, in my library the works of Luther number a hundred-and-one volumes; and, near by, the works of Schleiermacher comprise thirty-one, thick and closely printed. There are other authors who are more merciful; and, as was said above, we have to speak of classical books as well as classical authors. A single book may make its author immortal. Loyola's *Spiritual Exercises* and Pascal's *Thoughts* are cases in point; and a recent remarkable instance is the *Journal* of the Swiss Amiel. Or some single work of an author may so outdistance the rest that the mention of his name suggests this and this alone. Thus, though at the present time the works of Thomas à Kempis are being published abroad in many volumes, it is questionable whether the world will care to hear of any of them except *The Imitation of Christ.* Bunyan has the unusual number of three masterpieces to his credit—*The Pilgrim's Progress*, *The Holy War* and *Grace Abounding*—and the general reader is unaware that he penned anything besides; nor is this ignorance a great loss; for the level of the rest is by no means equal to that of these classics. On the other hand, in my opinion, *The Life of Christ*, by Jeremy Taylor, is far superior to the *Holy Living and Dying*, by which he is best known, and I question very much whether *The Saint's Rest*, by which Richard Baxter is remembered, be the best work of that exceedingly voluminous divine.

This may raise the question, how the books recognised as classics have reached this station and degree, or how it

is determined who are the classical authors. Is it not possible that there have been better books written than those which reappear in every collection, or that there may even have been authors more worthy of immortality than those who have actually attained it? There were brave men before Agamemnon;

> Sed omnes inlacrimabiles
> Urgentur ignotique longa
> Nocte, carent quia vate sacro.

Books have their fates; and even the best of books depend, in some degree, for their influence on other circumstances than merit. Some readers have a generous and enthusiastic way of praising the books they read. Of this there has been in our day no such example as Principal Whyte, of the New College, Edinburgh, and no man alive has done more either to determine who are to be reckoned religious classics or to secure that these shall be read. Not only did he, early in his career, cause to be preached in St. George's, and published under the title of *The Evangelical Succession*, lectures on a score of leaders of the Church Universal, most of whom were also religious classics, but he has gone on, to the present day, issuing from the press, as the result of his enormous but discriminating reading, appreciations of his own favourite authors, with choice extracts from their works, till the volumes now amount to a considerable library; and there can be no question that these have done much to both stimulate and guide reading. So wide are the sympathies of the venerable and beloved Principal that writers of all schools, if only they reveal excellence, obtain admission to his gallery. On the other hand, the intensity and the narrowness of particular views may secure to writers the chance of republication. Thus, the Evangelical Revival gave resurrection to the authors of the Puritan Period; and the leaders of the Oxford Movement translated and circu-

lated the works of the Fathers. In the Roman Catholic communion the greatest effort of the kind—the publication of a series of the Latin Fathers, extending to over two hundred volumes, and a collection of the Greek Fathers, of even vaster extent—was the work not of official zeal, but of a priest cast out by his superiors, who turned in his extremity to bookselling. The bookselling tribe have displayed remarkable enterprise in devising series of the kind, and critics in the press have helped them. But, whatever virtue may lie in the arts of advertising—this term being used in the widest sense—the ultimate decision rests with the public; for what the public will not buy publishers cannot continue to print; and, where the public persist in buying in quantity sufficient to justify publication from generation to generation, it may be assumed that there exists genuine merit. Of what nature this is, we proceed to inquire.

First, I should say, there is required in a religious book which is to be a classic a certain amount of literary quality. The prime quality of a religious book is religion, just as the prime distinction of a literary classic is style; but we have seen that a literary classic may do well sometimes to go over into the sphere of religion, and now I add that a religious classic may be helped on its way to diffusion and success by the possession of literary distinction. Of this the most striking examples are the Cavalier theologians of the seventeenth century. Richard Hooker, Jeremy Taylor, Bishop Hall, Thomas Fuller all breathed the air of England at the same time as Shakspeare, and the atmosphere of the Elizabethan Age fills the sails of their eloquence. They would be mentioned in the histories of literature even if they were omitted from the ecclesiastical histories. The contrast between them and the Puritan authors living at the same time is extraordinary; for the latter were singularly destitute of the literary faculty: substance they had in abun-

dance, but very little form ; and it will be interesting for later generations to watch how far this will handicap them in the race for longevity. The only one of the Puritan writers who greatly excelled in style was Bunyan ; and he is the one whose works find a place even in collections of literature which have no bias towards theology.

A second mark which may give to a book a position among the classics is a providential origin. There are books which may be called inevitable. They are products of history, and they are themselves a portion of the history they recall. Those who pen them are not so much their authors as the mouthpieces of the opinions they embody. I have spoken of the Evangelical Revival and the Oxford Movement as having both caused the republication of series of books congenial to their spirit ; but each of these also produced a book in which its own genius was concentrated and prolonged. Wilberforce's *Practical View* might, at the time of its publication, have been called an Evangelical pamphlet, though it has become a religious classic ; and in Newman's *Apologia pro Vita sua*, not only did the author himself rise to life again out of the tomb of obscurity to which he had been consigned by his perversion, but the passion for antiquity and ritual which has meant so much to the Church of England for half-a-century received a living embodiment. The Broad Church Movement, in the same communion, achieved a literary monument no less likely to endure in Seeley's *Ecce Homo*. When thus the pith of a great movement finds its way into a book, the hold of the latter on the interest of the world is strengthened. Milton's *Paradise Lost* might be called Puritanism set to music, and Dante's *Vision* contains within itself all the penitence and the aspiration of the Middle Ages.

A third quality essential to a classic is a certain antiquity. We do not style the works of living authors classics, although

of course they may deserve the honour more than some of the authors or books that receive it. It is not at all unusual, indeed, for critics to predict that their own favourites will be classics; but so frequently have such predictions been falsified that the public is sceptical, and prefers to wait and see. The very power of a book or writer to make a great impression at the moment may be prejudicial to lasting success; because it is due to adaptability to a situation which is transient and not important enough to make a permanent impression on the memory of the world. For a similar reason books of learning are seldom likely to be included among the classics of religion. Learning grows from generation to generation; and, the faster its growth, the more certain are its products, however priceless they may seem at the time of their appearance, to become antiquated and be laid upon the shelf.

A fourth element entering into the composition of a Christian classic is experience; and this is probably the most vital element of all. Experience does not, like learning, grow old, but unites to one another Christian minds in all the centuries, just as it converts the contemporary members of all the denominations into brothers who understand and appreciate one another. "It is a communion, mediated through Christ, of the soul with the living God, wherein is included all that belongs to the peculiar life of Christianity —revelation and faith, repentance and the comfort of forgiveness, the joy of believing and the service of love, aloneness with God and fellowship with the Christian community." This definition of what experience is, taken from one of the best productions of the Ritschlian School, Herrmann's *Communion of the Christian with God*, is excellent; but that school has gravely erred through thrusting in the Church too far between God and the soul; for the essence of experience consists in the immediate contact between the divine

and the human, the direct intercourse of Person with person. In the awakening of the aspirations of the spiritual nature, the quest of God through regions of doubt and systems which do not satisfy, the finding of the Saviour at last, the ecstasy of His love and the never-ending pursuit of His image, lies the very romance of religion; and, in maintaining this, we dread no reproaches of Pietism or Mysticism, from whatever quarter these may come. If the indubitable classics of religion be reckoned up, it will be found that a remarkable proportion of them, such as Augustine's *Confessions*, Bunyan's *Grace Abounding*, Scott's *Force of Truth*, are records of the initial stages of Christian experience, while the very titles of others, such as *The Pilgrim's Progress*, Jeremy Taylor's *Holy Living and Holy Dying*, Scougal's *Life of God in the Soul of Man*, *Doddridge's Rise and Progress of Religion in the Soul*, indicate that they deal with the later stages of the same process. The earliest record of religious experience, after the Fall of man, is that Enoch "walked with God." There could be no better definition of what experience is; and in the efforts of the children of men to imitate this primitive example there has been so much of pathos and tragedy, of both littleness and grandeur, that the wonder is, not that there are so many classics of religion, but that there are so few.

This may introduce the mention of the last element I shall touch on at the present time—namely, scripturalness. If the classics of religion are rare, it is not only because so many religious books fall beneath this standard, but because the best of all rise above it. In Carlyle's *Lectures on Heroes* there is no place given to Christ; and that is in harmony with the feeling of the author's native land, though a different sentiment rules elsewhere; for example, the first volume published in the series of German books I commenced by referring to has *Jesus* for its title. The same feeling prevents

us from reckoning Isaiah and Paul among our religious classics, though we lose as well as gain perhaps by setting them aside as not classical, but canonical. So full are the sacred Scriptures of the elements with which religious classics require to be impregnated that they are able to impart to other books the germs of immortality. Not a few of our religious classics—like Bengel's *Gnomon* and Leighton's *First Peter*—are actual imterpretations of Holy Scripture ; but many more of them have borrowed from the same source that which has made them what they are. In fact, this may be said of them all ; and the best training for anyone aspiring to write a religious classic is to be imbibing the letter and the spirit of the Scriptures all the time.

Enough has been said to prove that both the topics touched upon belong to the sphere of a preacher of the Gospel; while the union of the two suggests how wide his range must be. It will be from the young that the demand will come that he should display sympathy and comprehension for their secular reading ; and it will be in persons at the opposite end of life that the expectation will arise, that he should manifest acquaintance with the choicest products of Christian thought, so as to be able to feed them with the finest of the wheat. It may seem most natural for a young minister to be absorbed in the literary classics and for an aged one to be familiar with the religious classics. Yet the development is sometimes the other way : a minister's reading is sometimes in youth limited to theology, but, as he advances in life, he becomes more alive to the connection of his message with all human interests, not the least important among which is literature. When we say with Paul, " I am debtor both to the Greeks and to the Barbarians, both to the wise and to the unwise," we ought not always to lay the emphasis on the second noun in each pair : we ought not always to be thinking of what we owe to the Barbarians, but seriously some-

times to be considering the Greeks ; and, instead of always thinking of the many unwise, we should occasionally give attention to the few wise. We must seek the lost not only in the purlieus of vice and crime, but on the slopes of Parnassus and among the thyme of Hymettus ; for there human beings may be sinning and suffering quite as much ; and, while we do not withhold from the multitude the rousing message of the evangelist, we must seek, with the Ecclesiast, to find out " acceptable words " for the select few who aspire not only to live but to grasp the philosophy of life. The Apostle who wrote, " My speech and my preaching was not with enticing words of man's wisdom," went on to say in the very next breath, " Howbeit we speak wisdom among them that are perfect."

JAMES STALKER.

THE CHRIST-PARTY IN CORINTH.

DISPUTE about the divisions at Corinth, reported to Paul in Ephesus by members of the household of Chloe, refuses to be silenced. It is with good reason. The matter is too vital to our understanding of conflicting tendencies in the primitive Church, too indispensable to our appreciation of Paul himself in relation to the older apostles, and withal too inherently obscure and disputable, to permit its quiescence. We urgently need to understand ; yet the varying interpreters refuse to be reconciled. Under these circumstances the needful thing is not the restatement of old arguments, but the contribution of new data. The latter is our aim.

Lietzmann in his recent Commentary on First Corinthians[1] very justly remarks on the passage (i. 12) : " Each one of you saith, I am of Paul, and I of Apollos, and I of Cephas,

[1] *Handbuch z. N. T.* iii. 1, 1910, p. 85.

and I of Christ," that since Paul puts the fourth clause " and I of Christ " on precisely the same level as the other party cries of the Corinthians, and therefore connects with it grammatically the primary clause " Each one of you saith," there certainly must have been in Corinth a particular faction which boasted themselves " Of Christ." This grammatical argument is fatal (as Zahn had already pointed out[1]) to all interpretations which reduce the factions to three, such as von Dobschütz's, which takes the words " And I of Christ " as Paul's counter-declaration : " Each one of *you* says . . . ; but as for me, Paul, *I* am of Christ." The negative argument that aside from the statement itself of 1 Corinthians i. 12 we have little or no reference in the Epistles to a ' Christ-party,' is quite inadequate to overcome the clear grammatical sense. The party-cries at Corinth were not three, but four in number.

But neither can we rid ourselves of the problem as to the nature of the fourth faction by declaring with Zahn and B. Weiss that there were no real *parties*, but at most mere *tendencies*, the party-cries being used by Paul only for purposes of illustration, without any intention on his part of suggesting that there were just these four. Zahn himself, after declaring it the greatest possible mistake to regard these divisions (ἔριδες) as " parties," proceeds to interpret the " tendencies " as well-defined movements of thought or action. We need not quibble about the distinction of ' party ' *versus* ' tendency,' so long as Paul himself makes clear the fact that " the body of Christ " was in danger of disruption because of factious rallying cries, whereof four at least were sufficiently outstanding to serve as examples of the danger. What we must beware of is the too easy solution obtained by eliminating that one of the four which perplexes us because of a lack of data in the

[1] *Introd. to N. T.*, vol. i.

Epistles. In reality, if the data we are about to adduce are valid, the 'Christ-party,' whose name, or party-cry, seems so difficult to interpret in any reasonable sense, is just the party (or tendency) most important to be understood. To eliminate it with Heinrici as the interpolated gloss of some reader is to destroy the evidence one finds it difficult to interpret. To explain it away, with von Dobschütz, Zahn, or B. Weiss, as representing no particular element in the Corinthian body, is little better. The same result is reached of destroying instead of interpreting the evidence, if with Baur and the Tübingen school we remove all distinction between those "of Christ" and the element which boasted the name of "Cephas." This is not merely inconsistent with the admitted sense of the rest of the passage, but deprives us of the most significant of all the facts at our disposal for understanding the relation of Paul to the Judaising "false-brethren" on the one side, and to the "Pillar" apostles on the other.

To imagine a tension between Paul and the Cephas-party so great as to call forth the unmeasured denunciation of 2 Corinthians x.–xiii. is to involve oneself in a double absurdity. In the same series of letters Paul begins by calling for the utmost tenderness and consideration for certain persons of Jewish scrupulosity termed the "weak" or "weak consciences" (1 Cor. viii.). A little later he himself violently assails certain Judaisers who "trust in themselves that they are of Christ." (2 Cor. x. 7 ff.) If there is no difference between these two Jewish-Christian groups, Paul sets a very bad example while preaching charity and toleration. Moreover we shall ourselves be puzzled to find a suitable object for his invective. Such expressions as "ministers of Satan," "false apostles," "enemies of the cross of Christ," applied to James and Cephas and John would destroy their own intended effect by their extravagance. Nothing in all Paul's writings

can be pointed to which gives ground for supposing that the 'Pillars' had ever done anything to evoke from him such bitter hostility. Galatians ii. 1–10 is far from supporting such an idea. It refers indeed in no measured terms to certain "false brethren privily brought in to spy out our (Gentile-Christian) liberty"; but as regards Paul and the "Pillars" it describes the contrary relation, a cordial agreement, sealed by "the right hand of fellowship" and the communion of giving and receiving. The "Pillars" repudiated the "false brethren," rejected their demand for the circumcision of Titus, and endorsed without reserve Paul's apostleship and "gospel to the uncircumcision." The parallel to this narrative in Acts xv. is equally emphatic on all these points with Galatians ii. 1–10, though unreliable in its further attempt to explain how the *unsettled* point —fellowship between Jewish Christians maintaining their legal purity, and free Gentile Christians—was adjusted. We know in fact from Galatians ii. 11–21 that it was not adjusted without years of trouble and division. The cordial relations established at Jerusalem were marred, perhaps broken off, by the disagreement with Peter at Antioch. But Paul himself does not charge Peter with anything worse than weakness and inconsistency. Peter had first followed the lead of Paul, disregarding Mosaic distinctions in the interest of Christian fellowship. Later he had been overpersuaded by "certain from James" to a different interpretation of the agreement made in Jerusalem. He had thus by his example aided and abetted those who sought "to compel the Gentiles to Judaise." But the argument which follows, whose aim is to show the futility of the attempt to combine law and grace, and which so clearly defines Paul's own consistent doctrine, over against the inconsistency of Peter, proves that the violation of the agreement of verse 10 was not conscious or intentional. Had

it been conscious and intentional, arguments of this kind would be wasted. We need not wonder that Acts should pass over these painful scenes of disagreement between Paul and the older apostles, substituting the adjustment of the "Decrees" for the solution advocated in Paul's Epistles; but to admit this discrepancy is not to class Peter, John, or even James, with the Judaisers. As I have shown in my Commentary on Galatians,[1] it is a gratuitous slander on the "Pillars" to put them in the company of the "false brethren" whom they had just before successfully resisted at Jerusalem (Gal. ii. 3–5). Why should Peter and Barnabas now at Antioch repudiate the agreement secured by their help in Jerusalem? Such conduct would imply a childishness inconceivable in grown men of serious character and responsible position. Undoubtedly the public rupture between Paul and Peter rekindled to more than its original ardour the zeal of the propagandists of circumcision. But Peter and Barnabas and "the rest of the Jews" at Antioch who "were carried away with their dissimulation" can have had no part in the anti-Pauline propaganda. Even had their resentment at Paul's rebuke tempted them to join his enemies, their previous solemn acknowledgment of the divine authority of his apostleship and gospel, and their official refusal to require the circumcision of Titus (Gal. ii. 1–10), made desertion to the anti-Pauline propaganda impossible. Recognition of his apostleship and gospel as *from God* is action which in the nature of the case stands irrevocable. The attempt to revoke it could be made only at the cost of acknowledgment of their own complete untrustworthiness. The Jerusalem agreement and rejection of the Judaisers were *not revocable.*

After the breach at Antioch denial of Paul's apostleship and gospel were indeed resumed. Of that the Epistles to

[1] "Bible for Home and School" series, Macmillan, 1909.

the Galatians and Corinthians give unequivocal proof. But the "false apostles," the "ministers of Satan masquerading as ministers of Christ," against whom Paul fulminates, could not possibly boast the names of either Cephas or James; for both James and Cephas were committed once for all against them and in Paul's favour, both as regards Paul's apostleship, and (in principle) his gospel. The Jerusalem agreement stood. The interpretation of it fluctuated. The argument of Galatians ii. 15–21 proves that it was only on the question whether *Jews too, as well as Gentiles*, were "justified not by works of law, but only through faith in Jesus Christ" that there was difference between Paul and the vacillating Cephas. The Jerusalem agreement had not settled this.

If, then, the extreme and bitter opponents of Paul, against whom he launches the unrestrained invective of 2 Corinthians x.–xiii., are represented at all among the four party-cries: "I am of Paul; and I of Apollos; and I of Cephas; and I of Christ," it cannot be by those "of Cephas," it can only be by the last; for Apollos, the disciple of Prisca and Aquila, established at Corinth by their commendation, whose return thither is still greatly desired by Paul himself (1 Cor. xvi. 12), is clearly out of the question. And not only is this identification of the Judaising "false brethren" with "they of Christ" among the Corinthian factions suggested by their remoteness from those "of Paul" and nearness to those "of Cephas" in order of enumeration, but Paul himself in concluding the section on the use of 'wisdom' (1 Cor. iv. 6) says expressly that he has limited the application of his rebuke to the matters concerning himself and Apollos. The nature of the discussion shows that the matters in debate with the Judaisers are not here considered. The least of the differences at Corinth is that concerning the use of 'wisdom' (philosophy), and the statement of iv. 6 implies that those

concerning the Cephas-party and the Christ-party are deferred. Indeed it is hardly needful to prove that the Judaisers could boast neither the name of Paul, nor that of Apollos. Only Godet hits upon an eccentric and ill-advised idea in identifying the 'Christ'-party with certain hypothetical ultra-Hellenisers, forerunners of the Docetists of the second century, to whom reference would be made in 1 Corinthians xii. 3, as men who say "Jesus (i.e. the Nazarene mechanic, as against the Aeon Christ) be anathema." But this, of course, would put the party-cry of 1 Corinthians i. 12 out of all relation to the boast "I am of Christ" of 2 Corinthians x. 7.

If, then, at Corinth those "of Cephas," and those "of Christ" were Jewish Christians of the two types, (1) the "weak," who conceded liberty to the Gentiles but were timorous for themselves, and (2) the anti-Pauline Judaisers, in what sense were these names "of Cephas" and "of Christ" employed, especially by the latter group?

Even Lietzmann seems none too clear in his distinctions; for he writes:[1] "We may regard the Cephas party as Judaisers (*Judaisten*): ix. 1 f. will have been directed against them." Unquestionably 1 Corinthians ix. 1 f. does allude to the Judaisers; but for reasons already given opponents of Paul's apostleship cannot possibly at this time have boasted the name "of Cephas." Those who said "I am of Cephas" certainly represented a much milder line of divergence. They were the "weak brethren," willing enough to concede liberty from the Mosaic requirements to Gentiles, but scrupulous as regards themselves, and therefore asking concessions when among Gentile believers, particularly on the score of "meats," lest their weak conscience should be defiled. Peter had demanded them at Antioch. Such concessions Paul is ready and anxious to see made by his own followers—if it be

[1] Op. cit. p. 85

as a matter of grace. When they are demanded as "necessary" (Acts xv. 28, ἐπάναγκες) they lead to "doubtful disputations" and should be refused (Rom. xiv. 1 f.). He had acted on this principle at Antioch (Gal. ii. 11 ff.); but when he went up to James in Jerusalem (Acts xxi. 18) it certainly was not without hope of amicable adjustment. The tone employed in his subsequent references to Peter and Barnabas, a tone of respect and regard (1 Cor. ix. 6; Col. iv. 10), agrees with the great stress laid in all the Epistles on the duty of avoiding "offence" to tender consciences. On this point I must ask leave to quote from the little commentary already cited:—

> The great emphasis laid both in First Corinthians and Romans on the duty of avoiding offence to the 'weak' brother, by inconsiderate application of the Pauline principle 'All things are lawful,' especially in the matter of 'distinctions of meats,' and the 'pollutions of idols,' is very noticeable. It can only be for the benefit of Jewish Christians [i.e. Christians of Jewish birth and training, *not* "Judaisers"], scrupulous of conscience regarding Sabbaths, holy days, and meats (Rom. xiv. 2, 5), yet peaceably disposed, and not making their scruples a subject for "doubtful disputations." Who are these toward whom Paul shows himself so considerate, if not those who at Corinth claimed to be 'of Cephas,' and who at Antioch seem to have remained masters of the field?

This relatively mild and harmless type of Jewish Christian, not able, if he wished, to make trouble while in the minority, might well put forward the name of "Cephas" as his example; for such precisely was the attitude assumed by Peter after the coming to Antioch of "certain from James." Its weakness has never been so overwhelmingly exposed as in the brief argument which Paul reports in Galatians ii. 14–21. It has faith that like "sinners of the Gentiles" it is "justified by faith in Christ," but not faith enough to let go the additional ground of Abrahamic descent and Mosaic purity. So (all unconsciously) they "make void the grace of God" and act as though "Christ died for nought."

Paul's logic against Peter is remorseless ; but we have all the less reason to believe it had effect on Peter, Barnabas and "the rest of the Jews," from the fact that our own Book of Acts attributes precisely the Petrine standpoint not only to James and all the apostles, but actually to Paul himself ! Paul, according to Acts xxi. 20–26, even takes public and formal action at James' request, to prove that when among the Gentiles he sets the example himself of strict legalism and teaches "the Jews which are among the Gentiles" to circumcise their children and to obey the Mosaic customs. That is, according to Acts, Paul repudiates as a slander the statement that he teaches the very things which his Epistles insist upon as obligatory !

It appears, then, that those at Corinth who said, "I am of Cephas" meant that on the burning questions of the day, circumcision and the Mosaic requirements, they *followed the example* of Peter, who had welcomed Gentile converts without the yoke of the law, but shrank from Paul's application of Christian liberty to his own case in becoming "as without the law to men not under the law." This became as a matter of fact the general standpoint of the church : The law is obligatory on Jews, even when they become Christians. Other Christians do not need to observe it except in certain parts which the apostles have specified for good reason.

In attempting to make unmistakably clear the distinction between the Cephas-party and the Judaisers, or Christ-party, I shall ask leave once more to resort to my Commentary on Galatians, continuing from the close of the preceding citation.

It is a different type against whom Paul launches the fierce invective of Galatians, Corinthians and Philippians, denying to them even the name of brethren, calling them 'spies,' 'ministers of Satan disguising themselves as angels of light,' 'false apostles,' 'super-extra apostles,' intruders in the ready-reaped harvest-fields of others. These intruders he expressly excludes from the

farewell blessing of his letter to the Galatians (vi. 16), and even invokes on them his solemn anathema (i. 9). Had we Galatians alone we might easily be misled into thinking that Paul classes Peter and Barnabas in this group. . . . But the later epistles enable us to discriminate. The Judaisers, even if any of them now came from Antioch into its mission field, were not of Antiochian origin [Gal ii. 4; Acts xv. 1], and did not appeal to its authority. 'Those of repute' at Jerusalem were the authority to which they at first appealed. Later, it would seem, [when the 'Pillars' had given verdict against them, Gal. ii. 3–10], they appealed to the example of Christ himself 'after the flesh' (1 Cor. i. 12, 2 Cor. x. 7, v. 16). It does not appear that they ever claimed the support of Peter, nor even of James after Gal. ii. 12. They urged that Jesus himself had been a Jew faithful to the law. Paul too, they pointed out, would admit that Christ had been 'a minister of the circumcision' (Rom. xv. 8). In the letter of boasting which his disloyal Corinthian converts compel him to write (2 Cor. x. 1–xiii. 10) to offset the 'letters of commendation' which these interlopers displayed, Paul draws their portrait with no gentle hand. They were 'Hebrews,' 'Israelites,' 'the seed of Abraham,' 'ministers of Christ.' They stretched themselves to reach out into another's province. They called themselves 'apostles (i.e. missionaries) of Christ,' and magnified their authority to take tribute of the churches. The name of James is not mentioned. Paul could not bring it in on his own behalf otherwise than he has done in Gal. ii. 1–10, until a personal interview (Rom. xv. 30–32, Acts xxi. 18, 19) should clear away mutual misunderstanding [that of Gal. ii. 12]. James' death occurred but shortly after (*ca.* 62 A.D.). Judaisers boasted a higher name (2 Cor. x. 7), and perhaps were themselves not altogether sure of the approval of James; for on at least one critical occasion his verdict had been given against them (Gal. ii. 9). Certainly Paul was hopeful of a good understanding when he 'went in unto James' attended by the delegates of his Gentile churches (Acts xxi. 18).

The citation of this earlier statement is not made for purposes of change or correction, but for the purpose of making unmistakable the distinction between the Cephas-party and the Christ-party at Corinth, before introducing certain new evidence which shows by ancient testimony that the party-cry "I am of Christ" was actually used by this particular faction of the extreme anti-Pauline Judaisers (the "Ebionites" as they came to be called) in the sense: I *follow the example* of Christ in His obedience to the law.

The Christ-party did not avail themselves of the name of James; mainly, no doubt, because they could not. Between the occasion of Paul's onslaught at Antioch on the delegates "from James" (Gal. ii. 12) and the renewal of cordial relations at the second Jerusalem conference (Acts xxi. 18), they could probably count on James' silence, but certainly not on his support for their covert attacks upon Paul. But the name of James would hardly have availed them much could they have used it. What they most needed, and could best depend on, was the far higher,—the supreme authority of Jesus. Here they had the immense practical advantage over Paul of being able to claim personal knowledge of Christ in His earthly ministry. Moreover even Paul could not deny that Jesus had been "born under the law" (Gal iv. 14), that He had lived in blameless obedience and loyalty to it, had been, in short, "a minister of the circumcision" (Rom. xv. 8), though according to Paul this was "not to please himself." Jesus had (according to Paul) shared the reproach of Israel "for the sake of the truthfulness of God, to make good the promises given to the fathers." If the party-cry "I am of Christ" means "I *follow the example* of Jesus on the disputed points of practice, I *am an imitator* of Christ," this is precisely what we should expect the Judaisers to claim. It was a plea for which Paul could have no answer save to maintain that in the deeper and more spiritual sense he was a better "imitator of Christ" than they. This is in fact the plea of Paul, and this is even his very expression in Corinthians and Ephesians.

We have every reason to suppose that those among the Corinthians who had consulted Paul by letter on the various points answered *seriatim* ("Now concerning the things whereof ye wrote," 1 Cor. vii. 1, 25, viii. 1, etc.), are his own professed adherents. It is they who claim to be "of Paul"

and who profess to "remember him in all things," to "hold fast the traditions as he had delivered them" (1 Cor. xi. 2). These imitators "of Paul" quote the Pauline principle of liberty in 1 Corinthians viii. 8: "Meat will not commend us to God: neither, if we eat not (the εἰδωλόθυτα) are we the worse; nor if we eat are we the better." Paul answers (ver. 9–13) with the qualifying principle of consideration for the 'weak' which limits personal liberty. He ends the long and enlightening section on "meats offered to idols" (chaps. viii.–x.) with the meaning command: "Be ye *imitators of me*, even as I also am *of Christ*."

In what sense Paul means this injunction to imitate him in a deeper and fuller way may be seen from the parallel injunction to consideration for the 'weak' in Romans xiv. 1–xv. 7. Paul has liberty; but "pleases not himself," just as Christ "pleased not Himself," but became a "minister of the circumcision" and shared the reproach of His people, as one born under the law. They who declare themselves "of Paul" should be "imitators of" him in the self-denial required by consideration for the weak, and not merely in the selfish claim of liberty (1 Cor. x. 23–xi. 1).

The phrase recurs on a higher plane in Ephesians v. 1, where the example of Christ is declared to be an imitation of God. To be kind, tender-hearted, and forgiving is to "be imitators of God as beloved children," "as God also in Christ forgave you." In these expressions of Paul we have at least enough to show that the cries "I am of Paul—Apollos—Cephas—Christ" could be meant in the sense I *follow the example* of Paul, Apollos, Cephas, Christ, on the matters in dispute, i.e. the obligation of the Mosaic law. Just as he does with the term "apostle" boasted by his opponents Paul takes the term "(imitator) of Christ" and raises it to a higher significance.

What we have finally to submit in confirmation of these

internal evidences from the Epistles and the Book of Acts is the testimony of early witnesses that in the specific case with which all modern debate is concerned the cry " I am of Christ " was actually employed in this sense of the imitation of Jesus' conduct in conforming to the law, and that those who thus employed it were no other than the Judaisers, the bigoted opponents of the apostleship and gospel of Paul.

Epiphanius, unsupported, is a poor authority. Especially where his prejudices are concerned every possible check must be employed to counteract his blundering misrepresentation. Fortunately it *is* blundering; were it astute discrimination would be less easy. Epiphanius plagiarises and contradicts himself. But he did have close connexions with Palestine, and does give Palestinian traditions and sources, which when disentangled and corroborated, as they often may be, from Hippolytus and other older and better writers than Epiphanius himself, prove serviceable in the highest degree. Of this character is the description in *Panar.* xxviii. 1–6 of the heresy of Cerinthus, a name familiar to us from the statements of Irenæus and his disciple Hippolytus as that of the great opponent at Ephesus of the Apostle John. As E. Schwartz has just pointed out,[1] Epiphanius in xxviii. 1 is simply telling the familiar tale from Irenæus (doubtless borrowing from Hippolytus) about Cerinthus the Docetic opponent of John in Ephesus. But in the following sections (2–6) he goes on with another and totally inconsistent representation:

> This man, beloved, was one of those who stirred up the opposition to the Apostles, when those who were of the following of James wrote an epistle to Antioch, saying, We know that certain of us have come unto you and troubled you with words which we did not command them.[2]

Cerinthus is further made responsible for the Judaising

[1] *Zts. f. ntl. Wiss.* xv. 2 (1914), p. 210 f.
[2] *Panar.* xxviii. 2, referring to Acts xv. 23 f.

opposition to Peter related in Acts xi. 2 f., for the demand for the circumcision of Titus made at Jerusalem in opposition to Paul by the "false brethren" (Gal. ii. 3), and for the charge against Paul that by bringing the uncircumcised Titus (*sic*) to Jerusalem (!) he had defiled the temple.[1] His followers are said to employ a mutilated form of the Gospel of Matthew for the sake of its genealogy, which proved the human descent of Jesus, and to repudiate Paul because of his rejection of circumcision. All this describes just the opposite of the Docetic Cerinthus of Irenæus and Hippolytus. Instead of minimising with the Docetists the human and Jewish elements of the Lord's nature and teaching, it lays all stress upon these, and violently opposes the Hellenising tendencies which made Paul's gospel acceptable to the Greeks. Schwartz puts this curious inconsistency in Epiphanius' testimony together with that of Gaius of Rome, who in his Dialogue against the Montanist Proclus (*ca.* 180), denied the Johannine authorship of Revelation, declaring it a forgery of "the heretic Cerinthus." Gaius based his charge upon the crude eschatological realism of Cerinthus the Jew, whose craving for sensuous delights was responsible (said Gaius) for the apocalyptic description of the thousand years of Messianic enjoyment in Jerusalem. This would be the height of absurdity if Cerinthus' doctrine was Docetic, for as we learn from Ignatius and others, one of the chief abominations to the Docetist was the Jewish doctrine of a material Paradise and a "resurrection of the flesh." It was mainly for the sake of avoiding this sensuous Jewish

[1] *Panar.* xxviii. 4; cf. Acts xxi. 28 and Galatians ii. 3. In a less blundering writer than Epiphanius one might suspect that the variations from Acts which agree better with the Pauline Epistles were derived from some independent source. Thus 2 Timothy iv. 20, in a passage which would otherwise agree well with the journey of Acts xx. 4; xxi. 28 f., leaves Trophimus the Ephesian behind at Miletus, sick, though in Acts xxi. 28 f. he occasions the attack in Acts upon Paul in Jerusalem. Titus is never mentioned in Acts.

eschatology that the Docetist made the flesh "mere semblance" even during the earthly ministry of Jesus. But if Cerinthus was an Ebionite Jew the Book of Revelation might be attributed to him with perfect plausibility; for an intensely realistic millenarianism went hand in hand with anti-Pauline legalism in this Jewish-Christian sect. Schwartz, therefore, is inclined to acquit the "very learned Presbyter Gaius" of the folly of imputing such a book as Revelation to the very father of Docetism, and to attribute the little that Irenæus and his disciple Hippolytus have to tell of the Docetic doctrine of Cerinthus to their common endeavour to bolster up the tradition of "John in Asia"; for it is as the bulwark of apostolic orthodoxy against the Docetic heresy of the time, that the John of Irenæus (i.e. the author of the Gospel and Epistles) is depicted.

For our present purpose it is fortunately unnecessary to take sides one way or the other on the thorny question of the Irenæan tradition of John in Asia. All we require for present purposes is the recognition that Epiphanius' portrait of the *Ebionite* Cerinthus comes from somewhere, because it does not stand alone. We may, in fact, leave the mere name "Cerinthus" entirely out of account, so long as we recognise that Epiphanius, and Gaius, and Origen (in a passage which also has a bearing on our case), all testify to the persistence of an ultra-Jewish Christian sect, clinging obstinately to circumcision and the law, and bitterly opposing Paul. By the testimony of two of these (Epiphanius and Gaius) Cerinthus was the leader in apostolic times of this sect. Epiphanius even declares that it was against his false teaching that Paul directed his doctrine of the resurrection in Corinthians xv. 16, 32 f. By the testimony of Epiphanius, Origen and Hippolytus the sect put forward as their chief argument *the practice of Jesus* in respect to the great matters in dispute in apostolic times, viz. circumcision and

the Mosaic festal system,[1] thus declaring themselves "of Christ" in the sense that they alone were truly and completely imitators of Him.

It is in his description of the followers of the *Ebionite* Cerinthus, after the passage referring to their use of a form of Matthew adapted to their own tenets, that Epiphanius goes on to say:

> And they adduce this testimony from the Gospel, saying again, 'It is enough for the disciple that he be as his Teacher' (Matt. x. 25). What, then, say they? Jesus was circumcised; thou also, be circumcised. Christ conducted himself in accordance with the law; thou also, do the like.[2]

That Epiphanius is not inventing arguments for the Judaisers, but reporting (probably at second hand) their actual language in defence of circumcision and legal purity, is proved by what we learn from an older scholar, as critical and accurate as Epiphanius is the reverse. Origen was better informed than Epiphanius on the history of Ebionism in Palestine, where he had studied it on the ground. In his Commentary on Matthew (§ 79) Origen tells us of these same sectaries, and of the attitude they took on that other great ecclesiastical question of the first and second centuries, the keeping of the Mosaic feasts and sacred days. Origen's comment on Matthew xxvi. 17 is made in answer to an Ebionite who defends the ancient observance of the passover on the fourteenth Nisan. The reply is of less importance to us than the form of the Ebionite's defence. It is as follows:

"We *as imitators of Christ* ought to do as He did."

We have independent confirmation of this statement of Origen from no other than Hippolytus himself. In the *Paschal Chronicle* Hippolytus' answer is given to the Jewish-Christian plea for Quartodeciman observance as follows:

[1] Gal. iv. 10; v. 2. Josephus also makes these the essential marks of Judaism.

[2] *Panar.* xxviii. 5.

For this is his plea: Christ then observed the passover on its proper day, and suffered death. Therefore for me also it is needful to do just in the same manner as the Lord did.[1]

If the chain of witnesses linking back these Jewish sectaries of the second and later centuries to the time of Paul is unavoidably incomplete we have at least the *a priori* probability that those whose sole effort was to hold fast to the old and to resist the new were not changing their own fundamental position. What they were claiming for themselves in the time of Epiphanius was that in holding to circumcision and the Mosaic observances they were "following the example of Christ." In the time of Origen they were making the same plea. In the time of Hippolytus the same. In the time of Gaius the same. There would seem ample reason to hold that in the time of Paul they were also making the same; and that these are they whose party-cry in Corinth was: "I am (an imitator) of Christ." To these Paul finally answers when driven at last by the disloyalty of his Corinthian converts to take up the burden of his own defence (2 Cor. x. 7): "If any man be persuaded that he is (an imitator) of Christ, let him again consider this with himself, that even as he is (an imitator) of Christ, so also are we." In how much higher a sense Paul meant his 'imitation of Christ' we have already seen.

B. W. Bacon.

RESEMBLANCES BETWEEN THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS AND THE NEW TESTAMENT.

So much does the language of Epictetus resemble that of the New Testament that a grammar devoted to the one would, in many points, be applicable to the other. In the "Discourses" there are found the same phrases, the same

[1] Extract in Charteris' *Canonicity*, p. 194.

nouns, adjectives, verbs, verbal forms, pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions, particles, the same syntax as in the New Testament.

Often, too, in the loftiness of his teaching, Epictetus comes very near to the New Testament position.

So marked, in fact, are the resemblances which the two collections of writings bear towards one another, that the question has been raised, "Was Epictetus acquainted with the New Testament?"—or even, "Was Epictetus a Christian?"

We must return to the latter question again; for the present, we give a provisional answer "No."

As to the former question, Epictetus was born about A.D. 60, when the New Testament was in process of formation. In his early life he removed to Rome, where there was already in existence a branch of the Christian Church. He remained in Rome until A.D. 94, when he was expelled by Domitian. It would be difficult, therefore, to suppose that Epictetus had not seen some of the New Testament writings—written as they were in his own tongue—or that he had not come into touch with Christian teaching and thought.

Thus Epictetus may well have quoted (with change of number) "*Ζήτει καὶ εὑρήσεις*" (Bk. iv. ch. 1, § 51), or "*κύριε, ἐλέησον*" (Bk. ii. ch. 7, § 12).

But his acquaintance with Christian writings and thought must have been somewhat superficial if we consider his description of a Jew, *τοῦ βεβαμμένου καὶ ᾐρημένου* (Bk. ii. ch. 9, § 20). Assuming that the latter participle refers to Circumcision and the former to Baptism, we notice two circumstances in regard to Epictetus: firstly, in common with the pagans of the time, he confuses Jews and Christians, regarding the Christians as a Jewish sect; secondly, he does not use the technical terms *περιτέμνω* and *βαπτίζω*.

(Perhaps we may cite Epictetus as evidence that baptism was by immersion.)

But we have no need to fall back on the probability of an acquaintance of Epictetus with Christian writings to explain the resemblances of language which his "Discourses" bear to the New Testament. For, as scholars like Drs. Moulton, Deissmann and Milligan make abundantly clear, the language of the New Testament was the language of documents of the time that were either non-literary or else literary to a very limited extent. We therefore expect to find some resemblances in language, if in nothing else.

We shall firstly deal with resemblances in language, secondly with resemblances in thought and teaching, thirdly with differences of thought.

I. Resemblances in language between the "Discourses" and the New Testament.

1. Phrases.

a. Possible imitations of New Testament passages.

1. *ὃ θέλει οὐ ποιεῖ καὶ ὃ μὴ θέλει ποιεῖ*—Bk. ii. ch. 26, § 4. Error is unintentional.

Cf. *οὐ γὰρ ὃ θέλω τοῦτο πράσσω, ἀλλ' ὃ μισῶ τοῦτο ποιῶ. εἰ δὲ, ὃ οὐ θέλω τοῦτο ποιῶ.*—Rom. vii. 15, 16.

2. (*δός μοι ἀπόδειξιν,*) *εἰ νομίμως ἠθλησας*—Bk. iii. ch. 10, § 8. The rules of the contest must be observed.

Cf. *ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ἀθλῇ τις, οὐ στεφανοῦται ἐὰν μὴ νομίμως ἀθλήσῃ* —2 Tim. ii. 5.

3. *ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι λέγω*—Bk. iii. ch. 7, § 13. The teacher's word of authority.

Cf. *ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν*—Matt. v. 22, 28, etc.

4. *ὁ κύριος αὐτοῦ ἀποδημεῖ*—Bk. iv. ch. 1, § 58. The slave's master takes a journey.

Cf. *ἄνθρωπος ἀποδημῶν ἐκάλεσεν τοὺς ἰδίους δούλους . . . καὶ ἀπεδήμησεν . . . μετὰ δὲ πολὺν χρόνον ἔρχεται ὁ κύριος τῶν δούλων ἐκείνων*—Matt. xxv. 14, 15, 19.

5. *καὶ τίς σοι ταύτην τὴν ἐξουσίαν δέδωκεν*;—Bk. i. ch. 29, § 11.

Cf. *καὶ τίς σοι ἔδωκεν τὴν ἐξουσίαν ταύτην*;—Matt. xxi. 23.

6. *ἀπελθὼν ἀπήγξατο*—Bk. i. ch. 2, § 3.

Cf. *καὶ ἀπελθὼν ἀπήγξατο*—Matt. xxvii. 5. We note that the aorist in Epictetus is gnomic, but in Matthew it is simple narrative. Is it a mere coincidence that the exact phrase found in Matthew occurs in the "Discourses"? Can it be that Epictetus used the story of Judas to illustrate his point that a man will take his own life when it seems good to him?

7. *ἐκείνων χρείαν εἶχεν ὁ θεός*—Bk. i. ch. 6, § 13.

Cf. *ὁ κύριος αὐτῶν χρείαν ἔχει*—Matt. xxi. 3.

8. *ὁρᾶτε οὖκ καὶ προσέχετε, μὴ . . .* —Bk. i. ch. 3, § 9.

Cf. *ὁρᾶτε καὶ προσέχετε ἀπὸ τῆς ζύμης τῶν Φαρισαίων καὶ Σαδδουκαίων*—Matt. xvi. 6.

9. *ζήτει καὶ εὑρήσεις*—Bk. i. ch. 28, § 19; Bk. iv. ch 1, § 51.

Cf. *ζητεῖτε, καὶ εὑρήσετε*—Matt. vii. 7.

10. (*ταῦτα μέλλεις μαρτυρεῖν καὶ*) *καταισχύνειν τὴν κλῆσιν ἣν κέκληκεν*—Bk. i. ch. 29, § 49.

Cf. *παρακαλῶ . . . ἀξίως περιπατῆσαι τῆς κλήσεως ἧς ἐκλήθητε*—Eph. iv. i.

11. (*τὸν Θεὸν ἐπικαλούμενοι δεόμεθα αὐτοῦ*) *κύριε ἐλέησον* —Bk. ii. ch. 7, § 12.

Cf. *Κύριε ἐλέησον ἡμᾶς*—Matt. xx. 30, 31. Was this phrase part of the Church's liturgy in the time of Epictetus? and, if so, did he adopt it?

12. *τὸν γὰρ ποιοῦντα αὐτὸ οὐκ ἐν γωνίᾳ δηλονότι δεήσει ποιεῖν*—Bk. ii. ch. 12, § 17.

Cf. *οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν γωνίᾳ πεπραγμένον τοῦτο* — Acts xxvi. 26.

This phrase denoting secrecy—*ποιεῖν* (*or πράσσειν*) *τι ἐν γωνίᾳ*—is evidently a current proverb found quite as naturally on the lips of Epictetus as on those of St. Paul.

Considering too the many instances of the term γωνία in the "Discourses" (Bk. i. ch. 29, §§ 36, 55, etc.), we cannot think that Epictetus was in this passage imitating the language of St. Paul.

β. Verbal Phrases.

1. εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἀφορῶντας (ἐν παντὶ καὶ μικρῷ καὶ μεγάλῳ)—Bk. ii. ch. 19, § 29.

Cf. ἀφορῶντες εἰς τὸν τῆς πίστεως ἀρχηγὸν καὶ τελειωτὴν Ἰησοῦν—Heb. xii. 2.

2. ὄφελον with 3rd pers.—one instance ὄφελόν τις μετὰ ταύτης ἐκοιμήθη—Bk. ii. ch. 18, § 25.

Cf. one instance in the New Testament—ὄφελον καὶ ἀποκόψονται οἱ ἀναστατοῦντες ὑμᾶς—Gal. v. 12.

ὄφελον with 1st person, which is common in the "Discourses" (Bk. ii. ch. 21, § 1, etc.), is not found in the New Testament. There are, however, in the New Testament three instances of ὄφελον with 2nd person (1 Cor. iv. 8; 2 Cor. xi. 1; Rev. iii. 15); but this construction does not occur in Epictetus.

3. ὅταν εἰς σαυτὸν ἔλθῃς—Bk. iii. ch. 1, § 15.

Cf. εἰς ἑαυτὸν δὲ ἐλθών—Luke xv. 17. Sin drives a man out of his senses.

4. πρός with accus. after λέγω—one instance: τοῦτο οὖν οὐ πολλάκις σου αὐτὸς εἶπες πρὸς τοὺς ἑταίρους —Bk. iii. ch. 26, § 3. Common in the New Testament (Luke xx. 2, etc.)

5. μὴ γένοιτο. Very common in the "Discourses," giving a strong repudiation (Bk. i. ch. 1, § 13, etc.). Equally common in New Testament in same sense, especially in St. Paul's writings (Rom. iii. 4, etc.).

6. δοκῶ μοι κεκτῆσθαι—Bk. ii. ch. 12, § 21.

Cf. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἔδοξα ἐμαυτῷ . . . δεῖν . . . πρᾶξαι—Acts xxvi. 9.

7. ἄφες with 1st person subj. as ἄφες ἴδω τίς εἶ—Bk. ii. ch. 18, § 24, etc.

Cf. *ἄφες ἐκβάλω τὸ κάρφος ἐκ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ σου*—Matt. vii. 4, etc.

γ. Adverbial phrases.

1. *κομψῶς ἔχεις* (describing recovery from illness)—Bk. iii. ch. 10, § 13. Also *κομψῶς σοί ἐστι*—Bk. ii. ch. 18, § 14.

Cf. *ἐπύθετο οὖν τὴν ὥραν παρ' αὐτῶν ἐν ᾗ κομψότερον ἔσχεν*—John iv. 52.

2. *οὕτω καὶ ὑμεῖς ποιεῖτε*—Bk. ii. ch. 17, § 34.

Cf. *οὕτως καὶ ὑμεῖς ποιεῖτε αὐτοῖς*—Matt. vii. 12, etc.

3. *πρὸς ὀλίγον*—Bk. iv. ch. 9, § 4; ch. 12, § 1. "For a little (time)."

Cf. *ἡ γὰρ σωματικὴ γυμνασία πρὸς ὀλίγον ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος*—1 Tim. iv. 8; *ἀτμὶς γάρ ἐστε πρὸς ὀλίγον φαινομένη*—Jas. iv. 14.

4. *ἵνα τί*—Bk. i. ch. 29, § 30; *γένηται* understood. Cf. Matt. ix. 4, etc.

δ. Adjectival phrases.

1. *ἡ οἰκουμένη* (*γῆ* understood) in the sense of "the world." *διὰ τί . . . ὥστε . . . πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔρχεσθαι τοὺς ἐκ τῆς οἰκουμένης*;—Bk. iii. ch. 1, § 18, etc. Often in the New Testament; cf. *μέλλει κρίνειν τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ*—Acts xvii. 31, etc.

2. *ἡ σήμερον ἡμέρα*: one instance: *ἀπὸ τῆς σήμερον τοίνυν ἡμέρας οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐπισκοπήσομεν*—Bk. i. ch. 11, § 38.

Cf. *μαρτύρομαι ὑμῖν ἐν τῇ σήμερον ἡμέρᾳ*—Acts xx. 26, etc. Sometimes in the New Testament *ἡμέρα* is omitted, e.g. *ἔμεινεν ἂν μέχρι τῆς σήμερον*—Matt. xi. 33.

ε. Noun clauses.

1. (*κανόνας εἰς*) *ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας*—Bk. ii. ch. 20, § 21.

Cf. *εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας ἐλθεῖν*—1 Tim. ii. 4, etc.

2. (*ὅταν δι' αὐτὰς τὰς ὑπατείας καὶ*) *τὴν δόξαν καὶ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν*—Bk. iii. ch. 22, § 29. Cf. *προσδεχόμενοι τὴν . . . ἐπιφάνειαν τῆς δόξης τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ*—Tit. ii. 13.

3. *χάρις τῷ θεῷ*—Bk. iv. ch. 4, § 7. *χ.* in sense of "thanks." Also *πολλὴ χάρις αὐτῷ*—Bk. iv. ch. 5, § 9.

Cf. *χάρις δὲ τῷ θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*—Rom. vii. 25. *τῷ δὲ θεῷ χάρις τῷ διδόντι ἡμῖν τὸ νῖκος*—1 Cor. xv. 57.

4. (*ὅταν εἰσίῃς πρός τινα*) *τῶν ὑπερεχόντων*—Bk. i. ch. 30, § 1. So three times in the New Testament.

Cf. *πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἐξουσίαις ὑπερεχούσαις ὑποτασσέσ* —Rom. xiii. 1 (also Phil. ii. 3; 1 Pet. xii. 13).

5. (*οὕτως ἰσχυρόν τι καὶ ἀνίκητόν ἐστιν*) *ἡ φύσις ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη*—Bk. ii. ch. 20, § 18.

Cf. *πᾶσά γὰρ φύσις θηρίων τε καὶ πετεινῶν, ἑρπετῶν τε καὶ ἐναλίων δαμάζεται καὶ δεδάμασται τῇ φύσει τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ*—Jas. iii. 7.

ζ. Pronominal phrases.

1. *οὐαί μοι*—Bk. iii. ch. 19, § 1, etc.

Cf. *οὐαὶ ὑμῖν*—Matt. xxiii. 13, etc.

2. *τί ἡμῖν καὶ αὐτῷ*—Bk. i. ch. 1, § 16; also *τί μοι καὶ αὐτῷ*—Bk. i. ch. 22, § 15; also Bk. i. ch. 27, § 13; Bk. ii. ch. 19, §§ 16, 19, ch. 20, § 11; Bk. iii. ch. 18, § 18, ch. 22, § 99.

Cf. *τί ἡμῖν καὶ σοι*—Matt. viii. 24, etc. Dr. Moffatt refers to these phrases in the Expositor for January, 1913, p. 94.

ζ. A phrase that resembles a "Hebraism." *πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἄκουσα* (*στέρεται τῆς ἀληθείας*)—Bk. iii. ch. 22, § 36.

ἄκουσα being equivalent to *οὐχ ἑκοῦσα*, the phrase is an example of the use of *πᾶς* with a negative in the sense of "no one." We may compare some New Testament passages: *οὐ δικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σάρξ ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ*—Rom. iii. 30; *πᾶς πόρνος ἢ ἀκάθαρτος ἢ πλεονέκτης . . . οὐκ ἔχει κληρονομίαν* —Eph. v. 5; *οὐκ ἂν ἐσώθη πᾶσα σάρξ*—Mark xiii. 20.

Strict "Hebraisms" or Hebrew or Aramaic constructions are no longer believed to exist in the New Testament. Instead we often find instances of Translation-Greek as in Rom. iii. 20 (a quotation from the Old Testament). We might per-

haps explain thus the other two passages instanced, St. Peter and St. Mark being Jews by birth, not Greek.

But can we thus explain the passage in Epictetus? Is not this evidence that *πᾶς . . . οὐ*, so far from being merely Translation-Greek, was a regular Hellenistic idiom? Also, if we are to understand the phrase as a quotation from Plato —*ἆρ' εἰδὼς ἀκριβῶς τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ὅτι πᾶσα. . .* —the possibility of Hebraic influence becomes very remote. Do the Papyri throw any light on the matter?

2. Verbs. There are so many instances of verbs common to Epictetus and the New Testament, that we refer only to the most important. This is true too in the case of adjectives and nouns.

1. *ἀπέχω* in the sense of "I have received to the full." In Bk. iii. ch. 2, § 13, and Bk. iii. ch. 24, § 17: *τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονοῦν ἀπέχειν δεῖ πάντα ἃ θέλει, πεπληρωμένῳ τινὶ ἐοικέναι.*

Cf. *ἀπέχουσιν τὸν μισθὸν αὐτῶν*—Matt. vi. 2, etc.

2. *ἄγω* and compounds (intrans.) "go." *ἄγωμεν ἐπὶ τὸν ἀνθύπατον*—Bk. iii. ch. 22, § 55. .

Cf. *ἄγωμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς*—John xi. 16, etc. *ὕπαγε*—Bk. iii. ch. 22, § 5, etc. Cf. *ὕπαγε*—John iv. 16, etc. *ὡς πρὸς τὰ γεωμετρικὰ προσάγομεν*—Bk. ii. ch. 17, § 39. Cf. *ὑπενόουν οἱ ναῦται προσάγειν τινὰ αὐτοῖς χώραν*—Acts xxvii. 27.

3. *λαλέω* "talk," contrasted with *λέγω* "say," with object in Bk. iii. ch. 25, § 7, etc.

Cf. Rom. iii. 19, etc. In Bk. iv. ch. 9, § 8 *λαλέω* takes an object—*λόγους ἐλάλεις*. So often in the New Testament, cf. 1 Cor. ii. 6, etc.

4. *διακονέω* (with *ὑπηρετέω*) in Bk. ii. ch. 23, § 11. Also corresponding nouns in the same chapter, §§ 7, 8, 16.

Cf. Mark x. 43, 45; Acts xxiv. 23; John vii. 22, etc.

5. *κατακύπτω* in Book ii. ch. 16, § 22: *κατακύψας εἰς τὸν βυθόν.*

Cf. *κατακύψας ἔγραφεν εἰς τὴν γῆν*—John viii. 8. *παρακύπτω* in Bk. i. ch. 1, § 13, etc. Cf. Luke xxiv. 12, etc.

6. *γυμνάζω* often in metaphorical sense, e.g. *ἐπὶ τῆς θεωρίας γυμνάζουσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ φιλόσοφοι*—Bk. i. ch. 26, § 3.

Cf. *γύμναζε δὲ σεαυτὸν πρὸς εὐσέβειαν*—1 Tim. iv. 7.

7. *βαστάζω*, "lift," "carry," in Bk. i. ch. 3, § 2: *τὴν ὀφρὺν βαστάσει*; in Bk. i. ch. 29, § 35 of an athlete, *οὐ βαστάζει με*; in Bk. ii. ch. 9, § 22, *τὸν τοῦ Αἴαντος λίθον βαστάζειν*.

Cf. Mark xiv. 13; John x. 31, etc. The meaning of "carry away" suggested for John xii. 6, *τὰ βαλλόμενα ἐβάσταζεν*, is not found in the "Discourses."

8. *ἀγρυπνέω*, "be sleepless," common, e.g. Bk. i. ch. 7, § 30.

Cf. Luke xxi. 36, etc.

9. *σκυθρωπάζω*—Bk. iii. ch. 22, § 48, Bk. iv. ch. 6, § 21.

Cf. adj. *σκυθρωπός*—Matt. vi. 16; Luke xxiv. 17.

10. *βάλλω* (intrans.)—*βαλὼν κάθευδε*—Bk. ii. ch. 20, § 10. So Bk. iv. ch. 10, § 29, "lie down."

Cf. Acts xxvii. 14; *ἔβαλεν κατ' αὐτῆς ἄνεμος*, "fall."

11. With *περπερεύομαι* in 1 Cor. xiii. 4: *ἡ ἀγάπη . . . οὐ περπερεύεται*, cf. *ἐμπερπερεύσῃ*—Bk. ii. ch. 1, § 34 and adj. *πέρπερον* in Bk. iii ch. 2, § 14.

12. *εὐχαριστέω* often, e.g., *εὐχαρίστει τῷ θεῷ*—Bk. ii. ch. 23, § 5.

Cf. *εὐχαριστῶ τῷ θεῷ*—Rom. i. 8, etc.

13. With *ἐν αὐτῷ . . . κινούμεθα*—Acts xvii. 28.

Cf. *πῶς γὰρ δύναται ἄμπελος μὴ ἀμπελικῶς κινεῖσθαι*—Bk. ii. ch. 20, § 18.

14. *χορτάζομαι*, of human beings in Bk. i. ch. 9, § 19; Bk. iii. ch. 22, § 66: *εἰς οἶκον . . . χορτασθῆναι*.

Cf. *ἔφαγον πάντες καὶ ἐχορτάσθησαν*—Mark vi. 42, etc.

15. *ἐπισκοπέω*, to denote superintendence in Bk. iii. ch. 22, §§ 72, 77, 97.

Cf. Heb. xii. 15.

16. *ἐμπλέκω* is used of the Cynic in Bk. iii. ch. 22, § 69, *δεῖ . . . οὐδ' ἐμπεπλεγμένον σχέσεσιν.*

Cf. *οὐδεὶς στρατευόμενος ἐμπλέκεται ταῖς τοῦ βίου πραγματείαις*—2 Tim. ii. 4.

17. *δουλαγωγέω—τὸν δουλαγωγοῦντά σε*—Bk. iii. ch. 24, § 76; Bk. iv. ch. 7, § 17.

Cf. *ὑπωπιάζω μου τὸ σῶμα καὶ δουλαγωγῶ*—1 Cor. ix. 27.

18. The use of *στίλβω* to describe Socrates' personal cleanliness: *ἔστιλβεν αὐτοῦ τὸ σῶμα*—Bk. iv. ch. 11, § 19—is not parallel with its use in the account of the Transfiguration, *τὰ ἱμάτια αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο στίλβοντα*—Mark ix. 3. But with the latter we may compare the use of the adj. *στιλπνὸς* in Bk. iv. ch. 6, § 4, *ἱματίδια στιλπνά*, and Bk. iv. ch. 9, § 7, *ἐσθῆτα . . . στιλπνήν.*

19. *βιάζομαι*, "use violence," in Bk. iv. ch. 7, §§ 20, 21.

Cf. *πᾶς εἰς αὐτὴν βιάζεται* Luke xvi. 16.

20. *θλίβω* and *στενοχωρέω* together in Bk. i. ch. 25, § 28, *ἑαυτοὺς θλίβομεν, ἑαυτοὺς στενοχωροῦμεν.*

Cf. *ἐν παντὶ θλιβόμενοι ἀλλ' οὐ στενοχωρούμενοι*—2 Cor. iv. 8.

21. *ὑπάρχω* has lost the sense of "I am to start with" in Bk. iv. ch. 6, § 2, *πότερον . . . ὑπάρχει τοῦτο, τὸ . . . ἢ οὐχ ὑπάρχει*, and perhaps in Bk. iv. ch. 9, § 6, *ὑπῆρχες αἰδήμων καὶ νῦν οὐκέτι εἶ.* With the former, in which *ὑπάρχω* is not stronger than *εἰμί*, cf. *ἀκούω σχίσματα ἐν ὑμῖν ὑπάρχειν*—1 Cor. xi. 18. So in Papyri—*v.* Expositor, December, 1912, p. 564.

3. Adjectives.

1. *ὁλόκληρος*, "whole," with *σῶμα*—Bk. iv. ch. 1, § 151; with *σκεῦος*—Bk. iii. ch. 26, § 26.

Cf. *ὁλόκληρον ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα . . . τηρηθείη*—1 Thess. v. 23. Also Jas. i. 4, *τέλειοι καὶ ὁλόκληροι.*

2. *αὐτόχειρ* with *ἐγένου*—Bk. iv. ch. 9, § 12.

Cf. *αὐτόχειρες . . . ἔριψαν*—Acts xxvii. 19.

3. *σαπρός*, never "rotten" in the literal sense, but the slang term "rotten" expresses the meaning, i.e. "of poor quality" or "morally corrupt." It is used in Bk. ii. of a pot—ch. 4, § 4, of a foundation—ch. 15, § 9; in Bk. iii. of words—ch. 16, § 7, of *δόγματα*—ch. 22, § 61; in Bk. iv. of vinegar and honey—ch. 4, § 25, of a coin of Nero—ch. 5, § 17, of geese (living)—ch. 11, § 31.

Cf. its use with *δένδρον*—Matt. vii. 17, 18, etc., and with *λόγος*—Eph. iv. 29.

4. *φαῦλος*, of *δόγματα* contrasted with *ὀρθός*—Bk. iii. ch. 9, § 2. Apparently it has the same meaning as *πονηρός* (of *δόγματα*)—Bk. iii. ch. 9, § 2, and as *κακός* in *εἴ τι ἔχω κακὸν δόγμα*—Bk. iii. ch. 9, § 13. It is used of persons in Bk. iv. ch. 1, § 3, ch. 5, § 8.

Cf. its use in contrast with *ἀγαθός*—John v. 29; Rom. ix. 11; 2 Cor. v. 10.

5. *νεκρός* in its use with *συγγένειαν* referring to the fact that with man *τὸ σῶμα μὲν κοινὸν πρὸς τὰ ζῷα*—Bk. i. ch. 3, § 3—means "mortal," virtually equivalent to *θνητός*. This seems to be the meaning in Rom. viii. 10, *τὸ μὲν σῶμα νεκρὸν διὰ ἁμαρτίαν* (cf. Sanday and Headlam, p. 198).

6. *κενόδοξος*—Bk. iii. ch. 24, § 43.

Cf. *μὴ γινώμεθα κενόδοξοι*—Gal. v. 26.

7. *φιλόστοργος*—Bk. iii. ch. 24, § 58.

Cf. *τῇ φιλαδελφίᾳ εἰς ἀλλήλους φιλόστοργοι*—Rom. xii. 10.

8. *ἀδόκιμος* of coins, "spurious," "worthless"—Bk. i. ch. 7, § 6, Bk. iv. ch. 5, § 17.

Cf. *εἰ μὴ ἀδόκιμοί ἐστε*—2 Cor. xiii. 6; *μήπως . . . αὐτὸς ἀδόκιμος γένωμαι*—1 Cor. ix. 27.

9. *τὸ εὐσεβὲς καὶ τὸ ὅσιον*, "piety and holiness"—Bk. ii. ch. 20, § 22.

Cf. *εὐσεβὴς καὶ φοβούμενος τὸν θεόν*—Acts x. 2; *προσεύχεσθαι . . . ἐπαίροντας ὁσίους χεῖρας*—1 Tim. ii. 8.

4. Nouns.

1. *ἀκοή*, "ear," in *κοινή τις ἀκοὴ λέγοιτ' ἂν ἡ μόνον φωνῶν διακριτική*—Bk. iii. ch. 6, § 8.

Cf. Mark vii. 35, *ἠνοίγησαν αὐτοῦ αἱ ἀκοαί.*

2. The use of *πηρίδιον* in association with *αἰτεῖν* in Bk. iii. ch. 22, § 10—*πηρίδιον προσλήψομαι καὶ ξύλον καὶ περιερχόμενος αἰτεῖν ἄρξομαι τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας*—strengthens Deissmann's suggestion (v. *New Light*, p. 43) that *πήρα* in Luke ix. 3—*μηδὲν αἴρετε εἰς τὴν ὁδὸν μήτε ῥάβδον μήτε πήραν*—is a beggar's collecting-bag. We notice that Epictetus' *ξύλον* corresponds to Luke's *ῥάβδον*.

3. *κράββατος*, "bed"—Bk. i. ch. 24, § 14, etc.

Cf. *ἔγειρε, ἆρον τὸν κράβαττόν σου*—John v. 8, etc.

4. For *γυναικάριον*—Bk. iv. ch. 1, § 86—cf. *αἰχμαλωτίζοντες γυναικάρια*—2 Tim. iii. 6.

5. For *κυνάριον*—Bk. iv. ch. 1, § 111—cf. *τὰ κυνάρια ὑποκάτω τῆς τραπέζης*—Mark vii. 28, etc.

6. *μάχαιρα*—Bk. iv. ch. 1, § 88, common in the New Testament.

Cf. John xviii. 10, 11, Rev. vi. 4, etc.

7. *ἀγγαρεία*—Bk. iv. ch. 1, § 79, *ἂν δ' ἀγγαρεία ᾖ καὶ στρατιώτης ἐπιλάβηται*—is not found in the New Testament, but *ἀγγαρεύω* occurs three times—Matthew v. 41, xxvii. 32; Mark xv. 21.

8. The common New Testament term for "queen," *βασίλισσα*—Matt. xii. 42, etc.—occurs in Bk. iii. ch. 22, § 99, *ἡ βασίλισσα τῶν μέλισσῶν.*

9. With *αἰσχρολογία* in Bk. iv. ch. 3 § 2, cf. *ἀπόθεσθε . . . αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τοῦ στόματος ὑμῶν*—Col. iii. 8.

10. For the stamp on a coin cf. *τίνος ἔχει τὸν χαρακτῆρα τοῦτο τὸ τετράσσαρον*;—Bk. iv. ch. 5, § 17, with Mark xii. 16, (*δηνάριον . . .*) *τίνος ἡ εἰκὼν αὕτη καὶ ἡ ἐπιγραφή*;

11. *σχῆμα* has the usual meaning "fashion" in Bk. iv. ch. 13, § 5, *στρατιώτης ἐν σχήματι ἰδιωτικῷ*; cf. 1 Cor. vii.

31, Phil. ii. 8, Rom. xii. 2 (for compound verb), etc. But in Bk. iv. ch. 5, § 19—*μὴ γὰρ ἐκ ψιλῆς μορφῆς κρίνεται τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστον; ἐπεὶ οὕτω λέγε καὶ τὸ κήρινον μῆλον εἶναι*—*μορφὴ* seems to be no stronger than *σχῆμα*. May we not argue from this that such may be the case sometimes in the New Testament?

Cf. Mark xvi. 12 *ἐφανερώθη ἐν ἑτέρᾳ μορφῇ*, where surely the outward appearance is intended. And may we not apply this to the use of *μόρφωσις* in 2 Tim. iii. 5, *ἔχοντες μόρφωσιν εὐσεβείας*?

12. For *κτῆνος* in the sense of "beast of burden," "horse," in Bk. ii. ch. 22, § 31, Bk. iii. ch. 9, § 15, cf. *ἐπιβιβάσας δὲ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἴδιον κτῆνος*—Luke x. 34, etc.

13. St. Paul uses the term *τὸ θεῖον* "the Deity"—Bk. ii. ch. 20, § 22—at Athens: Acts xvii. 29.

14. *ναός*—Bk. i. ch. 22, § 16—is the regular New Testament term for "temple"; cf. Matt. xxiii. 16, 17, etc.

15. For *αἵρεσις*—Bk. ii. ch. 19, § 20—in the sense of "sect," cf. Acts xxviii. 22, 1 Cor. xi. 19, etc.

16. *οἰκοδεσπότης*—Bk. iii. 22, § 4, etc.—is common in the New Testament, e.g. Matt. xiii. 27.

17. The common Synoptic term *τελώνης*—Matt. ix. 10, 11, etc.—occurs in Bk. iii. ch. 15, § 12.

18. *κανών*, "rule," is common in the "Discourses," and in St. Paul's writings. With Bk. i. ch. 28, § 30, Bk. ii. ch. 11, § 13, cf. 2 Cor. x. 13, Gal. vi. 16.

19. For *πρόσωπον* as "part" or "character played"—Bk. i. ch. 2, § 7, etc.—cf. Gal. ii. 6.

20. With the use of *πνεῦμα* in the sense of "faculty," "power" in Bk. ii. ch. 23, § 3, we may compare the anarthrous *πνεῦμα* (*ἅγιον*)—an influence from the Holy Spirit—John iii. 5, Mark i. 8, etc., and also the Old Testament teaching that wisdom and power were the result of the Spirit of God coming upon one. In Bk. iii. ch. 3 § 22 *πνεῦμα* is

used in close connexion with ψυχή apparently in the sense of "mind," the meaning often given to ψυχή. With this cf. Mark ii. 8, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐπιγνοὺς ὁ Ἰησοῦς τῷ πνεύματι αὐτοῦ. Apparently νοί—sometimes a variant for ψυχῇ—would express the meaning.

5. Pronouns (including article).

a. Reflexives—(1) 3rd person for 1st person (plural). With εἰς τίνα δὲ χώραν αὐτοὺς κατατάσσομεν—Bk. ii. ch. 4, § 3, etc., cf. οὐ γὰρ ἑαυτοὺς κηρύσσομεν—2 Cor. iv. 5, etc.

(2) 3rd person for 2nd person (plural). With τηρεῖτε οὕτως ἑαυτοὺς ἐν οἷς ἐπράσσετε—Bk. ii. ch. 19, § 20, etc., cf. τί διαλογίζεσθε ἐν ἑαυτοῖς—Matt. xvi. 8, etc.

β. ἐκεῖνος—(1) Used emphatically, e.g. φίλος ἔσομαι Καίσαρος· ἐκείνου με ὄντα ἑαῖρον οὐδεὶς ἀδικήσει—Bk. iv. ch. 1, § 95.

Cf. καὶ ἐκεῖνος οἶδεν ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγει—John xix. 35, also John i. 8, etc.

(2) Looking forward—with ἐκεῖνο πρόχειρον ἔχε . . . τί . . . περιποιῇ—Bk. iv. ch. 3, § 11.

Cf. ἐκεῖνο δὲ γινώσκετε ὅτι . . .—Matthew xxiv. 43.

γ. ὅς as Demonstrative (cf. Platonic ἥ δ' ὅς). With καὶ ὅς (ἔφη understood) τίνα τρόπον ; . . .—Bk. i. ch. 11, § 3, we may compare the common use of ὃς μὲν . . . ὃς δέ . . . in the New Testament, e.g. ἐκεῖ ἐσταύρωσαν αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς κακούργους, ὃν μὲν ἐκ δεξιῶν ὃν δὲ ἐξ ἀριστερῶν—Luke xxiii. 33.

δ. Confusion of Relatives and Interrogatives. For τίς used as a Relative, e.g. ἐγὼ δ' ἔχω, τίνι με δεῖ ἀρέσκειν, τίνι . . . —Bk. iv. ch. 12, § 11, cf. οὐ τί ἐγὼ θέλω ἀλλὰ τί σύ —Mark xiv. 36. There seems to be no clear parallel—Matt. xxvi. 50 : ἐφ' ὅ πάρει being disregarded—in the New Testament to the use in Epictetus of Relative for Interrogative, for which cf. (τὰ δὲ πτῆνα . . .) οἷα πάσχει ζητοῦντα ἐκφυγεῖν ; . . . οἷα λέγεις ; (direct)—Bk. iv. ch. 1, §§ 26, 28, and (indirect) τίς γὰρ ἀγαθός ἐστιν οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅς ἐστι ;—Bk. iii. ch. 24, § 20.

ε. Omission of Pronoun (such as *αὐτός*, *τις*)—Bk. ii. ch. 4, § 4, etc. A case occurs of the Genitive Absolute without a pronoun in Bk. iii. ch. 4, § 1 (*τοῦ δ' ἐπιτρόπου . . . λοιδορηθέντος*), *εἶτα ἐξῆς ἀπαγγείλαντος πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι ἐλοιδορήθη*). Common in papyri: cf. for New Testament *καὶ ἐλθόντων πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον προσῆλθεν αὐτῷ . . .*—Matt. xvii. 14 (*v.* Moulton, *Proleg.*, p. 74).

ζ. Omission of article—(1) with Possessives. With *ὡς ὑπηρέτης σός*—Bk. iii. ch. 24, § 98—cf. *ἐμὸν βρῶμά ἐστιν ἵνα ποιήσω . . .*—John iv. 34.

(2) With Demonstratives. With *ἀνδράποδα ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδεν*—Bk. iv. ch. 5, § 24—cf. *τοῦτο ἤδη τρίτον ἐφανερώθη Ἰησοῦς*—John xxi. 14; with *ὅτι τοιοῦτον κατάσκοπον ἐπέμπομεν*—Bk. i. ch. 24, § 5—cf. *τὸν θεὸν τὸν δόντα ἐξουσίαν τοιαύτην τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*—Matt. ix. 8; with *ἐκ τοσούτου χρόνου ἐπιδημῶν . . .*—Bk. ii. ch. 13, § 6—cf. *παρ' οὐδενὶ τοσαύτην πίστιν ἐν τῷ Ἰσραὴλ εὗρον*—Matt. viii. 10; with *τί . . . τηλικαῦτα βιβλία γράφεις*—Bk. i. ch. 20, § 19—cf. *πῶς ἡμεῖς ἐκφευξόμεθα τηλικαύτης ἀμελήσαντες σωτηρίας*—Heb. ii. 3.

(3) With Nouns. With *ἐν κόσμῳ*—Bk. iii. ch. 7, § 1—cf. *τὸ κληρονόμον . . . κόσμου*—Rom. iv. 13; with *σὺ ἥλιος εἶ*—Bk. iii. ch. 22, § 5—cf. *σημεῖα ἐν ἡλίῳ καὶ σελήνῃ*—Luke xxi. 25; with *ἐν οἴκῳ*, "at home"—Bk. ii. ch. 16, § 44—cf. two fine instances in 1 Cor. xi. 34, xiv. 35; with *εἰς οἶκον*, "home"—Bk. i. ch. 19, § 24: *ἔρχεται εἰς οἶκον*, cf. Mark ix. 28; *ἐξ οἴκου*, "from home"—Bk. ii. ch. 21, § 12—does not occur in the New Testament.

6. Confusion of Comparatives and Superlatives.

α. Some comparatives seem to be used quite naturally, as *δειλότερος*, "somewhat cowardly"—Bk. ii. 21, § 2, or *ψυχρότερον*, "somewhat coldly"—Bk. iii. ch. 23, § 10. But the sense seems to demand the superlative meaning for the comparative in Bk. ii. ch. 23, § 39: (*πόσα δ' ἄλλα πανδοκεῖα κομψά, πόσοι δὲ λειμῶνες . . .*) *οὐ γὰρ τοὺς κομψοτέρους ἡμῖν*

τόπους ἐκλεξόμενος ἐλήλυθας—"the finest places." Cf. τὰ τρία ταῦτα, μείζων δὲ τούτων ἡ ἀγάπη—1 Cor. xiii. 13. Such may be the case with ἄλλο δέ τι τῶν μικροτέρων ἔργων—Bk. iv. ch. 12, § 5.

β. In Bk. iii. ch. 7, § 24—ἐν τορεύματι τί κράτιστόν ἐστιν, ὁ ἄργυρος ἢ ἡ τέχνη;—a superlative is used in a comparative sense. Again in § 4 of the same chapter we find a superlative and comparative used in parallel clauses suggesting a contrast—ἀγαθὰ δὲ τὰ τοῦ κρατίστου κρείττονά ἐστιν ἢ τὰ τοῦ φαυλοτέρου. We must treat them either as two comparatives or as two superlatives.

7. Verbal Forms—α. Verbs in -μι with endings of verbs in -ω. E.g. with συνίστανεν—Bk. iii. ch. 23, § 22—cf. συνιστάνειν—2 Cor. iii. 1. With δεικνύω—Bk. iii. ch. xxvi. § 19—cf. δεικνύειν—Matt. xvi. 21.

β. Other non-classical endings. With ἤμην—Bk. ii. ch. 20, § 29, etc., and ἦς—Bk. ii. ch. 4, § 4, etc.,—cf. Matt. xxv. 21, 35, etc. For οἴδαμεν—Bk. ii. ch. 20, § 32, etc.—cf. 2 Cor. v. 1, etc. The New Testament 2nd pers. mid. and pass. ending for indic. and subj. ending -η is found, e.g. σύρῃ—Bk. i. ch. 29, § 22, and also the New Testament 3rd pers. plur. imperat. ending -έτωσαν in νευέτωσαν—Bk. iii. ch. 26, § 29.

γ. The New Testament γίνομαι is quite usual—Bk. i. ch. 9, § 19, etc.

δ. The augment is sometimes omitted. E.g. with πεπράκει—Bk. i. ch. 19, § 22—cf. διεγείρετο—John vi. 18.

8. Use of the Perfect. There are instances of the true Perfect of abiding result, e.g. ἀνάγνωτε τὸ Ξενοφῶντος Συμπόσιον καὶ ὄψεσθε πόσας μάχας διαλέλυκε—Bk. ii. ch. 12, § 15—reminding us of γέγραπται, "it stands written"—Matt. iv. 4, etc. But often the Perfect seems to have the meaning of the aorist: e.g. in καθεῖκε τὴν κόμην, ἀνειληφε τρίβωνα, δεικνύει . . .—Bk. iv. ch. 8, § 34, where Gnomic

Aorists might well be substituted for the Perfects. The confusion is the more marked when we find the two tenses used in close association, e.g. *τί ἐγένετο ; τὸ πλοῖον ἀπώλετο . . . τί γέγονεν* ;—Bk. iii. ch. 8, § 5.

Cf. *λαβὼν . . . εἰληφώς*—Matt. xxv. 20, 24, and *ἀπελθὼν πέπρακεν . . . καὶ ἠγόρασεν αὐτόν*—Matt. xiii. 46.

9. Prepositions—*α. ἀντί*, "for the sake of," in *ἀντὶ λύχνου κλέπτης ἐγένετο*—Bk. i. ch. 29, § 21, etc.

Cf. *ὃς ἀντὶ τῆς προκειμένης αὐτῷ χαρᾶς*—Heb. xii. 2, etc.

β. εἰς, "in," in *ἵν' αὐτὸ λούσῃ εἰς σκάφην*—Bk. iii. ch. 22, § 71.

Cf. *ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρός*—John i. 18, etc.

γ. ἐν, "into,"—development of pregnant construction. A good instance in Bk. ii. ch. 20, § 33 : *ἀπελθεῖν ἐν βαλανείῳ*.

Cf. *ἤλλαξαν . . . ἐν ὁμοιώματι*—Rom. i. 23, etc.

δ. παρά, c. accus., "because of," common, e.g. *ἂν δέ τις ἀτυχῇ, μέμνησο ὅτι παρ' αὐτὸν ἀτυχεῖ*—Bk. iii. ch. 24, § 2.

Cf. *οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος*—1 Cor. xii. 15, 16.

ε. παρά, c. gen., "by," of the agent in *ὡς ἂν δίδωται παρὰ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐξουσίαν*—Bk. iv. ch. 10, § 29.

Cf. *γενήσεται αὐτοῖς παρὰ τοῦ πατρός μου*—Matt. xviii. 19.

ζ. for *ὑπέρ*, c. gen., in the sense of *περί*, e.g. *φοβεῖταί τις ὑπέρ*—Bk. ii. ch. 13, § 9—cf. *ὑπὲρ οὗ ἐγὼ εἶπον*—John i. 30.

η. Preposition governing an Adverb. With *μέχρι νῦν*—Bk. ii. ch. 19, § 25—cf. *ἀπὸ τότε . . . ἀπ' ἄρτι*—Matt. xxvi. 16, 29.

10. Uses of *ἵνα*. *ἵνα* is used in six different ways apart from the "final" sense.—*α.* In a consecutive clause : e.g. with *εἰ δ' οὕτω κωφὸς εἶ . . . ἵνα . . .*—Bk. iv. ch. 8, § 21—cf. *μὴ ἔπταισαν ἵνα πέσωσιν* ;—Rom. xi. 11 (cf. Moulton, *Proleg.*, p. 207).

β. After *ποιέω*. With *ποίησον ἵνα σε μηδεὶς ἀποστρέφηται*

—Bk. iv. ch. 11, § 17—cf. *οὐκ ἐδύνατο οὗτος . . . ποιῆσαι ἵνα καὶ οὗτος μὴ ἀποθάνῃ*;—John xi. 37.

γ. In a substantive clause: with *ἵνα πάθῃ ταῦτα ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων*—Bk. i. ch. 29, § 16—cf. *ἐμὸν βρῶμά ἐστιν ἵνα ποιήσω τὸ θέλημα*—John iv. 34.

δ. After verbs denoting a wish or command: e.g. *ἤθελον, ἵνα με . . . θαυμάζωσι*—Bk. i. ch. 21, § 3; *εὔχεσθαι αὐτοὺς ἔδει ἵνα μὴ θερισθῶσιν*;—Bk. ii. ch. 6, § 12.

Cf. *πάντα οὖν ὅσα ἐὰν θέλητε ἵνα ποιῶσιν . . .* Matt. vii. 12; *προσεύχεσθε δὲ ἵνα μὴ γένηται . . .*—Matt. xxiv. 20.

ε. Introducing a request. With *ἄγε ἵνα Σώφρων στεφανωθῇ*—Bk. iii. ch. 4, § 9—cf. (prob.) *τοῦτο λέγω ἵνα μηδεὶς ὑμᾶς παραλογίζηται*—Col. ii. 4.

ξ. In the sense of "because." With *γελοῖον οὖν, ἵν' ἄλλος νικήσῃ κωμῳδῶν, ἐμὲ βλάπτεσθαι*—Bk. iii. ch. 4, § 10—cf. *Ἀβραὰμ . . . ἠγαλλιάσατο ἵνα ἴδῃ τὴν ἡμέραν*—John viii. 56.

11. Uses of *μή*.—α. *μή τι*, common, introducing a question implying a doubt, "Can it possibly be?" e.g. *μή τι οὖν βέβαιον ἡ ἡδονή*;—Bk. ii. ch. 11, § 20.

Cf. *μήτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Χριστός*;—John iv. 29.

β. *μή* is commonly used with the participle, whatever the sense, *οὐ* being very rare: e.g. *νῦν δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοί τινες τὸν ψωμὸν καταπίνειν σύνταξιν ἀγοράσαντες ἐπιβάλλονται ἐσθίειν* (concessive)—Bk. i. ch. 26, § 16.

Cf. *μὴ ἔχοντος δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀποδοῦναι* (causal)—Matt. xviii. 25.

γ. With indic. of statement especially after a relative or *ὅτι*, "because," e.g. *μὴ γὰρ σὸν τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον ἦν ἀλλ' ἐκείνου*—Bk. ii. ch. 6, § 8—

cf. *κέκριται, ὅτι μὴ πεπίστευκεν εἰς . . .*—John iii. 18.

δ. With infinitives of verbs of "saying" and "thinking," e.g. *λέγοντες μηδ' εἶναι τὸ θεῖον*—Bk. i. ch. 12, § 1.

Cf. *λέγοντες μὴ εἶναι ἀνάστασιν* Matt. xxii. 23.

12. Particles, etc.—*α.* ἄν is usual for, ἐάν, e.g. Bk. i, ch. 1, § 20.

Cf. John xii. 32, etc.

β. ἄν, "would," is often omitted, e.g. with ἤθελον—Bk. i. ch. 19, § 18, etc.

Cf. Gal. iv. 20 : ἤθελον.

γ. ἰδού—common as interjection, e.g. Bk. iv. ch. 11, § 35.

Cf. Acts i. 10, etc. It is also followed by an object, e.g. ἰδοὺ τί ἀντὶ τούτου ἔχεις—Bk. iv. ch. 9, § 1.

Cf. ἰδοὺ ὕδωρ—Acts viii. 36.

δ. πλήν, "but," in πλὴν ἐπ' ἐμοῦ παρεκαλοῦντο—Bk. iii. ch. 23, § 27, etc.

Cf. πλὴν λέγω ὑμῖν—Matt. xi. 22, 24, etc.

ε. ἄνωθεν, with the meaning "again," in Bk. ii. ch. 17, § 27 : οὐ θέλεις ἀπομαθεῖν . . . πάντα ταῦτα καὶ ἄνωθεν ἄρξασθαι συναισθανόμενος . . . supports such a meaning for the same term in John iii. 7 : δεῖ ὑμᾶς γεννηθῆναι ἄνωθεν.

ζ. ποῦ, ὅπου, ἐκεῖ, ἀλλαχοῦ, of "motion to." E.g. with ἄν μ' ἐκεῖ πέμπῃς—Bk. iii. ch. 24, § 101—cf. μετάβα ἔνθεν ἐκεῖ—Matt. xvii. 20.

η. For ὧδε, "here." With ὧδε ἡ πολλὴ προσοχὴ καὶ σύντασις—Bk. iii. ch. 22, § 105—cf. καλόν ἐστιν ἡμᾶς ὧδε εἶναι—Matt. xvii. 4. For ὧδε, "hither" : with δὸς ὧδε τὴν πτισάνην—Bk. ii. ch. 20, § 30—cf. ἦλθες ὧδε πρὸ καιροῦ . . .;—Matt. viii. 29.

13. Sundries—*α.* Infinitive for Imperative. With μεμνῆσθαι οὖν ἐν τοῖς καθόλου, ὅτι . . .—Bk. iv. ch. 13, § 23, etc. —cf. τῷ αὐτῷ στοιχεῖν—Phil. iii. 16, etc. (cf. Moulton, *Proleg.*, p. 179).

β. Participle for Imperative. With ἀεί μεμνημένος ὅ τι σὸν καὶ . . .—Bk. ii. ch. 6, § 8—cf. ἀποστυγοῦντες τὸ πονηρόν, κολλώμενοι τῷ ἀγαθῷ—Rom. xii. 9.

γ. Accusative—in place of Nominative—with Infinitive. With οἱ τραγῳδοὶ οἰήσονται ἑαυτοὺς εἶναι προσωπεῖα . . .—

Bk. i. ch. 29, § 41—cf. *ἐγὼ ἐμαυτὸν οὔπω λογίζομαι κατειληφέναι*—Phil. iii. 13.

δ. Plural verb after Neuter plurals. With *πάντα περιστάσεις εἰσίν*—Bk. ii. ch. 6, § 17—cf. *τὰ κυνάρια ὑποκάτω τῆς τραπέζης ἐσθίουσιν*—Mark vii. 28, etc.

ε. Dative of Time (Duration). With *τοσούτῳ δὲ χρόνῳ παρακεκαθικέναι . . .*—Bk. ii. ch. 6, § 23, etc.—cf. *χρόνῳ ἱκανῷ οὐκ ἐνεδύσατο ἱμάτιον*—Luke viii. 27, etc.

ζ. Dative of "motion to." Common after *προσέρχομαι*: e.g. *προσέρχεται τοῖς φιλοσόφοις*—Bk. i. ch. 26, § 9.

Cf. *προσῆλθεν αὐτῷ ἑκατόνταρχος*—Matt. viii. 5, etc. Also after simple verb *ἔρχομαι*: with *ἔρχῃ μοι . . .*—Bk. ii. ch. 21, § 11—cf. *ἔρχομαί σοι ταχύ*—Rev. ii. 16.

η. Loss of Emphasis. In Diminutives probably and certainly in Compound Verbs: for the latter, with *τὰς χεῖρας καταφιλῆσαι*—Bk. iv. ch. 10, § 20—cf. *κατεφίλησεν αὐτόν*—Matt. xxvi. 49. It seems needless to insist that Judas "kissed fervently."

II. Owing to lack of space we can refer to but few of the Resemblances in Thought and Teaching between the "Discourses" and the New Testament. Passing by those which became evident as we dealt with points of language, we now take a few instances at random.

1. God's care over all. "Who doth not even neglect any of the smallest things"—Bk. iii. ch. 24, § 113. Also, "He doth not neglect the affairs of men"—Bk. iii. ch. 26, § 28.

Cf. "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? And one of them will not fall to the earth without your Father. But even the hairs of your head are all numbered"—Matt. x. 29, 30.

2. Man's superiority. "Is not then a man in any way better (*διαφέρει*) than a stork?"—Bk. i. ch. 28, § 19.

Cf. in reference to the birds, "Are ye not much better (*διαφέρετε*) than they?"—Matt. vi. 26.

3. Conscience. "To the Cynic, instead of arms and guards"—as with a king—"Conscience (*τὸ συνειδός*) gives this power"—of reproving and of punishing delinquents—Bk. iii. ch. 22, § 94.

Cf. Rom. ii. 15: *τῆς συνειδήσεως*. With *ἄνθρωπος συνειδὼς ἑαυτῷ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν μή τε πεποιηκότι*—Bk. iii. ch. 23, § 15—cf. *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐμαυτῷ σύνοιδα*—1 Cor. iv. 4. Evidence of a dull conscience (1 Tim. iv. 2), the result of being overcome by Temptation: "You will be reduced to so weak and wretched a condition that afterwards you will not even know that you are doing wrong, but you will actually begin to make defences for your conduct"—Bk. ii. ch. 18, § 31.

4. True Freedom. "Who then would live *ἁμαρτάνων*?"—difficult to distinguish from "sinning"—"No one . . . no wicked man (*φαύλων*) then lives as he likes; therefore he is not even free"—Bk. iv. ch. 1, §§ 2, 3.

Cf. "Every one who doeth sin (*ἁμαρτίαν*) is slave of sin"—John viii. 34.

III. We conclude with a few instances of Differences in Thought between the Discourses and the New Testament.

1. *ἀγαπάω* is used in the Classical sense, "I am content," e.g. (*χαῖρε τοῖς παροῦσι καὶ*) *ἀγάπα ταῦτα, ὧν καιρός ἐστιν*—Bk. iv. ch. 4, § 45. In the New Testament the verb always means "I love," e.g. *ἀγαπᾶτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμῶν*—Matt. v. 44, etc. In the same way in Epictetus the adj. *ἀγαπητό* means "satisfactory," e.g. *ἀγαπητὸν γάρ, εἰ . . . ὀλίγων γε ἁμαρτημάτων ἐκτὸς ἐσόμεθα*—Bk. iv. ch. 12, § 19; but in the New Testament "beloved," e.g. *σὺ εἶ ὁ υἱός μου ὁ ἀγαπητός*—Mark i. 11.

2. *πλεονεξία* is used in a good sense for "advantage" in Bk. ii. ch. 10, § 9: *ὅρα γάρ . . . ἀντί . . . καθέδρας αὐτὸν εὐγνωμοσύνην*—"good temper"—*κτήσασθαι, ὅση ἡ πλεονεξία*. But in the New Testament the term is always used in a bad

sense, meaning "covetousness" or "greediness," e.g. *ἀκαθαρσία πᾶσα ἢ πλεονεξία μηδὲ ὀνομαζέσθω ἐν ὑμῖν*—Eph. v. 3.

3. There is a similar contrast in the use of *οὐâ*. In Bk. iii. ch. 23, §§ 24, 32 it is a term of praise, but in the New Testament a term of scorn: *οὐὰ ὁ καταλύων τὸν ναόν*—Mark xv. 29.

4. In the use of *ταπεινός* and its cognates Epictetus adopts the pagan attitude. With him the term has the sense of "mean," e.g. in Bk. iii. ch. 2, § 14, where it is associated with *δειλός*. Contrast New Testament, e.g. *εἰμὶ. . . ταπεινὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ*—our Lord's claim in Matt. xi. 29, "lowly." So—as in Acts xx. 19: *δουλεύων τῷ Κυρίῳ μετὰ πάσης ταπεινοφροσύνης*—*ταπεινοφροσύνη* is a leading Christian virtue, while in the "Discourses" it is "meanness" and is associated with *κολακεία*—Bk. iii. ch. 24, § 56.

These instances are sufficient to form an argument that Epictetus was not a Christian. This argument is strengthened by the reference previously made to the phrase *τοῦ βεβαμμένου καὶ ᾑρημένου* (Bk. ii. ch. 9, § 20). Two facts must be added. In the first place Epictetus often speaks of Zeus and the gods: considered by itself, this does not carry much weight, as it might be interpreted as an accommodation to current thought and custom, but considered in the light of the above it strengthens our argument. In the second place the term *οἱ Γαλιλαῖοι* occurs in Bk. iv. ch. 6, § 16, apparently referring to the Christians, a term applied in the same way later by the Emperor Julian. There is, too, a suggestion of scorn underlying the passage. This seems to be sufficient to clinch our argument that, in spite of his lofty teaching, in spite, too, of the many resemblances between the "Discourses" and the New Testament, Epictetus cannot have been a Christian.

DOUGLAS S. SHARP.

THE SENSE OF SIN IN GREAT LITERATURE.

V.

Here and There.

The objection may be taken to these studies, that we are dealing with rare and unusual personalities; that therefore the inferences which we deduce from their behaviour *in extremis* are good only for them and are not authoritative for average human beings. Well: there are many things to be said by way of answer or qualification to such a criticism. For example: it is surely a presumption in favour of the universality which is claimed for these tragic moods and protests, that they awaken a response in the souls of those who either choose to come within hearing of them; or, is it when men are reduced by life to some constraint or fear, the language of great literature becomes their own natural speech. It is not claimed that all men dwell habitually among those deep things. It is not claimed even that all men have had experience of those deep things. What is claimed is that those deep things are there; that the soul of man is capable of and liable to the vision of those depths; and that whenever the soul has been thrown back upon itself, and shut in with itself, there are certain persistent fears which present themselves, and a certain course which offers itself as the only possible way of peace.

The deeper literature of the soul, with an unanimousness which makes it authoritative for many of us and ought to make it worthy of consideration by all responsible people (the deeper literature of the soul) has given a name and body to those intangible things.

To say that there are many who have never had such feelings is simply to say that their great day,—that day on earth wherein the soul rehearses what its behaviour shall

be before the Great White Throne,—their great day has not yet come. Or it may only mean that they have so far succeeded in escaping from a season of loneliness long enough and acute enough to bring out those lurking shapes.

Certainly it is no news to those of us who are acquainted with that great body of the literature of the soul, the Bible, to be told that all men have not these tremors and disquietudes. "All men have not faith," said St. Paul, meaning, when he wrote the words, this very thing, that all men have not this moral tenderness which keeps us soft towards God. Plato also discriminates between "royal" natures, as he calls them, natures, that is to say, which are liable to waves of contrition, and natures of another kind which, so far as we see,—but then in these matters we do not see very far and can only see for ourselves,—live on without ever coming to a day of reckoning with themselves.

In our own day, William James of Harvard divided all souls into two classes,—souls which, with a measure of predestination, are tough, and souls which, by an equal necessity, are tender.

It is another aspect of the greatness of Jesus that in His view the human soul in its final instincts and necessities is *one*, however certain features may have been heightened or depressed. He believed that the true and final nature of the soul is to seek, and having found, to dwell in communion with, Him whom He called "the Father." He believed that if the Father were brought to the heart of man, as He by His own unstinted life of love was bringing Him, the heart of man in every instance would respond. Not easily indeed. With great difficulty and labour rather, as happens at every new birth.

But this He did believe, and in this faith He gave Himself without reserve, that there was and is in every human being the capacity for seeing something higher than its own

reach at any moment, and that, when the human spirit becomes aware of that Presence of God knocking and waiting at its own very door, there and then begins a controversy between impulses which, whatever be the issue, makes the man morally self-conscious and a party to his own fate.

Whether or not all men are ultimately liable to the miseries which follow wrong-doing, or to the shame and sorrow which afflict souls of a certain kind when they see themselves in the light of some holier way, is a matter so serious that it is wiser not to dogmatise upon it. It must be left to ourselves one by one to say whether we have such feelings, or do not have them. It may be that once upon a time we did have them. But they do not trouble us now. In that case, we ought to ask ourselves whether we dealt honourably by them when they visited us, or whether we tampered with the delicate mechanism of our spiritual life and trampled down the secret barriers of God.

Once again, it may be said that all this agonising over one's ways has lost its reason and foundation by the work in various fields of the scientific method. If moral grief appears to-day in literature or in life, it is a reminiscence from pre-scientific times. In short, to recall the phrase with which these studies began—" no one to-day is worrying about his sins." Well now, let me say one or two things just there.

It is probably quite true that in our day the sense of sin is much fainter than it has been ; for the sense of God may not be so strong as it has been. The sense of sin is the shadow of the sense of God ; and a dim light casts no shadow. It is the bright shining of a light which discovers us to ourselves. It is inevitable that in a society which is without moral seriousness, the individual, if he does not summon himself each day before a higher court, will come more and more into equilibrium with his surroundings. But this

is not to say that he has lost the power to feel the misery of his own way, if the higher way should be revealed to him. And besides, populous and confusing as is the general life in these days, one's soul is always distinct to itself and keeps urging its own business upon each one's attention. It is true that there are many ways by which we may for a time escape from ourselves. We may even train our mind to an extraordinary pitch of ingenuity for escaping seriousness. And yet all the time we know that we are merely evading something, we know that we are living by our wits. It is not without significance that the best-known poem of Francis Thompson should be "The Hound of Heaven." It but shows that there the poet had revealed the thoughts of many hearts.

So long as a man believes himself, he will believe in the unhappiness of wrong-doing and he will know precisely wherein for him wrong-doing consists. It is when we cease to believe ourselves, and begin to believe other people; it is when we take our eyes off our own case and let them wander carelessly upon the general life; it is when we say —"Why should I trouble myself, in this busy city where the crowds are passing to and fro, and where other people are not troubling themselves?"—it is then and thus that we escape the very issue which bears witness to our moral worth in the world. Now the fact is that those crowds who help us to get over our own scruples are made up of individuals like ourselves, who, so far as we know, are doing precisely what we are doing, avoiding the challenge of some personal question by looking out upon what seems the fashion or custom. So long as we keep our eyes upon ourselves we feel we must decide something. Whereas when we look away from ourselves and begin to speak about the spirit of the time, about progress, about enlightenment and so forth, we begin to feel that everything has already been

decided, and decided in a way that falls in very happily with our own inclination.

But once again it is simply not true, if one may judge from the best writing of our own time, that man has found a formula for the silencing of those ancient voices of the soul. Book after book has appeared in our day, where one might even say the author has tried to prove a case against the established moral habit and prejudice. He has launched a human being out upon life on some principle which is against the social tradition. And yet I know of no single case where the end is not bitterness. I know of no case in any piece of serious literature where a person, or persons, who flout the accepted morality in fundamental things, gain happiness: I mean, of course, such a happiness as they themselves can bear to think about and to look back upon. You may say, indeed, that the reason for this is, that society itself is so constituted, so hide-bound by conventionality, so timid, so insincere and hypocritical, that souls who will be free must suffer. But that is not my point. That men suffer at the hands of society is, of course, no proof that they are wrong. It may be proof that society is wrong. It is true likewise that it will only be by the faithful endurance of suffering at the hand of society that society itself will be renewed. It would be no disparagement of a life's principles that they nailed a man to a cross. But it is a disparagement of a life's principles that they lead on to private misery, that they provoke an invincible reaction towards shame and bitterness. And that is what I find in every sincere piece of writing in which the dice are not loaded, in which, I mean to say, the writer obeys with fidelity the logic of his own imagination. The thing in the long run does not work. Not only does it not work, and will it not work, on the large scale as a social habit; it does not work in the kingdom of a man's own spirit. If you still

protest that this liability to remorse, this tendency of self-seeking to leave the taste of ashes in the mouth, is simply the reminiscence in our blood of barbarous and hideous social retributions before these days of enlightenment, once again you leave the real issue untouched. For human nature is just that thing which has come down through history bearing within itself those profound and terrible susceptibilities.

But it is not enough to say that this misery which free spirits cannot escape is the reminiscence of the social penalties of earlier times, or that it is the effect of the attitude of society to-day towards one who violates its conventions. Society has not the power to cause moral misery. Society has the power to inflict penalty; society has not the power to make one ashamed of himself. There is a quality of misery which I alone can bring upon myself and it arises when at length I have come within sight of a way of living which makes the way I have come seem unworthy, or cruel, or sensual, in any case intolerable.

So long as my own heart does not reproach me, so long as, in the fine speech of the Bible, I can lift up my face to God without spot, I may suffer, I may be forsaken, but, deeper than everything, I ought to be at peace, my heart should be free of even one drop of bitterness. I ought, indeed, to be contemptuous of a society or of a generation which is so blind as not to see the glory of the way which I have chosen. Suffering, indeed, is no proof that a man's life-principles are at fault; the society which inflicts the suffering, or stands by while it is being endured, may be at fault. In such a case, the man's life-principles, though they are opposed to the principles of his day, may all the time be in harmony with the principles of a day that is coming. But misery, the taste of ashes in the mouth, personal shame, the sense of world-weariness, these, when they follow upon

some way of life, and when they arise in the human heart out of some way of life, do demonstrate that that way of life is contrary to the man's own true nature and spirit. For a way of life which destroys the very principles of human nature cannot be according to the nature of things.

"And so," I said, "Good-bye to London!" We said no more, but watched the South-side streets below—bright gleams of light and movement, and the dark, dim, monstrous shapes of houses and factories. We ran through Waterloo Station, London Bridge, New Cross, St. John's. We never said a word. It seemed to me that for a time we had exhausted our emotions. We had escaped, we had cut our knot, we had accepted the penalty. That was all settled. That harvest of feelings we had reaped. I thought now only of London, of London as the symbol of all we were leaving and all we had lost in the world. I felt nothing now but an enormous and overwhelming regret. . . . Then suddenly, stabbing me to the heart, came a vision of Margaret's tears and the sound of her voice . . . I came out of a cloud of thoughts to discover the narrow compartment with its feeble lamp overhead, and our rugs and hand-baggage swaying on the rack, and Isabel, very still in front of me, gripping some wilting red roses tightly in her bare and ringless hand.

For a moment I could not understand her attitude, and then I perceived she was sitting bent together with her head averted from the light to hide the tears that were streaming down her face. She had not got her handkerchief out for fear I should see this, but I saw her tears, dark drops of tears upon her sleeve.

For a time I stared at her and was motionless in a sort of still and weary amazement. Why had we done this injury to one another? Why? Then something stirred within me.

"Isabel," I whispered.

She made no sign.

"Isabel!" I repeated, and then crossed over to her, crept closely to her, put my arm about her, and drew her wet cheek to mine."

So ends a great modern story. But surely this sad way is the wrong way. It is not that they are suffering which proves that they are wrong. Their chief suffering is that they know that they are wrong.

"Sail in there," cried an old admiral, when the fight had gone against him, "sail in there; for I have taken the

soundings, and when they sink my ship, the flag at the mast-head will still be flying." That is the language of a man whose heart is with him in the deep waters. But "wet cheeks, silence, wilting red roses"—these are signs that their own heart has gone out of the business.

The last thing about us is that we are not alone. When we look long and deeply into ourselves, we perceive that we stand for ever in a relation to Another, to an Absolute and close-fitting Personality. We can no more think of ourselves as quite alone and independent than we can think of space except as being surrounded by space, and of time except as surrounded by time. Whatever may be the truth in regard to other races, it is true with regard to us, that the only God with whom we have to do is the God of our fathers. We can free ourselves from the bondage of one aspect of His nature only by appealing to another aspect, which we claim as belonging still more properly to Him, more central and abiding.

I do not know how better to describe the private misery which, on the witness of all great literature, has been let loose in men's hearts by certain ways than to say, that it is the experience by us of an intolerable loneliness. We can all of us endure loneliness in one region of our life, so long as we are sustained by friendliness and belief in us, in another region deeper and more intimate. We can bear to be misunderstood by those who do not know us, so long as we are supported by the love, or, if need be, by the patience of those who know us to some depth. And even when friends forsake us, when the one or two on whom we leaned fall away, if we can still without conscious self-deception send our soul more deeply into itself and there find comfort and no embarrassment; if, to use language concerning matters about which language fails, we can look across the frontier of our own personality and truly believe that we are not

outcasts or outlaws from the Kingdom of God,—we may suffer, we will suffer, but we have not failed, and we are not unhappy. The Spirit beareth witness with our spirit that we are sons of God. But, if it is otherwise with us, if when we descend into ourselves for solace, we find none ; if, when we would lean upon our last Resource and make our protest from the judgment of the world to Him who knows everything ; if there and then we are alone ; if the Face we plead with seems to be turned away from us, —we have come, I think, upon that final silence and disapproval from which there is no appeal.

This was an idea which more than once our Lord dwelt upon. In some of His gravest words He warned men that the penalty for certain courses was not the pain which they entailed. The true penalty was—the consequence, and that consequence was that one day they should be left out of something. It might be the society of men. It might be the friendship of those who had been dear to them. It might even be the Fellowship of God.

And the great cries of the soul in literature and in life are the cries of those who are afraid of that loneliness, or who already are tasting the bitterness of it.

JOHN A. HUTTON.

NOTES ON THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

XVIII. THE RESURRECTION (John xx.).

(1) IT is not necessary here to discuss the general problem of the evidence for the Resurrection ; we are now concerned only with the narrative in this chapter and the light it throws on the question of the authorship, character, and credibility of this Gospel. In the first division of the chapter (*vv.* 1–10) the visit of Peter and the other disciple to the tomb to verify Mary Magdalene's report that it

was empty is recorded. Matthew xxviii. 1–10, Mark xvi. 1–8 and Luke xxiv. 1–11 also report the discovery of the empty tomb, not only by Mary Magdalene as here, but also by other women; but in much greater detail than in the Fourth Gospel. Probably the evangelist mentions the discovery of Mary Magdalene only to introduce the visit to the tomb, in which he had a personal interest. Luke records the visit of Peter alone to the tomb (*v.* 12), and of no other disciple. The other disciple's hesitation to enter, the greater boldness of Peter, the beginning of faith in the Resurrection of the Lord, the confession of the failure of the disciples to understand the Scriptures as they afterwards understood them as foretelling the victory over death—these are all life-like touches which inspire our confidence. Only one feature of the narrative claims fuller discussion, the association of the evangelist with Peter; for Dr. Sanday uses in favour of the authorship of the Gospel by the son of Zebedee the argument that the Fourth Gospel represents Peter and the beloved disciple as holding the same relation to one another as Peter and John the son of Zebedee in the Book of Acts; and it is more natural and obvious "to regard the later relation as the direct continuation of the earlier" than to suppose "two pairs who would be too much the doubles of each other" (*The Criticism of the Fourth Gospel*, p. 107). His interpretation of xx. 2 is that "they lodged together in Jerusalem" (p. 102). But, if as has been maintained in a previous article, it is not improbable that the evangelist was a wealthy householder in Jerusalem the obvious explanation is that Peter, and possibly other disciples, were his guests; and so this verse does not bear the significance Dr. Sanday finds in it. The details with which the meetings in the Upper Room on two successive "first days of the week" are recorded as compared with the less definite

account in Luke xxiv. 33 suggest that the evangelist was on both occasions the host as he had been at the Last Supper. Dr. Sanday's further statement that xxi. 20 shows that "they each take an affectionate interest in the other" (ibid.) loses its force, if the *Appendix* is a much later addition to the Gospel of much lower credibility. The evangelist was with Andrew, Peter's brother, a disciple of John the Baptist's (i. 40). While this connexion probably involved acquaintance it does not necessarily indicate the close association assumed. On two other occasions are the evangelist and Peter brought together. It was Peter who beckoned to the beloved disciple to ask Jesus who was the traitor (xiii. 24); but the position of both is sufficient to explain this circumstance. That the disciple who was known to the high priest secured Peter's admission to the high priest's house (xviii. 15, 16) is no proof of any closer association than he would have had to any disciple of Jesus. The writer at least can find no adequate proof of the special friendship which is assumed.

(2) In the second division of the chapter (*vv.* 11–18) the appearance to Mary Magdalene is reported. Matthew (xxviii. 9) records an appearance to the women returning from the empty tomb without any special mention of Mary; but she may have lingered behind at the tomb, and the loving and pitiful Lord, after the word of cheer to the others, may have come to comfort her sad heart. That this appearance is not mentioned by Paul in 1 Corinthians xv. may be explained in two ways: he may not have heard of it; or he may have omitted the account as of the appearance to the two on the way to Emmaus (Luke xxiv. 13–35) because he confined his list to those who as apostles were commissioned to be witnesses of the Resurrection. Features in the record which may be noted are, the failure of Mary to recognise Jesus, as of the two on the way to Emmaus, indicating a

change in His appearance, the recognition by the tones of the voice here as there by the movement in the breaking of bread, the prohibition of her loving touch, signifying that the former earthly relationship was ended, and a higher heavenly fellowship was to take its place. The reason why the evangelist recorded an appearance of which he was not an eyewitness, as he was of the other two he reports, may lie in the interest for him of some of these details. The declaration of verse 17 may have specially appealed to him as continuing previous declarations which he had reported (xiii. 33; xiv. 2–28; xvi. 28).

(3) The third division of the chapter (*vv.* 19–23) contains several features of special interest. (i) Verse 19 indicates that it was necessary that secrecy should be observed as to the dwelling- and the gathering-place of the disciples. A similar caution is the probable explanation of the arrangements made to secure both the guest-chamber for the Last Supper (Mark xiv. 13–14) and the ass for the triumphal entry (xi. 2–4). If in all three cases the fourth evangelist was the unnamed friend and helper, may we not here find the clue to the silence of the synoptic tradition regarding so influential a disciple? He risked much in rendering the services he did owing to the greater enmity which would probably have been turned against him by the priesthood. His ability to befriend may have depended on his not coming too much out into the open; and gratitude as well as prudence enjoined silence regarding him. (ii) Although we must not press the details too hard, yet the narrative suggests that Jesus appeared in the midst of the disciples suddenly, the doors remaining closed. This is one with other indications that the risen body of Jesus was not subject to ordinary physical conditions; and yet it could at will apparently be made accessible to the sense both of sight (*v.* 20) and of touch (*v.* 27) with proof of identity.

Another token is offered in the corresponding passage in Luke (xxiv. 41–43). Jesus eats before them. To meet the objection to so complete a materialisation of the resurrection body Bernard offers the following argument. "This" (proof of identity), he says, "with a view to the persons dealt with, could best be done by taking food. If there be a resurrection of the body, there is no reason why such a body should not have the power of taking food without depending on it. Once cross the boundary of the present sphere of existence and we are in a realm where we can no longer say 'this is impossible.' Indeed it was the reality and identity of the risen body which the Lord had to insist on; the difference was evident, and spoke for itself" (Hastings' *Bible Dictionary*, iv. 234). While admitting the possibility here maintained, several considerations forbid confidence. *First of all* why does the fourth evangelist, who *ex hypothesi* was present, mention only the proofs of sight and touch? *Secondly*, the intention of the passage in Luke is ostentatiously apologetic. It is difficult to believe that the risen body had *flesh and bones*, even if it had power of manifestation to the various senses of sight sound, and touch in proof of its reality. *Thirdly*, while in the appendix to this Gospel, it is not expressly stated that Jesus Himself took food, He is represented as dividing bread and fish among His disciples (xxi. 12–13). This trait may belong to a late tradition, and we are at least justified in suspending judgment as to its trustworthiness

(iii) There is nothing to excite suspicion in the words ascribed to the Risen Lord, while we may admit the possibility that some of the sayings "summed up the Church's confession of faith conceived as uttered by the lips of the Risen One" (Bruce, *Expositor's Greek Testament*, i., p. 340). The action and words in verse 22 are to be regarded as symbolically prophetic, as in Luke a promise is given (xxiv.

49) which was fulfilled at Pentecost, unless the evangelist anticipated events in his record, as we have conjectured in other instances. Verse 23 recalls the logion in Matthew xvi. 19, and for such a declaration the context in the Fourth Gospel seems more appropriate than that in the First.

(4) The fourth division (*vv.* 24–29) presents four points for notice. (i) The representation of the disposition of Thomas here is quite consistent with the two other references in this Gospel. He expects death as the result of the return to Bethany ; and yet is prepared to run the risk (xi. 16). He cannot understand how the disciples can be expected to know the way when they know not whither the Master is going (xiv. 5). He was despondent and yet devoted, and his absence may have been due to the utter overthrow of his faith by his grief. (ii) The presence of the disciples in Jerusalem after "eight days" demands explanation, in view of the command given to depart into Galilee (Matthew xxviii. 10 ; Mark xvi. 7). Was it the unbelief of the disciples which kept them from instant obedience, and so necessitated the appearance of Jesus on the first occasion to awaken their faith ? Could His loving heart no longer delay in giving them the comfort they needed ? Did they consider the first appearance in Jerusalem as cancelling the command to go to meet Him in Galilee ? We can but ask these questions. At least the narrative does not contain any rebuke or reproach for disobedience.

(iii) The exclamation of Thomas (*v.* 28) when convinced of the reality of the Risen Lord, whether by touch, or by the words uttered, is difficult. "His faith returns," says Dods, "with a rebound and utters itself in a confession in which the Gospel culminates. The words are not a mere exclamation of surprise" (*The Expositor's Greek Testament*, i., p. 866). But even if Thomas fully shared Peter's

confession of Jesus as the Messiah, the Son of the Living God, this faith fell far short of the recognition of divinity such as is here affirmed. This confession goes beyond the doctrine of the early apostolic preaching. It shows a lack of historic sense when Dods adds in confirmation, "In Pliny's letter to Trajan (112 A.D.) he describes the Christians as singing hymns to Christ as God," for a considerable doctrinal development had intervened. Here again the evangelist anticipates the development, and puts on the lips of Thomas the doctrine his Gospel aims at proving.

(iv) Jesus' answer gives no indication that so advanced a confession had been made, proving a faith beyond that any other disciples had reached; for surely words of commendation would in that case have been deserved and bestowed, and not the censure that Thomas' faith resting on sensible evidence was inferior to the faith resulting from moral insight and spiritual discernment regarding His person and work.

(5) Verses 30 and 31 are a formal conclusion of the Gospel, indicating that there has been a selection of the material which has been presented, and that the selection has been made with a distinct doctrinal and practical purpose. But, as has been shown in the course of the previous discussion, the additions or omissions in comparison with the synoptic records are not to be explained exclusively from this point of view. The evangelist's own personal presence or absence must be recognised as an explanation of the inclusion or exclusion of some incidents; as for the most part the Gospel is the testimony of an eyewitness, who had a distinctive personal interest in what he saw and heard, remembered, reflected on, and then recorded. The attempt has been made to discover throughout the Gospel the influence of theology on history; and yet to show that, while recognising that influence, we must not so exaggerate

it as on account of it to regard the history as unauthentic.[1]

XIX. The Appendix (John xxi.).

(1) The writer finds it quite impossible to regard the *Appendix* as the work of the evangelist or even his editor. It is true that there is no textual evidence as in regard to Mark xvi. 9–20 to show that it is a much later addition. It is true also that the style closely resembles that of the rest of the Gospel. But the author of such an *Appendix* would make it his business to copy the style as nearly as possible, and we cannot affirm that our present texts reproduce the original so closely as to exclude such an addition. "Even within the brief space of the appendix, idiosyncrasies of language and style appear which are practically sufficient to indicate another hand" (Moffatt's *Introduction*, p. 572, which may be consulted for further details). Neither of the considerations mentioned above bars the way to the conclusion that the contents of the chapter force upon us. The immediate purpose of this addition was both to prove Peter's restoration to apostolic authority (*vv.* 15–17) and to remove a current misconception of a traditional saying about the beloved disciple (*v.* 23) which his recent death had made a stumblingblock to faith. But the occasion is also used to add a joint attestation from the circle in which the writer of the *Appendix* moved of the evangelist's trustworthiness as a witness, and so the worth of his Gospel (*v.* 24). It is hard to believe that the evangelist himself could have borne such self-witness. The hyperbole of verse 25, quite in the Rabbinic manner, contrasts most

[1] Much has in recent years been written in support of a spiritual and not a physical resurrection. It is worth noting then that the author of the "spiritual Gospel" records the empty grave, and the sensible proofs of some kind of continuity between the buried and the risen body; and that of both he claims to write as an eyewitness. If we accept the evangelist as at all trustworthy, we must reckon with this fact.

unfavourably with the conclusion of the Gospel in xx. 30–31.

(2) The first part of this *Appendix* (1–14) presents a parallel to the account given by Luke (v. 1–11) of the call given to Peter. While there are differences in details it is difficult to resist the conclusion that both passages contain variant traditions of the same incident. In his *Studies in the Inner Life of Jesus* the writer expressed the opinion that Peter's confession in Luke v. 8, "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord," found a more appropriate context in the record of restoration to discipleship after his denial, as given in John, than in the record of his first call as found in Luke. Further study has, however, modified this judgment. In a previous article it has already been suggested that the Galilæans in the small company of disciples, whose attachment to Jesus is recorded in John i. 35–51, followed Him only for a time; and had to be recalled when the Galilæan ministry began (Matt. iv. 18–22; Mark i. 16–20). Had they wavered for a time in their allegiance, and gone back to their old calling, and was what the Synoptists represent as a first call not only a recall but a restoration? This would explain both Luke v. 8 and John xxi. 15–17, if this passage belongs to the same context; and would allow us to place the incident where Luke does. We must admit, however, other possibilities. The story about the miracle may be due to a late tradition in which the figurative saying about the disciples becoming fishers of men was misunderstood, and was turned into an actual miracle of an abundant, unexpected draught. It is very difficult to understand how, if this account relates to the beginning of the Galilæan ministry, Mark, dependent as he was on Peter for his knowledge, has no trace of it. We cannot even conjecture whether, if we had Mark's Gospel complete, this story would have been found in the same context as in the Fourth Gospel.

Whatever the original tradition may have been, it is clear that the writer of this *Appendix* has adopted it for his purpose. This is obvious in regard to verses 1 and 14. As regards the mention of the two sons of Zebedee in verse 2 it is to be observed that nowhere else in the Fourth Gospel is there any mention of them. The writer of the *Appendix* evidently intends to identify "the disciple whom Jesus loved" (*vv.* 7 and 20) with one of the brothers; and yet there seems to be some doubt in his mind, and he leaves himself a door of escape from mistake by adding "two other of His disciples" (*v.* 2) without mentioning their names.

It is probable, therefore, that he was not the disciple who edited the evangelist's testimony to the Master, but belonged to a younger generation, even if he was in contact with the Johannine school in Ephesus. The statement in verse 3 is abrupt. Is not an explanation needed for the presence of these disciples in Galilee, and for their return to the calling which at the bidding of Jesus they had forsaken? Is not also the restoration of Peter to his apostleship unduly delayed? Would he after his denial have resumed his place in the Apostolic company without such a restoration?

(3) We seem compelled to find in verses 1–14 a tradition which we have no means of authenticating, or putting into its proper context if authentic, in the Gospel history, which the writer of the *Appendix* has with honest intention, but mistaken judgment, adopted as the occasion for the tender and touching talk of Jesus with Peter in verses 15–19. For this conversation a context at once suggests itself. On their return the two disciples who had seen the Lord were told that He had appeared to Simon (Luke xxiv. 34), and Paul mentions an appearance to Cephas (1 Cor. xv. 5). What more probable than that Jesus among His very

earliest appearances should show Himself to the penitent disciple to comfort and restore him? The place of this appearance would be Jerusalem, and the time the day of the Resurrection. As these Notes are not exegetical, the interesting question of the difference between the two words used for love must be passed over. The statement in verse 18 need not be treated as a prophecy after the event, as xiii. 36 indicates that Jesus anticipated that Peter would thereafter be faithful unto death. Such a prediction is surely not beyond the range of the foresight we may ascribe to the earthly Jesus even, not to say the heavenly Christ. Attention may be called to the article in the EXPOSITOR for March by the Rev. R. H. Strachan, in which he seeks to show that in this *Appendix* use is made of the thought of chapter x. But if the account of the conversation is an authentic tradition, and not a literary composition, the subtle argument falls to the ground.

(4) If the whole *Appendix* is treated as a tendency-writing with little, if any, contact with tradition, and with a skilful working up of materials suggested by the Fourth Gospel itself, as the article just mentioned seeks to show, there is no difficulty in connecting verses 20–23 with verses 15–19. But it is here at least suggested that verses 15–19 contain an authentic tradition of Jesus' appearance to Peter on two grounds: (1) that it is probable that Jesus did restore Peter to apostleship after his denial before he assumed the prominent position he holds according to the record in Acts; (2) that it is preferable to ascribe to the writer even of such an *Appendix* an adaptation of an authentic tradition rather than free invention, if that charge can be at all avoided. If this is so, it follows that verses 20–23, if resting on any authentic tradition, must have belonged originally to another context, as it is not likely that if the evangelist had been present when Christ appeared to Peter,

as testified by Luke and Paul, his Gospel would have contained no account of the appearance. If the saying of verse 22 was current, it is not improbable that the writer in his own mind connected it with this occasion, even if there was no tradition to that effect. The recent death of the beloved disciple seemed to give the lie to the promise of Jesus, as contained in this current saying; and the writer of the *Appendix* seeks to save the veracity of Jesus in one of two ways. Either he lays the emphasis on *if I will* (ἐὰν θέλω) or on *tarry* or *abide* (μένειν). In the first case Jesus is represented as simply affirming that it lay in His power to preserve the disciple till His Second Advent, without any pledge that His power would be so used. In the second case, μένειν must be interpreted in accord with the use of the word μοναί in xiv. 2. "In his interpretation of μένειν," says Strachan, "he seeks to save the veracity of our Lord by implying that Jesus actually contemplated the death of John when He so spoke, and meant that the disciple would *abide* in the intermediate state until the Parousia, when, with the other saints who inhabited the μοναί of the Father's house (xiv. 2), he would be received into glory." The first explanation seems adequate, and the second rather far-fetched. Both explanations presuppose the recent death of the evangelist as the occasion of the *Appendix*; and, as Strachan argues, "the passage presents extreme difficulty to those who hold the theory of the early martyrdom of John." The way in which Dr. Moffatt seeks to remove this difficulty in his *Introduction* (pp. 575–6) need not now detain us, as it does not exist for those who do not identify the evangelist with John the son of Zebedee. The writer of the *Appendix* does identify them; but he was probably altogether ignorant of the tradition of John's early death. If the tradition was not known, and if a disciple of Jesus also called John lived

to a great age in Ephesus, and testified as an eyewitness, it is easy to understand how the one could be confused with the other.

Alfred E. Garvie.

THE INTEGRITY OF THE EPISTLE TO THE PHILIPPIANS.

One of the most significant features in connection with contemporary advanced criticism of the New Testament is the all but complete change in the attitude assumed by that type of criticism towards the Epistles of St. Paul. The attacks made upon the Pauline Epistles during the latter half of the nineteenth century were almost exclusively directed against their authenticity. Baur and his followers of the Tübingen school had reduced the number of genuine letters to four, the famous *Hauptbriefe*, viz., the two Epistles to the Corinthians, the Epistle to the Romans, and the Epistle to the Galatians. The efforts of the more sober scholarship of that period were, therefore, necessarily confined to the task of restoring to the pedestal from which they had been somewhat ruthlessly deposed the other Pauline Epistles, which an unbroken tradition had connected with the name of the great Apostle, and this it may be said to have accomplished with a considerable degree of success. There is some hesitation felt in certain quarters as to the genuineness of the Second Epistle to the Thessalonians, but on very inadequate grounds; the Epistle to the Ephesians is still regarded with suspicion by a no means inconsiderable body of scholars, while the Pastoral Epistles still constitute the storm centre of Pauline literary and historical criticism. The battle of the "authenticity" has, therefore, on the whole issued in favour of the traditional position, and criticism no longer seriously concerns itself with the problem

of the genuineness of the Epistles. The great majority of scholars are content to accept the bulk of them as the undoubted product of the Apostle's mind and hand, the only exception of note being the Dutch school, of which Van Manen is the best known representative, which still refuses to see in the body of Pauline literature little or anything of what is genuinely Apostolic. But we must not on this account assume that advanced criticism has abandoned the field or entirely surrendered its position with regard to the Pauline Epistles. It still acts on the offensive, but the direction of the attack has been modified. Compelled, much against its will, to acknowledge that much the larger portion of the letters comes indubitably from the hand of the Apostle it now seeks to disparage their value and significance by attempting to show that in some instances the letter is not a self-contained and self-consistent unit, but is composed of fragments, not necessarily all Pauline in origin, which have been put together by a later hand so as to form one single document. There would appear to be some reasonable ground for the supposition that this may have taken place in the case of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians. It is a plausible suggestion that 2 Corinthians vi. 14–vii. 1 may be a section of a previous letter written by St. Paul, to which reference is made in 1 Corinthians ix., which has been interpolated at this point, while 2 Corinthians x.–xiii. may possibly be wholly or in part identified with the "severe" letter to which the Apostle refers in chapter vii. 8 of the same Epistle. That St. Paul did write more than our two canonical letters to the Church of Corinth seems to be adequately proved by the evidence contained in these very letters, and certain features in these Epistles may be interpreted as pointing to the conclusion that the second does not represent one single and complete document, but contains portions of other letters

addressed to the same Church, much at the same time.

Many scholars suggest that a similar process is to be detected in the Epistle to the Philippians, and it is to an examination of this attempt to destroy the unity and homogeneity of what is, in some respects, the most beautiful of all St. Paul's Epistles that the following pages are devoted.

It is right to acknowledge that the theory that this letter is composed of more than one fragment is not altogether without reasonable foundation, but the evidence in favour of such a supposition is weak compared with that upon which the "partition" theory in the case of 2 Corinthians is based, and the fact that such a process may be justifiably postulated in the case of that particular Epistle must not be allowed to prejudge the issue as it affects the Epistle to the Philippians.

The following are some of the main reasons for maintaining that the Epistle to the Philippians is not a simple unit, but a compilation consisting of two or more distinct fragments.

a. The real basis of the above contention, without which, I imagine, no such theory would ever have been formulated, is the sudden and unexpected change of tone which is discernible in chapter iii. 2. The transition is so abrupt and the subject introduced at this point is in such marked contrast to the spirit and character of the Epistle as a whole that it is contended that the only satisfactory explanation is that we have in this verse the opening section of a separate document, which by some means or other has been interpolated at this point. In support of this theory it is pointed out that there is evidence in the Epistle itself that more than one letter had been addressed by the Apostle to the Philippian Church, and our letter, in the form in which we have received it, must therefore contain one complete letter to the Philippians and fragments of one or more

other letters, all joined together, and subsequently circulated as one single document. It is also noted that the phrase "To write the same things to you to me indeed is not grievous: but for you it is safe," in chapter iii. cannot well be explained by the contents of the present Epistle, and must, therefore, refer to previous correspondence between the Apostle and the Philippians.

Again, the reference by the Apostle in chapter iv. 16 to the fact that he had been the recipient of assistance from the Philippian Church on two occasions previous to the writing of the present letter probably implies that a letter of acknowledgement had been sent by him in both cases.

There is also a certain amount of external evidence which seems to point in the same direction. Polycarp, writing to the Philippians in the second century, makes use of the plural ἐπιστολαί in reference to St. Paul's epistolary intercourse with that Church—a fact which apparently ought to decide the question definitely.

b. The phrase τὸ λοιπόν in chapter iii. 2 indicates an intention to close the letter at this point and is entirely out of place if it was followed by two more chapters, forming at least half the letter, as is the case in our present Epistle.

c. Finally it is argued that in the Epistle as it stands the acknowledgement of the Philippians' bounty is much too casual. It comes too near the end of the letter, and is apparently nothing more than an afterthought, seeing that the Apostle has twice been on the point of concluding the Epistle with the usual benediction.

The cumulative effect of these factors has led many scholars to discover more than letter in our extant Epistle, but they by no means agree as to the exact limits of the interpolated matter or as to its occasion and character. It should be noted that among those who favour the "partition" theory there is but a slight tendency to discover the

presence of any non-Pauline matter in the Epistle. Only two scholars of note, viz., Schrader and Völter, have expressed themselves to that effect. The latter formulates a somewhat elaborate analysis of the Epistle, in which every chapter, with the exception of the third, contains material that is not genuinely Pauline. According to him the Epistle in its present form is the work of a redactor who combined a genuine and spurious Epistle, and then added a few verses of his own in order to give to the combination the appearance of a single and self-consistent unit. He gives, however, no valid explanation of the aim and motive which impelled the writer to pursue this course, and the whole character of the Epistle is so simple and spontaneous as to put this theory entirely out of court. The attempt to find matter in the Epistle which did not proceed from the Apostle is, therefore, not of sufficient importance to call for further notice, and we shall do well to confine ourselves to the consideration of the various theories which assume that the Epistle in its present form consists of two or more genuine Pauline documents, either joined together or interwoven.

The great majority of those who maintain that the Epistle is a collection of letters rather than one single letter divide it into two separate documents. They all agree in placing the beginning of the second document at chapter iii. 1 or 2, but there is a very striking variety of opinion as to where this document ends. A simple division is that of Hausrath and Bacon, who suggest that two letters of similar length, each consisting of two chapters, have been merely joined together. According to this view the latter of these two documents, comprising chapters iii. and iv., was the first in point of time, and was written to the Philippians to thank them for their gift and to warn them against certain dangerous doctrinal tendencies which were

manifesting themselves among them. The other letter, to be found in the first two chapters, was written some months later, when the Apostle took advantage of the return of Epaphroditus to his native city to send to the Philippian Church some further information concerning his own position and to prepare it for an early visit from Timothy.

A theory which was very popular in the early years of the last century and was advocated by Le Moine, Heinrichs, and Paulus, and later by Weisse, saw in our Epistle not two letters simply joined together, but one letter interpolated in the midst of the other, the interpolated matter consisting of chapters iii. and iv. 1–19. These scholars offer the suggestion that the first of these two letters was intended for the Philippian Church as a whole, while the second was addressed to a narrower circle of readers, perhaps the ruling authorities of that Church.

Professor Kirsopp Lake,[1] who also favours the "interpolation" theory, would close the second letter at chapter iv. 3 on the plea that the exhortation "to rejoice" found in iii. 1 is repeated and extended in iv. 4, thus forming an admirable sequence.

A more ambitious and intricate partition scheme wherewith to account for the factors which are supposed to demand the presence of more than one letter in our Epistle is that of Rev. J. E. Symes, which he puts forth in the *Interpreter* for January, 1914.

According to this scheme, which is based entirely upon the internal evidence of the extant Epistle, the Apostle must have written *five* separate letters to the Church of Philippi.

These five are set forth in the following order:—

1. A letter written from Macedonia in the year 56, in reply to which the Philippians send to the Apostle the first

[1] See Expositor, June, 1914.

of the two gifts mentioned in chapter iv. 16, together with a written communication informing him of the arrival of some Jews in Philippi who disparaged his position as compared with that of the Twelve. This, the first of the Apostle's letters to the Philippians, has not been preserved.

2. A letter in which St. Paul acknowledges the gift and deals with the attacks made upon him. This is contained in Philippians iii. 2–iv. 9. The particular portion referring to the generosity of the Philippians was intentionally withheld by them.

3. A letter written about 59, acknowledging the receipt of the second gift from the Philippians. This letter, like the first, has also perished.

4. A letter acknowledging the third gift, written about the year 60, a portion of which is to be found in Philippians iv. 10–20.

5. A letter consisting of the main portion of our present Epistle, chapters i. 1–iii. 1 and iv. 21–23. This had nothing to do with any gift and is merely a statement of Christian theology and Christian duty, and was written from Rome in the year 61.

The theory advocated by Mr. Symes is that the canonical Epistle to the Philippians is the work of a scribe who combined the three Pauline documents which had been preserved by the Philippian Church and formed out of them one single document by inserting 1 and 2 between chapter iii. 1 and the benediction which closed 5. This scribe made no attempt to edit his sources and was content with being a mere compiler.

A less drastic view than any of those mentioned above is that of Ewald and others who suggest that we have in our Epistle not a collection of distinct documents written and forwarded by St. Paul at various times, but one document consisting of two sections, and that a substantial space of

time must have intervened between the writing of the first and second sections. The matter included in chapters iii. 2–iv. 19 would, on this view, take the form of a postscript or postscripts to the original letter, and these were occasioned by the receipt of fresh information from Philippi before that letter was sent to its destination.

Before we proceed to show that the Epistle is in reality a single and self-contained document it will be well first of all to deal with those factors which have been noted, which, in the opinion of many scholars, are only to be explained by the presence in it of a considerable quantity of material foreign to itself.

1. We will begin with the contention that there is strong evidence both within and without the Epistle that St. Paul addressed more than one written communication to the Philippian Church. I have no desire to controvert this statement, and I consider it extremely probable that the Apostle wrote several letters to a Church which he held in such high esteem, and with which he was manifestly associated in the most intimate fellowship. To mention no other reason, the simple acknowledgement of the frequent gifts received at the hands of the Christians of Philippi would alone necessitate a fairly wide correspondence. The Apostle was above all things a Christian gentleman, and we can hardly picture him as the recipient of bounty which was not promptly and gratefully acknowledged. But this in no way implies that these letters, or fragments of them, are of necessity embodied in our one extant letter to the Philippians. It is a very much more reasonable supposition that the others have perished. That the very great majority of St. Paul's letters have been irretrievably lost, and that we have only a selection, and that a very narrow one, of the numberless letters that he must have written are to me facts beyond all dispute. To limit the correspondence of

the great missionary Apostle with the Churches over which he exercised supervision for the space of at least twenty years to our nine canonical Epistles is absurd on the face of it, and more especially when we bear in mind the wonderful facilities for communication offered by the Roman Imperial system. Besides, we have actual proof that some of his correspondence has disappeared, because letters are definitely mentioned in our extant Epistles of which we have no further knowledge. I see no difficulty, therefore, in accepting the suggestion that St. Paul wrote more than one letter to the Philippians, and it is quite possible that τὰ αὐτὰ in iii. 1 refers to earlier written communications, although I hope to be able to show later that the phrase can be adequately explained from the context of our present Epistle.

The evidence of Polycarp would very considerably strengthen the hands of those who support the "partition" theory if it could be proved that it implies the existence of more than one letter to the Philippians *at the time when he was writing*. It is not likely that a letter of St. Paul's which had been preserved well into the second century would have been allowed to disappear. The linguistic argument in support of the possible use of ἐπιστολαί to denote a single letter is developed by Lightfoot,[1] but Moffatt [2] points out that Polycarp in this very Epistle distinguishes carefully between the singular and plural use of this term, so that we cannot attach much importance to this suggestion. There is much to be said in favour of the hypothesis that Polycarp's reference here may include the letters to the neighbouring Church of Thessalonica as well as that to Philippi. Polycarp's own language in his letter to the Philippians seems to suggest that at any rate the Second Epistle to the Thessalonians was closely associated

[1] Lightfoot, *Philippians*, pp. 141, 142.

[2] Moffatt, *Introd. to Literature of the New Testament*, pp. 173, 174.

in his mind with the letter to the Philippians. It is also known that Tertullian quotes the Epistle to the Philippians as if it had been addressed to Thessalonica, and it is fairly evident that in the second century the Pauline letters to the Macedonian Churches were regarded as forming a definite group, intimately connected with each other. In that case it is quite possible that the use of the plural in Polycarp's reference covers the whole group and is not necessarily confined to Epistles written only to the Philippian Church.[1] A simpler explanation would be that Polycarp is using the term loosely. We do not look for exactness of language in an Apostolic Father. He probably knew that St. Paul had addressed more than one letter to the Philippians and he refers to them here in a general way, but we need not, therefore, assume that there were more than one letter in existence at the time he was writing. I would also endorse Mr. Ball's remark [2] that it is difficult to understand how, if there were several distinct letters to the Philippians extant during the later years of Polycarp, we should apparently be unable to find any trace of them in Marcion, who was practically a contemporary of the former.

2. The argument from the occurrence of τὸ λοιπόν in iii. 1. It is maintained that the use of this term implies an intention to close the letter at this particular point. That the customary meaning of the term is "finally" is probably true, but it is not the only meaning even in the New Testament. A reference to 1 Thessalonians iv. 1 and 2 Thessalonians iii. 1 where, in both cases, the phrase is found at some considerable distance from the close of the letter shows that it does not necessarily point to the conclusion. In the Κοινή the expression does little more than mark the transition to a new subject, and is in many instances only a con-

[1] Moffatt, *Introd. to the Lit. of the New Testament*, p. 174.
[2] See Expositor, August, 1914. p. 150.

necting particle. In modern Greek it has become a mere substitute for *οὖν*.[1]

3. Much stress is laid by some writers, and more especially by Mr. Symes, on the fact that the acknowledgement of the Philippians' bounty, which is clearly the practical purpose of the letter, is relegated to the close of the letter. We are told that in its present position it reads like an afterthought, and must, therefore, belong to another document. A very superficial examination of the Apostle's method as illustrated by his other Epistles completely disposes of this alleged difficulty. Two striking instances may be adduced in support of this statement. It is quite manifest that the main practical purpose of 1 Corinthians is to issue instructions to the Church of Corinth with respect to the "collection for the saints," and yet there is not the slightest reference to this collection until the very last chapter is reached. Not until every other topic has been exhausted and the whole teaching of the Epistle summed up in the exhortation in xv. 58 does the Apostle approach the business which lay so near to his heart. Then, and only when the very end of the letter has been reached, does he formulate his commands in reference to the "collection" in connexion with which he was so anxious that the Corinthians should act aright. The same method is discernible in the Epistle to the Romans. Here again the practical and personal motive of the letter is to prepare the Roman Church for a visit from the Apostle in the near future. It is true that much is said in the first chapter concerning his desire to visit Rome and his many prayers to God that his wish may be fulfilled, but the actual details of the coming visit, the how and the when, are reserved until the fifteenth chapter, and are not mentioned until the Epistle has been apparently concluded with the benediction in xv. 13. In

[1] See Milligan, *Epistles to the Thessalonians*, p. 46 note.

this respect, then, the Epistle to the Philippians differs in no wise from what seems to have been the general practice of the Apostle of relegating the purely personal and practical details to the close of the letter, after the more definitely doctrinal issues had been adequately dealt with.

4. Finally, we come to what is after all the real foundation for the supposition that in the Epistle to the Philippians we have more than one document embodied, viz., the transition from the first to the second verse of the third chapter. The change from " Rejoice in the Lord " of the one verse to the " Beware of dogs " of the other is undoubtedly very abrupt and disconcerting, but unless the evidence for the intrusion of a second document at this point is overwhelming it is preferable to look for an explanation of the change in another direction. The section which opens at iii. 2 offers a most remarkable contrast to the general character of the remainder of the Epistle, which is, in some respects, the most affectionate, the most commendatory, and the most joyous of all the Pauline Epistles. And yet some of his other Epistles are not altogether free from similar phenomena. I am not sure that the presence of this particular section, which breathes the spirit of some of the most embittered chapters in 2 Corinthians, in the midst of the Epistle to the Philippians, with all its affection and joy, is more surprising than the inclusion of the beautiful " eulogy of love " in 1 Corinthians, with its rebukes and reproaches and its strong manifestation of the disciplinary side of the Apostle's character. These two letters only testify to the fulness and many-sidedness of St. Paul's personality. In the case of the letter to the Corinthian Church we see the womanly tenderness and love of the Apostle breaking through his indignation and reproaches like a gleam of bright sunshine piercing through the gloom of a cloudy sky on a stormy day, while the contrary process is illustrated in the Epistle to the

Philippians. There the tenderness and affection with which his heart is overflowing are for the moment overborne by his righteous indignation at some special manifestation of the animosity of his enemies. Note the words "some special manifestation."

It was evidently not the ordinary opposition of the Jewish faction in the Roman Church which was responsible for this sudden outburst of passion, because he was familiar enough with that and had already referred to it sorrowfully, and yet in a spirit of Christian forbearance and toleration. I venture to suggest a reasonable cause for the indignation which he found himself utterly powerless to repress. It is now fairly generally agreed that the Epistle to the Philippians was the last of the Epistles of the Imprisonment (leaving out of account for the moment the Pastoral Epistles), and that it was written after the preliminary proceedings of the trial had taken place. Is it not possible that while he was actually employed in writing this letter there may have arrived in Rome the deputation of Jewish witnesses from the Council at Jerusalem who proceeded to hound him to his death with that relentless hatred which had so nearly proved his doom in Jerusalem and Cæsarea? The tone of this particular section of the Philippian letter is strongly reminiscent of the Apostle's language in some of the speeches delivered during the days of his earlier captivity; and even if it be granted that these speeches are the work of St. Luke rather than of St. Paul (a supposition that I am not at all prepared to accept) the tone and atmosphere of the originals have been retained, and this is all that is necessary for my purpose here. A comparison of Philippians iii. 3–9 with Acts xxi. 3–4 and xxvi. 2–10 will serve to illustrate this point. I would suggest, then, that while the Epistle to the Philippians, in which he informed them of the comparatively favourable character of the early

proceedings of the trial, was still in an incomplete state the Apostle found his hopes of release seriously jeopardised by the arrival of the hostile witnesses from Jerusalem, and that he gave vent to his indignation in the words which have given rise to so many disputes and discussions. If the first trial was also his last and only closed with his death, as many scholars of note contend, this would add considerable force to the suggestion. The sudden change for the worse in his prospects and his subsequent condemnation were due to the arrival of the hateful Jews of Judæa and to their baneful influence upon the tribunal which judged and condemned him. The abrupt change in the tone of the Epistle is all the more natural and intelligible if we bear in mind that it was probably dictated and, therefore, partook more of the nature of a speech than a written letter. It is not difficult to picture the Apostle being interrupted while in the act of dictating by the news of the arrival of his relentless enemies and by the thought of all that that meant for his future and then breaking out into the fierce denunciations which were so faithfully recorded by his amanuensis. A careful reading of this section of the Epistle shows that the mood lasted but a short time. The Apostle's burning indignation gradually cools down, and by the time the end of the chapter is reached he has again recovered his wonted calmness, and in the remainder of the letter the original keynote is struck, the joyous and confident tone being maintained to the very end. One of the strongest arguments against the "interpolation" theory consists in the fact that, while the break at the beginning of the chapter is clear enough, it is impossible to point out definitely the chapter and verse where the interpolated matter ends. The blend is so complete and the sequence so smooth and natural as to make the supposition of an interpolation at this point all but impossible. I offer the

above suggestion as a possible solution of a difficult literary problem.

So much then by way of a reply to the numerous arguments brought forward to support the contention that the Epistle to the Philippians is a mere compilation of separate documents. I do not consider that taken singly or cumulatively they are of sufficient weight to establish any such supposition.

The most powerful argument against any theory which demands the presence of foreign material in our Epistle I have kept to the last. In the absence of any conclusive external evidence a problem of this type must be solved by the character of the contents of the Epistle itself. Now a close study of the letter appears to me to prove incontestably that we have here no mere collection of Pauline fragments but a true Apostolic letter, which, in spite of a momentary outburst of indignation, breathes throughout the same spirit, and is from beginning to end concerned with the same subject. If I were asked to select one inclusive phrase in which to describe its contents and character I could offer no better suggestion than "The Epistle of Humility." From first to last it is the thought of humility, Christian humility, which has its issue in Christian unity, that underlies every utterance in the Epistle. It is in this direction, and not in any previous letters of the Apostle, that I would seek for an explanation of the expression *τὰ αὐτὰ* in iii. 1. There are two expressions in which this keynote of the Epistle is struck, *ταπεινοφροσύνη* and *τὸ ἓν φρονοῦντες* with its variant, *τὸ αὐτὸ φρονοῦντες*. After the introductory chapter in which the Apostle discourses with much detail on his own fortunes and on the progress of Christianity in the Imperial City we come in the second to the main subject of the Epistle, where it is emphasised in verse after verse, as the following citations show.

v. 2. *ἵνα τὸ αὐτὸ φρονῆτε· τὸ ἓν φρονοῦντες.*

v. 3. *τῇ ταπεινοφροσύνῃ.*

v. 5. *τοῦτο φρονεῖτε ἐν ὑμῖν ὃ καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.*

v. 8. *ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτόν.*

We arrive at this stage at the very heart of the Epistle, the great Christological passage, where humility is again the central thought, and the humility of Christ held up as the great exemplar.

How, then, does the so-called interpolated section stand with respect to this Christian grace of humility which is the leading thought of the Epistle as a whole? It would be difficult to imagine anything further removed from Christian humility than the opening verses of chapter iii., with their fierce attack upon the Jews and the Apostle's proud boast of his Hebrew descent, his Pharisaic training, and his righteousness in the sight of the law, and yet the true spirit of the letter is soon recovered. The *motif* may be discerned as early as the seventh and eighth verses. "What things were gain to me, those I counted loss for Christ"; but it becomes more articulate in verses 12 and 13: "Not as though I had already attained, either were already perfect." "I count not myself to have apprehended." We note also that this particular passage closes with the exhortation to the Philippians to maintain the same humble yet confident state of mind, and that the very phrase *τοῦτο φρονῶμεν* is reproduced and repeated in another form *εἴ τι ἑτέρως φρονεῖτε* (iii. 15, 16).

In verse 21, again, we have an echo of the same conception where the Apostle speaks of *τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως*, "the body of our humiliation." Finally, in chapter iv. 2, which still belongs to the alleged foreign document, the significant expression *τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν* again recurs. The literary evidence, then, would seem to decide conclusively against the disruption theory. Not only is the spirit of the rest of

the letter clearly discernible in the so-called interpolated section, but the very phrases which constitute the keynote of the Epistle as a whole occur repeatedly in it, giving to the entire document a unity and self-consistency which the arguments we have cited are powerless to destroy.

The tradition which has handed down to us the Epistle to the Philippians as a genuine, complete, and self-contained Pauline letter, therefore, still holds the field.

MAURICE JONES.

LITERARY ILLUSTRATIONS OF PHILIPPIANS.

i. 6. *Being confident of this very thing, that He which began a good work in you will perfect it until the day of Jesus Christ.*

"And here let me tell the Reader, that these early beginnings of virtue were by God's assisting grace blessed with what St. Paul seemed to beg for his Philippians, namely, 'that He, that had begun a good work in them, would finish it.' And Almighty God did; for his whole life was so regular and innocent, that he might have said at his death —and with truth and comfort—what the same St. Paul said after to the same Philippians [iii. 17] when he advised them to walk as they had him for an example."—IZAAK WALTON'S *Life of Dr. Robert Sanderson.*

i. 10. *So that ye may approve the things that are excellent, that ye may be sincere and void of offence.*

"The business of the head is to form a good heart, and not merely to rule an evil one, as is generally imagined."—SIR ARTHUR HELPS.

i. 18. *Whether in pretence or in truth, Christ is preached: and I therein do rejoice, yea, and will rejoice.*

"Persons who have the same general design, but differ in some particular modes of carrying it into execution, often

stand more aloof from one another than they do from persons whose principles and conduct they entirely disapprove. Hence prejudice rises and a tendency to mutual crimination."—CHARLES SIMEON (in a letter).

"To my humble apprehension, it is as unwise as it is unjust in any kind of political warfare to assail those who are disposed to co-operate, however slightly, in the attempt to overthrow a formidable and uncompromising enemy."—From COBDEN'S letters.

ii. 5. *Have this mind in you.*

"No one has any conscience except the man who pauses to reflect."—GOETHE.

ii. 6. *Taking the form of a servant.*

"I was a freeman according to the flesh, I was born of a father who was a Decurio. I bartered my noble birth—I do not blush or regret it—for the benefit of others. In short, I am a servant in Christ for a foreign nation."—ST. PATRICK (Epistle to Coroticus).

ii. 12. *Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling.*

In *Eothen* (ch. xiv.) Kinglake describes the babel of worshippers at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. "If this kissing of the shrines had seemed as though it were done at the bidding of enthusiasm, or of any poor sentiment even feebly approaching to it, the sight would have been less odd to English eyes; but as it was, I felt shocked at the sight of grown men thus steadily and carefully embracing the sticks and stones—not from love or from zeal (else God forbid that I should have blamed), but from a calm sense of duty; they seemed to be not 'working out' but *transacting* the great business of salvation."

"Truly, though many pretend to an absolute certainty of their salvation, yet, when an humble soul shall contemplate her own unworthiness, she shall meet with many doubts, and suddenly find how little we stand in need of the precept

of St. Paul, 'work out your salvation *with fear and trembling*.' "—Sir Thomas Browne, *Religio Medici* (I. lix.).

Your own salvation.

"Men speak too much about the world. Each one of us here, let the world go how it will, and be victorious or not victorious, has he not a Life of his own to lead? One Life; a little gleam of Time between two Eternities; no second chance to us for evermore! . . . That mania of saving worlds is itself a piece of the eighteenth century with its windy sentimentalism. Let us not follow it too far. For the saving of the *world* I will trust confidently to the Maker of the world; and look a little to my own saving, which I am more competent to."—Carlyle, *Heroes* (v.).

ii. 14. *Do all things without murmurings and disputings.*

"Why Pope and Lady Mary quarrelled is a question on which much discussion has been expended, and on which a judicious German professor might even now compose an interesting and exhaustive monograph. A curt English critic will be more apt to ask, 'Why they should *not* have quarrelled?' We know that Pope quarrelled with almost every one; we know that Lady Mary quarrelled or half quarrelled with most of her acquaintances. Why, then, should they not have quarrelled with one another?"—Bagehot, *Literary Studies* ("Lady Mary Montagu").

ii. 15. *Among whom ye shine as lights in the world.*

"Have the stars smooth surfaces? No, no; but how they shine."—Landor.

ii. 20. *I have no man like-minded.*

"I have no man like-minded with me, none with whom I can cordially sympathise; there are many good men to be found, and many clever men, some, too, who are both good and clever; but yet there is a want of some greatness of mind, or singleness of purpose, or delicacy of feeling, which makes them grate against the edge of one's inner

man."—Dr. Arnold (in a letter to Archbishop Whateley).

ii. 29. *Hold such in reputation.*

Sir Joseph Hooker said of Darwin that "he would never allow a depreciatory remark to pass unchallenged on the poorest class of scientific workers, provided that their work was honest and good of its kind. I have always regarded it as one of the finest traits of his character."

iii. 1. *To write the same things to you, to me indeed is not irksome, but for you it is safe.*

In his essay on Bernard of Clairvaux, Mr. Frederic Harrison warns the modern reader not to suppose that Bernard's letters "are the result of an officious and restless temper having a turn for spiritual agitation and intrusive advice. On the contrary, they are but, for the most part, replies to appeals besieging him for help and counsel. In those days, singular to relate, it was not thought contemptible to ask plainly for guidance. It was held rather honourable than otherwise to listen to the judgment of a good man. Men were not ashamed even to state plainly the anxieties of their inmost hearts. Men were in the habit of urging on one another, without reserve or apology, matters of moment to their common belief."

iii. 8–10. *I count all things loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord . . . that I may know Him, and the power of His resurrection, and the fellowship of His sufferings.*

These sentences ("never to be *finally* forgotten by the earnest-hearted of the Sons of Men," says Carlyle in his note) are quoted by Cromwell in a letter to his son Richard. "Seek the Lord and His face continually: let this be the business of your life and strength, and let all things be subservient and in order to this! You cannot find nor behold the face of God but in Christ; therefore labour to know God in Christ, which the Scripture makes to be the sum of

all, even Life Eternal. Because the true knowledge is not literal or speculative; no, but inward, transforming the mind to it. It's such a knowledge as Paul speaks of (Philip. iii. 8–10). How little of this knowledge is among us! My weak prayers shall be for you."

iii. 9. *But that which is through faith in Christ.*

"The smallest seed of faith is of more worth than the largest fruit of happiness."—THOREAU.

iii. 13. *Forgetting the things that are behind and stretching forward to the things that are before, I press on.*

"Assurance is not to be obtained so much by self-examination as by action. The Apostle Paul sought it chiefly this way, even by 'forgetting the things that were behind and reaching forth unto those things that were before.' The swiftness of his grace did more towards his assurance of a conquest than the strictness of his examination."—JONATHAN EDWARDS, *A Treatise Concerning the Religious Affections* (part iii.).

Augustine describes in his *Confessions* (bk. ix. ch. 10) how his mother and he leant over the window of the house at Ostia and talked. "We had sweet converse all by ourselves, and 'forgetting the things that are behind and reaching forth to the things that are before,' we discussed together in the presence of the Truth (which Thou art) what the eternal life of the saints would be.'

"The artist who says, '*It will do*,' is on the downward path."—R. L. STEVENSON.

"Therefore I do repent,
That with religion vain,
And misconceived pain,
I have my music bent
To waste on bootless things its skiey-gendered rain;
Yet shall a wiser day

Fulfil more heavenly way,
And with approved music clear this slip,
I trust in God most sweet.
Meantime the silent lip,
Meantime the climbing feet."

—Francis Thompson.

iii. 15. *If in any thing ye be otherwise minded, God shall reveal even this unto you.*

"He tells them this is the one thing to mind, the one thing to go on desiring and labouring for, with all the earnestness of a God-born existence; but, if any one be at all otherwise minded—that is, of a different opinion—what then? That it is of little or no consequence? No, verily; but of such endless consequence that God will Himself unveil to them the truth of the matter. St. Paul knows that, even if he could pass his opinion over bodily into the understanding of his neighbour, there would be little or nothing gained thereby, for the man's spiritual condition would be just what it was before. God must reveal, or nothing is done. And this, through thousands of difficulties occasioned by the man himself, God is ever and always doing His mighty best to effect."—Dr. George Macdonald, *A Dish of Orts*, pp. 286–287.

"Those who fancy their opinions private property are likely to be angered at the shock of finding them unconfirmed by others, and so they come to fall into bigotry—or, on the other hand, they are so perplexed at many divergences as to fall into apathetic indifference. But those who know that what they see, they see only because God has shown it to them—that it is a partial and gradual manifestation of Him, and one which was granted only on difficult terms, that has given them faith—will hesitate to think that, in His dealings with others, He must have made the same truth

clear precisely in the same way and at the same time. And yet they will know that it can never pass away."—R. H. Hutton, *Theological Essays* ("The Hard Church").

iii. 17. *Be ye imitators together of me.*

In 1854 Jowett wrote to Dean Stanley: "The mournful fact forces itself upon one that there is no older person in whose footsteps one can tread."

iii. 19. *Whose God is the belly, whose glory is in their shame, who mind earthly things.*

"Yet, if thou sinne in wine or wantonnesse,
Boast not thereof, nor make thy shame thy glorie.
Frailtie gets pardon by submissivenesse;
But he that boasts shuts that out of his storie."
—George Herbert, *The Church Porch* (ix.).

In his *Confessions* (xiii. 26) Augustine connects this verse with what follows. "Those who rejoice in such fruits [he has been allegorising, Genesis i. 29–30 with reference to works of mercy] are fed by them; they whose god is their belly do not rejoice in them. And in the case of those who furnish such fruits it is the spirit with which they give, not the actual gifts, which is the fruit. Hence I recognise clearly why he rejoiced who served God, not his own belly; I recognise it and I rejoice with him indeed. He had received what the Philippians sent by Epaphroditus, but I recognise why he really rejoiced. And his source of joy was his food, as he truly says: 'I rejoiced greatly in the Lord that now at the last your care of me hath flourished again; wherein you were also careful, but you wearied of it.' They had dried up with weariness day after day, and as it were had withered in bearing that fruit of good service; he now rejoices for them, that they had flourished again, not for himself, that his wants had been supplied by them.... Why dost thou rejoice, O Paul the great? Why dost thou

rejoice? On what dost thou feed? What is it that feeds thee? Joy."

iv. 3. *The rest of my fellow-workers, whose names are in the book of life.*

"The Puritans were men whose minds had derived a peculiar character from the daily contemplation of superior beings and eternal interests. . . . If they were unacquainted with the works of philosophers and poets, they were deeply read in the oracles of God. If their names were not found in the registers of heralds, they were recorded in the Book of Life."—MACAULAY: "Essay on Milton."

JAMES MOFFATT.

THE LITERARY ORIGIN OF THE NARRATIVE OF THE FALL.

GENESIS II.–III.

THE teaching conveyed by the narrative of the Fall, Genesis ii.–iii., may be fairly set forth as to its substance under the following heads: In their original state the first human beings, the parents of mankind, led a happy, innocent life, in close intercourse with God, and were free from bodily evils and from subjection to death.[1] Deceived and misled by a hostile power, they transgressed a direct command imposed upon them by God; the immediate result of the transgression was a sense of shame and guilt, its punishment misery and suffering ending in certain death; the hostile power, never relenting from its enmity and opposition towards God and man, will one day be overthrown by the seed of the woman.

That the inspired author means to assert, on his own responsibility, the real truth of those essential contents of his narrative, should, we think, be held as certain by the theologian, if it were only on account of the deep religious interest which attaches to that real truth.

But an altogether different one is the question whether the picturesque scenery occurring in the narrative is in

[1] It has been recently denied by some scholars that the privilege of deathless life would appear in the narrative of Gen. ii.–iii. as belonging to the original state of man, that liability to death would there be stated to be a sequel of sin. We cannot in the present paper enter into any discussion of the question. We feel, however, obliged to express our conviction that the grounds on which this denial has been set forth against the obvious meaning of the texts do not rest on solid foundation.

the same way meant and proposed by the author as actual fact,—if it were not rather to be considered as mere framework and accident form. By the notice that God put the man into the *garden* of Eden, we are taught that God created the first man in a state of delight and happiness; but should it therefore be understood that that happiness really consisted in the sojourn in a garden? The "*tree of life*," whose fruit man was allowed to eat, suggests the notion that the first men in their original state were provided with security against death; but must, therefore, that security have been really procured by eating from the fruit of a tree? The taking and eating of the fruit of another tree, "*the tree of knowledge of good and evil*," show us that the first men transgressed a definite command of God; but must, therefore, the divine command and the transgression have really stood in relation to the fruit of a tree?

Sure it is that in the Christian Church a different opinion on that subject has been at all times set forth from most authoritative quarters. The earthly paradise, with its two wonderful trees, the serpent in conversation with the woman, God walking about in the garden, the Cherûbîm placed as a watch at the entrance of the garden after the driving out of man, those are things of which it has always been admitted that they are not necessarily to be taken in the literal sense, as real history. Among the Fathers many were concerned with explaining those traits in an exclusively allegorical way, giving them out as profound symbols, conceived by the biblical writer himself under divine inspiration, of moral lessons and supernatural truths;[1]

[1] Allegorism in the exposition of Holy Scripture was borrowed by the Christian Fathers from the learned Jews of Alexandria (Philo); Jewish schools in Palestine followed a quite different course, as may be seen, for the narratives of Genesis, in the Book of Jubilees.

and till in late Middle Ages similar views met with approbation. It is a long time, however, since it has been perceived that such explanations oftentimes lack solid ground. Moreover the comparison with similar traits in the traditions and literature of other ancient nations does not in the least favour the supposition that such particulars as those just mentioned were the literary product of the inspired genius of the Hebrew author.

Thus whilst on the side of biblical rationalism the assertion of absolute equivalence of form and contents in the biblical narrative led to the construction and increasing diffusion of mythical interpretations, it happened that amongst a large number of Christian scholars, who could not resolve to attribute any historical value to some details of the paradise story, the so-called historical-folklorist system made its way and found warm defenders. According to those scholars, the images or elements of scenery which, with regard to the doctrinal substance of the narrative sketched above, may be fairly considered as mere accidental means of representation, were, at least for the main part, borrowed material, taken from widespread traditions or legends, and worked out by the sacred author in order to present historical-religious truth in a familiar, popular form.

But here a serious difficulty arises. On what ground, by what standard, will it be decided whether such or such a particular is to be considered as foreign to the supposed doctrinal kernel and as belonging rather to the accessory envelope? Had also the ancient Hebrew readers, for whom the narrative was originally devised, any means at hand to distinguish essential contents from the so-called mere ornamental framework or form?

To this question the historical-folklorists will answer at once that at least in some instances the soundness of their

way of dealing with the text cannot be doubted. Such is the case with the far-going anthropomorphisms, in the passages where God is spoken of as having at first, like a potter, made the body of man out of clay and afterwards breathed into his nostrils the spirit of life; or as planting a garden and as walking in the garden in the cool of day; as conversing with man in the most familiar way, calling unto him when he does not come forward. Of course all agree that in such descriptions of divine activity, taking into account the spiritual, monotheistic standpoint of the author, the share of imagination is a very extensive one. But the scholars whose opinion we are now outlining think that even that remark offers a foundation to further inferences in the same direction. From descriptions of that kind, thus they argue, we are logically compelled, and the Hebrews also had every reason to guess or to conclude, that the narrative was composed in the picturesque popular style, and that consequently there might be expected in it other notions borrowed from, or adapted to, legendary traditions.

The serpent appears in the narrative as the well-known reptile of that name. But again it is, and especially for the ancient Hebrews[1] it must have been, easy to perceive, so at least it would seem, that we are confronted here with a metamorphosis in the style of popular tale of higher symbolical speculations. As a symbol of the power of darkness, hostilely raging against the Creator of light and order, the serpent-like figure was so generally recognised amongst peoples of antiquity, notably amongst such as

[1] In later Jewish schools things were rather understood in a rough, literal way, and the case of the serpent's conversation with the woman led to the extravagant belief that before the Fall beasts in general were endowed with the faculty of speaking as well as man. But from this fact no one will infer that such would have been the meaning intended by the author, or admitted by the first readers of the narrative.

Babylonians and Egyptians, with whom the Hebrew lived in close intercourse, and the Hebrews themselves, as appears, for instance, from the book of Job (iii. 8, vii. 12, ix. 13, xxvi. 12, 13), were so apt to make use of the symbolical value of the serpent monster in the mythology of their neighbours, that they hardly could fail to consider that the serpent of the paradise story, which acts the part of God's adversary, was meant as a realistic reproduction of the power of darkness, acting here on the field of morals. The text itself pointed clearly enough that way. The first part of the malediction of the serpent (iii. 14) answers, in fact, to the metamorphosis under which the narrative introduces the tempter: "Because thou hast done this, thou art cursed above all cattle . . .; upon thy belly thou shalt go, and dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life . . ." But, that the author would have the rebuke to be implicitly understood according to an intended analogy, the repulsiveness of the serpent being meant as figurative of the reprobation of the fiend, the immediate sequel of the divine sentence distinctly suggested (*v.* 15): "And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head and thou shalt bruise his heel." These solemn words do not simply refer to the sense of aversion that man feels towards the serpent as towards many other kinds of animals, nor to the eager pursuit of extermination which animates man against the serpent as against many other animals, such inclinations or affections of the mind having no concern whatever with the fate of mankind. A great victory is promised to the seed of the woman. The struggle between the seed of the woman and the seed of the serpent, in which the former is indeed hurt at the heel, thus undergoing an accidental injury, but at the same time crushes the enemy's head, is, as to the mere image, a speaking counterpart to the serpent-

struggle which, according to heathen mythology, ends with the triumph of the God of light over the power of night, with this difference, that in the biblical document the serpent and its seed represent in a definite manner the principle of moral evil, the seed of the woman that of moral good.

When one, reading Genesis iii. 15, thinks of the fight of Marduk against Tiamat in the Babylonian epic, or of the struggle between the serpent Apophis and Osiris depicted in the 39th chapter of the Egyptian Book of the Dead, or of other similar descriptions, he only follows the direction given in the Apocalypse of St. John. The author of the Apocalypse, in chapter xii., obviously looking back to the prophecy of the contest between the seed of the serpent and the seed of the woman, shows us the bearing Woman, clothed with the light of sun and moon and stars, against whom war is waged by the great seven-headed, ten-horned red dragon, with the result that the dragon, "*that old serpent*, called the devil and Satan," is cast out into earth by Michael and his angels. All circumstances being taken into account, it does not appear that the dragon of the Apocalypse is the exaggeration, but the serpent of the paradise story the reduction of the original figure.

* * * * *

But the question about the standard according to which the essential contents of the history of the Fall ought to be distinguished from the accidental form of the narrative, is perhaps susceptible of being answered in a more comprehensive manner.

The objections to which the credibility of the history of the Fall has been in the past, and is still at present, liable among many, are all closely connected with the matter of the earthly paradise. If now it were true that a distinction ought to be made in our story between kernel or doctrinal

substance and mere external envelope or form, most likely this would be owing to the literary process by which the biblical narrative came into existence. Let us, for the sake of argument, provisionally suppose that there was current or commonly known amongst the ancient Hebrews a popular tale, no matter whether inherited from the primitive common stock of Semitic traditions or borrowed from without, which in its proper form had no concern whatever with the history of men, but told of a paradise or a wonderful garden occupied by inmates of a quite different kind ; let us further suppose that such a tale was in course of time taken up by the biblical author, or even before him, orally, by the spiritual leaders of the people, and made use of in order to serve as a means for the narration and adornment of the history of the parents of mankind. Then we shall understand at once how it came that the state of happiness of the first men was depicted as the sojourn in a garden, why Sin was represented as having consisted in the eating of the forbidden fruit of a wonderful tree—without the least necessity of such images being intended as part of the doctrinal truth. There also would be no doubt whatever that the ancient Hebrew readers of the narrative were apt, indeed at least as well as we are, to distinguish in it doctrinal contents from accessories, seeing that they surely would have knowledge of the supposed primitive tale.

The question, therefore, is whether there are sufficient grounds for us to justify our view concerning the literary process by which the narrative of Genesis ii.–iii. took its actual form.

At the very outset an objection might be raised against our view, from the fact that in Genesis ii. 8, it seems to be stated explicitly that the paradise was from the first moment of its existence exclusively destined to serve as a dwelling-

place for man: "And the Lord God planted a garden eastward in Eden; and there he put the man whom he had formed. . . ." This statement, however, would not in any case seriously impair our argument. It could be accounted for as a quite natural result of the adaptation of the original tale to the history of the first man.

Moreover, a closer consideration of the text would possibly bring us to a starting-point on the true track. Further on in the narrative it is recorded again that God placed the man in the paradise, as if no mention had been made of it before, (ii. 15): "And the Lord God took the man and put him into the garden of Eden to dress it and to keep it (לעבדה ולשמרה); (16) and the Lord God commanded the man. . . ." etc. Critics now pronounce that ii. 15 is a later addition to the text, interpolated, thus they argue, to resume the thread of the narrative after it had been interrupted by the long description of the lands watered by the four rivers (ii. 10–14), which is also held by them as interpolated. But the supposition that the description of the rivers and the lands irrigated by them should be held as inserted by a second hand, is a quite gratuitous one. The passage appears, in fact, to be a very old one, except perhaps some slight modifications. That it belongs, as to its main traits, to the original description of the paradise in our narrative, may be inferred from the consideration that the stream of vivifying waters appears also as an essential element in Ezekiel's poetical picture of the new paradise into which the holy land will be converted (Ezek. xlvii.; cf. Zech. xiv. 8, Joel iv. 18), and even in the vision of the heavenly paradise in the book of Revelation (xxii.). As to the thread of the narrative which is said to be interrupted by Genesis ii. 10–14, it will suffice to notice that the only place in which that thread is to be traced before the description of the rivers is just the incidental mention of

God putting the man in the garden in *v.* 8*b*, and that therefore it would be much simpler to suppress this statement alone as a later interpolation. This would seem, in fact, an advisable correction, as a glance at the text will convince us: (8) "And the Lord God planted a garden eastward in Eden; *and there He put the man whom He had formed.* (9) And out of the ground made the Lord God to grow every tree . . ." etc. Here the man appears to be put into the garden before the trees are there, which is not quite appropriate. If anywhere a thread would appear to be cut off, it would be the one connecting *v.* 8*a* with *v.* 9. Very likely *v.* 8*b* was originally a marginal note indicating, in the same way as the chapter-headings in our books do, the contents of the narrative beginning at that point, and afterwards introduced into the text at the cost of the repetition of the subject in *v.* 9.

The only authentic mention of putting the man into the garden will be that of *v.* 15, where it stands in its place, after the description of the paradise.

Now, in *v.* 15, we read that Jahve God put the man into the garden *to till it and to guard it.* Some critics assert that this is contradictory to iii. 17 ff., where it is stated (according to their view) that the man was condemned to till the ground *as a punishment for his sin.* The remark is not correct. Not properly to be bound to work, but to be doomed to lifelong hard and painful working "in the sweat of his face," to laborious struggling against a hostile ground that brings forth thorns and thistles, is man's punishment for sin. Nevertheless the charge imposed upon him, in ii. 15, does deserve all our attention. It is remarkable that the man does not appear here as a master in the paradise, nor simply as an enjoyer of it, but in the first place as appointed to a definite office. If he had had to till the ground only for himself and for his own convenience,

why should it be said that he was put there *to* till the ground? It seems to be supposed that there was another being, or were some other beings, in whose service the man might be understood to be charged with tilling, and in whose behalf he had to guard the paradise. One could ask why it was at all necessary that the wonderful garden should be tilled? Did not plants of every kind grow there by themselves? And then, against whom or what had the garden to be protected? Not against the beasts, as later Jewish exposition would have it (Jubilees iii. 16); for the beasts are supposed to have had free access to the paradise (Gen. ii. 19 f.; iii. 1). From such considerations it might seem already as if in our narrative the man was connected with the paradise by something as an artificial link, binding divergent notions and representations together.

Our suspicion becomes stronger when we ask ourselves how it comes that the first punishment of the man's sin consists, not in the suppression of the paradise, but in his expulsion out of it, precautions being taken against his coming ever back to it again and approaching to the tree of life. Even without men the paradise, with its wonderful trees, is preserved as having still a reason for its existence and a proper destination. What this destination was, for whom the paradise had still to serve as a dwelling-place after the driving out of the two first men, the narrative in Genesis does not tell. But even from this we are apt to infer or to guess that the Genesis narrative supposes, as its literary substructure, a well-known tale which conveyed information on that subject.

At the entrance of the garden, according to Genesis iii. 24, Jahve God put as a watch *the* Cherûbîm and the flaming fire of the revolving sword. Readers are understood to be well acquainted with those Cherûbîm in connexion with the wonderful garden. Would not, perhaps,

in a pre-existing tale which was made use of for the purpose of a popular account of the history of the Fall, the Cherûbîm have appeared as the proper original inmates of the divine paradise ?

* * * * *

Here is the opportune place to turn our attention to a well-known passage in the Book of Ezekiel, where the divine garden of Eden forms also a foremost part of the scenery. In figurative style the prophet describes the fall of the King of Tyre, the city itself, or the state, interchanging in the prophet's mind with the King. In the first verses of chapter xxviii. he has stigmatised the haughtiness of the prince who said : A god I am, in the seat of a god I sit in the midst of the seas ! Therefore, because his heart was lifted up as the heart of a god, will the Lord let loose against him the enemy who will destroy all his magnificence and wisdom. In *vv.* 11 ff. the sentence is then repeated under a still bolder image :

11 "The word of the Lord came to me saying : 12 Son of man, take up a lamentation upon the King of Tyre and say to him : Thus saith the Lord God :

"Thou wert a seal of perfection (?), full of wisdom and complete in beauty. 13 In Eden, the garden of Elohîm, thou wert ; every precious stone was thy covering : ruby, chrysolite and diamond, topaz, onyx and jasper, sapphire, carbuncle and emerald ; and golden was the work (= *the setting* ?) of thy jewels and thy pearls. In the day that thou wast created, as a ward (?) 14 by the protecting Cherûb I set thee.[1] On the holy mountain of Elohîm thou wert and walkedst in the midst of the stones of fire. 15 Thou wast perfect

[1] The massoretic punctuation, as dividing sentences and marking vowels, here and elsewhere in the passage, cannot be maintained. V. 13 : *as a ward* (?) ; thus we venture to translate, reading בָּנוֹן (comp. Arab. *kanna*) instead of כּוֹנַנְתְּ which yields no sense at all ; *v.* 14 : *by the protecting Cherûb* ; before the word הַסּוֹכֵךְ the massoretic text inserts the unintelligible כִּימְשַׁח, probably meant originally as an explanatory gloss on כּוֹבֵךְ (=*protecting*), wrongly taken as a derivate from מָשַׁח (*to anoint*). The Septuagint Greek translation simply has (13-14) : "From the day (that) I created thee with the Cherûb I set thee. . . ," which very likely may correspond to the original Hebrew.

in thy ways from the day that thou wast created, till iniquity was found in thee. [16] By the multitude of thy merchandise thou filledst the midst of thee with injustice; thou sinnedst and wert cast out of the mountain of Elohîm and the protecting Cherûb drove thee out of the midst of the stones of fire. [17] Thine heart was lifted up on account of thy beauty; thou corruptedst thy wisdom for thy brightness. (Because of the multitude of thine iniquities),[1] I cast thee to the ground. Before the kings I laid thee, that they might behold thee. [18] [1] By the iniquity of thy traffic thou defiledst thy holy gifts, and I brought forth a fire from the midst of thee that devoured thee and I brought thee to ashes upon the earth in the sight of all them that behold thee. . ."

Happiness connected with innocence was the original condition of the King or the State of Tyre. That blessedness of former times is pictured by the prophet as a sojourn of the prince in the paradise of Eden. It lasted "from the day that he was created" till "iniquity was found in him." Then, when opulence, born from traffic, had corrupted his heart, he was driven out of the delightful dwelling-place; the proud city will be reduced to ashes![2]

Ezekiel certainly knew the story of the Fall. But still it is manifest that some of the traits in his description of the garden of Elohîm are not derived directly from the narrative of Genesis. Firstly, this fixed appellation itself of "garden of Elohîm," or "mountain of Elohîm," here (*vv.* 13, 14, 16), and in chapter xxxi. 8 (bis), 9. That the paradise was situated on a mountain (*vv.* 14, 16) Ezekiel did

[1] The words: *because of the multitude of thine iniquities*, must be transferred from the beginning of *v.* 18, where they are not exactly fitting to the context, to *v.* 17, before the sentence: *I cast thee to the ground.* A copyist, in the first instance, wrote them twice, firstly in *v.* 17, in their proper place, then, by repetition, at the beginning of *v.* 18. Thus they appear *twice* in the Greek version of the Septuagint. Afterwards they were omitted in *v.* 17 and preserved only in the wrong place, at the beginning of *v.* 18, as the massoretic text has it.

[2] On Ezek. xxviii. cf. the highly interesting paper of Prof. Bevan, "The King of Tyre in Ezekiel xxviii.," in the *Journal of Theological Studies* (vol. iv., 1903, p. 500 ff.), which was brought to my notice by Prof. Emery Barnes, only, as I deeply regret, after the present article was printed.

not find in the Genesis document. The stones of fire strewed all over the garden (14, 16) are also taken from elsewhere. Finally and chiefly the notion that the paradise was the proper homestead of the "protecting Cherûb," thus a place of residence of Cherûbîm, where a human being only could abide as a guest, Ezekiel surely had not to infer from the Genesis narrative, but learned, as explicitly stated, from another source.

At the same time, however, the parallelism between the "lamentation" on the king of Tyre and the Genesis account of the Fall is evident. Of course the prophet does not make the sin of the king to consist in the eating of a forbidden fruit. He knew from the source that he made use of that the garden of Elohîm was planted with magnificent trees (xxxi. 8, 9). But the fault with which he intended to charge the prince representing Tyre was not a definite act of disobedience and rebellion, it was in a more general way the corruption gradually engendered by commerce. Such a moral condition could not be figured by any single action such as the violation of the tree of the "knowledge of good and evil." Nor was there any room for such a metaphor as the tree of "life"; the prophet never intended to teach that immortality or preventatives against death once were provided for the King of Tyre; and, moreover, it was natural, since the tree of knowledge was not to be mentioned, that both trees were left out of notice. But as to the main purpose, the time of Tyre's good fortune and happiness is described as a sojourn of the king, from the day of his creation, in the wonderful garden of Eden, just as the original state of happiness of the first human pair is depicted in the Genesis document as a sojourn, from the day of their creation, in the paradise of Eden. Through sin the king forfeits his happiness or prosperity and is banished from the mountain

of Elohîm and cast down on the earth, where he,—that is his city—shall be reduced to ashes, just as the first two human beings forfeit their privileges and are driven out of the paradise, smitten with the malediction which condemns man to return one day to the dust of the earth. Of such a parallelism Ezekiel was not unaware; it may safely be held as intended by him.

The conclusion seems to be unavoidable that Ezekiel knew how to distinguish in the narrative of Genesis the essential doctrinal contents from mere ornamental form borrowed from the legend of the garden of Elohîm. The use that the prophet made, with regard to the King of Tyre, of the image of the wonderful garden, as it was known by him even independently from the Genesis account, that same use he surely meant to have been made of the image by the author of this account, *imitated by him*, with regard to the first human pair. To the history of the first man in Genesis the paradise must not have been more than it is to the poetical sketch of the long career of Tyre in the Book of Ezekiel: a means of adaptation to popular lore and notions.

* * * * *

Before we proceed to adduce one or two more grounds for the proposed explanation of the literary origin of the Genesis narrative, it will not be out of place to insert here just a word of precaution to prevent any misunderstanding of the position we have taken. In the previous pages we put the question as if the author of Genesis, or, if one likes, the initiator or initiators of the oral tradition which led directly to the Genesis account of the Fall, had been the first to make the notion of the garden of the Cherûbîm subservient to some teaching or consideration about human beings. In reality, however, we do not mean to deny that, just as Ezekiel imitated the proceeding of the author of

Genesis, even so this author himself may have found, in Babylonian literature, some model to work after. This would not in any way impair the originality or the value of his own special teaching.

* * * * *

The garden of Eden being commonly known amongst ancient Hebrews as the dwelling-place of the Cherûbîm, it is not to be wondered at that the narrator in Genesis supposes his readers acquainted with the connexion of the Cherûbîm with the paradise when he speaks of *the* Cherûbîm put as a watch at the entrance of the garden. Nor does it any longer surprise us that the loss of supernatural privileges for the first man is described, not as a suppression of the garden and the tree of life, but as a banishment of man out of the garden and from the neighbourhood of the tree. According to the popular notion, used as a means or instrument of teaching by the inspired author, the garden and the tree retained, even after the driving out of the man, their proper original destination with regard to the Cherûbîm.

Whom the serpent meant, when it said to the woman "you will be as *elohîm* "—that is to say, as *divine beings*—"who know good and evil"; whom consequently also Jahve meant, when, alluding to the serpent's words, he made the ironical statement: "Behold, the man is become as one *of us*," may now be guessed in a quite satisfactory way. "Elohîm" here are not exactly "gods," and the assertion that the terms in which the statement attributed to Jahve is expressed contain a relic of old polytheistic belief, is gratuitous. The name "elohîm" was used also to signify, in a more general, indefinite manner, superhuman beings (1 Sam. xxvii. 13). In the serpent's address to the woman, and in the corresponding statement of Jahve, most probably the Cherûbîm are referred to, whom Jahve associates

with Himself as the celestial inmates of the wonderful garden, in opposition to man. The appellation "garden —or mountain—of *elohîm*," in Ezekiel's description, might well have the same import; Ezekiel does not usually name God by the mere appellation "Elohîm."

Keeping in mind the view presented above we can understand perfectly how it came that in the paradise there was a tree, the tree of "knowledge of good and evil," of which man was forbidden to eat. The objection that such a tree should never have been in the garden is not, we think, adequately answered by the consideration that the forbidden fruit was only a means of trial for man's obedience. With regard to such a purpose an indifferent tree would have been quite sufficient. Now, the qualification of the tree of *knowledge of good and evil* points to an inward, specific character of the tree in view. It is a tree the eating of whose fruit is expected to make man equal to "*elohîm*," as the serpent supposes the woman prepared to admit; the tree of "knowledge," as one of a special kind, is intimately associated with the tree of "life," even before any mention is made of God's command (ii. 9). Therefore the question arises: To what end should such a tree, which it was forbidden to man to touch, have been in the garden at all? Our answer is that both the trees of knowledge and of life were, of course, according to the popular notion of the garden of the Cherûbîm, primarily intended for the use of those Cherûbîm. The doctrine that man was created in a state of happiness is intimated in our narrative by the statement that he was placed in the wonderful garden; the doctrine that man, in his original state of innocence, was destined never to die, is intimated by the circumstance that he once had access to the tree of life, from which the Cherûbîm ate immortality; that a definite rule of life was imposed upon man by God is intimated in the prohibition

to partake of the tree of knowledge which is understood to remain exclusively reserved for the use of the Cherûbîm : men must not attempt to become the equals of superhuman beings.

But when man transgressed the divine law, he lost his privileges without attaining the coveted advantage. Critics and expositors try at best to explain how the account of man's experience after the eating of the forbidden fruit, Genesis iii. 7, signifies the acquisition of the knowledge of good and evil. Their endeavours are as painful as they are in vain. The opinion, in particular, that, according to iii. 7, man's gaining the knowledge of good and evil would consist in his growing to the consciousness of sexual difference, is, in regard of the man's address to the woman when he first saw her (ii. 23 f.), and of the qualification of the first men, even there and in the subsequent narrative, as man and wife, absolutely untenable. In fact Genesis iii. 7 does not intend to signify that by eating of the forbidden tree the first men acquired the knowledge of good and evil ; but, on the contrary, that they did *not* acquire it. The remark has been made, quite rightly, that the knowledge of *good and evil* considered in the narrative does not refer properly to *moral* good and evil in general as its object. One does not see how the knowledge of moral good and evil could have been represented by the tempter as a privilege making man equal to " elohîm," nor why the man would have been so eager to acquire that knowledge ; nor why God would have at all been imagined to have forbidden the acquisition of such knowledge by man. Moreover, the knowledge of moral good and evil must evidently be supposed to have been in man before the eating of the fruit, since it was the condition of his responsibility in his behaviour towards God's law. In Hebrew the phrase " good and evil " is employed to denote the notion of " every-

thing" (Gen. xxiv. 50; xxxi. 24, 29; 2 Sam. xiii. 22, etc.). To *know everything* was what the tempter promised to the woman (iii. 5): "... God knows that in the day you eat thereof, your eyes shall be opened and you shall be as *elohîm* who know good and evil." And what was the result? *v.* 7: "... And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked" ... Purposely the narrator repeats the mention of the opening of the eyes in order to express more keenly the opposition between the promised and expected boon and the wretched outcome. Not the knowledge of "everything"—a knowledge that he could boast of—but one to abasement and shame, the consciousness of the rupture of harmony between his higher and his lower faculties was all that man had won. Therefore we said that God's statement in iii. 22 was ironical.[1] But now again: How did it come that the tree of knowledge of "good and evil," whose fruit was apt to impart knowledge of "everything," missed its effect with man? Because, as the ancient Hebrews well knew to read between the lines, the tree of knowledge was held to be intended not for the use of man, but for the use of the superhuman beings whose natural dwelling-place the wonderful garden of Eden was.

A. Van Hoonacker.

[1] It would be out of place to dwell longer on this point here. Let us only notice that the ironical character of God's words is suggested also by His putting it as a sufficient condition for man to secure for himself eternal life, that he should put forth his hand and eat *once* from the tree of life.

NOTES ON THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

XX. Summary of the Argument.

(1) Having collected the data in the continuous examination of the Fourth Gospel in the previous articles, the writer will endeavour in this concluding article to give a summary of his argument for the authorship, character, and credibility of the Gospel, which he has in detail been seeking to establish; and in so doing will take fuller account of contrary opinions than has hitherto been done. Briefly to state his own position, he holds that the evangelist to whom, with the exception of some additions to be afterwards particularised, the work as a whole is to be assigned was an eye-witness of most of the events he records, although in regard to events in Galilee he seems to have had second-hand reports. He was a Judæan, and probably even an influential citizen of Jerusalem, closely connected with the priesthood, if not himself a priest. His dominating interest is in the progress of Christ's self-testimony and the growing unbelief and hate provoked by it in the Jewish leaders and teachers; and he again and again shows an intimate knowledge of the conflicting currents of opinion among the people, and the secret machinations of the hostile party. In the Galilæan ministry his interest is entirely secondary, and he refers to it in the sixth chapter only to mark the contrast of Galilæan enthusiasm, even if mistaken, and Judæan unbelief; and to show how Judæan hostility pursued Jesus even into Galilee to undermine His popularity there. Probably he provided both the ass for the triumphal entry and the guest-chamber for the Last Supper, and was also able owing to his rank and wealth to offer some protection and hospitality to the company of disciples. He was not a constant companion of Jesus in His public ministry, even

in Judæa; but enjoyed a peculiar intimacy, as did others outside of the apostolic circle, such as the family in Bethany.

As an appreciative and sympathetic hearer it is probable that Jesus laid bare to him His inner life as He could not even to the twelve. The difference of the Synoptic and the Johannine reports is, if not entirely, yet to a large extent explicable by two circumstances. In His public utterances in Judæa Jesus was urging His claim on the Jewish people through its representatives, the priests and scribes, and He exercised less reserve than in Galilee, for the peril of a mistaken Messianic movement was absent, and He gave more advanced teaching doctrinally as He was addressing Himself to a learned class, and not the unlearned masses. In His private conversations He was confiding His secrets to a companion who could understand. For some reason, which we can now but conjecture, not only did the evangelist keep in the background in the early Church, so that he is not mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles and the Pauline letters; but even in his later years, when he bore his testimony to the world, he did not reveal his name, and probably it was out of respect to his wishes that the disciple who edited what he had written, or reported what he had said as an eyewitness, did not betray the secret, but gave as a tribute of affection the description of him as "the disciple whom Jesus loved." This account of the evangelist is in all particulars based on the data discussed in detail in the preceding articles; and it offers a consistent, and to the writer a convincing picture.

(2) But it may be objected that the tradition that John the son of Zebedee was the author bars the way. Dr. Drummond, in his book on *The Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel*, after an exhaustive and searching discussion of the external evidence for the traditional belief, concludes that "the attestation is perfectly unanimous in

favour of the early date of the Gospel, for in this even the dubious Alogi are supporters of the Catholic view " (p. 348) ; but that " the second point, that the Apostle John was the author, can hardly claim the same degree of confidence." He admits, however, that " if the Gospel was issued soon after the Apostle's death by some writer who chose to keep himself unknown, and on the ground either of its own title or of internal evidence was pronounced to be John's, and generally accepted as such, the phenomena of the existing attestation would be sufficiently explained ; in other words, we have no testimony which affords us any security against an error of this kind " (349). It is true that he holds such an error not probable ; but he leaves us with a door not altogether closed, but at least ajar. The authorship by John the son of Zebedee is not a certainty, but only a probability. Dr. Sanday states the aim of his book on *The Criticism of the Fourth Gospel* as follows : " I propose to defend the traditional view, or (as an alternative) something so near to the traditional view that it will count as the same thing " (p. 3). The alternative referred to is Delff's theory that the evangelist was not the Apostle, the son of Zebedee, but the disciple whom Papias mentions separately and describes as the presbyter. While he inclines still to the traditional view, he admits the possibility of this theory. He too, therefore, allows that we are not shut up to the traditional view. The writer sees no good reason against identifying the evangelist, as described in the previous section, with the presbyter John. Against the traditional view we may place not only Papias' statement in Eusebius (*Ecclesiastical History*, Bk. III. c. 39), but also another statement in De Boor's Fragment that " Papias in his second book says that John the Divine and James his brother were slain by Jews," and the statement of Polycrates, bishop of Ephesus, in a letter written to Rome about 190

A.D., that "John . . . had been a priest and worn the High Priest's mitre." If John the Apostle at an early date suffered martyrdom, and the fact was not generally known, one can understand that another John living in Ephesus, and also bearing witness as a disciple of Jesus, might be confused with him. Without claiming that these statements are certain, we can at least appeal to them as a justification for the claims for freedom from the fetters of the traditional view to investigate the problem on *the grounds of internal evidence.*

(3) On these grounds Westcott sought to prove the authorship of John the son of Zebedee. The writer can go with him entirely in the first three steps of his argument, i.e., that the author was a Jew, a Jew of Palestine, and an eyewitness; but his next step, that he was an Apostle, rests on the assumption that the twelve and twelve alone stood in so intimate relations to Jesus as the author of the Fourth Gospel appears to stand, whereas it has been shown in the previous discussion that the twelve formed Jesus' constant companions in Galilee, but that in Judæa there were other disciples who came into close contact with Him also. "It is not on the face of it certain," says Dr. Sanday, "that 'the disciple whom Jesus loved' must have been one of the Twelve" (*op. cit.*, p. 98). But it is only by assuming this as certain that Westcott is justified by the method of exclusion in taking his last step to St. John as author. Dr. Sanday's argument for the son of Zebedee as author, that the beloved disciple is associated in the Fourth Gospel with Peter in the same way as John in the Acts of the Apostles, has been dealt with in detail, to disprove its cogency. The writer is, however, in entire accord with both Westcott and Dr. Sanday in insisting that the evangelist writes as an eyewitness, and it is hoped that throughout these notes the evidence for this conclusion has been strength-

ened. He is inclined to insist that the reason for the addition or the omission of an incident is not always to be found in the evangelist's pragmatism, but, where that is not obvious, and needs to be discovered by strained ingenuity, in the presence or absence of the evangelist from the scene. The view of Mr. Scott in the *Fourth Gospel* that "apart from its allegorical value, the picturesque detail in John's narrative can be set down, not to the accurate memory of the eyewitness, but to the fine instinct of the literary artist," appears not only intellectually improbable, but even morally offensive, as the evangelist seems far too serious and sincere to stoop to any devices such as are suggested in the following sentence. "All the more that the prevailing tenor of his work was abstract and meditative, he felt the need of relieving it with touches of livelier colour" (p. 19). What we meet with in the Gospel is reality and not realism. The intensity of religious faith excludes the artifices of literary culture.

(4) To one point adverse to the traditional view very full consideration has been given throughout these notes, namely, that the evangelist was not a Galilæan but a Judæan, even a Jerusalemite.

It is not necessary to repeat here what has been already said in describing the author of the Gospel. It seems to be altogether more difficult to maintain the historical credibility of the Gospel if we assume that a Galilæan disciple who was Jesus' companion throughout His whole ministry there was so indifferent to and ignorant of the course and characteristics of that ministry, and that a fisherman of Galilee had a dominating interest in, and an intimate knowledge of, not only the Judæan ministry, but of all the local and temporary conditions of it. It must be added that the character of the evangelist does not correspond with the impression of the son of Zebedee which the Synoptics leave

upon us. If it be urged that in his long life he was much changed, so that the fiery zealot became the thoughtful and tender interpreter of the heart of God in Christ, it has to be pointed out that his qualifications for the tender and thoughtful intimacy he enjoyed with Jesus must have belonged to his youth and not old age only. He must have already been as companion what he proved as witness, receptive of, and responsive to that inner life of Jesus which he has unveiled for us, and for which, as the Synoptic Gospels testify, the company of the twelve was so insensitive and inappreciative.

(5) While we are entitled to regard the evangelist as an eyewitness, yet the Gospel itself has characteristics which forbid our treating it throughout as historical report or record. Whle the partition theories which separate the source from the editorial framework are too simple a solution, we must recognise, in spite of the dominating unity, different strata which we may with more or less certainty distinguish, although we may not be able to assign each sentence or clause to one or another. First of all, in view of the conclusion reached by some scholars, which the writer himself maintains, that the Prologue does not determine the representation of the person and work of Jesus, but rather a conception of divine sonship, we may conjecture that the Prologue comes from the disciple of the evangelist, whom we may call the editor, without attempting to decide whether the evangelist himself wrote out the Gospel, or his discipline gave shape to the notes he had taken of his master's teaching in some such relation as is assumed regarding Mark to Peter. The evangelist may himself have concealed his identity under such a phrase as "another disciple," but surely he never described himself as "the disciple whom Jesus loved," and this phrase must be assigned to the editor. Mr. Strachan, in the EXPOSITOR for March,

sees also "the hand of an editor" in (1) the chronological scheme of chapters i.–xii., according to which the narrative of the ministry is arranged according to cycles of Jewish feasts; (2) the very evident heightening of the miraculous element of chapter xi., superimposed on what is evidently in its original form a simple narrative of raising from the dead." "As regards (1)," he continues, "his motive may be conjectured to be a desire to represent Jesus as consistently keeping the national feasts" (p. 256). The writer himself can see no adequate reason for assigning the chronological scheme to the editor and not the evangelist. In the previous discussion he has tried to show the historic probability of a ministry of Jesus in Jerusalem just at the feasts, when the evangelist as a Jerusalemite was in close contact with Him, and so could give the account of an eyewitness. As regards the story of Lazarus its difficulties have been recognised, and it would be assuredly a relief if we could assign the heightening of the effect to the editor and not the evangelist. For the editorial activity in chapter xi. Mr. Strachan finds "an eschatological motive," namely, "that the Parousia is delayed, and many who expected to be alive at His coming are dead." But if the Gospel was written in the evangelist's old age, this motive might affect him as well as his disciple. "The same motive," says Mr. Strachan, "prompts the editorial additions in such passages as vi. 39b, 40b, 44b (*ἀναστήσω . . . τῇ ἐσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ*, xiv. 1 ff. (which seems to me to have a very close connexion with the thought of xxi. 23)." As regards xiv. 1 ff. the writer feels no need for any such assumption; but he has already, in discussing chapter vi. in detail, suggested that the "verses 36–40 seem to contain teaching far too advanced for the multitude at the seashore," and he has applied this consideration to verses 43–46. While still maintaining the possibility that this teaching was

given to the scribes in the synagogue, he is ready to admit the probability that the eschatological reference is an editorial addition. As regards the passage v. 21–29, which Mr. Strachan finds "essentially true to the consciousness of the Fourth Evangelist as well as to the thought of Jesus," the writer does not consider it necessary to refer it to the editor; but finds that it is not appropriate to its present context, and must be regarded as either a later doctrinal development in the mind of the evangelist, or less probably an intimate communication made by Jesus to him; as a public utterance at the time and place assigned to it the passage is open to grave suspicion. It is possible that xix. 35 should also be assigned to the editor. The Appendix, as has been argued in the previous article, cannot be assigned to the editor of the Gospel, but must be regarded as from another hand, and of later date, and accordingly less trustworthy.

(6) In the evangelist's share in the work we must, as has been assumed throughout, distinguish reminiscence from reflexion, his report of what he had seen and heard and his meditation on its meaning. It must be admitted on the one hand that even reminiscences have often been affected by the evangelist's distinctive vocabulary; and that consequently it is sometimes impossible with certainty to mark the point of transition from reminiscence to reflexion. There are many cases, however, where the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus can be detected, and where we can follow the working of the evangelist's mind as memory passed into meditation. The reminiscences may be further distributed in three classes: (1) There are reminiscences of which one can be confident that they are given in their appropriate context; (2) there are reminiscences, however, which seem out of place where they are found, and for which we may conjecture a more fitting framework, such as the logion in iii.

13–15, which would be in a more suitable environment after xii. 31–32, and the passage in vi. 53–57, which, if it is authentic, can find a place only in connexion with the Last Supper; and (3) there are second-hand reports of occurrences in Galilee, as in chapter vi., in which one feels the evangelist is not speaking as an eyewitness, and does not quite understand the situation, for only thus can some of the differences from the Synoptists be explained, and even what one may call detached echoes of the Synoptic tradition, as in xii. 25, 26, 27. In respect to the last we may assume that the evangelist remembered less vividly what had been told him than what he had himself seen and heard of the ministry of Jesus. We cannot accordingly assert that all the evangelist's reports or records are of equal historical value, because we are concerned with less or more direct knowledge, and less or more accurate remembrance; and a searching criticism is both legitimate and necessary.

(7) In the reflexions one is justified in distinguishing two interests, the religious and the theological; or two elements, the experimental and the speculative; and much of the difficulty and failure to appreciate properly the value of the Gospel arises from the neglect of this distinction. The evangelist had no intention of adding his own private interpretations to the teaching of Jesus; but as he meditated on what he remembered he became conscious of the Master's presence and of the enlightening and quickening of His Spirit to bring all things to his remembrance, and thereby to guide him into all the truth; and accordingly he was not aware of any incongruity between his reminiscences and his reflexions, he was not conscious of any offence against historical veracity when he presented both, blended together, as his testimony to the truth and grace of the Word become flesh, or of the only-begotten and well-beloved Son. He doubtless did not distinguish

his experience in, and his doctrine about Christ; but we, with our more accurate epistemological method, cannot avoid doing so. There are many portions of the Fourth Gospel in which the most spiritual Christian piety finds itself at home as nowhere else even in the New Testament. The evangelist has in his reflexions interpreted as no other has done what Christ is to, and does for, the intensely devout soul. If in the report of the discourse in the Upper Room we cannot always claim to possess historical testimony, we have experimental evidence regarding the work and worth of Christ for the spiritual life. This element in the Fourth Gospel belongs surely to the revelation of God in Christ, and has permanent and universal value. We can provoke only contradiction if we make a like claim for the entire Christology of the evangelist. There is a self-witness of Jesus going beyond, and yet consistent with, and even necessary to complete the Synoptic representation, which we may accept as authentic. Jesus' consciousness of a unique sonship in entire dependence on, constant communion with, and perfect submission to, God as Father we may accept as belonging to the historical reality of which the evangelist is the witness. But along with this there goes a tendency to over-emphasise the supernaturalness of Jesus' knowledge and power, which does not invent its illustrations, but imposes an interpretation on facts, which these contradict. We can easily detect the instances of this tendency, and they do not depreciate the value of the Gospel historically or spiritually.

(8) It is in an interest vital to Christian thought and life that the previous investigation has been undertaken. The writer cannot agree with Dr Drummond that we "may well withhold our hands from the seamless robe"; for it does seem to him to matter whether we have only doctrinal or even experimental interpretation or historical testimony.

While the evangelist does not, as has been shown, keep the two apart, yet to him it was of primary importance that the Word became *flesh*, that men *beheld* the glory of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. And the writer cannot understand how it can be of no interest to Christian piety whether Jesus was or was not as the evangelist represents Him, whether He spake, did, and suffered as He is reported. It is because he is convinced that the view of the authorship and composition of the Gospel here advanced removes objections to, and affords reasons for the credibility of the Gospel as both historical testimony and doctrinal interpretation that he has risked this adventure of literary and historical criticism.

Note —Gathering together the conclusions or suggestions of the previous discussion, the writer offers the following tentative analysis of the Gospel. Where there is doubt, a mark of interrogation has been added. Where it is uncertain under which of two headings a passage should be put, it is given under both with this mark. The distinction which runs through the Gospels is between the evangelist's reminiscences and his reflexions. His reminiscences are in a few instances, however, not given in their proper context; and his reflexions may be divided in a rough-and-ready way into the experimental, in which he presents to us his appreciation of the truth and grace of Christ for himself and mankind, and the theological, in which he asserts his conception of the person of Christ. In dealing with the ministry in Galilee, he gives reports at second-hand; but from these we may distinguish what may be called Synoptic echoes, where sayings of Jesus are given in another context. It is possible that the disciple of the evangelist, who has been called the editor, has contributed more than it has seemed necessary to assign to him; and probable that the Appendix comes from a still later hand.

I. The Evangelist. (1) *Reminiscences in appropriate Context.* i. 19–34, 35–51 (*vv.* 41, 42, 45, 48, 49 ?); ii. 1–12, 13–20, 23; iii. 1–12, 22–30; iv. 1–23 (18a ?), 25–42, 43–45, 46–54?; v. 1–18b, 30–47; vii. 15–24, 1–14, 25–52; viii. 12–59; ix.; x. 19–29, 1–18, 30–42; xi. 17–46 (42 ?), 47–53, 54–57; xii. 1–24, 32, 34–36, 44–50, 37–43; xiii. 1–35 (or 31a), (3, 19 ?); xv. (26, 27 ?); xvi. (7–15 ?); xiii. 36 (or 31b)—xiv. 31 (16–20, 26, 29 ?); xvii. (3 ?); xviii. 1–14, 24, 19–23, 15–18, 25–27, 28–40; xix. (35 ?); xx.

(2) *Reminiscences out of Context.* iii. 13–15; vi. 52, 57, 62.

(3) *Second-hand Reports.* iv. 46–54 ?; vi. 1–59. (36–40 ?, 51c ?), 60–61, 63–65, 66–71 ?; xi. 1–16.

(4) *Synoptic Echoes.* vi. 66–71 ?; xii. 25–26, 27–28.

(5) *Reflexions Experimental.* iii. 16–21, 31–36; iv. 24; v. 19–29; xv. 26–27 ?; xvi. 7–15 ?; xiv. 16–20 ?, 26 ?

(6) *Reflexions Theological.* ii. 21, 22, 24, 25; v. 18c; xii. 29, 30, 33; xiv. 29 ?; xvii. 3 ?

II. Editorial Additions. (1) *The first Editor.* i. 1–18, the description "the disciple whom Jesus loved." vi. 39b, 40b, 44b ?; xix. 35b.

(2) *Later Redactor* xxi. and *Unauthentic* vii. 53–viii. 11.

Alfred E. Garvie.

THE WORK OF ST. LUKE: A HISTORICAL APOLOGY FOR PAULINE PREACHING BEFORE THE ROMAN COURT.

In the title of this article is already expressed that I assume as a base for this study the unity and the authenticity of the work of St. Luke (Gospel and Acts). After the works of Zahn, Harnack, Ramsay, it seems allowable to base argument upon their common results. Surely every historical result remains liable to revision, but a well-founded hypothesis can best be tested by its consequences and its applicability in details. So I start from the unity and authenticity of St. Luke's Gospel and Acts, and since the time when Harnack (*Die Apostelgeschichte*, 1908, p. 224 f.) felt obliged to apologise for the resemblance of his results with the rather suspect conservatism of Zahn, Blass, Ramsay, even such apology has become antiquated.

It is not only for brevity's sake, but also in acknowledgement of the great merits of Sir W. M. Ramsay in the region of the New Testament and Early Church history, that for the fundamental views of the following pages I refer especially to his works. I argue from the following theses on which partly I will give my restrictions and comments :—

1. St. Luke is the author of St. Luke's Gospel and Acts.

2. Both books are planned as parts of one historical work.

3. The work shows the great qualities of the author, especially with respect to style, disposition and deliberate choice of details.

4. Especially in the parts in which St. Luke writes as an eyewitness we may rely upon the trustworthiness of details, and for other parts St. Luke has followed the best traditions he could find.

The third thesis, however, must be entirely disqualified

if really, as is often asserted, it has been the intention of St. Luke to describe the diffusion of Christianity to the ends of the world. Not only Rome, where *Acts* xxviii. ends, is not the end but the centre of the world, but from *Acts* ix. onwards St. Paul is the principal person in the narrative, and what is not immediately a description of his work and his life is only characterised by the intention to make St. Paul's preaching and position clear. Even St. Peter is mentioned in the second part of Acts only when St. Paul's way crosses his. Of the great missionary regions lying outside of the sphere of St. Paul's work we hear nothing except by casual information. There are abundant traces of important missionary results in Alexandria and Egypt, and St. Luke knows of them (*Acts* xviii. 25 ; xi. 20 ; xiii. 1), but as Alexandria lies outside the missionary route of St. Paul, St. Luke does not speak of the missionary work there nor of the results of it.

Looking upon St. Luke's work as it lies before us, it is easily to be seen that the plan of a centre of missionary work, from which the evangelisation of the world moves towards the periphery, is not followed in it. The plan of the book may rather be compared with a pyramid : the broad basis is the Gospel of Jesus, which underlies all preaching of His missionaries ; the second stage is the foundation of the church at Jerusalem, the mother of all churches ; the third, the missionary work of the first church as far as it is necessary to relate it in order to understand the work of St. Paul ; the fourth, the missionary work of St. Paul, in which the Jerusalem churches and Apostles are mentioned only when St. Paul comes in contact with them ; finally, the voyage to Rome with the culminating point : in Rome under the eyes of the Roman judges and officials he preached the kingdom of God with all boldness and without being hindered.

That these words are really the culminating point to

which the whole work tends will be shown presently. But first I have to face a serious objection. The end of Acts is esteemed rather awkward, and is really so if its history is written from a later point of view, say *ca.* 80 A.D. Then it is entirely inconceivable how St. Luke could leave out the result of St. Paul's trial, of which the beginning is pointed to (*Acts* xxviii. 30, 31), and which cannot have been anything else but St. Paul's acquittal. The words of Agrippa (*Acts* xxvi. 32), *ἀπολελύσθαι ἐδύνατο ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος εἰ μὴ ἐπεκέκλητο Καίσαρα*, point to this result. St. Paul himself expected with full confidence his acquittal (*Phil.* i. 25; ii. 24; *Philem.* 22), which in the Pastoral Epistles is presupposed. Why did St. Luke not mention it? Zahn and Ramsay suppose that a third book was planned by St. Luke. The main argument for this thesis is found in *Acts* i. 1. St. Luke is esteemed to be a too correct stylist to write *πρῶτος*, i.e. first of more than two, where he means *πρότερος*, first of two. I will not lay stress on the use of the word *πρῶτος* in *Acts* xii. 10, where, in fact, there seems to be not the least hint of *three* gates and *three* guards; I acknowledge that in several passages St. Luke uses the word *πρῶτος* correctly. Surely, but he *never* uses the word *πρότερος*; so all material to show that St. Luke used *this* last word correctly fails, and Sir W. M. Ramsay must content himself to say that in Acts i. 1 *πρῶτος* means, first of more than two, "*if St. Luke wrote as correct Greek as Paul wrote.*" [1]

But even if St. Luke had the intention to write a third book, the end of Acts remains awkward if the supposition is true that he wrote a score of years after the events narrated. The first book reaches really a final point, the ascension of the Lord; but in Acts it is just the crowning fact, the acquittal of St. Paul, that is lacking. Even if a third book was planned, the omission of this fact, be it in

[1] *St. Paul the Traveller*, 11th ed., p. 309.

the form of a short notice, is inconceivable. The only really easy explanation is that Acts has been written just on the point of time where it ends, viz., at the beginning of the trial of St. Paul. The only really serious objection [1] to this hypothesis seems to me the passage *Luke* xxi. 20–24 compared with *Mark* xiii. 14–16. I can discuss this question only after having handled the whole of the problem. Lately the hypothesis has been defended by Koch,[2] who, however, weakened his thesis by separating the Gospel from Acts by an interval of two years, and who failed to explain the reason and the purpose why this historical work was planned and written just at this point of time.

To my view the end of Acts gives a decidedly distinct answer to the chronological question. St. Luke tells us that St. Paul during two full years abode in his own hired dwelling. The aorist ἐνέμεινεν shows that these two years have passed, and that now St. Paul has been transported elsewhere (the πραιτώριον of *Philippians* i. 13). But there "he *continued* to receive all that went unto him and preached the Kingdom of God and taught what concerned the Lord Jesus with all boldness, none forbidding him." I lay stress upon the imperfect ἀπεδέχετο and διελέγετο. In contrast with the aorist ἐνέμεινεν these imperfects must denote: "and continued until this very time to receive and to discuss."

It seems only natural to follow the line of inquiry indicated by the exegesis of the final verses of Acts. If it is right it is not difficult to give an answer to the question for what purpose St. Luke wrote his book. It must then have been written as an *exposé* of the teaching of St. Paul, not in the form of an abstract theological system, but in the

[1] For the rest cf. Harnack, *Apostelgesch.*, S. 221; and Koch, *Die Abfassungszeit des lukanischen Geschichtswerkes*, Leipzig, A. Deichert, 1910.

[2] l.c.

form of a history of facts and matters, of πράγματα which only could serve as material in a Roman procedure. The words of Gallio (*Acts* xviii. 14 seq.) are much to the point, and largely explain the purpose of St. Luke. Before a Roman court only *facts* of misdemeanour or crime are dealt with, questions of *word* or *names* or *Jewish* law are rejected. So St. Luke wishes to give an account of facts bearing on St. Paul's trial. He begins therefore with the beginning, the Gospel of Jesus, whom St. Paul preaches, and ends where the facts are at an end (πεπληροφορημένων πραγμάτων, *Luke* i. 3). So St. Luke must unavoidably begin with an account of the life of this Jesus whom St. Paul preached, and it is very remarkable that Acts ends with the words : διδάσκων τὰ περὶ τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ μετὰ πάσης παρρησίας ἀκωλύτως. In these very words lies the point to which the whole of St. Luke's historical apology tends : the very preaching for which he has been traduced by the Jews, and for which he will have to justify himself before the Emperor, has been continued by him in Rome, even under the eyes of the *praefectus praetorio*, who was responsible for his behaviour, and neither this high authority nor any of the Roman officials has anyhow hindered or forbidden him in doing so. In this way the end of Acts, instead of being awkward or abrupt, shows the fine and eloquent acumen of St. Luke in the "peroration" of his apology. They almost anticipate the verdict of the Emperor.

These final words, however, are prepared by many preceding traits throughout the book. The fact has often enough been remarked that St. Luke shows a decided prejudice in favour of the Romans. I wish to lay stress on the fact that it is especially Roman *justice* which in his book plays the *beau rôle*. In the trial of Jesus the Jews condemn Him to death ; the only member of the Sanhedrin who is said not to have assented to it, Joseph of Arimathaea,

is called *ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ δίκαιος*. Pilate, however, the Roman governor, states three subsequent times that Jesus is not guilty of anything that deserves punishment (*Luke* xxiii. 4, 14–15, 22). Gallio, who is described *Acts* xvii. 14 f. as a strictly just and high-minded Roman official, drove the accusers of St. Paul away from his tribunal. Before the tribunal of Festus it is unanimously declared that St. Paul has done nothing by which he should have deserved death or prison, and it will not be without special motive that Agrippa, whose advice as of an expert Festus has asked in the case of St. Paul, confirms the opinion of Festus and expressly declares: "This man might have been set at liberty, if he had not appealed unto Cæsar."

It is extremely improbable that such a view of Roman justice could be defended by any Christian after the sudden persecution under Nero, which implied a change of policy towards the Christians, and this consideration confirms the supposed date we fixed for the composition of the Lukan work. The emphasis, however, with which St. Luke makes his appeal to Roman justice implies another conclusion, viz., that the book was written as information for some Roman official (or more of them), whose influence in the process of St. Paul was of eminent importance. There is no doubt that St. Luke has tried to describe facts according to truth and accuracy. He especially tells us so in his prologue. There have been more persons who have described the matters, which at the moment he writes have reached some culminating point (*πεπληροφορημένα πράγματα*), but by the word *ἐπεχείρησαν* St. Luke indicates that to his view not only the task was a difficult one, but also that the persons who have tried to fulfil it were not wholly qualified for it. The case of *Luke* xxi. 20–24 compared to *Mark* xiii. 14–16 may illustrate the point, and shows at the same time the diverging view held by St. Luke of the position of the Roman

empire. The two passages may be put in comparative parallels :—

Mc. xiii.[14] Ὅταν δὲ ἴδητε τὸ βδέλυγμα τῆς ἐρημώσεως ἑστηκότα ὅπου οὐ δεῖ (ὁ ἀναγινώσκων νοείτω) οἱ ἐν τῇ Ἰουδαίᾳ φευγέτωσαν εἰς τὰ ὄρη· [15] ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ δώματος μὴ καταβάτω μηδὲ εἰσελθάτω ἆραί τι ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας αὐτοῦ, [16] καὶ ὁ εἰς τὸν ἀγρὸν μὴ ἐπιστρεψάτω εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω ἆραι τὸ ἱμάτιον αὐτοῦ· [17] οὐαὶ δὲ ταῖς ἐν γαστρὶ ἐχούσαις καὶ ταῖς θηλαζούσαις ἐν ἐκείναις ταῖς ἡμέραις.

Lc. xxi. [20] Ὅταν δὲ ἴδητε κυκλουμένην ὑπὸ στρατοπέδων Ἰερουσαλήμ τότε γνῶτε ὅτι ἤγγικεν ἡ ἐρήμωσις αὐτῆς· [21] τότε οἱ ἐν τῇ Ἰουδαίᾳ φευγέτωσαν εἰς τὰ ὄρη, καὶ οἱ ἐν μέσῳ αὐτῆς ἐκχωρείτωσαν, καὶ οἱ ἐν ταῖς χώραις μὴ εἰσερχέσθωσαν εἰς αὐτήν, [22] ὅτι ἡμέραι ἐκδικήσεως αὗταί εἰσιν τοῦ πλησθῆναι πάντα τὰ γεγραμμένα. [23] οὐαὶ ταῖς ἐν γαστρὶ ἐχούσαι καὶ ταῖς θηλαζούσαις ἐν ἐκείναις ταῖς ἡμέραις· ἔσται γὰρ ἀνάγκη μεγάλη ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς καὶ ὀργὴ τῷ λαῷ τούτῳ, [24] καὶ πεσοῦνται στόματι μαχαίρης καὶ αἰχμαλωτισθήσονται εἰς τὰ ἔθνη πάντα, καὶ Ἰερουσαλὴμ ἔσται πατουμένη ὑπὸ ἐθνῶν ἄχρι οὗ πληρωθῶσιν καιροὶ ἐθνῶν.

The great difference between these two parallels is not that the one is more apocalyptic in character than the other, nor that the Lukan version must be a *vaticinium ex eventu* on account of the military details it gives. If the judgment on Jerusalem would come by the Romans, and no Christian of the first century could expect anything else, the military details were self-evident. The great difference is rather that the account of St. Mark is written from the standpoint of a Jew or a Jewish Christian, who abhors the abomination that Jerusalem and its temple will be trodden down by the Gentiles, whereas St. Luke lays stress on the fact that the Romans will be the fulfillers of God's justice towards the people that has rejected His Messiah. It is for that reason that St. Luke leaves out the *βδέλυγμα* and speaks only of the *ἐρήμωσις*; that he speaks of the *ἡμέραι ἐκδικήσεως* by which all things which are written will be fulfilled; that he speaks not only of the great distress in the land, but also of the wrath upon this people of the Jews; and that this

judgment upon Jerusalem is the beginning of the times of the Gentiles (cf. *Acts* xxviii. 26 ff. and *Rom.* xi.).

So even this detail, which formed the most serious objection against the thesis that St. Luke wrote at the beginning of St. Paul's trial, is obviously a confirmation of it and in agreement with the plan and purpose of the whole book, and shows what St. Luke meant when he disqualified his predecessors to some extent. To the mind of St. Luke his narrative ought to possess three qualities: *ἀκρίβεια*, *ἀσφάλεια*, and completeness, in the sense that matters ought to be narrated from the very beginning. This was the more necessary because his reader is to some extent acquainted [1] with the matters, and partial knowledge could imply wrong judgement.

The reader to which St. Luke writes is a high Roman official of proconsular or at least equestrian rank, as is necessarily implied by the title given to him: *κράτιστος*. That St. Luke knows and follows the legitimate use of this word is seen from *Acts* xxiii. 26; xxiv. 3; xxvi. 25, where it is the title of the governors of Palestine, Felix and Festus. The list of places where the word occurs so far as I have been able to find them in Dittenberger's *Sylloge inscr. graec.* shows not only that the title was used only for high political or religious officials, but makes it highly improbable that the second adjective by which St. Luke addresses his reader, *Θεόφιλος*, is meant as a proper name. In connexion with the tradition or the hypothesis that St. Luke and his reader originated from Antioch, it might be esteemed of some importance that the name *Θεόφιλος Θεοφίλου Ἀντιοχεύς* occurs in an inscription found on Delos,[2] but this is a mere

[1] Cf. the meaning of the word *κατηχεῖσθαι*, *Acts* xxi. 21, 24; xviii. 25; Jos. *Vita*, 65; Philo *leg. ad Cai.* 30. It does not signify that "Theophilos" was a catechumen; cf. Zahn, *Einl.*[3] ii. S. 390.

[2] Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, 559, 1.

coincidence. Theophilus is a rather common name, and this fact excludes all inferences from the quoted inscriptions. But wherever the title κράτιστος occurs it is given to persons who bear genuine Roman names: Antonia Tryphaena, Aurelia Melitine, Tiberius Claudius, Stertinius Quartinus, etc.[1] That is an indication that Θεόφιλος is meant, not as a proper name, but as an epitheton denoting the qualities on which the expectation of the convincing force of the narrative is built; the reader is a God-fearing Roman, one of those Gentiles of which *at the end* of *Acts* (xxviii. 28) it is said: αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀκούσονται. In this light the long quotation from Isaiah at the end of the book, otherwise hardly explicable, becomes clear: the Jews have rejected the Gospel and persecute its missionaries; the Gentiles will accept it, these are really lovers of God. The end and the beginning of the book once more appear to be closely connected.

For which person or persons was the book written? That there may have been more than one person to whom a copy of the book may have been sent must expressly be stated. A proper name is not mentioned, and the account shows no personal traits (with one exception soon to be noticed). The reader is a man of proconsular or equestrian rank, and a man of influence in the procedure of St. Paul. The case of St. Paul was to be judged by the emperor, probably by him personally (cf. especially *Acts* xxvii. 24; *Phil.* iv. 22).[2] So the fate of St. Paul depended theoretically entirely on the personal verdict of the Emperor. With two important restrictions: the first is that the Emperor in every case in which he had to give his verdict consulted his *consilium*, which in the earlier time was composed for every individual case according to its proper character. To this *consilium*

[1] In κράτιστε ἀνδρῶν used of Epaphroditus, Jos., *Vita*, 76, and *Contra Ap.* i. 1, the word is not used as a title, as the addition of ἀνδρῶν shows.

[2] Cf. Tacitus, *Ann.* ii. 34 sq.

were called the *amici principis*, to which in the time of Nero belonged e.g. Seneca (Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 53 *fin.*). The second restriction is that Nero hardly ever was really himself; he always stood under some good or bad, but mostly bad influences. At the time we speak of these influences came from two sides: the better ones from Seneca, the philosopher and teacher of Nero,[1] and Burrhus, the *praefectus praetorio*, a man of great military merits and of unquestionable honesty; the bad ones came from Poppaea Sabina, the Jewish proselyte (Jos. *Ant.* viii. 11), of which lascivious and mischievous woman Tacitus says: *huic mulieri cuncta alia fuere praeter honestum animum.*

If we have to make a suggestion as to the direction in which we have to seek the persons to whom the Lukan apology was addressed, the answer cannot be doubtful. We immediately think of Seneca. When I had come so far with my inquiry I consulted the work of Kreyher, *L. Annaeus Seneca und seine Beziehungen zum Urchristentum*, and was surprised that his study, which attacked the problem from an entirely different side, had led in many points to the same results as my own inquiry. For more details I must refer to his work, though I cannot myself endorse many of his views. It seems, however, highly improbable that the traditions which connect Seneca with Christian, especially with Pauline, teaching should be entirely devoid of truth. The parallels in his writings to Christian beliefs and Christian writings, so striking that Tertullian calls Seneca *saepe noster*, are perfectly and easily explained if in the way we indicated Seneca became acquainted with St. Paul and through him with Christian teaching.

[1] In the time in which *Acts* was written there was only one *praef. praet.*; cf. *Acts* xxviii. 16, v. l. Only after the death of Burrhus there were two. Against the explanation of στρατοπεδάρχης as *princeps peregrinorum* cf. Zahn, *Einl.*[3] i. 392 f.

Perhaps, however, we must go further. There seems no reason why St. Luke should have sent a copy of his book only to Seneca; at least Burrhus had an equal right to it, and St. Luke accordingly has not put a proper name in the address of his book. Perhaps we find a trace of the fact, that also Burrhus, the *praef. praetorio*, received a copy of the book, in a various reading in *Acts*. In chapter xxviii. 16, the text of ℵ, etc., runs: ὅτε δὲ εἰσήλθομεν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, ἐπετράπη τῷ Παύλῳ μένειν καθ' ἑαυτὸν σὺν τῷ φυλάσσοντι αὐτὸν στρατιώτῃ. The text of H, etc., gives the reading: ὁ ἑκατοντάρχης παρέδωκε τοὺς δεσμίους τῷ στρατοπεδάρχῃ, τῷ δὲ Παύλῳ ἐπετράπη, etc. When one copy was sent to Burrhus, the *praef. praet.* himself, the fact that the prisoners were delivered to the *praefectus* of course was omitted in this copy and only the facilities allowed to St. Paul were mentioned expressively and gratefully. In the other copies the *praefectus* was inserted, not with his proper name Burrhus, but only by his title; it was in this quality that he had to take over the responsibility for the prisoners.

The other influence under which Nero stood is not left out of sight by St. Luke. Poppaea was not yet omnipotent then as she was afterwards, after the death of Burrhus and the going into exile of Seneca. But her influence was only counterbalanced by that of Seneca and Burrhus, and when she, the *Jewish proselyte*, was to become the speaking-tube of the Jews in the presence of Nero, the friends of St. Paul had reason to fear her influence. St. Luke shows in his work that he saw the danger. In contrast with the one characteristic feature of his narrative, the claim made to Roman justice as undoubtedly in favour of St. Paul and the Christian preaching, is the other feature—the hatred of the Jews towards Jesus and His followers. I need not go into details: the Jews are the persecutors of Jesus and His followers; and even where a Roman governor as Felix abuses

his power over St. Paul, St. Luke omits not to say expressively that not only hope of gain, but in fact the influence of his *Jewish* wife Drusilla and the favour of the *Jews* have driven him to it (*Acts* xxiv. 24–27). The God-fearing protectors which St. Luke hoped to convince of the justice of St. Paul's case ought to be on their guard against an influence which perhaps they would not have noticed otherwise.

That this fear of St. Luke was well founded can be seen from the history of the Neronian persecution. Seneca had gone into exile, Burrhus was dead, Poppaea all-powerful. When there were to be sought culprits for the fire of Rome, they were soon found in the Christians. That they had really set Rome on fire could not be proved in the strict sense; but they were *gens maleſica*, they were guilty of *odium generis humani*; the punishments inflicted on them were such as were inflicted upon *sorcerers, magicians*, etc. That notwithstanding they were punished for the fire of Rome shows, not that they were punished even where their guilt was not proved, but that they were believed or accused of having set Rome on fire by their *magical arts*. So it is clear that in this persecution use has been made of a popular accusation against the Christians, and when afterwards the people of Rome pitied the Christians, it was not because they were believed not to be guilty of *odium generis humani*, but because the Romans saw quite clearly that the Christians were punished for what Nero had performed. That St. Luke knew this popular accusation and tried to refute it may be seen, for instance, from the narrative of Simon Magus (*Acts* vii. 9 ff.), of Elymas the magician (*Acts* xiii. 6 ff.), and of the Jewish exorcists in Ephesus (*Acts* xix. 13 ff.).

In this way St. Luke has tried to be the able and eloquent barrister of St. Paul. He succeeded, and his confidence in Roman law, at least for the case he defended, has been confirmed.

The word " barrister " which I use has not been chosen unintentionally. In the *Canon Muratorianus*, the valuable Roman document, we read about St. Luke : tertio evangelii librum secundo lucan lucas iste medicus post ascensum $\overline{\text{XPi}}$ cum eo paulus *quasi ut iuris studiosum* secundum adsumsisset numini suo ex opinione concribset. The words *quasi ut iuris studiosum* have been emended into *itineris studiosus* and in other ways, but remained difficult. I conjecture that in these words lies a reminiscence of the service St. Luke paid to St. Paul in his first trial by writing his historical apology for the information of the Roman juridical advisers of the emperor.

D. Plooij.

DR. MOFFATT'S NEW TRANSLATION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

It has occurred to me, in reading the new translation which Dr. Moffatt has given us of the books of the New Testament and in making a rapid survey of the notices and reviews which it provoked, that there were many features of the new translation which had entirely, or almost entirely, escaped the observation of those who discoursed on the matter in the ear of the public. Their criticism was too fragmentary, too confined to the examination of occasional passages which were known to present peculiar textual or hermeneutic difficulties, to be regarded as a just estimate of the value of Dr. Moffatt's work. For that reason I propose to set down in order certain features of the new translation which are significant to those who do not regard any rendering of the New Testament as an isolated phenomenon, but who look upon it as one of a series in which one must lose sight neither of the great

historical translations of the past, nor of the successive attempts made in our own time to reproduce the New Testament Greek in adequate English, and incidentally (a feature which was hardly prominent in the translations of the Reformation period) to give a more correct idea of the underlying Greek text, so far as investigation has disclosed or verified it. It is especially important on this account to put Dr. Moffatt's book on the shelf of translations side by side with the Revised Version, the so-called Twentieth Century New Testament, and the translation of Dr. Weymouth, for all of these are sufficiently near to one another in point of time to be sensibly occupied with the same problems. If we do not discuss them in detail, they can hardly be left out of our minds on account of the new departures which they may represent in the region of textual study or in the art of the interpreter.

The Revised Version, for example, was characterised by an entirely new Greek text, on the one hand, and in some parts of it, on the other hand, by an entirely new English language. We must always remember that we are treating of the New Testament and not of the Old. The two parts of the Revised Bible are under separate linguistic controls; they must be judged independently: we are speaking of the latter part of the work, to wit, the New Testament. After more than thirty years' study of this translation and its underlying text, I do not hesitate to say of the text that it is often so hopelessly wrong that one wonders how it ever could have been so edited; and of the translation, that the bad Greek has often been done into worse English. The Reviser who is reported to have said at the conclusion of the work that it was the greatest literary bankruptcy of the nineteenth century was really not very wide of the mark. One of the proofs of this lies in the persistent efforts which succeeding translators

have made for its emendation or its replacement. Dr. Weymouth's translation is often represented in a purer classical English, and at the same time it condenses into the form of a scientific revolt the dictum of Matthew Arnold that "the aorist was made for man and not man for the aorist." It is an unequal piece of work, as might have been expected in the work of a single man, without adequate controls, and with a life the thrums of whose loom were cut too soon (as in most work of this kind). Still, Dr. Weymouth's translation was sufficient to show that there was a higher intelligibility possible for the New Testament in English than was attainable for those who held the absurd views on the Greek aorist and the Greek article which are adumbrated in the preface to the New Testament of 1881, and disclosed throughout the book.

The Twentieth Century New Testament was an attempt after intelligibility, and not, in the first instance, after scholarship. It was the will to carry out the Biblical maxim of condescension to men of low estate in the presentation of the text itself. Hence it was not surprising that the group of amateurs, men and women who were engaged in it, accepted with childlike innocence the Greek text of Westcott and Hort, and with childlike goodwill transferred it to the language of the man in the street. They succeeded, at all events, by a happy instinct, in divining the meaning of many elusive passages, and if we do not like the street English, we may often use the book as a genuine and just commentary. I had the pleasure of acting as occasional referee in the production of the second edition, which ran the risk of being badly vitiated by "secundæ curæ."

When we come to Dr. Moffatt's translation, we are face to face with a rendering whose literary beauty was evident even to those who had no specially trained artistic sense. People

read the 13th chapter of the first epistle to the Corinthians, and noted that almost every word had a new rendering and almost every new rendering was an improvement. It was something new in literature, and provoked an immediate resilience of approbation from those who had been uncomfortable, without exactly knowing why, at the barbarisms of 1881.

The English language had resumed its freedom; Lazarus was out of the grave-clothes of pedantry. Not only so, but the revolt had spread, somewhat timidly, into the region of the text. The reader noted that Westcott and Hort's text was at last definitely abandoned. In its place stood the new text of von Soden, and even that was treated freely, as of course it ought to be. We had thus the two preliminary observations, that literary grace had been restored, and that the older textual mechanisms were being discarded.

Now let us look a little more in detail into the peculiar features of this new translation, especially into those points which appear to have eluded the critics and the reviewers. For convenience we reduce the matter to seven heads, and make some remarks under each:

(*a*) We have a newer and freer text, in which for the first time the translator has made a liberal use of *Conjectural Emendations.*

(*b*) There has been an editorial rearrangement of such passages as might be supposed to be originally or early displaced.

(*c*) The practice is widely employed of printing in rhythms such passages as were suspected to be poetical in form.

(*d*) The translator has condescended (or, if we prefer it, descended) in certain cases to the use of provincialisms, vulgarisms, and slang.

(*e*) The use of quotation marks is introduced into the

epistles in order to distinguish between St. Paul's own views and those of the correspondents whom he may be quoting.

(*f*) Occasionally the translator is brave enough to say that the passage upon which he is engaged is beyond recovery as to its meaning and must be left untranslated.

(*g*) He recognises the help given to the work of translation of the New Testament by the modern Greek language. All of these points are practically new, at least in the extent in which they are employed : each requires a few words of explanatory discussion.

(*a*) It is interesting to detect that Moffatt is in textual revolt against the dominant school, even if he does not commit himself to a definite statement. For example, he still follows the impossible text of Romans v. 1, "Let us have peace with God" ; it is a mere itacism (*ω* for *o*), which is common in MSS. of all periods ; but its intrusion has undermined the whole of the Pauline argument. Moffatt sees this, and evades the theological inaccuracy by an adroit translation :

> As we are justified by faith, then, let us enjoy the peace which we have with God through our Lord Jesus Christ.

This is not exactly a translation, but we may say of it that Dr. Moffatt goes down to his house justified, rather than the other. St. Paul said it more simply, and we shall have to get back to him, and affirm him against the old MSS. which misrepresented him.

This does not mean reactionary prejudice against the critical lordship of the Vatican MS. and any other authority which may agree with it : there is a good instance to the contrary in 1 Corinthians xv. 49, and here Moffatt refuses to read *φορέσωμεν* (another itacism, "*let us* also bear the image of the heavenly"), and supports himself on the authority of Codex B, with little other confirmation. So he translates :

> Thus, as we have borne the likeness of material Man,
> So we are to bear the likeness of the heavenly Man.

That must be the right meaning, for St. Paul is not writing as an exhorter, but as a theologian, a divine. I suppose the objection that would be taken to this apparently arbitrary method of settling the text would be like the language of Dr. Hort concerning one of his opponents, "He still thinks he can read what he likes": to which the only reply is that we must prefer sense to nonsense, and good sense to inferior. That way, however, lies conjectural emendation, the one form of criticism which the critics of the older school declared to be barred.

Well, I am very glad that Moffatt has faced this necessity, and has recognised that there are cases where the true text of the New Testament does not exist in any MS. I am, however, somewhat disabled in my judgment of Moffatt's emendations by the fact that he has accepted two of my own in the first epistle of Peter, one of which, if I remember rightly, is not mine but Beza's. "Nothing is more certain than a good emendation"; but the judgment as to the goodness does not lie with the emender.

I may say, in passing, that in the correction which I made to the text of 1 Peter i. 12, the restored διενοούμην was further justified by διανοίας in the following verse, and it would have been well if Moffatt had brought that sequence out in his translation. But enough of our own restoring hand. I am glad if I have convinced so good an artist.

Those who are interested in the subject of emendations will find a very striking one in 1 Timothy vi. 19, in which, by slight change, St. Paul (if it really was St. Paul) is made to be quoting Tobit, with much illumination of the passage. I do not know who is responsible for this happy conjecture, (θέμα λίαν for θεμέλιον). As Dr. Moffatt says he accepts it, it cannot be his own: but whence?

Now let us come to our second head.

(*b*) The question of restored order in displaced passages is, in one sense, akin to conjectural emendation ; but as it leaves the text intact, it must not be confused with that process. Just as in the case of conjectures proper, it will sometimes happen that MS. evidence will turn up in justification. For instance, in Mark xvi. 3 it always seemed to be a bit inconsequent to say that the women " saw that the stone was rolled away : for it was very great." Mrs. Lewis' Syriac text, however, told us that the women said, " Who shall roll us away the stone ? for it was very great : and when they looked they saw that it was rolled away." I do not think we need hesitate to follow the order of the ancient Syriac at this point. We secure logical sequence : it was not an absolute necessity in an Oriental writing : but we are glad to have it. Quite different is the case with the last verse of the seventh of Romans, where the displacement of the closing words has made Paul contradict himself, and created the very opposite theological statement to what was evidently intended. Dr. Moffatt tells us to restore the latter part of the verse, " Thus, left to myself, I serve the law of God with my mind, but with my flesh I serve the law of sin," to a place before the climax of v. 24, " its original and logical position." Paul certainly never meant the climax to be a mere rhetorical ladder, up which one climbed only to climb down again. See how the readjustment brings out the argument :

> Miserable wretch that I am ! Who will rescue me from this body of death ? God will ! Thanks be to Him through Jesus Christ our Lord. Thus there is no doom now for those who are in Christ Jesus.[1]

[1] Dr. Moffatt does not give an outside authority for the correction of the displacement : so I conclude it is his own. I had already noted it from a German writer, Könnecke.

The reader will find many interesting restorations of order in the new translation : e.g. Matthew vii. 19 is to be placed after vii. 20. In Matthew v. 21, 22 will be found a very interesting readjustment which takes the troublesome *Raca* and *Moreh* out of Christ's mouth, and makes the involved sentences a Rabbinic gloss upon " thou shalt not kill."

Closely related to these questions of textual displacement are certain critical suggestions of intruded matter which breaks sequence, whose omission restores continuity. For instance, in 2 Corinthians vi. 14–fin. we have the matter bracketed as being probably from some other letter : I had already noted this in my New Testament : and the observation might be carried further, for the second epistle to the Corinthians is certainly in much disorder. An interesting, and very possible case, will be found in Titus i. 7–9, where Moffatt brackets the three verses as being a later and an awkward addition to the original text. They certainly break sequence : note the connexion between the word " insubordinate " in v. 6 and the same word in v. 10. The meaning of the excision is that the " bishop " of v. 7 is *not* the presbyter of the previous verse, but a later evolution : so the text describing him is also a later evolution : it is an interesting situation to study, and may confirm us in the belief that we have not the pastoral epistles in their first form. Now let us pass on to a much more important matter.

(*c*) The text appears in many cases printed in rhythms. Thus an attempt is made to indicate the point at which the speech of a person has become rhythmic, or is, for literary effect, represented as such. It is not absolutely new to attempt thus to discriminate prose and poetry. It had been occasionally suggested both in Greek and in English. For example, Westcott and Hort recognise a certain passage

in Ephesians v. as being a fragment of a Christian hymn, and accordingly they print the passage in stanzas:

> Awaken, thou that sleepest,
> And from the dead arise thou:
> Lo! Christ shall thee enlighten.

We are all familiar with these rhythmic recognitions in such cases as the *Nunc Dimittis* or the *Song of Zachariah*. A mere superficial examination of the New Testament will show that these are not accidental cases, but that throughout both Gospels and Epistles there are similar prophetic and high-didactic strains, which are printed poetically, not merely when they are quotations from the Old Testament or the like, but because such form of speech is the normal style of a prophet speaking under afflatus: from the prophet it becomes reflected on to the literature as one of the ways in which a story ought to be told. As this is very important for New Testament criticism and interpretation I propose to spend a little time upon it. Its importance may be estimated from the fact that it is not only Zachariah with his *Benedictus* who sings, but that the Baptist also sometimes talks verse: and not only is it the case with the Baptist, but *Jesus Himself talks verse constantly*, changing frequently from prose to verse, and then back again from verse to prose. This is a great and far-reaching discovery. In order to appreciate it we must not disdain to make comparison with similar phenomena in the uninspired literatures. For example, such a composition as *Aucassin and Nicolette* in old French will help us, for here we find the Provençal story-teller marking the changes of form in his recitation by the words,

> Here it is said,
> Here it is sung.

An even better parallel, because it is Oriental, will be found

in the Arabian Nights. A glance, for instance, at the story of *Sindbad the Sailor* in the original will show us Arabic prose interspersed with Arabic poetry. A person may read the story of Sindbad in a translation, and never suspect that he passes from prose to poetry, and back again from poetry to prose in a single speech.

Perhaps an even better parallel may be found in the *Pilgrim's Progress*, where the people are constantly saying or singing something metrical, and pass from one form of speech to another with the greatest freedom: one can hardly tell whether it is meant for prose or verse, for sometimes it is called "saying" and sometimes "singing." Here is an example:

"Christiana thought she heard, in a grove a little way off on the right-hand side, a most curious melodious note, with words much like these:

Through all my life Thy favour is
So frankly showed to me,
That in Thy house for evermore
My dwelling-place shall be;

and listening still she thought she heard another answer it, saying:

For why? the Lord our God is good,
His mercy is for ever sure;
His truth at all times firmly stood
And shall from age to age endure.

So Christiana asked Prudence what it was that made these curious notes? They are, said she, our Country Birds; they sing these notes but seldom, except it be at the Spring when the Flowers appear, and the sun shines warm, and then you may hear them all the day long."

The following illustration will be a little closer to what actually occurs in the Scriptures: here is Faithful's comment upon Talkative:

then did Faithful say,
How *Talkative* at first lifts up his plumes,
How bravely doth he speak! How he presumes
To drive down all before him! But so soon
As Faithful talks of Heart-work, like the Moon
That's past the full, into the wane he goes,
And so will all, but he that Heart-work knows."

There are passages like that, in form, in the pages of the New Testament. This is, in part, due to the occurrence of Hebrew parallels, which are the basis of Old Testament poesy. Suppose we take a passage and try to discriminate between its prose and its verse: let us try Luke ix. 19–24 using Moffatt's rendering as a base; with some further modifications (or, if you prefer it, exaggerations on our part) in order to emphasise the arrangement:

"I have indeed given you the power of treading on serpents and scorpions and of trampling down all the power of the enemy: nothing shall injure you; only" (now it is sung):

Rejoice not ye that sprites of ill
Yield to your prowess in the strife;
But joy because the roll of Heaven
Hath writ your names elect for life":

(now it is said):

"He thrilled with joy at that hour in the Holy Spirit, saying, I praise thee, Father, Lord of Heaven and earth, for concealing this from the wise and learned, and revealing it to the simple-minded: yes, Father, I praise thee that such was thy chosen purpose. Then, turning to the disciples, he said":

(now it is sung):

"Praise God from whom all blessing flows,
My Father God whom no man knows,
Save me; He gives me all.
I, too, the Christ, am known of none
Save of the Father, and the one
Whose mind I disenthral."

(Now it is said):

"Then turning to his disciples he said privately (now it is sung):

"How happy are your eyes
That see this gospel light!
Prophets and kings desired it long,
And died without the sight.
How happy are your ears
That hear this heavenly sound!
Prophets and kings desired it long,
And sought, but never found."

(Now it is said):

"Now a lawyer got up to tempt him," etc. etc.

These illustrations will serve to show the meaning of the reform which Moffatt introduces into the printing and spacing of the text. It must not be supposed that it is always easy to detect and isolate the poetical strains. Sometimes, as in Mark iii. 23, we are prepared for verse by the remark that Jesus was speaking in parable; so that we easily isolate the rhythms which follow the question, How can Satan cast out Satan? Rhythm is the natural form of parable. Accordingly Moffatt prints Mark iii. 24–26 as follows:

If a realm is divided against itself,
that realm cannot stand:
If a household is divided against itself,
that household cannot stand:
And if Satan has risen up against himself and is divided,
He cannot stand, he comes to an end.

It is not so clear, however, why *v.* 27 is not metrical, and then *vv.* 28, 29 again are metrical.

We noticed in passing that John the Baptist talks in prophetic rhythm: see Matthew iii. 11. But so does Paul: and Moffatt prints Romans viii. 5, 6 that way; and so Romans xiv. 6–8 and elsewhere.

Enough has now been said to draw attention to this

important feature of the new text. We now pass on to the fourth point.

(*d*) Here Dr. Moffatt has been abundantly and adversely criticised. He exposed himself to hostile review by introducing provincialisms and colloquialisms. It is doubtful if he could persuade people to accept—

Hebrews xii. 1, "Let us strip off every *handicap*": nor would it pass to translate

Matthew xxv. 21, "*Capital*, you excellent and trusty servant": the ambiguity of the term "capital" in a parable already under economic suspicions, would suffice for condemnation!

The translation in Matthew xxvii. 41, and elsewhere,

"The high priests *made fun* of him,"

is wanting in dignity, at a point where dignity was imperative.

Luke xi. 7, "He answers from the inside, Don't *bother* me," is, on the other hand, a situation where colloquial forms are in order, and almost tolerable.

John viii. 11 is, however, past forgiveness: for Jesus to say, "Be off, and never sin again," is the speech of a magistrate to a first offender, not the release of the Judge of all the earth.

In 2 Thessalonians iii. 6 we are advised to "shun any brother who is *loafing*" and so in 1 Thessalonians v. 14. I do not know whether this word has a respectable ancestry: if it is German *laufen*, it has changed its meaning: the modern *loafer* stands idle and does not run. It was an unfortunate word to use in spite of a certain attractiveness.

I suppose we must regard it as a provincialism when Dr. Moffatt avoids the word "lest," and prefers to render the Greek μὴ by *in case that*. Is this French or Scotch or both? It certainly is not English. Examples will be

found in Matthew vii. 6, "In case they trample"; Hebrews iv. 12, "In case there is a wicked, unbelieving heart in any of you"; Revelations iii. 11, "Hold fast to what you have, in case your crown is taken from you." The last instance shows clearly how the provincialism misses the meaning.[1]

Our remaining observations must be very brief.

(*e*) In the matter of recognising quotations in the Pauline Epistles, Dr. Moffatt has made a great stride forward in the interpretation of St. Paul, especially by relieving his epistles from contrary sentiments, which lie adjacent to one another. For example:

1 Corinthians viii. 1, "We all possess knowledge," followed by a scorn of knowledge, is justified by the inverted commas, which mark a quotation from the Epistle *from* the Corinthians. So in 1 Corinthians viii 4, the meaning is brought out quite clearly by the inverted commas in the sentence,

> I am quite aware "*that there is no such thing as an idol in the world*" and that "*there is only the one God.*"

Elucidations of this kind might have been applied in many other passages, for St. Paul habitually quotes from his correspondent, in answering a letter.

As, however, this is the first time that quotation has actually been recognised in New Testament translation, it was natural that Dr. Moffatt should not treat us to too many examples in a new region of criticism.

(*f*) Our next point is that Dr. Moffatt sometimes says that a passage is untranslatable, which is an almost unheard of modesty. An instance will be found in Acts xxiv. 17, where the translator says he can only give the

[1] Murray's Dictionary says that it is good modern English: "take your umbrella in case it rains": but this is not the same thing, unless we regard the rain as the consequence of the umbrella not being taken.

general drift of the passage. See, for a somewhat similar case, Acts ii. 47.

(*g*) Our last case of translator's reform is the use of modern Greek analogies, with which we might take the results of the modern study of papyri and of dialects. The best instance of modern Greek, considered as incipient in the speech of the New Testament, is the use of the Greek *ἵνα* in the sense of the French *que* in such an expression as *que j'aille*. Moffatt translates Ephesians ii. 17:

> May Christ dwell in your hearts as you have faith. May you be so fixed and founded in love, etc.:

which is a great improvement on the conventional "that Christ may dwell." There are similar passages in John xvii. 21 sqq.; Colossians ii. 2 is another good case:

> May their hearts be encouraged!
> May they learn the meaning of love!

These new renderings are a great improvement, even if for the present the grammarians are ignorant of them and the classical scholars acknowledge them not.

There were a number of bad misprints in the first edition of this valuable book: but that only proves that the earliest manuscripts do not always convey the correct reading.

Rendel Harris.

THE BIBLE AND WAR.

In considering the nature of the Bible's teachings on war, as indeed on divers other matters also, it is essential to bear in mind that all these teachings are not of equal value. The Bible is not one book written by a single author in a single age. It is a book of many books, written by many penmen, whose scrolls are spread over many centuries. The early Christians called it not a sacred volume, but a "divine library." And "library" is a better, because more true, title for the Bible than "book"; for book gives a quite wrong impression of what the Bible is; an impression which has done infinite mischief to the world's conception of the Bible and has led to many serious errors in the interpretation of it by the Churches. But "library" is one of its primitive titles and best conveys the right impression both of its character and purpose.

What is a library? It is a collection of books; sometimes on several subjects, sometimes only on one. You may have a library on law, or medicine, or art, or science, or letters, or any combination of these subjects. But no one supposes that all the writings in any of these libraries are of equal value or possess identical authority. Similarly with the Bible. Religion is its special subject; and it is itself the best of all libraries on this subject. But not even in this "divine library" are all the books of equal value. The stories in the Book of Judges cannot be regarded as "written for our learning" in the same sense, or degree, as those of the Acts of the Apostles; or the Mosaic law of retaliation be accorded the same authority as the Christian law of love. This difference in values must always be remembered if we desire rightly to estimate the Bible's teachings concerning war.

Again: the writings of the Bible, unlike other sacred writings, are embedded in history; and not in the history of one age only, but in that of a long succession of ages. Other sacred writings were written, if not by one man, yet from the point of view of a single age. Their contents are all of one type; and that a stereotype. They are a fixed quantity. There is no movement, no progress in their pages. All is uniform and of the same standard. And when a people grows out of the stage of development and thought in which these sacred writings were written, they cease to have spiritual vitality or force for that people. Their interest is then limited to the domain of tradition and archæology. The fate of all such sacred writings is either to arrest the progress of the people, or themselves to be left behind in the people's onward march.

It is altogether otherwise with the writings of the Bible. They make no profession of the barren virtue of uniformity. They are of many types and many patterns. They are full of movement and advance, of progress in ethical and religious conceptions. They are redundant with expanding life; and, therefore, with perpetual inconsistencies. The inconsistencies of the Bible are an evidence of its truth and an element in its growth. Machines are absolutely consistent throughout every part. They are always the same. But the Bible is not a mechanism; nor is its purpose the making of machines. The Bible is a divine life-force. Its great purpose is to give continually more life to the lives of men; higher life, nobler life, whose lowliest and yet loftiest form is the life hid with Christ in God. Hence the obvious and natural inconsistencies of the Bible, which from beginning to end is an ever-growing, ever-expanding revelation. But these inconsistencies affect not the truthfulness of the Bible. They are the inconsistencies inseparable from all life; the inconsistencies between the acorn and the oak, the

egg and the bird, the child and the man. They are an integral part of the consistency of a life of progress. If the Bible were a mechanical or mathematical treatise it would be scientifically consistent and on the same level all through its teachings, even on such subjects as war; but because it contains a living word it has had its infancy and youth in pre-Christian ages, and in Christ its immortal maturity.

These various stages in the development of Bible teachings are different—different as the seed from the flower and the flower from the fruit, but they are not contrary to each other. One is not false because the other is more true, any more than the prattlings of an infant are false because they are not as profound as the riper thoughts of men.

We may truly say of the Bible as St. Paul said of himself: "When I was a child I spake as a child, I thought as a child, I understood as a child; but when I became a man I put away childish things." In a very real, although limited, sense, each successive writer in the Bible was a child of his age and wrote for his age in terms which his age could appreciate and understand. Suppose he had not so written, what would have been the use to his contemporaries of his writing at all? They could not have understood him; and he could have been no help to them. The Bible acts like a good and wise nurse to children. It feeds them with food convenient for them—food which they can assimilate, milk at first to develop their digestion for strong meat. But to feed a babe with the food of men would result in the death of the babe and the destruction of its possibilities for manhood.

This progressive and only wise method of the Bible is sometimes misstyled, with a touch of contempt, as "accommodation." In the highest sense, that of ministering to the present for the sake of the future, it is "accommodation"; but in the lower sense, that of being satisfied with the

present and making the present a fixed standard for the future, there is no "accommodation" in the Bible. For in all the writings of the Bible, whereas we find they are addressed to their own age in terms which their age could understand and therefore benefit by, we find they contain also messages for future ages, messages immortal and eternal, messages which, till the end of the ages, will never be wholly comprehended and fully realised. While the writings of the Bible are a historic mirror of the age in which they were written and reflect the transient stage of its morals and religion, they are also mirrors of immutable truths written by the finger of God on tablets seen by the prophets on the Mount of God. This is the greatest of all the distinguishing characteristics of Biblical teachings. The holy men of old who spake by the Holy Ghost were men of their time as far as they were men; but they all were men before their time, and some of them beyond all time, in so far as they spake by the Holy Ghost. Their writings are actual and human so far as they were embedded in history; but they are ideal and divine so far as they are given by inspiration from God. While the Bible addresses itself to the highest consciousness and noblest conceptions of the current time, it also draws gradually forth the progressive consciousness and advancing homage of mankind to its divine ideals for future ages. This is true of all the writings of the Bible from the books of Moses to the Sermon on the Mount. Even amid the imperfect moralities of the Hexateuch we find trails of ethical glory which come from God Who is their home; and in the Sermon on the Mount, whereas some of the teachings were addressed to contemporaries and were understood, and gradually converted into practice, by them, others are still in the ideal stage. They have not yet become actual. Many things in them we do not even yet understand, far less do; but what we know

not now, nor do, the ages hereafter, in the progressive education of the world by God, will not only know, but also do.

It is, I would repeat, most necessary to bear in mind these fundamental facts of the unequal values of Biblical writings and the progressive character of its revelations, if we wish truly to understand its teachings on war. At first sight the Bible's teachings on war appear full of inconsistencies and contradictions. On the one hand we read that the Lord is mighty in battle; He is a man of war, the Lord of Hosts is His name. Not a few Old Testament battles are described as "battles of the Lord." As in the case of the wars against the Canaanites, some wars are said to be directly commanded by Jahweh. One of the lost histories of the Israelites referred to in the Book of Numbers is called "the book of the wars of the Lord." David speaks of his contest with Goliath as "the battle of the Lord," and avouches both in the second book of Samuel and in one of the Psalms that it is "the Lord who teacheth his hands to war and his fingers to fight." It is impossible to read the Old Testament, if we so read as to catch its spirit, without perceiving that its conception of God, especially in the earlier books, was of a warrior deity fighting on behalf of His chosen people to the discomfiture and defeat of other deities and other peoples. And even in the New Testament we read that Our Lord Jesus said, "I came not to bring peace on the earth, but a sword," and bade His disciples, if they had no sword, "to sell their garments and buy one." I say nothing about the eschatological and Apocalyptic sayings of the New Testament concerning wars and rumours of wars, of nation rising against nation, or of the Faithful and True seated upon a white horse and going forth in righteousness to judge and make war, because their meaning is not quite clear. The eschatological sayings may apply to the im-

pending destruction of Jerusalem, and those of the Apocalypse to the final spiritual conflict between the world and God, between Satan and Christ, and may not be intended to teach us anything about the permanence of war upon the earth to the end of time.

But whatever interpretation we accept of these cryptic and recondite utterances in the New Testament, nothing can be more evident and sure than that when we pass from the teachings of the Old Testament concerning war, as indeed on other things also, to the teachings of the New Testament we pass into a new world altogether; a new air, a new light, a new revelation of God, a new conception of man. Old things have passed away. In Christ the whole creation has become new. In the New Testament there is no trace of God as a military general, a resistless commander-in-chief. He is the Father, the Friend, especially of the poor and the weak and the lost. He yearns more for the one lonely wandering sheep than for the whole ninety and nine who are safe in the sheepfold, happy and well fed. His nature and His name are love. He is no longer described as the God of battles, but as the God of peace. The New Testament is an entirely new Covenant of relationship between God and man, man and God, man and man. It is not only an advance on the Old Testament; it is a transformation, as when the silent, motionless egg becomes the soaring, singing bird. It no longer bids or allows an eye for an eye, or a tooth for a tooth. It says, "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them which hate you and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you. Be like your Father in heaven, who maketh His sun to rise on the evil and the good and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust."

We are so accustomed to the sound at least of the New Testament teachings, although as yet we have scarcely

begun to walk in their spirit, that it is impossible for us to realise what a revolutionary revelation, a new way of religion, a new truth about God, a new life for man, these teachings brought into the world. They were a splendid and sublime novelty in religion, both for Jews and Greeks, Barbarians and Scythians, men and women, the slave and his master.

The Jews indeed had received inklings, forecasts, premonitions, of the coming Gospel in their ancient sacred writings. The Old Testament is rich in ideals—ideals which are like gleams of dawn in the reddening sky which heralds the departure of the night. Notably is this the case with war. Side by side with the concept of Jahweh as a war-god stands the declaration that He maketh wars to cease in all the " world " ; and Joel proclaims that although the heathen sanctify war, and beat their scythes into spears, yet the Lord will be the hope of His people and the strength of His children. Wonderful, too, and glorious is the prediction of Isaiah that when the house of Jacob walks in the light of Jahweh " they shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruninghooks ; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."

Instances might easily be multiplied in which the ideals of the Old Testament soar into the firmament of blessed contradiction above the historic actual of the age in which they were written. How can we best interpret these contradictions ? First, let us beware of attaching too much significance to single texts isolated from their context. Disjointed passages of Scripture can be so wrested as to prove almost anything, however anti-Scriptural. Nearly every false doctrine preached among men has discovered single texts of the Bible wherewith to defend itself. The most powerful instrument in the temptation

of our Blessed Lord was the quotation of texts by the tempter. The devil said, "It is written." How did the Saviour reply? He said, "It is written again." That is the only way of understanding the Bible. It is not enough to know what is written in one place; we must find out what is written in others also. Single texts taken separately may easily lead us into ditches of darkness. There are dark spots even in the sun; and it is only in the light of the whole orb of Scripture that men can see the true light of God. For this reason I could wish that the universal habit of taking texts for sermons were frequently broken. It misleads congregations to attach undue value to texts, and causes them to forget that no revelation from God can be fully unveiled in a single text, whereas the doctrines of devils often have no other leg to stand upon except single texts. If we desire, then, to know what the Bible has to teach about war, we must cease to build our conclusions on disjointed sayings, even the sayings of our Lord Himself. For when we read the context of His saying, "I came not to bring peace on the earth but a sword," it seems more than probable that the saying has no relation to war at all, but to the domestic disputes which would necessarily arise in Jewish families from the introduction of the Christian religion. At any rate it is certainly written again: "Put up thy sword into its sheath; for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword." And still again: "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God."

In endeavouring then to ascertain the true teaching of the Bible on war, we must first rid ourselves of the pernicious habit of breaking texts away from their context. We must interpret each part in the spirit of the whole, and not judge the whole by any single part. We must sacrifice the letter on the altar of the spirit of Scripture. And, next,

we must assign different values to the different stages of Biblical revelation. The four immortal figures in Michael Angelo's Descent from the Cross were in the sculptor's mind before he chiselled them into clearness from the block of marble. The process of chiselling them to perfection was slow and passed through many stages. And we rightly judge the worth of each successive stage by the final completion of the whole.

Similarly with the Bible. Its final standard of moral and religious values is to be found not in the Hexateuch, not in the Historical Books, not even in the Prophets or the Psalms, but only in Christ and His Spirit of Truth. Christ was in the mind of God when He first began to speak through holy men of old at sundry times and in divers manners as the successive eras were able to receive His messages. But it was not until God spake in His Son that the perfect mind and will of God was revealed. Christ, and Christ alone, is the full brightness of God's glorious thoughts for man, the express image of His person, the perfect character of His teachings, the true mirror of His purposes. Whatever, therefore, in the Old Testament seems at variance with, or even contradictory to, the teachings of Christ must be regarded by Christians as temporary, evanescent, and intended to vanish away. It is singularly true of Biblical teachings that the first shall be last, and the last first.

So is it with the Bible's teachings on war. Modern treatises written in defence of war, when they refer to the Bible at all, chiefly refer to the Old Testament. But many of these Old Testament teachings were temporary, imperfect, partial; and in so far as they are in conflict with New Testament teachings are not a guide for Christian people. The New Testament, indeed, says very little about war as war. Just as it does not, in precise terms, condemn the institution of slavery, so neither does it

categorically condemn the practice of war. But, as in the case of slavery, by proclaiming that all men, slaves as well as masters, were children of God and therefore brethren, it first ameliorated the condition of the slave, then undermined the institution of slavery, and has now almost completely abolished it; so by its benedictions upon peace, by denouncing those who are angry with their brothers without a cause, by the prominence which it gives to Christ's last legacy to His disciples of the peace which passeth all understanding, the New Testament is gradually introducing to mankind a new temper, a new point of sight, a new ethic about war. Already we find that Christians no longer delight in war. If they defend it, their defence now takes the form of apology. The militarist spirit is repugnant to them. They hate its lusts and ravages, its barbarities and atrocities. They do all in their power to restrain its ferocity by international conventions, and humanise its horrors by gentle and skilful ministries to the wounded and the sick.

We see not yet all wars put under the feet of Christ; but these Christ-born humanities in war are signs of the coming day, heralds of a better time. The Christ dwelling in men and societies is developing a nobler conscience about war; a profounder realisation that the paths of wisdom are the paths of peace. This development of a diviner consciousness of the brutalities of war, their sin against the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of men, contains the promise of a great hope for the future reign of peace. For the moment this sky of hope is darkened with thick and threatening clouds. The strength of might is being arrayed against the ranks of righteousness. Contempt is being poured upon the Gospel of the Prince of Peace. War is proclaimed by German culture as a moral duty, the surest way to national prosperity and imperial power. Valour is declared the chief among virtues, and

self-sacrifice in slaughter a manlier thing than self-sacrifice in sympathy. This recrudescence of a pagan gospel should not affright or dishearten us. In all developments there are periods of reversion. While "evolution is ever climbing after some ideal good, so reversion is ever dragging evolution in the mud." The teachings of Nietzsche and Treitschke and General von Bernhardi have nothing new in them. They are simply reversions to non-Christian systems of morality and religion in which "political or heroical virtues occupy the first place, and the milder virtues a place wholly subordinate; and the virtue of humility no place at all." But as the gentler Christian virtues of peace and love have again and again won the day over the pagan heroisms of might and war in former times, so at the present time will they, under the invincible Cross of the world's Redeemer, win the day again, with results more glorious and far-stretching than have ever been gained before. Nietzsche and Treitschke will go the way of Celsus; and once again the shout, ascribed by Theodoret to Julian the Apostate when he received his fatal wound, will ring throughout the world as in rolls of blessed thunder bursting the clouds of pagan perils and shaking down to earth fresh showers of a righteous and a fruitful peace, "*Νενίκηκας Γάλιλαιε*," Galilæan, Thou hast conquered, Let us therefore not quake, though "the earth be removed and though the waters be carried into the midst of the sea." Eighteen centuries ago Christ conquered the Cæsars of the Roman Empire, and He cannot be conquered by the Kaiser of the German Empire to-day. This modern apotheosis of strength and power, which is but a reversion to pagan cults, like them is doomed to destruction and will yet prepare the way for a new furtherance of a new reign of peace under the Prince of Peace.

Nowhere in the Bible, not even in the New Testament,

are we led to expect that wars will cease or peace grow permanent until truth and righteousness guide and rule the governments among men. Peace is promised only as the fruit of righteousness. The anthem first sung by angels over the pastures of Bethlehem was not an anthem of peace at any price, but only of peace among men of good will. We are taught to resist onslaughts of the devil; and when these onslaughts take the form of militaristic pride, of merciless ambition, of the subjugation of free nationalities, of the tyranny of strength in the name of the god of Christless culture, then non-resistance is non-Christian and war a Christian duty. Soldiers in such a war are soldiers of Christ; courage and endurance, even unto death, are Christian virtues. There is nothing contrary to the last and best teachings of the Bible concerning war, when the contest is in behalf of righteousness, freedom and truth, and nothing is claimed as the reward of victory but justice and concord, established on the foundations of national independence and brotherly love. In such a war the meekest and the lowliest of Christ's disciples may honestly and devoutly pray that the God of peace will defend the cause of right against the powers of might, and break the swords of oppression under His own most blessed feet.

J. W. Diggle.

THE LIFE STORY OF ALBRECHT RITSCHL.[1]

THE family to which Albrecht Ritschl belonged had for generations been settled at Erfurt, a place known to all the world from its connexion with Luther. Albrecht's grandfather was pastor of a church and "Professor" in the *Rathsgymnasium;* and at Erfurt was born (November 1, 1783) Albrecht's father, George Charles Benjamin Ritschl, who also became a Lutheran clergyman, rising to hold the position (from 1827) of "Bishop of the Evangelical[2] Church and General Superintendent of Pomerania." Albrecht, the eldest child of his father's second marriage, was born March 25, 1822, at Berlin, where the family home and the father's duties were then situated. Two younger brothers saw the light, but did not survive infancy. There were, however, children by the first marriage. The father delivered "a beautiful address" at Albrecht's baptism, when he "astonished every one" by giving the child this name, along with one of his own—Benjamin; but the second name Albrecht Ritschl never troubled to employ. Like many men of distinction, Albrecht seems to have owed much to his mother, upon whose affection he had so unique a claim. The father is described as an enemy of Rationalism and a champion of the policy which united the two Protestant confessions in a single Church-fellowship. Briefly, he stands for a sober and moderate Protestant orthodoxy. His grandson, in the biography of Albrecht, contrasts Bishop Ritschl favourably with Schleiermacher's father. Whereas the latter grew bitter towards his son during the days when he seemed drifting from Christianity, Albrecht

[1] Part of a study of Ritschl prepared for Messrs. Chapman and Hall's *Great Christian Theologies*, edited by Dr. H. W. Clark.

[2] *i.e.* Lutheran, or in this case United.

Ritschl's father guided his child gently, and was rewarded by hearing him ultimately enunciate positions which could be greeted not merely with relief, but with gladness. Professor Otto Ritschl goes so far as to claim that the Bishop did more than any other single influence to mould Albrecht Ritschl's final beliefs. The thesis may be exaggerated, but it is a pleasant manifestation of a grandson's pious regard.

From 1828 the family home was at Stettin. In 1831 Albrecht became a schoolboy. He soon learned to know every uniform ; and an interest in military things accompanied him through life. Like many German families, the Ritschls were musical. As a young man of twenty-one Albrecht is found mastering the organ ; a few years later still, " though I am sufficiently child of my age to enjoy pepper and salt in my music," he criticises what his son describes as the concealed sensuality, mixed with mysticism and pessimistic *Weltschmerz*, of Wagner's productions. No two types of personality, adds the biographer, could be more diametrically opposed than Ritschl's and Wagner's. To return to Ritschl's boyhood ; he once saw Schleiermacher (anno 1831). The Ritschl family drove the great man out into the country for an airing, and the child Albrecht sat on the box seat. In this he afterwards claimed to trace a parable of his superiority to Schleiermacher as a theologian of wider outlook and fuller mastery. He learned to be fond of gymnastics, of swimming, of dancing ; but skating proved difficult and was abandoned. His anxious mother did not greatly encourage exercise, and her criticism of his friendships tended to make him shy. He was confirmed at the age of sixteen, without forming very strong religious impressions.

When he finished his schooldays—as senior boy, and also pupil of greatest distinction—theology was chosen for his life task, partly (he tells us) from a boy's love for

resembling his father, but still more from a "speculative impulse." The university selected was Bonn, in the then detached area of Rhenish Prussia. At Bonn Albrecht's cousin, Friedrich Ritschl, the classical philologist, was a professor. He and his wife proved warm friends to their young cousin during his years at Bonn as student and as teacher. Another attraction for Ritschl's father was the presence in the theological Faculty of Karl Immanuel Nitzsch, one of the central leaders of that "mediation theology" which claimed inspiration rather than instruction from Schleiermacher, and which sought to steer midway between Rationalism and stiff orthodoxy. The most distinguished of Nitzsch's colleagues was perhaps Bleek, the biblical scholar. But no one at Bonn exercised any great influence upon Albrecht's development.

The young man's studies are interrupted for a time by inflammation of the eyes. When he recovers, he reads Strauss's *Life of Jesus* without being greatly moved; he assures his father that Nitzsch has satisfied him of the fact that Strauss's central assumption—presumably the presence of myths in the New Testament—cannot be made good. The narrow and reactionary orthodoxy of the Hengstenberg school proved even less attractive. An exception occurred only once, under the influence of a fellow-student. Diederich's arguments might be weak; his testimony to personal religious help was less easily waved aside. However, the pendulum soon swings back. He reads Schleiermacher's *Letters to Lücke*, and hopes soon to acquaint himself with the *Glaubenslehre;* but apparently this was postponed.

To speak of lighter matters: with some compatriots—no doubt in a narrower sense—he decked a Christmas tree in December 1840; "something of a rarity at Bonn." We are told of the impression made on him by Cologne

cathedral "even in its then unfinished state." We also hear of a holiday journey into Switzerland and as far south as Milan—the only foreign travel of Ritschl's life; unless we should reckon under this head his visit in Lord Acton's company to Döllinger, among the Bavarian Alps, forty-one years afterwards. "Strictly speaking," says his son, "his pleasure in travel did not last beyond his earliest student days." When the party of 1840, seven strong, reached Baden-Baden, Albrecht was the only one who refrained from staking something at the gaming tables. Soon the party dissolved into smaller groups. It was a relief to the mother when the whole journey was over. A few months later, when Albrecht was *en route* for Halle, she had the privilege of seeing her son after an absence of eighteen months. During the same journey Albrecht, as a guest, visited Neander's lectures on the Epistle to the Romans at Berlin, but without pleasure.

The young Ritschl's discontent with Bonn teaching had induced his father to consent to a change, such as the German university system facilitates. The choice lay between Berlin and Halle. It was no attraction to Albrecht that Berlin contained a large circle of relatives. At Halle Julius Müller, Tholuck, Erdmann seemed to him names of promise, and Halle finally was chosen. But here again neither the vigorous mediation theology of Müller nor the more pietistically tinged spirit of Tholuck satisfied the new listener. As for Erdmann, his conservative and theologically orthodox reading of Hegel was being challenged by the revolutionary school of the Left—Strauss, Feuerbach and (at Halle itself) Ruge. Nevertheless, in one shape or other, Hegelianism at that time enjoyed commanding influence. Young Ritschl was caught in its strong current; and, though the biographer claims that he "never completely adopted the standpoint of the Absolute Philosophy," he

grants that the study was a good because severe discipline for thought. Julius Müller's dislike for Hegelianism lest it should involve Pantheism was intolerable to young Ritschl. Tholuck and he were at least friends, but even there friction arose.

He enjoyed Gesenius on Isaiah, finding it "impossible not to laugh at his profane wit." Of Erdmann he speaks sometimes with gratitude, sometimes with censure. But the decisive impression was made on him by the reading of Baur's book on the *History of the Doctrine of Atonement.* He became more than ever Hegelian, and began to incline to historical studies. Nothing will satisfy him but a visit to Tübingen. He considers Baur "the foremost theologian of Germany," while assuring his father that Baur, Zeller, Vatke and most of the Tübingen school are much more positive than Strauss, Feuerbach or Bruno Bauer. He preaches more than once in classroom at Halle. Among his student friends are Max Duncker the historian, Nasemann the philologist (a lifelong correspondent), Rogge, his old room-mate, for whom he once actually preached, and Carl Schwarz, also a theologian, whose book on *Recent Theology* Ritschl reviewed with painful consequences in 1856. The close of the Halle period is marked by his proceeding to the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, when he defended six Latin Theses.[1]

The next step forward was a first theological examination. The subjects prescribed included a sermon on Rom. ii. 4—a text to which Ritschl constantly turned in later life for its testimony that repentance is a consequence of grace, not its prerequisite. Rather against the grain, he spent

[1] How many of our university men understand the proper meaning of a "thesis" in connexion with graduation ? or realise that Luther's ninety-five theses which "shook the world" were meant as an appeal to the learned ? Since writing these sentences I have met with references to true "theses" at Cambridge in the biography called "J."

some months in Berlin working for this examination, "without leisure to hear many lectures." However, he made the acquaintance of Vatke, a Hegelian divine, and one of the forerunners of the Wellhausen criticism of the Old Testament.[1] The examination itself took place at Stettin, April 23, 1844, with satisfactory results; a "test sermon" on 1 Cor. i. 20–25 being pronounced "very good." Presently he had to put in six weeks of military service.

Before the visit to Tübingen was sanctioned, the father insisted on a short visit to Heidelberg. There Richard Rothe, who was at the zenith of his career, proved extraordinarily kind. Ritschl also met Ullmann, editor of the *Studien und Kritiken*, and saw something of Umbreit. But it was not long before he pushed on to what his father laughingly called "the promised land." Within a few days, through the kindness of a friend, he was personally acquainted with Zeller, Schwegler, Kuno Fischer, and not long afterwards with Baur himself. He observed the Tübingen custom—it has astonished since then successive generations of Scottish visitors—by which the young theologians pass the evening together in beerhouses.

At this early date the Tübingen theory was still in process of development. Ritschl ardently flung himself into the fray. For an academic purpose, he chose a theme belonging to the field of New Testament study, defending Schwegler's radical theory of the dependence of the canonical Luke upon Marcion's Gospel. Ritschl accordingly dated the canonical Luke between 140 and 180. The essay gave great satisfaction to Baur, who secured its purchase and publication by a Tübingen bookseller, and followed it

[1] His work, according to Robertson Smith (*Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, Ed. I. p. 418), was "encumbered with a mass of Hegelian terminology of a repulsive kind."

up by an article from his own pen, in the Tübingen *Jahrbücher*, enforcing the same conclusions.

Thus Ritschl, when not yet twenty-four, had become an author, fighting under the banner and supported by the applause of the great radical critic. He did not, however, contemplate settling in the remote Swabian town. Halle might have pleased him, but his friends Duncker and Schwarz had met with unfriendly treatment there. Marked man though he was, friendship might smooth his way to a teacher's life at Bonn. Here accordingly he passed his examination as Licentiate in Theology (May 18, 1846), defending nine more Latin theses. The first of these asserts the priority of Marcion's Gospel to the canonical Luke; the last affirms that we ought to speak of "Theological" rather than of *Christian* "Morals"; a usage which, with a slight modification,[1] Ritschl followed to the end of life. Next came his "habilitation" as *Privatdocent*, a business which dragged on with the unfortunate result that Albrecht could not attend the celebration of his parents' silver wedding. Visits to the parents (then temporarily at Berlin), to the home at Stettin, to Halle, and to Marburg were followed by first experiences as a lecturer.

If one tries to take a general view of the eighteen years spent by Ritschl as lecturer or professor at Bonn, one is struck by the check in his career. The clever and precocious boy seemed to develop with comparative slowness after his first sensational hit in manhood. One cause of this might be his connexion with the suspected Tübingen school; but that cause cannot have operated alone. From very early lecturing days, indeed, he was forsaking Tübingen positions; and published work made this plain, notably in the two editions (1850, 1857) of the *Early Catholic Church*. By 1857 there was no ground for regarding Ritschl otherwise

[1] "Theological *Ethics*."

than as the representative of a moderate orthodoxy. It is the most orthodox point in his whole curve. Still, suspicion may have outlasted its grounds. A curious report formulated by Dorner in 1850 on behalf of the Protestant faculty of theology at Bonn, and presented to the Prussian government, criticises and patronises the younger man, pushing him gently back into what the authorities considered his proper place.

There were several disappointments for Ritschl in other matters besides his promotion. He had hoped for the appointment of Rothe to a vacant chair in 1847; but Dorner was preferred. Later, in 1849, Rothe came, and the numbers of the theological students at Bonn increased; but Rothe accepted a call back to Heidelberg (1851), and the numbers at Bonn fell off again. For a time, it would seem, Ritschl's old friend and fellow-student Krafft surpassed him in popularity as a teacher. In 1850, when a vacancy had to be filled, Krafft, not Ritschl, was chosen, and the Government informed the Bonn faculty it regretted it could not find a vacancy for Ritschl (as had been suggested) in another university. In 1852, after another disappointment, he became *Extraordinarius*, not becoming *Ordinarius* till 1859—when he cut out Krafft.

The biographer gives a record of every course of lectures delivered by Ritschl, whether in winter or summer *Semester*, and of the numbers attending. During three and a half years (seven *Semesters*), hardly more than one-third of the attendances go into double figures, whereas in the four closing years of the Bonn period only one lecture out of twenty-five falls below ten, and it counts nine, while the average over all is above twenty-six. But there had been worse experiences. In the winter of 1847–50 Ritschl had no demand whatever for his lectures. An altered programme was equally unsuccessful, and the *Privatdocent* had to sit down

in his lodgings with his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, sending a message of thanks to his mother for transmitting to him hereditary courage. It is hardly necessary to say how complete a contrast is furnished by the later Göttingen years. Never, not even in a Seminar,[1] do we find an attendance of fewer than ten, while classes approach and sometimes surpass a hundred ; and the last years of all are the best. In those days it was Ritschl who was the " foremost theologian of Germany." He had a great door and effectual opened to him, if truly there were many adversaries.

Ritschl had qualified at Bonn as a lecturer in New Testament. Before he got to work, he felt inclinations towards Church History ; but university regulations did not allow of a new branch of teaching till after two years' service, and he did not long use this liberty when it became available. In 1853, when Dorner left for Göttingen, Ritschl had opportunity to do something in Dogmatic, and his inclinations had been turning in that direction. Hence he was glad to serve the Faculty ; but in a little while he began to fear that they were almost making him a " maid of all work." In the thoroughgoing German fashion, he lectures both on Dogmatics and on Theological Ethics. One feels a difficulty about the frontier between these two studies. We learn that Ritschl himself introduced into Ethics teachings in regard to a Christian's patience, prayerfulness, faith in providence, which he afterwards came to feel claimed a place in Dogmatic *as well*. Göttingen arrangements led him to separate Dogmatic into two courses, and " Ethic," " Dogmatic I," " Dogmatic II " regularly recur, while the few other courses chiefly deal with New Testament Epistles. A New Testament teacher ; tempted to diverge into Church History ; devoting himself afterwards mainly to system ; and within Dogmatic, so far as published work goes, mainly

[1] Taken in alternate years with H. Schultz.

to the great doctrine of " Justification and Reconciliation " —such in outline is Ritschl's place as professor. The biographer reports carefully on the more important systematic courses. He tells us that, in their very first form, they contain all the characteristic Ritschlian positions, but that not nearly all foreign matter is extruded—as ultimately it will be. Ritschl as a lecturer freely enlarged his text by oral additions or corrections. Sometimes he had to secure the results for his own use in the future by copying out a student's *Heft*. Along with this classroom work we must record many articles in learned periodicals, almost all of them leading up to the two editions of the *Early Catholic Church* or to the great task of his life, the trilogy on *Justification*.

Of new friendships we may mention Hilgenfeld, one of the most loyal of Baur's followers, from whom Ritschl naturally diverged in opinion as years elapsed till the friendship faded away ; H. Holtzmann and Weizsäcker, lifelong friends, although the latter, so far as the biographer reports, was never personally met ; Diestel, a colleague and close friend, on whom Ritschl relied for the Old Testament basis so important in his system. Pupils included Nippold, who afterwards became a very unfriendly critic ; Link, loyal through life, who demonstrated that Ritschlian views could be made effective by a working pastor ; Thikötter, who also trod the paths of his master's developing thought, and defended Ritschl's views in a pamphlet which, when translated into French, professed to set forth the *Théologie de l'Avenir*. It is impossible not to observe the absence of weighty and brilliant names, such as fill the records of the Göttingen period. While Ritschl's Dogmatic was only half defined, his influence had only half its power. And indeed it was by the printed page more even than from the academic platform that he made converts.

A more important and more promising friendship dated from 1856—with R. A. Lipsius, then at Leipzig, afterwards well known at Jena. When Lipsius communicated to Ritschl his postulates for Dogmatic, Ritschl "had to say to himself that he had essentially been working on the same plan." They entered on a lively correspondence. And the following year, when Lipsius visited Ritschl, they walked among the Siebengebirge "with much perspiration but still more pleasure." Unhappily, this friendship was to be wrecked upon theological differences. "Old Baur" himself (*der alte Baur*) permitted a good deal of amicable intercourse even in the face of hostile criticism. Ritschl was naturally proud of this. But his unfortunate anonymous review of Schwarz's book proved unpardonable, and killed the friendship outright.

We have heard of walks taken in Lipsius' company. When Thikötter was a pupil, he and Ritschl often went singing together along a certain "pretty path" not far from Bonn. And once, when Link pays a visit to Göttingen as late as 1874, there is the record of a walk taken for pleasure. But one gathers that Ritschl early yielded to that habit of neglecting exercise which reached an evil perfection when he spent holiday months at Göttingen working in his garden. The bill came in promptly. Before the end of the Bonn period, "obstinate sleeplessness" had begun.

The greatest losses of these years were the death of his father in 1858 and of his mother in 1861. Albrecht was present at the Bishop's death-bed, but not when his mother passed away. The parents had sympathised warmly in their son's professional disappointments. The careful father had had a copy of the *Early Catholic Church* (ed. 1, 1850) presented to King Friedrich Wilhelm. It made the author smile to see how splendidly the binder gilded it, after he had learned that it was meant for a great Personage. When

a gracious acknowledgment came, complimenting both father and son, the Bishop formally thanked his son for putting him in the way of such praise.

Between the two sad dates fell the happy event of marriage.[1] The bride was Ida Rehbeck (or "Roebuck"), daughter of a late pastor, and sister-in-law to Pastor Edward Steitz of Frankfort-on-the-Main, who had become and who remained Ritschl's warm friend and theological confidant; vol. i. of the *Justification* is dedicated to him. A long day in the woods with Steitz and Ida made Ritschl sure of his own heart. The son prints many of his parents' love letters. They range over all the serious themes of Ritschl's thought and teaching. When opinions differ, the lady tries gallantly to stand up for her beliefs, but she is borne down partly by argument and partly by authority. "Ritschl hated wedding journeys," so, one day after the marriage proper—the religious in contrast with the civil ceremony—they took the steamboat for Bonn. Unfortunately the day was wet, and "the crowded cabin tested their powers of endurance." It was no true omen. The marriage was thoroughly happy. All that we are shown of Ritschl as husband and father redounds to his honour. He was left a widower within ten years, but remained devoted to the beloved memory. His half-sister and, after her death, another lady housekeeper cared for his home.

With his promotion to Göttingen in 1864 [2] begins the last period of Ritschl's life. The university dates from the reign of our second George, who founded it as Elector of Hanover. Indeed it is named after him (German fashion) "Georgia Augusta." In 1864, political conditions in Han-

[1] There is a veiled reference to some other unsuccessful courtship (1856).

[2] Ritschl is believed to have preached for the last time in 1863. It was in a country church; the text, Rom. ii. 4.

over were strained.[1] Church politics also had a colour of their own. Coming from a "united" church into the undiluted Lutheranism of Hanover, Ritschl is required to give specific assurances of loyalty to the Lutheran faith, and does so cordially. It is a great event for him when Prussia annexes Hanover. The same minister of worship is in office—von Mühler—who in former years had seemed cold, perhaps hostile, towards Ritschl; but renewed relations proved pleasanter. Ritschl, of course, was Prussian to the core. He declares that the stiff confessional Lutheranism of many in the Hanoverian state and university is a cover for "Guelphic" hostility to the new government. A few vacancies, a few fresh appointments, and the situation in *Georgia Augusta* changes in favour of the Prussians. It was put about in certain quarters that Ritschl had great influence with a subsequent minister of worship, Falk, Bismarck's instrument in the *Kulturkampf;* but the biographer assures us this was a delusion. He also repels the charge that Ritschl pulled strings in favour of his personal adherents, summarising the few and slight efforts he was at any time induced to make on behalf of pupils. Quotations prove, indeed, that Ritschl was resolutely anti-partisan. He even chose an orthodox divine to prepare his eldest son for confirmation.

A still greater event than the campaign of Sadowa was the triumph over France. One regrets to find Ritschl sharing the tone of high moral superiority which was so common in Germany, and so embittering.

A series of invitations, to leave Göttingen for other universities, helps to prove Ritschl's popularity. There is, indeed, some disappointment among his friends that he

[1] We have said nothing hitherto of Ritschl's relation to politics; of his mild liberalism; of his presence as a spectator at sittings of the short-lived Frankfort parliament of 1848, the year of revolutions.

is not called to a vacancy at Heidelberg. He is, however, warmly pressed to transfer himself, after the peace, to the remodelled university of Strassburg. But he declines to move; and on four separate occasions, when invited to Berlin, he rejects the offer. For he regarded himself as a "small city man." He took a similar view of Lotze, a colleague at Göttingen whom he greatly valued, and who exercised much influence on his thinking. When Lotze was tempted away to Berlin, Ritschl judged that he had made a serious mistake. It may have been so; certainly Lotze did not long survive his change of sphere. Later (1877) we are told how Ritschl was placed first and Pfleiderer third on a list of names eligible for a vacancy at Tübingen. It was a time of keen controversy. The authorities thought safest to make an appointment which could not be called partisan.

The great events of this period are of course books. First came the *magnum opus:* vol. i. in 1870; vols. ii. and iii. in 1874; later editions of one or other in 1882, 1883, 1888, 1889. Shorter works dealt with *Christian Perfection* (1874; 2nd slightly revised ed. 1889); with Schleiermacher's *Reden* "and their effects on German Protestantism"—here the son takes a different view from his distinguished father. *Instruction in the Christian Religion* is a valuable summary for students, if an unsatisfactory school-book (1875; 2nd and 3rd edd. revised 1881 and 1886; posthumous edd. of 1890 and 1895 are reprints of ed. 3). A short discussion of *Conscience* (1876) removes it from the place of honour it had held in some of Ritschl's courses of dogmatic lectures as the religious faculty proper, and treats it—under the influence of his friend Gass—as derivative, not primary. *Theologie und Metaphysik* (1881; 2nd somewhat revised ed. 1887) shows the increased attention to philsophical prolegomena which we also encounter in later editions of *Justification*, vol. iii.

About this time Ritschl felt it needful to concentrate upon some other great theme. He therefore devoted several years to the history of a phenomonon which he greatly disliked—*Pietism* (vol. i., 1880 ; vol. ii., 1884 ; vol. iii., 1886). He admits to a correspondent that vol. i. turned out more than he had expected an *Anklageschrift*, or speech for the prosecution. The other volumes are very largely in the same key. Yet the work is laborious, thorough, well documented ; and the author never hesitates to praise —though he is skilled in making praise in one quarter reflect blame upon another. As with Tennyson and the *Idylls*, so with Ritschl and *Pietism*, one doubts whether engrossment in such a theme was the wisest disposal of time. The last production which we need name—the posthumous pamphlet on *Fides Implicita*—exhibits a return to Doctrine or History of Doctrine.

These busy and prosperous years at Göttingen greatly enlarged the number of Ritschl's friends. First may be mentioned Hermann Schultz, who left Göttingen just before Ritschl's arrival, but returned after some years of service at Basel and then at Strassburg to be a colleague and close intimate. Professor Otto Ritschl, in his perfectly respectful reference to Schultz, rather underrates the amount of theological sympathy which bound him and Ritschl together. It is quite true that the preface to Schultz's *Gottheit Christi* speaks of a religious sympathy which united the author not only to Ritschl but to men like Schleiermacher—whom Ritschl strongly criticises—or like Lipsius, with whom he had broken. The difference in viewing such men is one of temperament rather than of opinion. Religious sympathy is one thing, detailed theological agreement is another. In the detail of theology, Schultz was exceptionally near to Ritschl. There is a remarkable list of distinguished pupils—among others, Bender (who developed Ritschlianism

on radical lines, and gave up theology), Guthe, Robertson Smith, John S. Black, Duhm, Smend, Baethgen, Wellhausen, Bornemann, Loofs, Wrede, Baldensperger, Oskar Holtzmann, Simons, Gunkel, J. Weiss, Mirbt, Troeltsch, Bousset. Scholz, a Moravian, who became a disciple and made himself known by letters, is an interesting figure. For his benefit Ritschl softens as far as possible his wonted censures on Moravianism. Ultimately Scholz found it necessary to join the national Church. Kattenbusch and Wendt were Göttingen colleagues who adhered to the Ritschlian movement. Men not pupils nor colleagues on the staff who became enthusiastic supporters were Schürer, Harnack, and above all Herrmann.

If Ritschl's books moved his followers to enthusiasm, they evoked hostile criticism from the right and from the left; in the former case, Luthardt and Frank were leaders; in the latter, Pfleiderer and Lipsius. A second burst of hostility seems to have been partly at least due to the publication of a full statement of the new Christology in Schultz's *Gottheit Christi* (1881). The final break with Lipsius belongs to this period. Ritschl suspects Lipsius of jealousy; Diestel with difficulty makes peace. But Herrmann's polemic against Lipsius[1] sharpens the antagonism, and personal friendship goes to pieces. Theologically Lipsius, though a philosophical neo-Kantian, had reached results practically coincident with Pfleiderer's or Biedermann's.[2] Ritschl could not be expected to concur. But the two might have parted in peace.

This separation marks in a sense the rise of a Ritschlian school. Lipsius seemed to treat Herrmann as a mere underling, speaking or falling silent at his master's bidding.[3]

[1] In a Review article and in *die Religion* (1879), although the preface to the latter contains an apology for previous severity in language.

[2] The writer heard him say so in conversation (1881).

[3] In *Protestantische Kirchenzeitung*, 1877, quoted in Ritschl's *Life*, ii.p.309.

Ritschl was indignant at the suggestion, and Herrmann denied that he was the spokesman of any school.[1] One knows how British and American philosophers, profoundly influenced by Hegel, decline to be described as "Hegelians." A further unpleasantness appeared when Nippold, already mentioned as a pupil, insinuated that Ritschl pulled strings on behalf of those of his school. We can understand that there was a disposition to deny that such a school had any existence; yet one believes that Professor Otto Ritschl is only doing his duty as a historian when he records its "rise."

Though reluctant to be entangled in university business, Ritschl was highly capable of doing such service, and twice was called to the pro-Rectorate. On the first occasion the duty fell to him of pronouncing the Göttingen oration on the 400th anniversary of Luther's birth. His second pro-Rectorate was marked by a ball attended by a hundred and twenty guests; to this his family had instigated him. During the same term of office, as public orator on the university's 150th anniversary, he retorted on Catholicism the charge of responsibility for all revolutions. It created much amusement when a Roman Catholic critic treated Ritschl—one of the foremost living New Testament scholars—as a non-expert in exegesis, on no better grounds than that the calendar of the university did not include his name among the New Testament teachers.

Ritschl's health was disturbed from time to time. There was an attack of typhus in 1865, followed in 1866 by inflammation of the lungs; and the old enemy of sleeplessness gave much trouble. In 1883 Ritschl and Schultz had been favoured with anonymous letters from some pious persons at Hermannsburg, where Ludwig Harms earlier in the century carried on his vigorous labours on behalf of evange-

[1] *Die Religion, etc* (1879), pref. p. viii.

lical religion and orthodox Lutheranism. The letters intimated that several Christians had been praying God to convert the two Göttingen theologians, but if that "could not be" to stop their teaching. After this, when he felt worse than usual, Ritschl would remark, "The people at Hermannsburg are praying." The final break-up came rather rapidly in Ritschl's sixty-seventh year. His biographer gives us few details.

Calumny did not leave Ritschl alone even after death. The old lurid painting, in fancy's hues, of an infidel's deathbed was refurbished and made to apply to him; but his son assures us that neither sickness nor the approach of death interrupted Albrecht Ritschl's peace of soul. He had been no great admirer of Paul Gerhardt's celebrated passion hymn. Perhaps few of us realise that the hymn is based on Bernard of Clairvaux's meditations on the several limbs of the suffering Redeemer—a species of mediæval piety which is also extended to the Virgin Mother. Ritschl quoted against such hymns our Charles Kingsley, whom he did "greatly admire." Nevertheless, when he had reason to apprehend the approach of death, he instructed his son to repeat to him, very near the end, the last two verses of Gerhardt's poem.[1] Evidently he accepted as suitable for the dying a mode of religion which seemed to him undesirable in time of health. But, when death drew near, he was beyond the reach of any human voice, passing away peacefully March 20th, 1889.

The accepted portrait caused Ritschl great annoyance during the necessary sittings. The face recalls, *mutatis mutandis*, Carlyle's verdict on Macaulay's countenance:

[1] Beyschlag has put on record—I borrow from Schaff-Herzog—how, at Ullmann's request, these same two verses were actually recited to him during his last hours. One wonders whether the brusquely original Ritschl condescended to imitate Ullmann, or whether it was a pure coincidence.

"Well, anyone can see that you are an honest, good sort of fellow, made out of oatmeal!" Those who knew a Scotsman of great gifts in another department must still more certainly be reminded of a yacht builder, Will Fife, the second in the Fairlie dynasty of that name, who designed many masterpieces, from the "terrible *Fiona*" of the 'sixties to the miraculous *Annasona* of the 'eighties, and whose *Bloodhound* of the 'seventies still, as an aged cruiser, carries to victory the well-known colours of Lord Ailsa.

ROBERT MACKINTOSH.

INDEX.

PAGE

Rev. W. D. Allen, M.A.
Papias and the Gospels 83

Rev. Professor H. T. Andrews, D.D.
The Structure of the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel . 167

Rev. Professor B. W. Bacon, D.D.
Will the Son of Man find Faith on the Earth? . . 289
The Christ-Party in Corinth 399

Rev. Gerard Ball, B.A.
The Epistle to the Philippians: a Reply . . . 143

Rev. Arthur Carr, M.A.
Boldness in the Day of Judgment 211

Rev. A. A. Dauncey, M.A.
The Two Great Refusals 282

Rev. J. T. Dean, M.A.
A Plea for the Four Trumpets 72

Right Rev. J. W. Diggle, Bishop of Carlisle, D.D.
The Bible and War 538

Rev. Professor B. D. Eerdmans, D.D.
Pharisees and Sadducees 299

Rev. Principal A. E. Garvie, M.A., D.D.
Notes on the Fourth Gospel:
The Raising of Lazarus and its Result . . . 60
The Week before the Passion 68
The Upper Room 155
The Arrest, the Trials and the Crucifixion . . . 367
The Resurrection—the Appendix 445
Summary of the Argument. 499

Rev. Professor C. Van Gelderen, Ph.D.
Who was Nimrod? 274

Professor Rendel Harris, Litt.D.
Dr. Moffatt's New Translation of the New Testament . 523

Rev. Professor A. Van Hoonacker, D.D.
The Literary Origin of the Narrative of the Fall . . 481

PAGE

Rev. John A. Hutton, M.A.
The Sense of Sin in Great Literature :
1. Introductory 29
2. "Peer Gynt" 115
3. "La Morte" 258
4. The Redemption of our Solitude 330
5. Here and There 437

Rev. Maurice Jones, D.D.
Dr. Sanday and the Creeds 1
The Integrity of the Epistle to the Philippians . . 457

Rev. Professor Ed. König, D.D.
Old Testament and Babylonian Language . . . 97

Rev. Professor H. R. Mackintosh, D.Phil., D.D.
Studies in Christian Eschatology :
6. Future Judgment 47
7. Universal Restoration 128
8. Conditionalism 242
9. The Life Everlasting 315

Rev. Professor Robert Mackintosh, D.D.
The Life Story of Albrecht Ritschl 550

Rev. Alphonse Mingana, D.D.
A New Document on Clement of Rome, his Relations and his Interview with Simon Peter 227

Rev. Professor James Moffatt, D.D., Litt.D.
Exegetica 188
Literary Illustrations of the Book of Ecclesiasticus . 379
Literary Illustrations of Philippians 473

Rev. Professor D. Plooij, D.D.
The Work of St. Luke : A Historical Apology of Pauline Preaching before the Roman Court 511

Rev. E. B. Redlich, M.A.
Aristarchus 183

Rev. C. F. Russell, M.A.
The Second Commandment 178

Rev. Douglas S. Sharp, M.A., B.D.
Resemblances between the Discourses of Epictetus and the New Testament 415

Professor Alex. Souter, Litt.D.
Interpretation of certain New Testament Passages . . 94
The Freer (Washington) MS. of the Gospels . . . 350

Rev. Professor James Stalker, D.D.
The Religion of our Classics and the Classics of our Religion 385

Rev. Professor Newport J. D. White, D.D.
The Creed and Dr. Sanday 217

Rev. J. A. S. Wilson, M.A.
The Jerusalem Visits of Jesus 344

INDEX TO SUBJECTS.

PAGE

A New Document on Clement of Rome 227
Albrecht Ritschl, The Life Story of 550
Aristarchus 183
Babylonian Language, Old Testament and 97
Bible and War, The 538
Boldness in the Day of Judgment 211
Christ-Party in Corinth, The . . 399
Christian Eschatology, Studies in 47, 128, 242, 315
Classics of our Religion, The Religion of our Classics and the . 385
Clement of Rome, A New Document on 227
Corinth, The Christ-Party in . . 399
Creed and Dr. Sanday, The . . 217
Creeds, Dr. Sanday and the . . 1
Dr. Moffatt's New Translation of the New Testament 523
Ecclesiasticus, Literary Illustrations of the Book of. . . . 379
Epictetus and the New Testament, Resemblances between the Discourses of 415
Epistle to the Philippians: A Reply 143
Epistle to the Philippians, The Integrity of the 457
Eschatology, Studies in Christian 47, 128, 242, 315
Exegetica 188
Fall, The Literary Origin of the Narrative of the 481
Faith on the Earth? Will the Son of Man find 289
Fourth Gospel, Notes on the 60, 155, 367, 445, 499
Fourth Gospel, The Structure of the Prologue to the 167
Gospels, The Freer (Washington) MS. of the 350
Gospels, Papias and the . . . 83
Great Literature, The Sense of Sin in . . 29, 115, 258, 330, 437
Historical Apology of Pauline Preaching before the Roman Court, A 511
Integrity of the Epistle to the Philippians, The 457
Interpretation of Certain New Testament Passages, The . . 94
Jerusalem Visits of Jesus, The . 344
Judgment, Boldness in the Day of 21
Life Story of Albrecht Ritschl, The 550
Literary Illustrations of the Book of Ecclesiasticus 379
Literary Illustrations Philippians 473

PAGE

Literary Origin of the Narrative of the Fall, The 481
Luke, The Work of St.: A Historical Apology of Pauline Preaching before the Roman Court 511
New Testament, Dr. Moffatt's New Translation of the . . 523
New Testament, Resemblances between the Discourses of Epictetus and the. 415
New Testament Passages, Interpretation of Certain 94
Nimrod? Who was. 274
Notes on the Fourth Gospel 60, 155, 367, 445, 499
Old Testament and Babylonian Language 97
Papias and the Gospels . . . 83
Pharisees and Sadducees . . . 299
Philippians, Epistle to the: A Reply 143
Philippians, Epistle to the: The Integrity of the 457
Philippians, Literary Illustrations of 473
Plea for the Four Trumpets, A . 72
Prologue to the Fourth Gospel, Structure of the 167
Refusals, The Two Great . . . 282
Religion of our Classics and the Classics of our Religion, The . 385
Resemblances between the Discourses of Epictetus and the New Testament 415
Ritschl, The Life Story of Albrecht 550
Sadducees, Pharisees and . . . 299
Sanday, Dr., and the Creeds . . 1
Sanday, The Creed and Dr. . . 217
Second Commandment, The . . 178
Sense of Sin in Great Literature, The . . 29, 115, 258, 330, 437
St. Luke, The Work of: A Historical Apology of Pauline Preaching before the Roman Court 511
Studies in Christian Eschatology 47, 128, 242, 315
Visits of Jesus, The Jerusalem . 344
War, The Bible and 538
Who was Nimrod?. 274
Will the Son of Man find Faith on the Earth? 289
Work of St. Luke, The: A Historical Apology of Pauline Preaching before the Roman Court 511

INDEX TO TEXTS.

PAGE

Gen. ii.–iii. . . . 481
x. 8 . 274, 278, 280
x. 10. . . . 275
x. 25 . . . 279
xi. 16–26 . . 279
xxxi. 47. . . 210
Exod. xxxi. 18 101, 102, 111
xxxii. 16 101, 102, 111
Deut. x. 4. 101
xvii. 14–20 . 103

PAGE

Deut. xxvi. 5 . . 208
xxxi. 26 . . 104
Judges v. 17 . . . 202
1 Kings v. 15. . . 202
vi.–viii. . . 103
xviii. 37 . . 291

	PAGE
2 Kings iv. 42	22
xxii. 5	104
xxii. 8	103, 106, 108
xxiii. 29	207
1 Chron. xii. 13	196
xxiv. 12	196
xxv. 18	196
xxvii. 14	196
Ezra iv. 7	210
vi. 22	207
vii. 6	205
Nehem. viii. 8	204
Job xxxviii. 6	104
Ps. xlv. 2	111, 205
cxviii. 22	104
lxix. 22	377
Prov. xxv. 1	203
Isa. viii. 1	112
xxv. 8	327
xxviii. 11	194, 195
xxviii. 16	104
xxxiii. 19	195
xxxvi. 11	195
lvi. 1	289, 290
Jer. i. 3	195
xxxvi. 9, 22	113
lii. 5	195
Ezek. xxvi. 1	196
xl. 49	196
Micah v. 5	275, 280
Zech. i. 7	196
Matt. iv. 18–22	453
v. 21, 22	530
v. 39	188
ix. 11	300
ix. 14	300
ix. 18–26	60
x. 23	293
x. 40	161
xii. 2, 10	300
xiii. 24–30, 26–43, 47–50	293
xvi. 12	300
xix. 16–26	282
xxii. 16	300
xxiii. 5, 16, 23	300
xxiv. 14	293
xxv. 46.	135
xxvi. 12	300
xxvi. 17	414
xxvi. 53	296, 298
xxviii. 1–10	446
xxviii. 9	447
Mark i. 14	344, 345
i. 16–20.	453
iv. 26–29	293
v. 35–43	60
ix. 30	347
x. 1	347
x. 17–27	282
xi. 2–4	448
xiii. 10	293
xiii. 28	293
xiv. 2	367
Mark xiv. 3–9.	68
xiv. 13–14	448
xiv. 32–35	71
xiv. 44	370
xvi. 1–8.	446
xvi. 3	529
xvi. 9–20	88, 452
Luke v. 8	453
vii. 12	61
viii. 49–56	60
ix. 19–24	533
ix. 53	348
ix. 54	156
ix. 60	282
x. 1	348
x. 1–20	64
x. 4	189
x. 31–33	94
x. 39	159
xiv. 1	300
xviii. 1–8	289
xix. 33	94
xxii. 15–16	368
xxii. 48	370
xxiv. 1–11	446
xxiv. 21	189
xxiv. 33.	447
xxiv. 34.	454
xxiv. 41–43.	449
xxiv. 51.	15
John i. 18.	170
i. 35–51.	453
iii. 12	170
iii. 13	170
iii. 14	171
iii. 22	171
iii. 31	172
iv. 35	293
vi. 68	297
viii. 23	172
xi.	60
xi. 53	212
xii.	68
xii. 32	135
xiii.–xvii.	155
xv. 14, 15	214
xvi. 13	158
xvi. 20	212
xviii., xix.	367
xx.	445
xxi.	452
Acts i. 7	190
iii. 19–21	293
iv. 13	212
iv. 31	212
viii. 31	298
ix. 27	212
xiii. 46	212
xiv. 3	212
xv. 28	406
xvi. 9	186
xvi. 19	94
xix. 8	212
xix. 29	183, 186, 187
xx. 1–3	187
Acts xxi. 20–26	407
xxiii. 8	300
xxvi. 5	299
xxvii. 2	186
xxviii. 16	521
Rom. i. 4	247
v. 1.	527
v. 18	135
vii. 9	246
ix. 11	295
xi. 32	135, 136
xiv. 1	406
xv. 8	409
xv. 19	23
xvi. 23.	95
1 Cor. i. 12	399, 400
ii. 9, 10	317
iv. 6	404
v. 7	367
vii. 1, 25	409
viii. 8	410
ix. 6	406
xi. 2	410
xii. 3	405
xiii. 3	190
xv. 5	454
xv. 22	135
xv. 28	135
xv. 32	144
xv. 49	527
2 Cor. iii. 12	212
iv. 3	136
vi. 14–vii.	458
viii. 3	191
viii. 19.	186, 187
x. 7	415
x.–xiii.	458
Gal. ii. 1–10	402, 403
ii. 3–5	403
ii. 15–21	404
iv. 4	25
iv. 14.	409
vi. 11.	111
Eph. v. 1	410
v. 14	246
Phil. ii. 10.	135
iii. 2–iv. 9	463
Col. iv. 1	191
iv. 10, 11	184, 406
1 Thess. ii. 7–8	192
iv. 1.	466
2 Thess. i. 9	136
iii. 1.	466
1 Tim. i. 3	192
vi. 19	528
Philem. 24	184
Heb. iv. 16	215
xiii. 23	192
1 Pet. i. 12	528
1 John iv. 17	211, 215, 216
v. 6	376
v. 13	215
2 John 9	223
Rev. xxi. 4	327

Butler & Tanner, The Selwood Printing Works, Frome, and London.

GTU Library
3 2400 00276 5893

DEC 15 1967
ser.8
v.8
1914:2
Exploration
Ser 8
v.8
1914:2
CBPac